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The Reich Conference. [Presumably Parvus]

In all historical struggles, one must distinguish between the matter itself and the form in which the factual opposition is expressed. When the English made their revolution some 22 centuries ago, they marched to war in the guise of Old Testament patriarchs and bombarded one another more with Bible quotations than with shotgun bullets. Five-quarters of a century later, the French played out the contradictions of their great revolution in the guise of ancient Romans. The guise in which German Social Democracy became conscious of the great revolution of the World War was the dispute over party organization. Here, too, there is much quoting, and it was certainly one of the most dramatic scenes of the Reich Conference when the worthy Kautsky's triple cotillion crown as party pope fell from his head amidst great fanfare when it was demonstrated to him, the converted credit-sceptic, that he had made a grave error on August 4th, he declared, how he had demanded the Japanese socialists' approval of war credits during the Russo-Japanese War. Yes, but! And that came out correctly: yes, but in a violent interjection from Kautsky: "Yes, but I have never approved of granting war credits to the German government!" Indeed, can one be more "international"? The stormy excitement that took hold of the entire conference here—Kautsky's intimate friends remained silent in horror—demonstrated how this brand of "Marxism" was viewed. Rightly so, in 28/1 p. 2 ( 22) In his closing remarks, Scheidemann spoke of a debacle for Kautsky. A fate had been fulfilled. But as useful as it is when such explosions cause the theoretical ruins of the past to blow themselves up and thereby clear the way for the new, this only furthered one side of the reorientation, and indeed only the negative one. The positive side still hangs completely in the air. And in fact, almost nothing happened for it at the Reich Conference. This is not surprising after all. Before the consequences resulting from the decision of August 4 can be discussed, this decision itself must first be recognized. And that is what happened at the Reich Conference, and by a larger majority than might appear outwardly . For behind the 167 votes that approved Haase's motion in principle were a good portion of those comrades who, while unconditional supporters of the majority's policy, considered any decision by the conference impracticable for purely formal reasons . After deducting these votes, it turns out that the opposition comprises a weak third of the Reich Conference, and this under circumstances that greatly benefit the minority. If, even under the current food situation, a full two-thirds of the

party support the policy of August 4, this proves that this majority is indeed almost unshaken. Of course, there is something that could shatter it too and help the opposition to victory. And that would be if the party did not understand the Reich Conference's decision and continued to hesitate to draw the consequences that naturally follow from the situation; for in itself this decision is purely negative; it initially means nothing other than the defense against oppositional attacks. The resolution of the Reich Conference will only acquire content and life when it becomes the basis for new political thinking. And in this respect, the prospects are certainly bleak enough. p. 3 ( 23) The Reich Conference. 3 It cannot be denied that the tactical behavior of the majority itself stands in the way of such a political reorientation. By incessantly repeating the empty slogan with which the break with the past was papered over on August 4th: we are making true what we have always said, the majority is making it extraordinarily difficult for its own supporters to grasp the true significance of August 4th. According to this theory, not a word further needs to be said about this day. It is just as meaningful or meaningless as any indifferent day of an indifferent year, and nothing is as wrong and as incomprehensible as the grandiose nature that the opposition, as well as the entire bourgeois world, has made of it. Herein lies the decisive weakness of the majority, as well as the decisive strength of the minority. No one, and least of all political parties, can permanently contradict the reality of the facts. On August 4, however, things were still the other way around. At that time, that dangerously dazzling word facilitated the decision of the hour in which Social Democracy entered a new phase of its development, and it certainly contributed significantly to making the majority of party members feel at peace, even inwardly, not to say theoretically, with the fact that the credit had been granted. There is, of course, no doubt that the creators of this word created and used it with optima fide in mind, but it has always been the case that new decisions were most easily accepted when it could be proven that they were neither new nor decisive. It is well known that the fundamental principle of universal conscription was implemented in Prussia in this way, and much that was new and decisive in German Social Democracy had to be implemented in a similar way. Not only is the Prussian monarchy a conservative power, political parties are no less so, and the influence of tradition and authority is particularly strong in revolutionary parties, and the more so the deeper they are anchored in the life of the masses and thus in reality. 28/1* p. 4 ( 24) The Reich Conference. 4 Even if it undoubtedly strengthened the position of those who granted the credit on August 4th that their spokesmen unconsciously catered to the conservative instinct of the revolutionary masses and masked the greatest break that the

party had previously experienced in its development with the uninhibited phrase: we are making true what we have always said, this strengthening of their position was bound to lead to a weakening of their position if the spokesmen of the majority did not themselves become clear about the true meaning of August 4th in the meantime. But that did not happen. So the disaster took its course. Not the majority, but the minority "spoke out what was" and denounced the approval of the credit as a break with tradition. However, it drew completely incorrect conclusions from this correct insight, seeking to lead the party back to the historically transcended times of the pre-August period. But even in this historical distortion, speaking out about what is proved to be the most powerful political tool, to which even the great Napoleon owed a large part of his successes. The majority, however, which had historical law completely on its side, seriously endangered the favorable situation of its position through "political narrow-mindedness," as Lassalle denounced the concealment and concealment of what is. We have already pointed out that little was achieved on the positive side of the political reorientation at the Reich Conference. The papers dealt with the World War in the form of an organizational dispute. From the standpoint of the opposition, this was understandable. It finds itself in sharp contrast to historical development, and since it therefore cannot bring the living forces of the present and future into play for itself, it could only support its cause with arguments from the past. For such a cause, however, the formally astute but totally unhistorical dialectician Haase was the obvious advocate. In the papers of the two majority speakers, however, Scheidemann and Ebert, the lack of historical perspective became a dangerous vulnerability and robbed p. 5 ( 25) the two speakers just presented their most important and decisive arguments. Thus, the great "historic decision" almost took on the form of a trivial lawsuit. But this was ultimately no accident and did not depend on the goodwill of individuals. This is simply the path, under the given circumstances, on which the German working class is proceeding in its difficult process of coming to terms with itself and its historical situation. What matters now is drawing conclusions; for development does not stand still.

MAX COHEN, Reuss, M. d. R.: It England and Russia. (Some Historical Notes on Present Questions.) It is perhaps not quite as useless as it might seem at first glance to recall that England and Russia have already acted in fairly close political union for a time in modern history. Karl Marx, as is well known, repeatedly pointed to the counter-revolutionary role that England played in Europe at the end of the 1840s by raising the considerable sums of money

without which it It would have been impossible for Russia to act as the executioner of the freedom movement in Europe. This activity found expression at that time, among other things, in the surrender of German Schleswig-Holstein to Danish foreign rule, for which, as the London Protocol of 1852 proves, England and Russia bore the main responsibility. The friendly relationship between the two states continued even in the early 1850s. In 1850, Nesselrode wrote to Prince Vorontsov:1 See "Karl Marx on the Origin of Russian Supremacy" by N. Ryazanoff (Supplementary Books to the "New Age"). p. 6 ( 26) 6 England and Russia. "We recently received a new, brilliant proof of the sympathy now felt in England toward Russia. This proof is the reception our loan found, notwithstanding Cobden, Peace & Co., as the Morning Chronicle wittily calls the leader of the Free Traders. Imagine, the subscription reached the amount of 16 million pounds sterling. Let it now be said that England no longer loves Russia." At the end of 1852 and the beginning of 1853, relations between the two countries were such that Russia seriously believed that, in concert and with Great Britain's consent, it would be possible to divide Turkey and incorporate Constantinople into the Russian Empire. The then Russian Emperor, Nicholas I, tried in various discussions to prove to the English ambassador, Sir George Hamilton Seymour, that this division was in the common interest of both countries. This, however, was the point that could not withstand the strain of the Anglo-Russian friendship and, when the Crimean War broke out a few years later, led to the participation of England and France in this war, on the side of Turkey, against Russia. Even today, one may legitimately doubt whether England would truly give its blessing to a Russian seizure of Constantinople. Even if one does not immediately believe the report reported by some German newspapers. If one claims that England did not seek Romania's participation in the World War because it absolutely did not desire the renewed possibility of a march on Constantinople, then one may assume that London and Petersburg are not of one mind when it comes to the Dardanelles. The march of the Russians and Romanians to Constantinople will certainly have its good ways, and the successes of the Bulgarian-German Dobrudja Army may have somewhat dampened Russia's certainly not particularly strong hopes for Constantinople. Unless all signs are deceiving, Romania's intervention will not help the Russians enter Constantinople, which, as we hope and are convinced, is the capital of a constantly strengthening Turkey allied with the German Empire. This aside, however, the view held by many experts, despite all assurances to the contrary, has much to be said for the view that the Gallipoli Expedition, initiated by England but ultimately failed, was intended to place England's heavy hand

on Constantinople rather than to hand it over to the Russians. But precisely this circumstance suggests raising the question of whether there is no possibility of taking into account Russia's understandable desire for free passage through the Dardanelles. The Quadrilateral Alliance will oppose insurmountable resistance to Russia's desired solution of possessing Constantinople, not only in this war but also later on. But wouldn't a compromise solution be conceivable here? Couldn't a strengthened Turkey, closely allied with Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Bulgaria, open the Dardanelles to the Russians, in whose closure only England had previously had a significant interest against Russia? It is very likely that England will continue to maintain this position even after the war. which it has never really given up, and in this war only apparently. I already pointed out in the first August issue of this year's "Sozialistische Monatshefte" that Germany has no reason whatsoever to permanently deny itself to the Russian wish in the English interest. Everyone in Germany wishes for a tolerable relationship with Russia in the future. Wouldn't this be a way to prepare for it without Germany and its allies suffering any harm? - Even if the community of England and Russia has never been as close as during the current struggle between nations, it would nevertheless be a grave error to assume that this commonality would outlast the World War for any length of time. The decades-long antagonism between the two countries has, it is true, been bridged for the time being p. 8 ( 28) 8 England and Russia. through the fight against the mutual enemy Germany, however, in the midst of the war, it is already showing itself again in an area that has long been one of the most sensitive in the relations between England and Russia: in East Asia and China. By the end of the 1890s, the Anglo-Russian conflict of interests in East Asia had become so acute that Great Britain was seriously considering a military conflict with Russia. The Russian threat in East Asia preceded all other dangers at that time. It posed a significant threat to England's position in China, whose market London had already conceived of as a kind of English monopoly. Russia's advance in China, together with the never-ending fear of one day having to defend India against the Russians, was one of the main reasons that led England to seek good relations with the German Empire, for a Russo-German war would have been the best way to relieve England's pressure in East Asia. It is well known that Germany, at one time, rightly refused to help the British out of the fire, and that England then found in Japan a helper who fought England's battles against Russia in the Russo-Japanese War. Even today, it may not be without interest to note that Japan, after its work was done, found no support from England in pushing through Russian war reparations. On the contrary, grateful England, in conjunction

with the United States of America, played a significant role in thwarting the payment of war reparations to Japan. For Japan's financial weakness was the chain by which Great Britain intended to keep its loyal ally as dependent on it as possible. The current World War has thrown a wrench into this calculation, and it is no mean joke that the same war that brought Japan financial liberation from England also offered the opportunity, united with Russia, to barricade the East Asian-Chinese door against the English more firmly than England had reason to fear twenty years ago, in the days of its worst Chinese anxieties. For this, above all, is the purpose of the recently announced Russo-Japanese Treaty of Alliance. Japan's latest demands on China leave no doubt that all of China is to be made into a Japanese-Russian sphere of interest. Even though this policy cannot be a matter of indifference to Germany, it is clearly directed primarily against Great Britain, which, despite its friendship with Japan and Russia, is threatened precisely where, at the turn of the century, it still succeeded in playing one off against the other. Even if the future course of historical development need not follow the patterns of the past, Germany would do well not to lose sight of either the Nearer or Farther Asian problems. If, on top of that, one considers the strained relationship between the United States of America, England's most loyal friend, and Japan, one must admit that storm clouds are beginning to appear in the Far East, and German interests most urgently require that their development be closely monitored, even in the turmoil of the World War. LUDWIG QUESSEL, M. d. R.: Romania and Italy 1870 and 1914. Five years ago, when the Austrian Foreign Minister had once again praised Romania's correct relations with the Central Powers, a Budapest newspaper retorted that in this country, which supposedly enjoyed friendly relations with Austria-Hungary, the most shameless irredentism was in fact being taught. On maps hanging on the walls of all Romanian schoolhouses, Hungary had been robbed of 180,000 square kilometers, so that Romania extended into the zone of the Hungarian capital. p. 10 ( 30) 10 Romania and Italy 1870 and 1914. Romania's true feelings toward Hungary, the newspaper believed, could be better seen from this than from the pronouncements of its diplomats. Romania's relationship with Germany was less clear than with Austria-Hungary. There was no outright hostility toward Germanness, but it was viewed with a cool, heartfelt attitude. Only among Romania's 270,000 German-speaking Jews was there some sympathy for Germany. However, since these Jews were treated by the Romanians as "foreigners" and lacked political rights, their influence on the government's stance could only be minimal. How Romanians themselves would behave in the event of a clash between Germany and France, however, was clear to anyone with an

understanding after the experiences of 1870. Although in 1870 all of Romania's state interests demanded friendly neutrality toward Germany, the entire Romanian people, to the extent that they participated in political life at all, declared themselves for France. The people's representatives warned the dynasty not to allow themselves to be guided by pro-German sentiments; The Romanian people would only tolerate French policies, since Romania and France were inextricably linked by racial ties. To maintain its position, the dynasty had to have the ministry declare: Where the Latin race fights, there lie our sympathies. and our most heartfelt feeling therefore guides France's flags." It is certain that the Romanians would have marched together with their Hungarian hereditary enemies against Germany in 1870 if the then still quite influential Austrian military and revenge party, contrary to the will of the Austro-Hungarian peoples, had been able to push through an armed intervention in favor of France. Given this whole situation, one should always have expected that in a fight in which Germany stood against France and Hungary against Russia, Latin racial solidarity and the irredentist desires for Transylvania and Bukovina would lead the Romanians against the Central Powers. 99 p. 11 ( 31) Romania and Italy 1870 and 1914. 11 Just as little as the attitude of the Romanians, the events in Italy were to contribute to the friendship and alliance treaties that Germany and Austria-Hungary had concluded with Italy. As for Italy's relationship with Germany, this was actually only clouded by Germany's antagonism towards France. Territorial and economic rivalries did not exist between Italy and Germany. In addition, Germany could claim to have saved Italy from ruin in 1866 after the devastating defeats at Custozza and Lissa, and, moreover, to have provided Italy with a large territorial gain. All this, of course, would not have prevented the Italian people and government from rushing to the aid of the French in 1870, if the lightning strikes at Wörth and Weissenburg had not struck them with utter fear. Italy's feelings for Germany in 1870 are sufficiently evident from the fact that the German troops were opposed by Italian troops under Garibaldi, whose departure from home the Italian government could easily have prevented. After 1870, however, the annexation of Tunis, which the Italians claimed for themselves, a certain tension arose between the two Latin peoples. However, this could not eliminate the fact that the Italians also viewed France's enemy as their enemy. For Germany, there was no other way to the hearts of the Italian people than through Paris. The relationship between Austria and Italy was quite different. There was no antagonism between Austria and France that could have repercussions for Italy. In this respect, a sincere rapprochement between Italy and Austria would have been possible. It is also certain that in 1870, Rome eagerly awaited an Austrian

intervention against Prussia so that they could join Austria in the war on France's behalf. What clouded Austria's relationship with Italy, however, was the rivalry over control of the Adriatic Sea and Italy's irredentist claim to South Tyrol and the p. 12 ( 32) 12 Romania and Italy 1870 and 1914 Austrian border countries on the Adriatic. It should be noted, however, that in both Romania and Italy in 1870, irredentist claims would have given way to the Latin feeling of solidarity with France if Austria-Hungary had decided to intervene. In that case, Romanians and Italians would have gone over to their hereditary enemies, the Hungarians and Austrians, with flying colors. In any case, it is certain that in 1870 and 1914 the position of the Italians and Romanians was quite uniform: where the Latin race fought, there were their sympathies and their most cordial agreement, guided by France's flag. In 1870, the Romanians had no opportunity at all to demonstrate their racial solidarity with the French through action, and the Italians had only a limited opportunity. In 1914, however, both peoples went over to the French camp, in breach of trust and treaty. First secretly, later openly. The fact that Romania's declaration of war on Austria-Hungary came a year later than Italy's does not indicate a prolonged vacillation between treaty loyalty and racial solidarity, but merely a consideration of the war situation in order to give the betrayal full effect. Describing Latin racial solidarity as the most important factor in Italian and Romanian politics is not intended to deny the power of irredentist motives. It should be noted, however, that in both 1870 and 1914, irredentist desires proved effective only to the extent that they could be reconciled with Latin racial solidarity. In this respect, nothing is more instructive for Germany than the turnaround made by the Italian irredentists in 1870. When the war against France broke out, nothing would have been more natural than for the so-called Italia irredenta, founded as an association in 1861 for the express purpose of liberating Nice from French rule and reuniting it with Italy, to now attempt to achieve its goal with German help. But there was no longer any talk of this when the war against France began. Italy's claim to Nice was immediately abandoned as soon as the first shot was fired on the border. With colors flying, the irredentist circles went over to the camp of the Italian friends of the French. We know that this unexpected flare-up of Latin racial solidarity among the Allies of 1866 was one of Bismarck's bitterest disappointments. However, the abandonment of the irredentist claim to Nice did not stop the activities of the Italian irredentists. When Italy realized that Austria would not exploit the war against France to take revenge against Prussia, the irredentists suddenly underwent a complete turn and turned furiously against Austria, claiming all Austrian territories with a partially Italian population, especially Trieste and

South Tyrol, as supposedly "unredeemed Italy" for Italy and demanding their separation from Austria for Italy's benefit through war and revolution. There was no shortage of subsequent attempts to tear "unredeemed Italy" away from Austria. On the occasion of the celebration of Trieste's 500th anniversary of Austria's accession in August 1882, the irredentists planned a revolutionary uprising of the Italian-speaking population of the Danube Monarchy. The signal for this was to be the assassination of Emperor Franz Joseph in Trieste. When he arrived in Trieste on August 17, a bomb attack was carried out, but it failed to achieve its goal and only resulted in the loss of one human life. The leader of the irredentists was Wilhelm Oberdank, who openly admitted that he had intended to assassinate the Emperor. As a result of this open declaration, he was elevated to the status of Italian national hero after his execution, and a monument to him was erected in Venice a few years before the outbreak of the First World War. On this occasion, not only were fiery speeches delivered against Austria, but irredentist writings calling for war against Austria were also distributed throughout the country. The mood of the people generally corresponded to the attitude of its statesmen. Thus, it happened that in 1880, at the funeral of the irredentist leader Avezzana, two ministers and an undersecretary of state held the cords of the bier. Anyone who was aware of this mood of the Italian people and its statesmen must have considered it very doubtful from the beginning of the war whether Italian interests, which, after Austria's willingness to cede extensive territory, really all spoke in favor of maintaining neutrality, would prevail over Latin racial solidarity. Viewed objectively, all state reason spoke in favor of Italy's persistence in neutrality. Without a fight, it was able to obtain a large portion of the Austrian territory it coveted. And not only that. Pushed deep into the Mediterranean, Italy had a pressing interest in gaining naval supremacy in the Mediterranean, which alone could guarantee the security of its coasts. For this, the circumstances now proved more favorable than ever before. After our victorious advance into Galicia and Poland, if Italy had remained neutral, the war on the continent would in all probability have been decided in our favor in the winter of 1915 or the spring of 1916, primarily through the complete defeat of Russia, which, with a loss of approximately 4 million men and a severe shortage of ammunition, would have been forced to conclude a separate peace, which would then have brought about peace with France. This would have put Italy in a position to almost effortlessly capture the most valuable acquisitions in and around the Mediterranean: Nice and Savoy, Corsica and Malta, Tunis and Cyprus. Gains at the expense of a defeated France were precisely what the Italian people detested. The thought of France's defeat made all of Italy tremble with fear.

It was not France's defeat, but its victory that they longed for with ardent longing. The people viewed the representatives of purely Italian interests as ruthless and hateful; they, opposed to Latin racial solidarity, lent their ears to Bülow's whisperings. Overnight they became the most hated men in Italy. They were willing to bleed for the victory of the Latin race; they went into battle with jubilation for it. That Italy and Romania, from the very first day of the war, just as in 1870, were on France's side, is certain. As early as the beginning of August, German visitors to northern Italy and the western Alps observed the alarming fact that Italy was completely denuding its western border militarily in order to deploy the newly freed troops against the Austrian border. The fact that France was able to withdraw its troops from the Italian border and deploy them on the Marne facilitated Joffre's success, which then aroused a delirium of joy among our Latin "allies." Romanian "neutrality" was just like Italy's. It revealed itself to us in the first year of the war in the complete blockade of grain exports and later in unprecedented customs difficulties and harassment regarding the export of other national products important to us. The troop buildup on the Hungarian border immediately after the outbreak of war forced the Austro-Hungarian military command to take countermeasures, diverting significant forces from the fight against Russia. The Russian border, however, remained free of troop concentrations because no one wanted to prevent the allies of the Latin race from deploying their full strength against the enemies of France, who were denounced in Bucharest as "enemies of Latin civilization" no less than in Rome. Irredentism certainly played an important role in Romania as well, but just as in Italy, only to the extent that it was compatible with Latin racial solidarity. The irredentists in Bucharest wanted nothing to do with the liberation of their Romanian brothers in Russia because the Russians were, after all, the dear allies of the Latin race. As easy as it would be to reproach our diplomacy for not sufficiently taking into account the power and strength of the Latin peoples' sense of solidarity, we would better refrain from doing so. p. 16 ( 36) 16 Romania and Italy 1870 and 1914. Social Democrats would have little right to do this, because it was precisely we who always sharply opposed those who counted on racial solidarity in the event of war. In this war, racial solidarity only appeared powerfully and purely among the Romans and Anglo-Saxons. Among the Germanic peoples, the most threatened race, solidarity is least noticeable. After all, the other Germanic peoples, struggling for their existence, are partly indifferent to Germanness, partly with barely concealed hostility, even though they have to wage the most heroic and just struggle that any people has ever had to endure. Nevertheless, it is not useless to recall that, for the sake of our Latin allies, we have repeatedly

refused our support to those peoples who have remained loyal to us in this war. When Italy, in 1911, When Turkey attacked to wrest its African provinces, we believed we should not stand in the way of our Latin ally. Likewise, Germany believed itself obligated by its alliance with Romania to support its claims in the Treaty of Bucharest. This loyalty to the treaty was rewarded with treason. While the central powers worked diplomatically for the interests of their Latin allies, the latter vied with each other in the passionate propaganda of a single idea that gave life to ever new associations and publications. This idea was: A basso l'Austria! The defeat of Austria, which was preached with growing passion in Italy and Romania, could only be the prelude to France's victory over Germany, which was to restore the former political and cultural predominance of the Latin race in Europe. Even before the war, our Latin allies worked on this task, perhaps even more ruthlessly than even our Latin enemies. Indeed, if one looks today at the recent Looking back twenty years of our foreign policy, one must say that world history has not boasted stranger allies than Romania and Italy. p. 17 ( 37) Scandinavianism in Wartime. 17 WILHELM JANSSON: Scandinavianism in Wartime. EVER SINCE the Scandinavian initiatives of academic youth around the middle of the last century had been weighed and found wanting, the idea of closer union seemed to have been dead for a while. The union struggles between Norway and Sweden did their part to drive the Nordic peoples further apart instead of forging them together. Early Scandinavianism had too much youthful enthusiasm and too little reality to achieve success. Only the socialist workers' movement would take the idea further at the end of the 1880s. But it had its special Tasks that lay more in the field of organization, and where it was active beyond that, it developed more pacifist-international than purely Scandinavian ideas. Nevertheless, its organizational alliance has promoted the Scandinavian idea. The most unmistakable proof of this is provided by the relations of the Scandinavian business organizations, which, although directed against the workers, nevertheless contain the idea of the unity of the North and put particularism aside. Capital itself often follows Scandinavian paths. Finance and commercial capital have, in some cases, been able to establish quite close Nordic relations. In the area of civil law, legislation has only recently taken a step forward through the preparation of a uniform family law, which, incidentally, has already been implemented in some parts. Interparliamentary conferences deal with important matters in the same direction, and although differences of opinion have recently emerged regarding social policy, This is based more on domestic political reasons than on any possible aversion to the idea itself. The World War has now forced the

governments to adopt the same line. The Epiphany Conference in Malmö was followed by the ministerial conferences in Copenhagen and Christiania. The actual decisions achieved by the latter may be little enough. But they do mean something more than courtesy visits. The conference that has just taken place in Christiania appears, due to the accompanying circumstances, to be considerably more important than the Copenhagen Conference. The situation in all three countries is by no means pleasant. Rather, they are increasingly beset by the measures of England, which is implementing its blockade with a robust conscience regarding the guaranteed rights of the neutrals. In addition, there are domestic political difficulties in Denmark and Sweden that are likely to weaken their power of resistance. The Danish The domestic political crisis is externally connected to pressure from America, which is using the opportunity for colonial territorial expansion and seeking to conceal the true nature of the robbery with a sum of money. The Danish government, in agreement with the Social Democrats, wanted to accept the American offer regarding the West Indies, but the machinations of the Christensen Frond prevented a smooth settlement of the matter. Mr. Christensen apparently found the opportunity suitable to regain control; the separation of the colonial islands from the motherland was intended to provide him with an election slogan with which to whip up national passions. And since the new constitution was to form the basis for the elections for the first time, the old wiseguy who once vouched for Alberti could hope for good results among the large new electorate. When the conference took place in Christiania, the crisis had not yet been resolved. In the meantime, a solution has been found, brought about under the pressure of new threats of war. For a week or more, the greatest unrest prevailed in the country. Unrest, a panic-like atmosphere had taken hold of the Copenhagen Stock Exchange, and stock prices fell by as much as 50 percent. Rumors circulated of English landing intentions on the Jutland coast and of dangers to the country's peace. An unscrupulous press, whose importance was, however, greatly overestimated in Germany, had been waging a furious campaign of hatred against Germany since the beginning of the war, and the whipped-up mood of its readers provided the best breeding ground for the panic-inducing rumors. The firm stance of the Danish Social Democrats, led by their central organ in Copenhagen, which was prudently and wisely managed in the difficult wartime situation, and the measures of the exceptionally talented statesmanlike Zahle Cabinet proved strong enough to tame the panic atmosphere. Even the cabinet's opponents ultimately learned from the affair that the current situation was not conducive to domestic political experiments. By including one representative each from the three other

parties, the cabinet formed by the Radical Party found a solution that will hopefully last until the end of the war. The Social Democrats entrusted their long-standing leader, Th. Stauning, with the task. It goes without saying that Stauning, as minister, is not a "Social Democrat on leave"; there is no inclination within Danish Social Democracy for such experiments. Its chairman remains its responsible advisor and leader, and he will not remain a minister for an hour longer than his party deems necessary in the country's interest. Sweden's situation at the time of the conference was hardly less serious. Here, too, there is an internal political crisis, which, however, dates back to February 1914, but was settled during the war by an explicit peace agreement. As the spokesman for Swedish Social Democracy, Branting assured the government of his confidence and support in maintaining neutrality soon after the outbreak of war, and this assurance was subsequently repeated several times in one form or another, most recently on May 17 of this year, when Steffens' Aaland interpellation forced a unanimous demonstration in the Riksdag. Of course, words and deeds are two different things with Branting. The longer the The longer the war lasted, the more he exposed himself on the side of Russia and the powers allied with it, and he did everything in his power to arouse suspicion of the government's policy of neutrality among the belligerent powers, whose interests he assiduously defended in the war. This dual position of Branting as "neutral" party leader and advocate of Entente interests was never revealed more clearly than in Sweden's last foreign policy crisis. Due to certain measures taken by the belligerents in the Baltic Sea, the Swedish government had seen fit to puncture a new shipping route on its coast at Falsterbo in order to secure access for Swedish ships from the Sound to the Baltic Sea and vice versa. To keep the war out of this shipping lane, it was mined and foreign ships were prohibited from using it. When the British wanted to bring their ships interned in Russian ports out of the Baltic Sea, this Swedish measure stood in their way. Branting launched a campaign against the government for favoring Germany (!), and the Entente governments responded with their well-known notes, the so-called "common friendly step," to which the Swedish government responded in a firm and dignified manner. Even before the Entente governments had assessed the Swedish response, Branting resumed his campaign, declaring the government's response on this point inadequate and the measure itself a one-sided disadvantage for the Entente! One cannot exactly claim that Sweden's position among the belligerents was made easier by this campaign by the Social Democratic leader. It weighs all the more seriously because new, threatening clouds are already appearing in the Swedish sky, which

time circumstances prohibit us from discussing here. The trade harassment of the three countries by England adds to these internal difficulties. They are equally severe whether one country submits to English demands, like Norway, or whether the other asserts its rights. sought to preserve, like Sweden. One could rather say that Sweden fared better than its western neighbor, for the firm stance of its government has in more than one case advised the Entente not to draw the bow too tightly. It was repeatedly encouraged by the attitude of Branting and his newspaper, who, following the example of the "great" Cretan, sought to steer his country's policy into the Entente's waters. According to the Malmö Agreement, the Scandinavian ministerial conferences are to meet as often as "circumstances require." There is no doubt that such circumstances justified the meeting in Christiania. The result was already reported in a previous issue of the "Glocken." It is directed against the belligerent encroachments on the shipping and trade of the three countries, proposes measures against commercial espionage, which England has excellently organized, and otherwise rejects peace mediation under the current circumstances. Swedish Prime Minister Hammarskjöld is a wise man and knows that he who comes uninvited leaves unthanked. The Entente has made it clear that it does not want peace and has, moreover, informed the neutral governments that it would regard peace mediation as an unfriendly act. Under these circumstances, the conference in Christiania had no choice but to reject the supporters of peace mediation in the three countries. Moreover, it would be mistaken to place too much hope in this Scandinavianism of the governments at this moment. Even before the conference convened, a newspaper close to the Norwegian government declared that the policy of the three states is being determined in each individual state, which was evidently intended to reassure England. The conferences can therefore only give certain guidelines; the treatment of questions that arise from case to case is left to each country according to its own interests. As things currently stand, not all of these interests are of a common nature. On some points they still diverge. p. 22 ( 42) 22 A Failed Action. JOHANN LEIMPETERS. A Failed Action. Editorial note: The following article has been in our hands for several weeks. We held it back to avoid even the shadow of suspicion that we were trying to disrupt a party action already underway. But now the petition movement initiated at the beginning of August seems to have come to a fairly general conclusion. We therefore retrospectively reproduce Leimpeter's article as a snapshot of the mood in Germany's largest industrial region, but we want to expressly state that we have received similar statements from a whole series of German districts, including Berlin.

[Translator Note: Parvus, is that you?] One should not construct the mood of the masses as something other than what it really is! This has often led to bitter disappointments. It goes without saying that the editorial staff does not adopt every phrase in Leimpeter's article, and likewise, that the mood of broad working-class circles described by the author should not be equated with the guidelines of socialist policy. While the deed of August 4, 1914, was enthusiastically acclaimed by the entire organized working class, and as determined as they are to adhere to this policy, the petition "for an early peace without annexations" was received with equal coldness, often with direct rejection. The war situation was and is not yet ripe for such an action ; many workers felt this, and the instigators of the petition should also recognize this today. As long as the war situation is still completely undecided, as long as no one can foresee or predict with certainty which way the scales of war will fall, it is not only useless but harmful to speak or petition for or against annexation. Annexation depends not only on willingness, but even more on ability, and the current war situation, coupled with the still-shrouded plans of the "neutral" states, do not allow us to predict the final outcome of the war with any degree of certainty. To argue about territorial distribution intentions at present, or to petition against such intentions, is not only idle, but just as misguided and premature as was the "demand of the hour." · p. 23 ( 43) A misguided action. 23 which was written more than a year ago by "clever" and "far-sighted" politicians. The "command of the hour" coincided roughly with Italy's declaration of war on Austria-Hungary and Turkey, rendering this act ridiculous, while the peace action initiated by our party was immediately buried under five new declarations of war! But even without the new declarations of war and without Romania's entry into the war, the action "for a peace without annexation" was misguided, equally harmful for our country and for our movement. The people are thus led to believe that the German government has it in its power to make peace, while in reality the war barometer is in London, not Berlin. From London, the moment will be determined when the insane genocide will end and peace can be made. However, a petition by German citizens "for a peace without annexations" does not make the slightest impression on London, which is why such a peace action does not shorten the war by a second. Not only is a false belief awakened, but hopes for a very early peace are nurtured that lack any real basis, and when these hopes are not fulfilled, setbacks naturally follow that hit our movement. However much the German people, and no less the people of France, Russia, Italy, etc.—long for peace, however much the German government and probably the other governments of the countries involved in the war—would

like to make peace, the war situation is not ripe for it; the basis for peace is lacking; the stakes are too high and are increasing with each passing day, and so the game must continue. It is childish to believe that this terrible struggle could be broken off in a draw, perhaps at the Kaiser's command. It may be, but no one knows. that it would be better for the future development of Europe if it ended without victors and vanquished; however, such an end is - - p. 24 ( 44) 24 A misguided action. - not possible. England, totally misjudged and criminally underestimated, will force a decision. Either the Entente or the Central Powers will be defeated, but the war will continue until the decision is reached, whether the German government wants it or not. And so it is like an avalanche: once set in motion, it runs incessantly to the abyss, sweeping away everything that opposes it. The demonstrations "for a peace without annexations" were intended to form a counterweight to the "annexations" in Germany, through whose activities the war would be prolonged. A claim that cannot be proven by any fact. On the contrary; an enemy who knows that even evil will come to him A man who, in the event of defeat, retains all his landed possessions intact, has only men to lose, is much less inclined to peace, and continues the cruel game even when all possibility of victory has already disappeared. If he knows that a pointless continuation of the war will also cost him land, he will demand peace much sooner. Anyone with even a halfway sane mind knows that old Europe will not rise again in its former form from the terrible melting pot into which the world catastrophe has thrown it, and that it will therefore not leave without "annexation." The statesmen of the Entente, confident of victory from the outset, have repeatedly informed the world which parts of the country they will take, while the governments of the Central Powers wisely do not reveal their cards until weapons have decided the outcome. Overcoming the enemy is the fundamental war aim of every belligerent, and as long as this aim is not achieved, the fighting continues, regardless of the wishes and grievances of individual groups behind the front. Whether the French Social Democrats, from the standpoint of principled Marxism, want to pocket a few more or fewer provinces, whether the Belgian Marxist and Royal Household Minister Vandervelde wants to divide all of Germany, or whether German Social Democrats and principled Marxists do not annex, but rather want to return all territories occupied by German troops without any compensation, p. 25 ( 45) A misguided action. 25 or whether a raging Englishman does not want to make peace until the German Kaiser is languishing on St. Helena: all these wishes have no influence or effect on the course of the war and its duration. First the decision, then the drawing up of accounts! -- In addition to the deceptive hopes awakened by the party's action, there is also a shameful

self-deception. By signing the petition, the impression is created that the Social Democratic workers of Germany are fundamentally opposed to any annexation. Nothing is more false than such an assumption, and it is high time to publicly counter this false impression in order to warn against further self-deception. I have ample opportunity every day to interact with our comrades in mines and steelworks, and almost all of them, without exception, are annexationists! Even comrades who rave about Liebknecht's policies and stand up for the minority do not want to surrender Belgium or any other occupied territory! In a victorious Germany, if annexations depended on a ballot of our party members, 90 percent would certainly vote for annexation, and those who returned from the field would probably vote in full. Whether this stance is principled and Marxist is of little concern to the workers. They say, "We bled and fought for it and we don't want it a second time." This is certainly not a political viewpoint, and it must not be decisive for our party's policy, but large sections of the working class simply think this way. If many of our comrades, despite being "convinced annexationists," signed the petition, it was out of discipline and in the belief that they were promoting peace without affecting the actual decision to go to war. Petitions and assembly resolutions do not serve peace; they do increase the areas of friction within the party, and all political opponents are forged into a closed phalanx against us; the party is politically isolated. The workers are quite unable to understand what the question of "annexations" means. p. 26 ( 46) 26 Ignaz Daszynski. has anything to do with socialism or Marxism, and why this question should be made a party question, thereby alienating the party from the nation as a whole. All the more so since Social Democrats and principled Marxists in hostile foreign countries represent the opposite standpoint and are unwilling to accommodate us and adopt the same position for their part. Instead of being accommodating, they have only ridicule and scorn for our peace efforts, considering them dishonest, ordered by the government, and a sign of Germany's weakness. The "Imperial Social Democrats" should beg defeated Germany for a favorable peace. Our comrades in hostile countries do not believe in any concessions on our part, nor do they want them; they do not want chivalry, but a fight to the decision, and the more magnanimous we show ourselves, the more violent they become. We cannot put a stop to the furious onslaught of the enemy with petitions; rather, it will devour us if we do not actively defend ourselves. Let us therefore cease all completely useless talk about the future shape of individual states until the weapons fall silent. Our voices are too weak to drown out the thunder of cannons; let us therefore save them for later times, when the cannons fall silent again! RICHARD BERNSTEIN: It was Ignaz

Daszyński. It was in the spring of 1897. For the first time, the new fifth Curia, the "general electorate," had elected representatives. Every Austrian over the age of 24 who had lived in the area for six months on the day the election was announced had the right to vote. The new curia elected seventy-two representatives throughout Austria. 353 representatives were sent by the large landowners, chambers of commerce, townspeople, and farmers. A tremendous election fever swept through the empire. In Vienna, where Lueger had not been in power for long and was therefore still firmly in power, the Social Democrats, to everyone's surprise and our youthful, furious pain, were defeated in all five constituencies. In the Alpine countries, we fared badly, except for Trento, Graz, and Trieste. But we won most of the mandates from the Sudetenland's industrial districts; German Bohemia, Prague, Pilsen, Kladno, and Brno were ours. But what astonished us most was also Lviv and Krakow, with their vast agricultural areas that should have crushed the cities. Soon after, in early summer, Parliament convened. Adler wasn't there, nor Pernerstorfer, nor Schuhmeier nor Ellenbogen. Lueger's "barrier stocks" had been moved in for our best people; he later called them "stone pillars." What could we possibly get from this house? The fifth Curia was thus condemned: a colossal fraud, a true Galician Badeni swindle. (The long-time Lviv governor, Count Kasimir Badeni, was Prime Minister.) - No sooner had the initial formalities been completed, no sooner had the 425 repeated their "I vow" in every imaginable language, than a flame blazed up on Franzensring, where the gleaming Athena had not yet stood before Hansen's Doric palace. The newly elected representative from Krakow, the Social Democrat Daszynski, had delivered a speech in which he demanded the immediate release of the farmer Thomas Szajer, who had been arrested during the Galician elections and since elected as a representative. He spoke about the Galician elections, and when, with his arm outstretched toward the Prime Minister, he shouted his famous "Blood flows in Galicia!" for the first time in the white-gold marble hall, this cry resounded throughout Austria, and everyone spoke of the previously unknown man. Certainly, the Galician elections had already found their critics before: Pernerstorfer and good old Dr. Kronawetter, the municipal councilor and democrat, and the Polish-radical Dr. Lewakowski, and long before that, Dr. Lueger, who ultimately introduced Galician electoral practices in Vienna himself. But what was all that compared to the blazing fire that was now supposed to spread light over Galicia, over Galicia, which the Viennese and western Austrians had previously known only as the land of origin of the hated Polish Jews (and about which, incidentally, only the war would have taught them more, hardly anything better). Parliament demanded Szajer's release, and Daszynski's

public success shone brightly. Szajer came to Vienna—a Polish clerical peasant who humbly kissed the hands of the counts, who, in all their splendor, addressed him with the familiar "du" in their native language. He later revealed himself to be a somewhat dubious figure, without ever having appeared as a speaker. But Daszynski was from then on the brilliant fighter for popular rights. There wasn't a single Galician debate in which he didn't smash the Prime Minister and the Polish Club to pieces. And how he did it! It was fascinating to hear the extremely slim, tall man with the swordsman's figure, the fine head, and the "carefully disheveled hair," as one parliamentary chronicler wrote, speak. A deep, rumbling voice that effortlessly fills any room and confidently escalates to trembling excitement and cutting edge; an elegant force of gesture and, at the same time, a constant struggle with the German language, which allows the Polish speaker, with the linguistic talent of the North Slavs, to always find just the right word, which flashes and sparkles through the air to strike his opponent in the heart. Who was he? The son of an Imperial and Royal District Commissioner (roughly deputy district administrator) in Eastern Galicia, supposedly of noble birth; somewhat expelled from high school, a private tutor, a Zurich student of all faculties, an agitator in Russian Poland, a prisoner of the Pultusk fortress, a socialist journalist, expelled from Prussia. A fighter against the slaughter in Galicia, constantly fighting against the administration and the courts, twenty times accused of incitement, just as often acquitted by the jurors, editor of a workers' newspaper in Krakow, participant in international congresses, a leader of the PPS—all this was gradually revealed. Daszynski, however, had long since stepped beyond the confines of Galician territory, speaking about national autonomy, about mining issues, about the petroleum coolies of Drohobycz, about the regime of Field Marshal Galgotzy in Przemysl, about the Compromise with Hungary, and against Czech Neo-Slavism. Each of his speeches was an event, and every person who came to the gallery asked their neighbor, the servant: "Please, which one Is that Daszynski?" - The storms of 1897 came. The 14 Social Democrats, long led by Daszynski, immediately joined in when the German nationalist obstruction directed against Badeni's language regulations decided to violently defend against the presidential attempts at rape. Among the first to be expelled with police assistance at the behest of the Armenopol Abrahamowicz and the Czech Kramarsch was Daszynski. "As the representative passed through the police cordon at the foot of the ramp, he was lifted onto the shoulders of strong workers and carried away in the direction of the Burgtheater." I can still see the words of the special edition before me. It was a heroic struggle that ultimately culminated in the fight for

universal suffrage, which in 1911 awarded Daszynski two mandates: one from the Krakow and one from an East Silesian miners' circle. He opted for the second option, which was less secure for the party than the Krakow option. When we still had all-Austrian party conferences, Daszynski often presented the parliamentary group report. I can still remember how, at the Wimberger in Vienna—it must have been around the turn of the century—old Bebel, whom we badgers naturally kept an eye on, shook with laughter when Daszynski wittily and not entirely without malice took a few "radical" critics to task. He told Resel, who was then without a mandate, that he hoped the next Graz election would heal Resel's "fundamental" pain. p. 30 ( 50) 30 Ignaz Daszynski. 1905 in October, party conference in the Faforiten workers' home. Right in the middle of it, the Tsar's October Manifesto strikes. What debate, agenda, and so on! General recess, executive committee meeting, reconvening; a manifesto to the peoples of Austria. Then they speak, one from each nation, Adler, rejuvenated by decades, the volcanic Soukup from Prague, a few more. And Daszynski Daszynski about the victory of the Russian Revolution. Rouget de l'Isle? Ah, Poland's soul roared. Tyrtaeus? And in the evening, 100,000 were on the Ring. And a few weeks later, Krone fought and government for the right to vote. A few years later, Daszynski was a guest at the Reichenberg Party Congress and spoke to thousands here in the Jizera Mountains about Tsarism, Pan-Slavism, and European democracy. As I was leaving, I heard an old man say—I reported it in the Vienna "Arbeiter-Zeitung" at the time—"Dos ho ich noch d'rlabn wulln." Is that "speaking," is it just giving a report? Over time, one learned from the "Soz. Monatshefte," but also from the furious attacks of the Luxemburg Group, that Daszynski was a fervent Polish patriot. A true social patriot; how could a Pole not be nationalistic! The attacks didn't move him; he later explained to me his opinion of the "kings in exile," whose organs several German party papers and a German-Austrian one occasionally became. That he made peace with the Polish Club during the war was only astonishing at first. Poland is a separate chapter in history. And there must be reasons why he separated from the Polish Club now. But Daszynski cannot evade the Austrian Parliament. Galicia belongs to Austria and therefore Daszynski belongs in the Austrian parliament. When it awakens again, it will not be able to do without him. The Krakow party executive only did the obvious thing when it called on Ignaz Daszynski to remain a member of parliament. p. 31 ( 51) German War Novels. 31 ENGELBERT PERNERSTORFER. German War Novels. It is very difficult to obtain magazines and newspapers from enemy countries. The outbursts of hatred these people indulge in against everything German are desolate. Voices of reason from enemy territory are a rare

occurrence. A large portion of our party press gives its readers as little information about this as possible. They do not want the German worker to be fully informed about the degree of hostility towards us of the enemy nations. Evidently, these papers fear that if these often insane statements by our enemies become known, the internationalism of the German working class could suffer. This fear is entirely unfounded. The German worker is not lacking in international sentiment. Rather, he lacks a dignified, proud national feeling to a degree that is downright shameful. It took this world war to bring natural national consciousness to the surface even among the German worker. But certain internationalist circles in Germany are already at work to disgust the German worker with healthy nationalism. They tell him that the English and French are, after all, particularly "democratic" peoples, seek to degrade all German conditions beyond all measure, and if possible even create the impression that Germany's war today is not a war of defense, but a war of conquest. They base their argument on isolated statements. Since these statements are in no way encouraged by the German government, they present themselves as if they originated from the most powerful circles in Germany. This type of "radical" politician, whose entire effort is to continue the "victorious" social democratic tactics of the pre-war period after the war, must, of course, most carefully conceal from the German worker the nature of the so- p. 32 ( 52) 32 German War Novels. widespread German war literature Quite apart from the fact that in the entire German-speaking world there is not a single newspaper as vile, lying, and chauvinistic as, for example, the "Matin" in Paris and the "Daily Mail" in London, to name just two, the rest of German war literature also proves that the German people, even in its literary representatives, are morally vastly superior to the enemy nations. We are a nation of self-criticism, and that is a good thing, but why shouldn't we calmly recognize and acknowledge our own worth when it is undeniable? Doesn't the constant kowtowing we make to all foreigners reflect that servility of the Germans so often reviled by Western democrats? Or doesn't the German worker feel that he, too, has his fair share of the moral superiority of the German people? I may well say that I am thoroughly familiar with German war literature. I have read several hundred war books and war pamphlets, and I may assume that nothing of any importance has escaped me. Since I read reports in the Berlin "Literary Echo" about French and English novels, which showed me that the same ugly and base spirit lives in this kind of literature as in the great war literature, I decided to read some German war novels. I approached them at random and took whatever came to hand. It is quite impossible that I would have stumbled upon just such books, almost all of which are free of the horrors of

French and English chauvinism. Among the new plays I am discussing here, there is only one that is filled with hatred. Here, hatred of England is preached. The novel is set 35 years after the war and aims to prove that the German and English spirits are so different, and the former inferior, that an inner understanding is impossible for all eternity. The novel 1 Hate. The novel of a German-Englishman from 1850. By Artur Landsberger. Munich. G. Müller. p. 33 ( 53) German War Novels. 33 is skillfully and excitingly written, but suffers greatly from improbabilities. Five novels deal with the beginning of the war. One is set in Belgium and describes the war against the guerrillas. It is written al fresco, full of vividness and a thrilling plot. But despite the temptation to degenerate into wild patriotism, a certain restraint is evident. The second[3]) describes a certain type of Swiss educational institute, run by Frenchmen and in which there are also German pupils. The national contrasts between the pupils are portrayed most happily. Girls from France, Germany, Austria, and Serbia are under the command of fanatical Frenchwomen. The Alsatian question plays a role. Much is sharply observed. The novel ends in Belgium, where the The novel's heroine, the daughter of a German officer and a Frenchified Alsatian woman who has defected from Germany, finds her way back home. The strong national differences are revealed; the author does not conceal her German convictions, but she never becomes rude to the enemy. The fourth and fifth[1]) are set in Russian Poland. The two novels belong together; the second continues the first. The plot is simple and exciting, the whole thing briskly invented, the observation of the country and its people sharp. However, there is not only a patriotic but also a decidedly chauvinistic streak running through everything, which invites contradiction. Despite this, and despite the often, but not consistently unsympathetic portrayal of the Polish characters, the novel is not a hate book. The author's excessive patriotism is more evident in his plans for conquest. For The Flag of the Walloons. By Nanny Lambrecht. Fleischel and Co. Father and Fatherland. By Countess Edith Salburg. Elischer. We Want to Ride to Russia. By Max Geissler. Fleischel and Co. Berlin. Leipzig. Berlin. The Power in Poland. By Max Geissler. Berlin. Fleischel and Co. 28/3 p. 34 ( 54) 34 German War Novels. Everything looks extremely simple to him: Germany will take over and Germanize Poland and Lithuania. At least his German heroes express this idea. That's just crazy, something like what the French think about Alsace-Lorraine. We don't really blame them for thinking and saying it. But when Germans express similar thoughts, we find it very repugnant. Above all, it offends our reason, not to mention our emotions. Such novels are read by the general public, especially women, who are not very politically educated and gullible . Such foolish ideas can take root in many minds. They can do no

further harm. But even these overly patriotic novels are in no way mean. The same can be said of the fifth novel in this group , although at one point an insult to the French people occurs. The author knows how to captivate and confidently carry out the inventive plot. She also possesses a respectable talent for vivid characterization. Another novel is set in the hinterland. It tells the story of a severely wounded young man who has lost a foot and an arm and is threatened with hopeless despair. Only through the influence of an older officer, seriously ill in the war and doomed to certain death, is he gradually restored to hope and led toward a new, active life. Neither he nor any other character in the novel utters a single inappropriate word against the enemy. Among the war novels can be counted a strange book, which has no connection whatsoever to the current war, but is, so to speak, a theoretical book. 5 On the Rhine, to the German Rhine. A Vosges Novel. Erika Grupe-Lörcher. Leipzig. Hesse and Becker. By Those Who Bleed for the Homeland. A Novel of a Soul. By Countess Edith Salburg. Dresden. Reißner. 7 Peter van Pier, the Prophet. Leipzig. Wolff. 71 p. 35 ( 55) German War Novels. 35 against war in general. In a fantastic way, a person is introduced who is, as it were, the principle of all evil and incites the people to war. Admittedly, the meaning of the book is somewhat distorted at the end, as this person, Peter van Pier (Vampier?), perishes miserably. This brief reflection concludes with a book whose author died suddenly in recent weeks. The personality of Mrs. Lily Braun is widely known. Her life story is quite unusual. She came to the party from aristocratic circles. Despite the disagreements that later arose between her and the party, one can safely say that she continued to work as a true socialist and died as such. She had an unusual literary talent. Her latest book is titled "Life Seeker." She herself was always a passionate seeker of life. Thus, the book reflects much of her own experiences and hardships. A young, talented, financially independent man of unusual birth, descended from an old noble family, searches for a great meaning in life. The emptiness and desolation of modern life yawns before him everywhere. It seems as if he finds life's meaning and happiness in love with women. This happiness, too, vanishes, and he finds himself where he stood before. Then the war breaks out, and now he finds, if not happiness, then at least the meaning of life, which is worth only as much as one is willing to give it. But isn't finding the meaning of life itself the highest happiness? He joyfully gives his life to his fatherland. What is the individual worth in comparison? Lily Braun, the gifted author, has proven herself a true poet through this book, and she would certainly have given us much more. beautiful book as a gift. I would like to take this opportunity to draw the publisher's attention to something of her book, "In the Shadow of the Titan." The first part is a kind of rescue of

Jerome, the King of Westphalia. This may raise some doubts as to whether the author is on the right path. * Life Seeker. Novel by Lily Braun. Munich. Langen. 28/3* p. 36 ( 56) 36 A Grave. The second part tells the story of her grandmother. Should the publisher decide to publish this part as a special book, it would be destined to be a popular book in the best sense of the word; indeed, it would be ranked among those books that may be considered the best of the German people. It is a magnificent book of lasting value. Editor's note: Three of the novels mentioned in this article by Pernerstorfer have previously been discussed in other contexts in the Glocke: Arthur Landsberger's "Haß" in No. 9 of the first year in Konrad Haenisch's "Literarische Rundschau"; Nanny Lamprecht's "Fahne der Wallonen" in No. 14 of the first year by Franz Diederich in his article "Weltkriegsromane"; Lily Braun's "Lebenssucher" in No. 22 of the second year in Edgar Steiger's obituary for the socialist fighter and poet. ADOLF KOESTER: A grave. It was on the Lorraine border saddle. A year ago. A sultry summer day. We lay on a trigonometric height. The ruins of Blamont trembled beside us in the white waves of mist shimmering above the earth. The grain of the second year of the war yellowed up and down the hills. Every now and then a hoarse shot broke the silence. Yonder on the French horizon lay the grave of Ludwig Frank. Sixteen kilometers ahead. At the entrance to Baccarat - on the left hand side of the white country road that leads from Blamont through the colorful hills at our feet into the Meurthe valley. The dark towers of Baccarat, its white houses, on which the sun shone, the small town crept timidly up from the long wave of height that evenly cut across the horizon. So close behind our brown trenches lies the grave. And so close to Germany. So midway between these two great peoples that Ludwig Frank loved until they crushed him between them. p. 37 ( 57) A grave. 37 Shortly before, south of Ypres, I had met people who told of those old battles before Baccarat. One claimed to have seen Frank lying there dead, his hands pressed to his face —"with such beautiful new yellow field boots." Others remembered his grave —right next to the country road, with many flowers on it and his name. A captain wanted to know that the French soldiers had taken good care of the grave after our retreat. I could see nothing of the entrance to the city— nothing of the grave, nothing of the flowers. And yet I thought I saw it, trembling in the sunburn, a catafalque of mourning, before which everything bows, growing higher and higher. This grave is already a legend. So far away are those hours in which this man's idealistic resolve grew. Even those hours of initial tension are already a legend. We are in our third year of fighting. The blood pumps of Verdun, Picardy, and Volhynia are working on Europe's peoples. No nation has lost heart. But for all, the war has become nothing

more than a bitter craft, a cruel reckoning. Into the holiday spirit and the intoxication of the first Amidst the world-historical dismay, sobriety and horror have crept in everywhere. "One of us must have seen the foundations" – these succinct words of Frank's reveal the true motives behind his controversial decision, which for him was not accidental, but of deep inner necessity. He did not belong to the ranks of the staggering people of the early days who forgot their past and their future. His decision arose from a feeling of historical obligation that can only be possessed by someone who, averse to all political games, affirms history even where it becomes tragically complicated. "One of us must have seen the foundations" – these words reveal the ultimate motives of Frank's resolution precisely; they do not lie in the intoxication of the moment, but are plucked from the future, the free future of his country, in which Ludwig Frank believed like no other. It has been lamented that today he is spoken of less often than his great p. 38 ( 58) 38 The Week. French fellow sufferers. That's not bad. But that Ludwig Frank is reduced to a mediocre outburst of emotion, which in his case arose from clear ethical awareness, that is bad. There was something demonic in his nature, which his friends know was not without physiological reasons. He, too, must have considered what so many of us wise men accused him of before and after his death: whether it wasn't more important that his brain be preserved for the country than that his fists protect it. But that's how the students spoke to Socrates, too. Socrates remained true to his inner voice. Frank wanted to see the foundations. The foundations of his German hope. The foundations that he had dreamed of being so very different. He saw them and died because of them. But today we still don't know whether we have anything to mourn him for. D Die Woche. October 6. Privy Councillor Körting's longing for a vote of no confidence in Bethmann-Hollweg, launched by the rock Bassermann in the very first autumn session of the Reichstag, remained unfulfilled. Unfulfilled, as did all the hopes of our Pan-German world conquerors for a riot in the Reich Parliament. Was the mood indeed not so explosive? Were there only bubbles of harmless gas gurgling from secret meetings and open press columns in the first months of September, or was the spark simply missing? In any case: instead of accelerating a catastrophe, Germany's savior and hope, namely the aforementioned national liberal Mr. Bassermann, endeavored to postpone it by offering courageous resistance to Ledebour's request that a meeting immediately follow the Chancellor's opening speech. Mr. Körting, together with Count Hoensbroech, Emil Kirdorf, Admiral von Knorr, Ernst Haeckel, and other like-minded individuals, is now attempting to hasten the catastrophe. Since this subterranean corona has so far proven ineffective, Bassermann ( p. 39 ( 59) Die Woche. 39) is sending

another confidential letter to other National Liberal and Conservative Reichstag deputies, filled with negative flattery for the Chancellor and urgently requesting the PT deputies to demand the dismissal of Mr. von Bethmann-Hollweg. The essential part of the contents of the "Berliner Tageblatt," whose confidential information was blown onto its editorial desk—much "confidential" information is now flying onto many editorial desks—is made public. One learns that, first of all, some demands are being made whose general justification cannot be denied. Such as: discussion of the political situation in the plenary session of the Reichstag and approval of the discussion of war aims. The further postulate, on the other hand, can count on less popular approval: "Ultimate ruthlessness towards the neutral states." The trade agreement with Switzerland has just been finalized, proving to be a moral victory for the Reich over the Entente. If Mr. Kirdorf's compatriots had had their way, then, on top of everything else pleasant, instead of a beneficial relationship with the Swiss Confederation, we would have an economic war with it. A goal that the most cunning businessmen of the Quadruple Alliance were most ardently striving to achieve. While the discord with the neutrals may certainly better feed some syndicates and others greedy for immeasurable war profits, it is not exactly conducive to the "perseverance" of the masses. This is incidental for the time being, although it remains a chapter of European self-preservation of no small importance in the march of events to come. Our confidential subversives, accustomed to thoroughness in pursuing their interests, support their demand for the removal of the Chancellor with the following motives: a) "Mr. von Bethmann-Hollweg proved himself before and during the war completely incapable of maintaining the political prestige of the German Empire and of effectively exploiting the military successes of our glorious army. b) Before the war, the Chancellor pursued a policy of the weakest concessions towards all our enemies, especially England, and thereby undermined the belief among the enemy aroused the impression that Germany would rather accept anything than take up the sword, and thus appeared neither internally nor externally strong enough to assert its right to world economic development. c) Mr. v. Bethmann-Hollweg himself declared to the British ambassador Goschen, on the day of the English declaration of war, p. 40 ( 60) 40 Die Woche., that his policy of understanding with England had collapsed. A man who has pursued such a wrong policy for years, a policy that led to World War instead of "understanding," is incapable of continuing to hold a leading position. He himself should have drawn the necessary conclusions from the collapse of his policy; he should have resigned. Blinded by himself, he did not do so. The Reichstag is there to hold up a public mirror to him. d) During the war, Mr.

von Bethmann-Hollweg committed error after error of the most serious kind: he uttered the immensely pernicious phrase "injustice" we had committed against Belgium through "violation of neutrality"; a phrase so untrue and so detrimental to Germany that it could only have come from the mouth of a lying enemy; despite our army's great victories, he continued his miserable peace policy of weakness to the greatest detriment of Germany. e) Mr. von Bethmann-Hollweg knew, neither before nor during the war, how things really stood. Who should succeed Bethmann? That is primarily a matter for the Kaiser. But one name comes to mind, especially with regard to England: Tirpitz. Junius Alter brought together reasons of this kind far more effectively for his own purposes. But their public discussion, as the Bundestag, with its sympathies for the Chancellor, has well sensed, will achieve anything but the ostracism of the man hated by the heavy industrialists and their professorial entourage. Tirpitz, some who know him better, also believe that he would shy away from accepting an inheritance that would force him to responsibly carry out what those irresponsible people consider him capable of. But: "Nothing is known for certain." The Reichstag's political committee meets behind closed doors. None of the flashes of inspiration that surely strike there in abundance can dispel the darkness over the abysses. And even the Chancellor's speech, which remained a monologue, did not distinguish between light and darkness. So, since we have no other choice, let us "hold out" until the debate after the commission negotiations. And wait to see whether the Reichstag will then become a light for us, and what kind of light. p. 41 ( 61) DIE GLOCKE 29th Issue 14 October 1916 2nd Year Reprint of all articles with detailed source information permitted by the Reichstag and secret diplomacy. GERMANY will come out of this war different from the way it went into it. Everyone has gradually become aware of this, and only in the spinning rooms of the Social Democratic Working Group does one still dream that after the war the party stocking will be continued to be knitted exactly where the stitches fell from the industrious hand on August 4, 1914. The government of Mr. v. Bethmann-Hollweg is clear about the upheavals that the war has brought about for Germany and will bring about even more. However, it seems less clear that these economic and social upheavals also have their inescapable political consequences. If it is the hallmark of a true statesman to recognize what is emerging and to freely grant what is necessary before it is taken away from him against his will, the Reich government has so far not exactly displayed a bubbling abundance of statesmanlike qualities. It has refrained from doing anything that would have been capable of reviving the spirits of the fighters both inside and out. A few glimmers of hope that occasionally sprouted, if not on the heights, then at

least in the valleys of Bethmann's eloquence, such as the phrase "free road for the capable," were a pear for thirst. Now the Reichstag itself has taken matters into its own hands and attempted to gain an elevated position of power in an area whose importance should not be underestimated. This 29/1 p. 42 ( 62) 42 Reichstag and Secret Diplomacy. foreign policy is the central issue, and it is highly characteristic that it was the bourgeois parties—the National Liberals, the Progressives, and the Center—who made a move here. The three motions introduced by the three parties in the Reichstag's main committee differed essentially only in that some wanted to establish a special committee, while others wanted the budget committee to have expanded influence. In the matter itself, however, they were completely agreed that the German people's representatives absolutely deserved greater influence in foreign policy. A nation of 70 million cannot and will not, as the National Liberal speaker expressed, blindly accept the decision about its fate from the hands of a few bureaucrats. Finally, the Center Party's motion was adopted: The Reichstag authorizes the Budget Commission to convene during the adjournment of the Reichstag to discuss matters of foreign policy and war. It is highly characteristic that the attitude of the Reich leadership was generally approving. Mr. von Jagow, who is said to be the head of foreign policy, declared that he did not see the motions as a vote of no confidence in himself, but even less could he see them as a special vote of confidence from the parties. For if the trust of even the bourgeois parties in him and his art were as great as it is small, or, better said, if Mr. von Jagow had even the slightest remnant of trust to lose from any party, the motions would certainly not have been passed, and the need for quasi-control of foreign policy would not have emerged so fundamentally and so simultaneously among all parties. After Romania joined the ranks of our enemies, the rumor of Mr. von Jagow's resignation spread quite spontaneously; for this total collapse of Jagow's Romania policy, which we had helped to expand its territorial power at the expense of Bulgaria by rigidly adhering to the Peace of Bucharest, and for which we had further procured a large loan through the mediation of the Discount Bank, which enabled it to complete its war preparations against us, the liquidation of this policy through Romania's entry into the war on the side of our enemies, demanded, in the opinion of public opinion, as a natural consequence the resignation of Mr. von Jagow. But the gentleman remained in office, and now the Reichstag took the lead. Only in this context can one properly assess and appreciate the statement by the Foreign Office—whose strongest point, as one speaker on the Commission pointedly remarked, is its amiability—that the Foreign Office does not see the three motions as a vote of no confidence

in itself. But apart from the personality of Mr. v. Jagow: The Reichstag's advance and the Reich leadership's elastic absorption of this thrust also have a symptomatic significance that should not be underestimated. The National Liberal speaker revealed himself to be a member of the retraining guild and openly admitted that he and many of his friends had come to a different conclusion in their assessment of the parliamentary system through the experiences of the war. The still very young French Republic, headed by a temporarily elected advocate, where the heads of the major administrative departments, including the Prime Minister, are laymen and again laymen, has so far been able to wage the war with an energy that almost no one would have believed it capable of before the war. The reason, of course, is not that the advocates and laymen are such outstanding geniuses—no one will want to claim that—but rather the fact that the war is proving unfortunate for France, yet at the same time continually awakens new hopes. In this situation, the war has become It has become a people's war, mobilizing national forces to the utmost and awakening in France a truly revolutionary energy no less than that of 1793. The great political dress rehearsal for France, as for other states, but especially for France, will only come after the war. Nevertheless, the image presented by belligerent France has awakened new insights in national-liberal minds and led to concrete political demands for Germany. These demands, further developed, lead to a control of foreign policy, which is essentially secret policy, or rather, secret diplomacy, and indeed represents a significant source of danger to world peace, as the World War has clearly demonstrated. Social Democracy has always demanded the abolition of secret diplomacy, without this This demand appears to have come one step closer to being met. A modest approach to fulfilling this demand now presents itself. The government should constantly consult on foreign affairs with members of the Reichstag, meaning it should be required to increasingly and more thoroughly lift the veil from the face of its secret diplomacy. What we have lacked in Germany, and especially in the German democracy, were experts and specialists in German foreign policy. In this respect, the French, or rather, the Frenchman Jaurès, and the English, have always been superior to us. Here, German Social Democracy still has a gap to close in the gradual development of a specialist in foreign policy, a gap that absolutely must not remain when the post-war years come when the Third International arises. Only through the joint cooperation of well-informed socialists from the major civilized countries will it be possible to turn the hitherto empty slogan of "elimination of secret diplomacy" into a meaningful reality. Only in this way is a gradual overcoming of the current situation conceivable, which is characterized by

the fact that millions of peoples have to accept their fate from the hands of a few bureaucrats. The history of war teaches that developments are moving in the direction of overcoming this situation. Precisely the more powerful and terrible the fate that the bureaucrats of diplomacy carry in their trembling hands, the more certain every war that is once ignited will result in a world conflagration that threatens entire nations with destruction or centuries of infirmity, the more the diplomats themselves feel the impossibility of maintaining the current system. And as unconditionally as the German people remain determined to use every ounce of their strength to defend their political integrity and their freedom of economic development, just as little is they willing to shape their future destinies to entrust a secret diplomacy over whose decisions he has no influence. HEINRICH CUNOW: THE FINANCIAL BATTLES. The liberal and conservative press are blowing victory fanfares. The great "giant bond success" is being proclaimed in all possible tones. The blaring is at times quite intrusive, but even those not inclined to overly loud fanfare music will have to admit that the result of the fifth war loan represents a decisive "financial victory," even if the advertising drums were beaten more zealously this time than before. Many may have had anxious doubts at the beginning of the subscription period as to whether the result of the fourth war loan would be achieved. Even if Romania's annexation to the Quadruple Alliance improved rather than worsened the war situation in the southeast, several changes have taken place in Germany's economic life since the spring that led one to expect a decline in participation. 4,728,712 people subscribed to the fourth war loan; even approaching this number again seemed quite hopeless. Today, the small middle class, unless it works for the army, is hardly in a position to subscribe for substantial amounts. The savings it does not necessarily need for its business operations have mostly already been invested in war bonds, and new capital is now flowing in only sparsely. The considerable cash flow that was generated in p. 46 ( 66) 46 financial battles. The fact that this crisis prevailed even in small business circles during the first year and a half of the war can be explained not only by the fact that initially large sections of the small business community were still able to continue their operations with ample profit, but also by the fact that they also had some stocks of raw materials and finished goods in stock, which they could sell at rising prices. They sold off their old stocks; and since they could not buy new goods for the sold-out goods, the money they earned went into the bank or savings bank and from there, since war bonds offered a higher interest rate, into the Reich Treasury. But this process of converting old stocks into money has almost ceased, and with it the mass participation of small business circles in the

bonds. On the other hand, the profits of other circles have, of course, increased further since the fourth bond issue. Primarily in agriculture. The conversion of part of the rural inventory, especially livestock, into money capital is still ongoing. In addition, the increasing price increase for rural produce offers agricultural businesses, large landowners, and farmers a favorable opportunity to accumulate new capital, as evidenced by the strong increase in deposits in rural savings banks. The relatively good autumn harvest has further increased this accumulation of capital. In addition, large-scale industry, even though individual branches of industry have since been brought to a standstill by the shortage of raw materials, is still pocketing high profits, particularly those involved in army supplies. And the Reich Finance Administration, it must be admitted, knows how to skillfully exploit the resulting accumulation of capital for its own purposes. By timely issuing new short-term treasury bills and treasury bonds, it repeatedly skims off a large portion of the newly accumulating capital in the periods between loans and makes this available to state credit before it is invested in other enterprises. This then presents a prospect for the p. 47 ( 67) Financial Battles. 47 If a new bond is issued, the issued Reich Treasury bills are taken into payment for the new bond values, in a sense exchanged for them, and thus the short-term floating debt that has since grown is transformed into a long-term funded national debt. Unfortunately, the total amount of short-term Reich Treasury notes and Reich Treasury bills in circulation cannot be determined, as the Reich Treasury Office has not published any information on this. However, that it must have reached its highest level since the beginning of the World War is clear from the fact that the Reichsbank's holdings of bills of exchange, discounted Treasury notes, etc., amounted to 10,759 million marks on September 30, the date on which payments on the fifth bond could begin. By the close of subscription, 54 billion marks had already been paid into the fifth bond, mostly in these Reich Treasury bills. This greater participation by large-scale industry, agriculture, and large corporations largely offset the lower participation of the small and medium-sized businesses, even though subscriptions from the agricultural population probably did not quite reach the level that many had expected. The loan funds were by no means more heavily involved in the Lombardization of securities this time than with the third and fourth war loans. For the first four bonds, these funds were only burdened with 876 million marks. This represents just under 22 percent of the total bond amount of 362 billion marks: a ratio that no one could have imagined possible when the loan funds were founded. Almost everyone underestimated Germany's economic strength. How modest the first war loan, raised in September 1914, for less than 4.48 billion marks, seems to us

today, and yet it was a tremendous surprise for many at the time. One could often hear in those days that Germany would not have been capable of a second, similar effort, and now, in the meantime, the first war loan has been followed by four more, and the total amount of all five loans has risen to over 47 billion marks – without the German economy collapsing and becoming a desolate heap of rubble, as some socialist economic theorists predicted at the time. Of course, it is nothing other than replacing one naive illusion with another to simply conclude from the fact that there is still considerable liquidity in Germany today that this will continue in the postwar period. The current fifth war loan will, however, hardly significantly reduce the abundance of money, since a large portion of the new bonds will not be paid for with banknotes or cash vouchers, but, as already mentioned, will simply be exchanged for short-term Reich Treasury notes. The feared money shortage will only occur when, after the conclusion of peace, the German economic machinery is switched back on, raw materials and foreign foodstuffs are brought back in, worn-out machinery is replaced, existing facilities are expanded, and working capital must be increased. One of the most necessary measures of the transitional economy will soon turn out to be the disposal of foreign securities held by Germans abroad to an even greater extent than before, and at the same time, as far as possible, the placement of a portion of the German bond assets there. - But we can leave this financial policy to the coming peacetime. For the time being, the new fifth loan has been raised, raised through our own efforts. The difficult defensive struggle in the East and West can continue. I wish the fifth loan to be the last in this tremendous international war. - It is characteristic of the English business world with what almost comical expectation the City of London circles have awaited the outcome of the German "financial battle" in recent weeks. Caught up in the traditional old- p. 49 ( 69) Financial Battles. 49 English notion that Germany may have certain qualities as a military power, but is otherwise economically and culturally quite inferior, the average Englishman does not understand why Germany has not yet collapsed. Therefore, quite a few of the honorable businessmen believed they could count on a debacle in the German Reich's financial system this time. They will now set their hopes back a few notches, but by no means abandon them. The conviction of their own personal worth, of the superiority of the Englishman, endowed by wise providence with all intellectual virtues, over the pitiable German, is far too deeply rooted in the English people's minds for them to openly acknowledge German economic power. Far more likely, those in the City offices will resign themselves to the remark that the whole thing is a shameless German bluff, behind which there are surely dirty

tricks. The extent to which traditional conceit still dominates the arch-English, regardless of whether they are workers, businessmen, or ministers, is amply demonstrated by the history of the two English war bonds. In typical arrogance, the English government believed it could obtain sufficient funds at 32 percent interest on the first loan in November 1914, a rate which, however, rose to approximately 4 percent when the initial rate was taken into account (95 percent if repaid within 14 years at par). After the subscription period had closed, the English press proudly reported that the requested sum of 350 million pounds sterling had been oversubscribed almost three times. England's financial strength and public spirit had thus once again proven themselves brilliantly. In fact, however, as the most recent financial report of the English Treasury reveals, despite all the behind-the-scenes machinations, only 62.7 million pounds of these bond assets passed into the possession of the people; 137.5 million pounds had to be converted up in the second loan, and approximately 148 million pounds initially remained in the banks as irredeemable. 50 ( 70) 50 financial battles. until the Treasury decided to relieve them of the burden in exchange for Treasury bills. The best part, however, is that, to conceal the failure, the official price lists of the London Stock Exchange until a few months ago estimated the total circulation of the 32 percent bond at approximately 214 million pounds sterling, thus simply including the amount redeemed by the Treasury in exchange for Treasury bills. These painful experiences do seem to have had some effect on the English financial giants; however, their overconfidence hardly suffered as a result. For the second bond in June 1915, an interest rate of 42 percent was granted, as is well known; but this time the issue was at par with a special interest subsidy that reduced it to 98 percent. According to the last financial report, the total amount deducted from this second war loan issued by England, including the exchange of older 2.5 percent bonds and the aforementioned 32 percent bonds, is said to be almost 900 million pounds sterling. To achieve this sum, however, the Treasury not only had to grant the holders of old government bonds all sorts of attractive conversion advantages, but also assured the subscribers that if future bond issues offered greater advantages, they would also participate. Apparently, the British Chancellor believed he could assume that England would never be in a position to pay more than 42 percent interest on its bonds. This promise has proven to be disastrously premature. A second loan under the same conditions soon proved impossible given the state of the English money market, but the Treasury could not offer a significantly higher interest rate, nor did it want to immediately induce the holders of the second loan to demand similar concessions. Given this embarrassment, the issue of new

secured securities was postponed from month to month, and new series of short-term Treasury notes of various kinds, including so-called Treasury Bills, Echequer Bonds, War Expeditore Bonds, War Saving Certificates, etc., were repeatedly issued on more favorable terms, so that their total amount had already swelled to approximately 1,386 million pounds sterling according to the Treasury statement of August of this year. In addition, attempts were made to temporarily cover the rising war costs through tax increases, American bonds, bank advances, etc. However, even this was no longer viable in the long run, and so the English Treasury was forced to issue 6 percent treasury bonds, so-called exchequer bonds, with a three-year term. Thus, in order to find buyers for its new bonds, the financially strong Albion had to offer approximately two-thirds of a percent more than the German Reich. This new bond type was probably chosen because in England, treasury bond issues are not considered bonds in the true sense of the word, and therefore the holders of the previous year's 42 percent bond have no legal claim to the benefits promised to them. They are thus being cheated by their government. France, too, is forced to issue a new, second, war bond, which this time is not advertised in advance as a grand "victory bond" like the first, but rather modestly as an "emprunt." Quite understandable, since although the first loan offered, among all sorts of other benefits, an actual interest rate of almost 534 percent, it only brought the French treasury a new sum of 6.37 billion francs. To avoid even worse results with their new appeal to French capitalists than with the so-called Victory Loan, the subscribers are again being granted a variety of advantages. The exchange of national defense bonds and debentures, as well as the 32 percent amortizable annuity, remains permitted. The issue price, however, is set this time at 8834 percent, 34 percent more than with the first loan. Only a small embellishment, since the interest will be paid as of August 16 of this year, so that the actual price is only 872 percent. Including the capital gains, p. 52 ( 72) 52 German Will. The interest rate will therefore again be 534 percent. How much the new loan will bring in so-called new money for the French treasury is, of course, difficult to predict. Even insightful French economists are unlikely to believe that, despite the higher interest rate, the amount of the fifth German war loan will be reached. Germany is also fighting its battles in the financial sphere. AUGUST WINNIG: German Will. We Germans are a young people. Are we faced with a secret that is still shrouded in the darkness of prehistory? Has the long sleep following the Peace of Westphalia kept us so young? We do not know, and in the end it is rather unimportant. The only great and significant fact is that we are a young people for whom the gates of the future are yet to open quite wide. If nothing else were to

testify to this, if the complete absorption of the entire people in its will to defend itself, if its adaptability, if its devoted patience in the face of the difficulties of daily life, if even our sentimental love and admiration for everything foreign were to count for nothing, then our optimism, our hope for the future would still remain a sure proof of the youthfulness of our people. That is really the greatest miracle in these strange times: the peoples of half the earth are storming against our borders, a gigantic superiority threatens on every side, all around us, enemies and neutrals alike, people are amazed that we have not yet been defeated and consider any other outcome to be absolutely impossible, and we ourselves, amidst this hostile rage, maintain an ever-renewing, indestructible confidence. And with such confidence we discuss today in detail and in depth what then p. 53 ( 73) German Will. 53 indeed, once the war is over, something must happen in this or that area. The war, certainly, lies like a nightmare on our senses, it never leaves our consciousness for an hour, but nevertheless we look beyond it and into a distant future for which we make and develop plans. And there is no fantasy in this; the discussions flow objectively, seriously, and calmly about sober, albeit significant, questions, and despite their objective calm, they are all pulsating with a strong urge to improve and to create freer paths for progress. Indeed, only a young people can do this, a people from whom, from the enigmatic depths of their inner life, flows the certainty of an indestructible strength and an invincible belief in a great future. Although the greatness of a nation does not depend exclusively on the forms in which its public and social life unfolds, political rights and material prosperity are nevertheless indispensable prerequisites for the development of national strength. It is therefore only natural that in discussions about the future development of our national life, the question of its liberal development takes undisputed priority. Every consideration leads us again and again to the realization that Germany will be all the more equal to its future tasks the more the idea of the national community finds expression in politics and administration, in the administration of justice and the economy. The national idea is all the stronger in a nation the more all sections of the people participate in the public and cultural life of the nation. From this insight, the well-known collection "The Workers in the New Germany," edited by Thimme and Legien, was born a year ago. Another book, related in some respects, was born from the same basic idea: the collection "Law, Administration, and Politics in the New Germany," for the publication of which two renowned lawyers, Dr. Heinemann of Berlin, and Dr. Bozi of Bielefeld, have joined forces. (Published by Ferdinand Enke, Stuttgart.) p. 54 ( 74) 54 German Will. Here, too, men from very different political and social spheres have

attempted, through individual contributions, to establish a set of reforms in specific areas as necessary and possible. Many of the essays collected in this book deal with specialist legal questions. Given their titles, many a non-lawyer might say to himself that they are of no interest to him. But precisely these deserve special attention, if only for the sake of bringing the world of law and its administration closer to the citizen, a world so foreign to many. Who would still want to view everything concerning law as the domain of experts, according to the old subservient view? After all, every single one of the specialist questions addressed in this book clashes at some point with the everyday life of the general public. Whether it is the previous training of administrative officials, which Professor Franz of the Technical University of Charlottenburg critically examines, whether it is the position of the judge in the administration of justice, which Higher Regional Court Judge Marx of Düsseldorf writes about, or the question of the lay element in the administration of justice, which is the subject of Wolfgang Heine: everywhere these legal questions touch on the significant interests of all citizens. This is, of course, more directly the case with the essays that deal with specific political and social questions, of which one by H. Dieck on administration and the workforce, a treatise by Adolf Cohen, the head of the Berlin metalworkers' organization, on the work record, and the contribution by Th. Leipart, the chairman of the woodworkers' association, on the future of the collective labor agreement deserve special attention. It is true that no reader who has already thought about the topics treated will put the book down without silently disagreeing here and there, and anyone who reads it carefully will come across a few passages in the book itself that are irreconcilable. But this can only offend those who think that if one comes out with a book together, it is absolutely necessary to do so in complete common ground- p. 55 ( 75) German Will. 55 ity of will. Such a presupposition lacks all reason simply because it is unfulfillable. What such attempts can only be about is obvious: one wants to make a common confession that one recognizes the necessity for far-reaching transformations of our political and social nature and is willing to cooperate in them. This confession is the basis of the entire book; even in those essays that limit themselves entirely to the treatment of a narrowly defined area or a single, isolated issue. This is the essential, but it is also the great thing. Anyone who wants to recognize and appreciate it as great must, of course, raise their head and look beyond our party-defined positions to the totality of our work for the well-being and advancement of our people. We neither want nor can give up or exchange these separate positions, which we occupy either by free choice or by social destiny, but we can and must be guided in our work by the one great

fundamental idea of serving the advancement of our people. But this, and in this respect the book forms a political watershed, is tied to the expansion of the legal and activity sphere of the masses of the people. Work unites! The closer the political and social community of a people, the more closely all its juices mingle with the organs of the whole, whose size and power grow in proportion as the participation of the masses in its functions increases. In the commitment to this idea lies the unifying, but at the same time the dividing line of future striving. What appears before us in this idea is not unrealistic fantasy; it is the ever-clearer realization that for all progressive circles of the people there is the possibility of common work. And the war has only presented us with a truth that had already been on the march, albeit with hesitant steps. 56 ( 76) 56 Th. Stauning to Vandervelde. was. Our great fortune is that it is recognized as such in such broad sections of the population. The participation and approval that books like those by Thimme and Legien and those by Bozi and Heinemann find are a guarantee of the winning power of the idea of common work for the elevation of the people, but they are also a decisive testimony to the youthfulness and resilience of our people, which, amidst the raging storms of war, is drawing up the guidelines for a great future with indestructible confidence. WILHELM JANSSON: Th. Stauning to Vandervelde. Editorial note: In July of this year, following an invitation from German party and trade union circles, several Danish and Swedish Social Democrats visited Germany, where they were also given the opportunity to explore Belgium. In addition to Brussels, they also visited Leuven, Antwerp, the industrial region of Mons, Namur, and Liège —all places where the war had raged. Their reports of what they saw in Belgium were in stark contrast to the horror stories spread by Entente propagandists in Scandinavia. This has earned them the sharpest attacks in the Entente press. Vandervelde, the Belgian minister, led a campaign against them and summarized his accusations in an "Open Letter" published in Humanité and the utterly reactionary "Berlinske Tidende" (Copenhagen). Since the Danish Social Democrats have no interest in this kind of party-fellowship, they refrained from responding in kind. However, their chairman, Th. Stauning, sent a letter to the Belgian minister through the usual channel, expressing the Danish Social Democrats' position on the international legal question of Belgium, which has been repeatedly reported, including in the German press, but also giving the attackers a reply that leaves nothing to be desired in terms of severity. "Die Glocke" received permission from Stauning, who is now, as is well known, a member of the Danish Ministry, to reproduce the letter in Germany. Following a publication in "Humanité," an excerpt was leaked to the press, turning Stauning's remarks into a fierce indictment

against Germany. The letter, thus reversed, actually reads: BEFORE Copenhagen, September 19, 1916. Mr. Emil Vandervelde, Belgian Minister. You recently addressed an "Open Letter" to the Social Democrats in the Scandinavian countries, on which occasion I would like to make a few remarks. I am not writing an "Open Letter," because I strongly disapprove of this form of correspondence between Social Democrats. It has never been the custom in Danish Social Democracy to supply weapons to our opponents to fight our own comrades, and I never noticed before that such a practice was common within the International. Although I often felt the urge to protest outrageous statements from the Social Democratic side during these unfortunate war years, my Social Democratic sense of brotherhood was stronger than this. In your letter, you attack some comrades from Sweden and Denmark because they also visited Belgium on their journey, and you base these attacks on some reports from the Wolff Telegram Bureau. I must therefore begin by providing you with a more solid foundation. Guided by good, socialist motives, the leadership of Danish Social Democracy and its press have considered it their duty since the outbreak of the war to maintain international ties and to contribute to rebuilding those that were severed by this terrible war. There were no disputes between us and our comrades in the other countries of the world 29/2 p. 58 ( 78) 58 Th. Stauning to Vandervelde. Nor did we seek to provoke them by placing the blame that belongs to those in power on the shoulders of our fraternal parties. In accordance with sound international socialist principles, we tried to pave the way for agreement between the socialist parties, and we tried as much as possible to prevent the disruption of the organizational work that had been carried out for many years. Since the first day of the war, we have attempted, through written correspondence, to maintain the fraternal connection between the parties, just as we have desired to obtain information for ourselves and for them through visits to the fraternal parties, and possibly thus to function as the missing link when everything else of this kind had been destroyed by the force of circumstances. The representatives of Denmark have visited the comrades in the Scandinavian countries, Switzerland, Holland, and Germany, but it is not our fault that these visits have not been extended further. Our Party Executive decided a year ago to continue this mediation work by sending representatives to England and France, but the English government authorities refused us passports, and the position of the French government authorities was exactly the same. Since then, I have continued our correspondence at all appropriate opportunities, and in particular, we have very energetically expressed the wish that the International Socialist Bureau would undertake mediation work, while at the same time we have firmly and

decisively distanced ourselves from the organizationally damaging fragmentation work that was staged at the instigation of the Italian and Swiss parties under the name "Zimmerwald Movement." The invitation to the trip, which aroused your indignation, was viewed by us as a means by which we could obtain information, but at the same time continue the aforementioned work. This invitation did not come from Governor General von Bissing, but rather from German party comrades who sit on the leadership of the trade unions and the Social Democratic Party, and it was accepted by comrades in all three Nordic countries; unfortunately, the Norwegian representative was prevented from participating in the trip due to unforeseen circumstances. - p. 59 ( 79) Th. Stauning to Vandervelde. 59 There is probably not a person in Denmark, and probably not in Sweden either, and especially not within the Social Democratic Party, who does not feel the warmest sympathy for the Belgian people, and especially for the Belgian proletariat. The men who took part in the trip expressed this sympathy most warmly, and did so again in public statements after their return. They naturally had no intention of mocking the Belgian people, nor did they give cause for justified discontent. They cannot be held responsible for Wolff's telegrams. It is possible that the traveling comrades did not see and hear everything that was of interest to them, but nevertheless it is not correct to claim that they were unable to become acquainted with the conditions in Belgium. They did not, as you write, "pass by the People's House (Maison du peuple) without entering," but rather they went there to gain impressions of life and conditions in Belgium through conversations with Belgian comrades. Reports of the destruction in Belgium were by no means unknown to them, and they had the opportunity to convince themselves of the horrors of the war through self-study. They were not blind to the misery the war had brought upon Belgium, and they left no less outraged than the rest of us about the injustice done to the country. It was capable comrades who undertook the trip, not scoundrels who accepted payment to change their convictions. In this case, it was the Social Democrats in Germany who sent the invitation; if such an invitation came from another source, it would also be accepted. We have only an interest in illuminating the effects of the war, but we have absolutely no desire to protect one party at the expense of another. And while I must now concern myself with this trip, I would like to point out that such visits have been made earlier during this war. Last year, representatives from Sweden, including some Social Democrats, visited England and France. They were probably guests of the government or the military authorities. I have read the reports of this trip, and as far as I could understand, a visit was also paid to the part of Germany occupied by French

troops. But no "Open Letter" was published on this occasion. I have noticed no indignation whatsoever about this trip, and yet the published travel accounts far surpass Wolff's telegrams. I have not even sensed such indignation on the part of Germany. German comrades who once mentioned this trip in a conversation expressed, on the contrary, their understanding that the French government should organize such a trip, and they found it quite understandable that the invited Swedes should participate. It is very obvious that the Swedish visit to France, etc., served as the model for the Scandinavian visit this year, and the circumstances under which this trip took place are most likely not very different. However, the essential difference here is that the latter trip was organized by party comrades for party comrades following several associated party conferences. We have no reason to doubt that the Belgian people have reason to complain, that conditions in some places are likely to cause despair, etc., and we are by no means deaf to the desire that Belgium's position and the position towards Belgium be investigated and clarified. But we simply cannot see how such a clarification can be achieved at the present moment. If, on the other hand, the Social Democrats of the various countries could organize a joint consultation, which, incidentally, should have taken place long ago, I consider it self-evident that these questions would also be raised and an attempt made to find a solution. The Danish nation has remained neutral during the current war, not least at the instigation of the Social Democrats. The active support of the Social Democrats was necessary for such a true policy of neutrality that it offered some degree of security that our country would not have to share the fate of Belgium and other countries. But this attitude was not, as you seem to think, so passive that it excluded any protest from the Social Democrats in the name of the abused law. The Danish Social Democrats immediately protested against the breach of neutrality in Belgium, both through their party leadership and through their press. This protest was unanimously repeated by p. 61 ( 81) Jaurès on the Alsace-Lorraine Question. 61 the conference held in Copenhagen in January 1915 by representatives of Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Holland. And this protest was again repeated at the conference in The Hague in August of this year, in which I participated as a representative of the Danish Social Democrats. These protests, and especially the last two, have been made known by the public broadcast of the resolutions to all countries and should therefore not be unknown to you. The leadership of the Danish Social Democrats has, moreover, wished to maintain as neutral a position as possible between the parties. We are of the opinion that when the representatives of the parties meet for a discussion, there are enough controversial issues to be settled,

and it seems to us that it would be good if some representatives kept their heads cool, so that they could make their contribution in the socialist spirit to the rallying of the proletariat and the reconstruction of the International. I ask you to be assured of the warm feelings on the part of the Danish Social Democracy and the Danish people for the Belgian Social Democracy and for the Belgian people, and I will close with the wish that the Social Democrats of all countries can unite as soon as possible in working for the victory of justice, for the end of the war, for the conclusion of a lasting peace and for the liberation of the proletariat from military, imperialist and capitalist domination. With socialist greetings, Th. Stauning. EMIL KLOTH: Jaurès on the Alsace-Lorraine Question and the Relationship of France to Germany. The influence of great men lasts far beyond their deaths. The question is raised in French, as well as in all international Social Democracy: What would Jaurès p. 62 ( 82) 62 Jaurès on the Alsace-Lorraine Question. What would he have done if he had lived? This question cannot be answered with complete certainty, although many believe they can resolve it according to their own views. Since we cannot ascend to the high Olympus to ask Jaurès himself about his position on the World War, the Alsace-Lorraine Question, and other things, the only reliable source of information left to us is what Jaurès himself said on questions connected with the World War. Such a comprehensive statement does indeed exist, namely in a major speech that Jaurès was supposed to deliver to the Berlin workers on July 9, 1905, "in the name of the socialist faction of the French Parliament," but was unable to deliver because the then Chancellor, Prince Bülow, foolishly refused to allow it. Nevertheless, the undelivered speech is available verbatim ("Vorwärts" of July 9, 1905), because, at the request of "Vorwärts," Jaurès sent the newspaper the text of his speech, written down by him in German. At that time, the Moroccan conflict played a role, which almost led to war, but the threatening storm passed once again. However, everyone was aware that new storms could arise; therefore, Jaurès had chosen as his theme: "The Idea of Peace and the Solidarity of the International Proletariat." In his introduction, he emphasized that the working class "is not yet self-confident and strong enough to repel those hostile powers and neutralize them." "The proletariat is neither powerful enough to ensure peace, nor is it so weak that war appears an inevitable necessity." Socialists were not afraid of war either. Their abhorrence of it should not be interpreted as weak and enervated sentimentality. But they do not want to entrust to this barbaric game of chance, this bloody dice game of war, the confidence in which they live, in the gradual emancipation of all proletarians." And then Jaurès deals with everything that separates and unites France and Germany by, following on

from the above line of thought, first touching on the Alsace-Lorraine question as follows: Therefore, we French socialists, without ever being accused of having humiliated our sense of justice, have renounced, thoroughly and for all time, and whatever the changing fortunes of the peoples' fortunes may bring with them, we have renounced any plan for a military war of revenge against Germany, any thought of a so-called revenge.* For such a war would Democracy would work against the proletariat, against the rights of peoples, which are sufficiently guaranteed only by the proletariat and democracy. Today, European peace is a necessary condition for human progress, and without peace between Germany and France, without a firmly established, lasting, trusting peace between them, there can be no peace for Europe. The interests of France, which has done so much for the democratic movement and the political awakening of the working class, cannot lie in any other direction than the direction in which democracy and the working class can also develop. Therefore, we French socialists believe that we are speaking not only for the interests of the world proletariat, but also for the highest interests of your nation and ours, by now rejecting before you any thought of an armed reclaim, by urging both France and Germany to renounce forever all hidden discord, all mutual suspicion; to reach an agreement on the firm foundation of peace. - "Without contradiction, without embarrassment, I may say this here, not only as an internationalist socialist, but also as a son of France." That sounds fundamentally different from the declamations of Renaudel and other epigones of Jaurès in "Humanité." * Also highlighted in print by "Vorwärts." p. 64 ( 84) 64 Jaurès on the Alsace-Lorraine question, which, among other things, demand the redress of the "injustice of 1871," ie, the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France, before peace can be considered. Despite his deep love for France, Jaurès was far from heaping all the blame on "barbaric" Germany. His thorough knowledge of history and his loving understanding of German intellectual culture saved him from this. In his angry speech, he did indeed emphasize the merits of France, which was the first to overturn the old feudal and absolutist world, to combat bourgeois egoism and place it at the service of humanity, its fine and profound culture, its democratic and republican drive, the clarity of its thinking and will, its quick-deciding energy, its loving understanding of all things - but at the same time, he spoke out in advance of how the same France had sinned against other peoples. The following passage from his speech testifies to how much Jaurès differs in this respect from many of his compatriots who claim to be full of his spirit and yet prefer to present today's bourgeois and lawyer republic as the innocent sacrificial lamb of the World War: "This country (France) has indeed committed many mistakes in the course of its long

history; from Charles VIII to Louis XIV, and from the latter to Napoleon, it has repeatedly abused its national unity, established earlier than in other peoples, to rape and injure nations that still lived in a fragmented and disorganized state. Only too soon, even during the Revolution, did a wild intoxication of violence and arrogance join its pure enthusiasm for freedom and humanity. As your poet Herwegh has said, France has allowed the rapacious violence of its soldiers to desecrate the freedom that it was supposed to lead to the world like a bride. France, although it had then climbed to the summit of revolution and democracy with a heroic effort, was then unable to maintain itself on this height; it has vacillated between alternating freedom and revolution; indeed, at times it has tolerated the disgusting intervening domination of Caesarist demagogy and slavery. And thus its foreign policy, too, suffered from the contradictions and ambiguities of its domestic policy. It supported rising nationalities with its sympathy and effective aid, and then it hampered their growth or annoyed them with secret jealousy. It had to give up a piece of its national spirit, of its flesh, to atone for the carelessness and imprudence of Napoleonic despotism, for which it itself bore the guilt, but of which it also became a victim." Here, there is no trace of the childish notion that the predatory instincts of the evil neighbor do not allow France to live in peace; rather, one can quite clearly recognize Jaurès's view that the abuse of France's national unity to rape other peoples still living in a fragmented and disorganized state had also cast its heavy shadow over the relationship between France and Germany. He knew only too well that Alsace-Lorraine had been taken to France by force when Germany was in such a state, and that, for example, Strasbourg could be attacked with impunity by Louis XIV in 1681, in the midst of the deepest peace. His historical objectivity therefore did not allow it, as Renaudel and the "neutrals" Troelstra and Branting do, to assess the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany as a "robbery" that is particularly hard to condemn and must be repaired under all circumstances. He was rather of the opinion that France had to atone for its own imprudence and imprudence by surrendering its flesh. From his lofty historical vantage point, he therefore summarized the task of the German and French workers in the following words: "It marked a serious defeat for all idealistic aspirations for our two peoples that 35 years ago we achieved the Republic solely through war, and you achieved unity solely through war. Thus we appear to one another without one-sided conceit and without presumption. We will only cherish the memory of the past in order to swear to one another an oath that we will renounce all thoughts of hatred and mistrust, that we will all strive wholeheartedly to establish lasting peace between France and Germany, so that the working class of both

peoples can devote itself fully to the work of liberation, so that both peoples can devote themselves fully to their cultural work. In this capital, Berlin, where French troops once entered, long before German troops entered Paris, we are determined to seal the fraternization of the German and French working classes and to proclaim it to the world. Together we want to dispel every thought of international rape." 99 Alliance claimed by the Franco-Russian Jaurès that it initially had no offensive significance. If it had retained this significance, if it had not been distorted and degraded by our leading classes, we would have had no decisive reasons to oppose this alliance, despite all the differences in the two constitutions. For the first right and the first duty of a people is to secure its existence. The Dual Alliance and the Triple Alliance were called upon to keep each other in balance. Jaurès then argued further: The opinion of almost all French people was that France's treaties with Russia, England, and Italy should not serve to "encircle and surround Germany through a system of concentric alliances directed against it." But not entirely without concern, he added: "And yet such a danger loomed to some extent. And yet a rash and conceited diplomacy could be tempted by it. Who could know whether it might not, in the dark, organize arrogant and windy combinations to create a system out of these treaties and alliances with the purpose of artificially isolating Germany?" Unfortunately, this dark premonition of Jaurès's came true. Shortly before his assassination, he had to recognize, in his own words: "France is Russia's plaything." He, the sincere friend of peace, who might have made an understanding with Germany possible, had to fall to clear the way for French revenge. His murderer, however, lives on, as a beacon of the victory of revenge over the idea of peace. KONRAD WERTHER: The Dark Side of Maximum Prices. The setting of maximum prices had a dual purpose. Consumers were to be protected from exploitation and, at the same time, educated to be thrifty and prevented from overconsuming food. Unfortunately, neither of these two purposes was achieved. Thrift and the prevention of overconsumption could only be achieved through the introduction of bread, meat, and other cards. Despite the maximum prices, this effect has not been achieved for foodstuffs not restricted by cards, especially not in those circles whose wallets allow them to afford all manner of luxuries. But they did not prevent the exploitation of consumers; in fact, they even encouraged it, for we now have maximum prices that are as similar to exploitation as two peas in a pod and that far exceed the increase in production costs caused by the war. The main mistake was probably that the setting of maximum prices was left to the municipal authorities. As a result, they lost their price-regulating effect, became a never-ending screw,

and led to a struggle between individual towns. An example may illustrate this. In the town of A., in the autumn of 1915, a complaint was made that the vegetables, which were grown in abundance in the surrounding area, had become excessively expensive. The magistrate then set maximum prices that guaranteed producers and traders a reasonable profit and brought consumers the desired reduction. The effect was that all the vegetables immediately disappeared from the market. They were then taken to the neighboring town of B., 25 kilometers away, where no maximum prices had been set. In order to obtain vegetables again, there was no alternative but to raise the maximum prices. This meant that there was now plenty of vegetables again. At the same time, however, the market in B. was deprived of them. B. responded with maximum prices, which were naturally somewhat higher than those in A. Once again, the procession went to B., and A. had to raise the prices again. This continued gracefully until only the very richest people could afford the vegetables. Although the maximum prices were lifted again with the new vegetable harvest, they have ensured that prices have remained at a quite considerable level even now, despite abundant yields. The enormous variation in maximum prices is also causing great discontent. In times of peace, prices are, as we know, regulated according to the age-old law of supply and demand. This law has now been abolished because, with food shortages, demand everywhere exceeds supply. It would therefore be hard to believe that price differences are even greater under the rule of maximum prices than in peacetime. But a compilation of the officially set maximum prices in July 1916 in Prussian towns with over 10,000 inhabitants, just published by the Statistical Office, provides proof of this. According to it, a liter of milk costs 18 Pf. in Lauenburg in Pomerania, but 34 in Brandenburg; a chicken egg costs 12 Pf. in Kolberg and 38 Pf. in Katernberg (Rhineland). For the following foodstuffs, the prices given in Pfennigs refer to a kilo in the retail trade: Potatoes: Kolberg 10, Hildesheim 30; Butter: Bocholt 420, 4 p. 69 ( 89) Downsides of maximum prices. 69 Werne 600; Wheat flour: Langenbielau 38, Lehe 60; Rye flour: Neustadt in Upper Silesia 32, Blumenthal in Hanover 54; White bread (rolls): Kirchhörde in Westphalia 42, Wilhelmshaven 100; K-bread: Stendal 30, Bensberg 52; Sugar: Roßberg in Silesia 58, Lyck 74; Table salt: Weißwasser in Silesia 18, Berlin-Schöneberg 32; Best beef (leg, fillet): Reichenbach in Silesia 360, Duisburg 760; Least beef (cooked belly): Kolberg 300, Bonn 580; Leg of mutton: Osterode in East Prussia 360, Stettin 640; Best pork (carbonade): Unna in Westphalia 282, M.-Gladbach 600 Lowest pork (belly meat): Striegau 240, Duisburg 520; lean bacon: Landeshut in Schl. 320, Krefeld 600; fatty bacon: Braunsberg in East Prussia 380, Hardenberg (Rhineland) 700; domestic lard: Leer in East Frisia

340, Aachen 680. This small compilation shows how enormously different the prices are and how the differences are not limited to places far apart, but are often found in those close together. Such price differences are bound to cause dissatisfaction. One doesn't understand why one should pay 600 pfennigs in Munich-Gladbach for a piece of beef that one can get for 282 in Unna. This also promotes legal uncertainty. The butcher who demands 3 marks for a kilo of beef in Unna is punished, while the butcher in Munich-Gladbach goes unpunished if he charges twice as much. Another flaw in the setting of maximum prices by the municipalities is that in many municipalities the procedure was quite bureaucratic. This, too, can be seen from the above summary. There are quite a few municipalities that have set uniform maximum prices for beef or pork without making any distinction between the individual cuts. One can assume that the holy bureaucracy was not involved everywhere in this, but that it was taken for granted that the maximum prices only apply to the best cuts and that the lesser ones must be sold at a correspondingly lower price. But under the rule of maximum prices, we experience the strange spectacle that we no longer have any inferior goods at all. All goods have now become first-class. Even the most deplorable junk, for which hardly any buyers could be found in peacetime, is now making its way to the forefront. Finally, there is the fact that not every subordinate authority is capable of drafting its regulations completely clearly and accurately. For example, a wartime offender recently had to be acquitted by a court because the district administrator's ordinance he had violated was so unclearly worded that it remained incomprehensible even to the court. It was reasonably decided that one could not demand that such unclear regulations be followed. How can this be remedied? Maximum prices must remain. But they must be changed in such a way that they fulfill their purpose, namely that they protect the consumer from exploitation. First of all, it is necessary that the maximum prices granted to producers be subjected to a thorough review. An example may show how necessary this is. In the spring of 1916, a sensible farmer said something like the following at an agricultural meeting: "The maximum prices set for potatoes in the autumn of 1915 were such that we could be quite satisfied with them. They more than covered the additional costs caused by the war. The price increase in the spring of 1916, however, was a big mistake. The farmers had been told that the autumn prices would not be increased under any circumstances. As a result, the smaller farmers in particular sold their stocks. The larger farmers, however, held on to the potatoes in the hope of getting higher prices in the spring. They were not mistaken and have now pocketed a large profit that is not justified by anything. What will be the result of this? In the

autumn of 1916, there will be no potatoes at all. p. 71 ( 91) Downsides of Maximum Prices. 71 can, if not even higher prices are approved. To alleviate the current potato shortage in the big cities, one should not have offered a reward for potato restraint, but rather stipulated that the current maximum prices would only be valid until a certain date, after which they would be reduced. Then so many potatoes would have come onto the market that the potato shortage would have been completely controlled." Unfortunately, this farmer's advice was not followed, but potato prices were actually raised again. This, however, achieved something that was neither expected nor intended. Greedy farmers, in anticipation of the later lower prices, have now prematurely picked and dumped so many potatoes on the market that this has seriously endangered the harvest. The best thing would be if prices were regulated uniformly for the entire German Reich. The fear that this would then lead to shortages on the one hand and surplus on the other seems unjustified. Our transport conditions are so excellent, even during the war, that even perishable goods can be shipped long distances without danger. Furthermore, the Central Purchasing Cooperative must set up subdivisions in all districts, whose task is to provide for the needs of their district. A completely uniform distribution of all foodstuffs is not feasible and would lead to inconveniences. Customs, climate, and geographical location must be taken into account. High mountain dwellers need different foodstuffs than coastal dwellers. Above all, however, the maximum prices that consumers have to pay must be reviewed and standardized according to the currently applicable lowest maximum prices. In some cases, they must even be reduced below these. Just as it is possible to sell a kilo of wheat flour for 38 Pf. in Langenbielau, it must also be possible in Lehe, where one currently has to pay 60 Pf. 72 ( 92) 72 Return home. Furthermore, only coercion, extensive confiscation, and expropriation can help. Harsher punishments might also be appropriate for wartime offenders who knowingly and intentionally violate wartime regulations. Individual courts have already taken rather harsh action. But these are still exceptions. As a rule, the sentences are still so lenient that they do not correspond to the people's sense of justice. The idea might now arise that, to expedite the delivery of foodstuffs and prevent tax evasion, rewards similar to threshing bounties could be offered. This idea, however, should be rejected just as threshing bounties should be opposed. Should the services that these difficult times absolutely require really only be achieved through special rewards? Isn't it more correct to use coercion and punishment to get those who hesitate and those who don't want to understand to adapt to the organized economic system that the war is forcing? All the unavoidable innovations in our economic life are

encountering great difficulties. These would be considerably less difficult if our economic life had been better organized before the war. So here again the war proves the healing power of socialist ideas. MAX BARTHEL (Musketeer in the Field): Homecoming. Tambourine, let the drum ring, brother let the shooting begin. Our flag shall wave high, tambourine, let the drum ring, may the calfskin shatter dully, let us march into Germany. p. 73 ( 93) Homecoming. 73 If the suffering of battle is over, we have returned home after all! Let us stoke the silent fires! Let us wash our bloody hands! If the suffering of battle is over, life is worth living again. May the bonfires blaze! Fame and honor, blaze with them! Surely from the wild hatred the rhythm resounds in every street. May the bonfires blaze, surely our footsteps still resound. Dear people, stop asking, we have all been sorely stormed. Let our hearts beat faster! Deepest feelings! Greatest daring! Dear people, stop asking, we have all been sorely stormed. Dearest, my love songs are surrounded by the cries of battle! Blind rows, dead brothers, mass graves... never again... Dearest, my love songs are crowned with much blood. Tambourine, let the drum sound, brother, let the shooting be! Our banner shall wave high. Tambourine, let the drum ring, may the calfskin shatter dully, let us march into Germany. 29/3 p. 74 ( 94) 74 War Plays. TAMEN: THE War Plays. The theater has turned field-gray. Under a mass array of rosin and drumheads, the permanently unfit perform gruesomely real heroic deeds up on the stage. They are infinitely more versatile than their real-life fighting comrades out in the trenches. Not only do they storm villages barricaded by hundreds of Frenchmen with machine guns as officer patrols of four men, performing feats that would arouse the pale envy of any true field-grey soldier, but they also find time to unmask spies, convince old French counts of the German people's culture, and make them fall in love and make them love them. And if only that were all! But no, they also sing the sweetest couplets, and when the audience applauds, they even find time between two devastating battles to repeat the couplet. Often you see real field-grey soldiers sitting in the stalls and laughing at their comrades in makeup, who then probably take it as applause. But I have also seen two officers in a box stand up in the middle of the first act, say "Ugh!" and leave the theater. It would of course be silly to demand that all entertainment and all cultural activity behind the front should cease during the war. Nothing can even be said against operetta. It is gratifying enough when, in the midst of all seriousness, we are still upright enough to allow ourselves the luxury of laughter. There was a time before the war and there will be a time after the war. We do not want to lose touch with either time. And no one can seriously blame actors for wanting to live during the war. They should just do so in a

more decent way. Europe has already become the cemetery for millions of people during the war, and perhaps it will become so for millions more. Never in living memory has there been such passionate hatred, such boundless bitterness in the world. Never has such terrible sacrifice been accompanied by such dignity as that accorded our war plays from all sides. 75 attacked people now shows itself by seemingly unperturbedly maintaining its life amidst all the sacrifices and postponing all grief until later. Perhaps one day a truly great world poet will emerge who will create an equally valid inner expression for this tremendous strength inherent in the German people and forge a great artistic unity from the struggle before and behind the front . We throw around the word "hero" so much these days and completely forget that it is not what matters. The times of heroes belong to the past. Being a man is now the highest ideal. And that we Germans, in the midst of the turmoil, are the outspoken representatives of masculinity, to such an extent that our horrified opponents believe they must insult us as barbarians, that will one day be the historical pride of these days in the just judgment of posterity. But it is unmanly and a complete misstep in tone to drag these supreme demonstrations of strength onto the stage now and degrade them to an empty theatrical gesture. Here, the higher kind of confession we demand from the stage, which speaks just as much from Goethe's "Götz" as from Hauptmann's "Weber," simply ends, and a rather ape-like shamelessness begins. There is no simultaneity between a great experience and its worthy embodiment on stage. The truly inner witness is mute. He is too deeply involved in the experience with his own most sacred shame to be able to pose and flaunt it. Only the cold and heartless, the inwardly uninvolved, are capable of that. No one wants to offend the theater, neither the theater as an educational institution nor the theater as entertainment. Play operettas and make us laugh for a few hours, make our serious and hard lives easier for a few hours! Play folk plays, love plays, glorify the humble everyday life on the stage, so that in the midst of the great experience we may truly understand and appreciate the beauty of its intimacy! And above all, play the great pieces of our literature so that we feel, feel with pride, that this passionate fight is not just about defending commercial influences, but is also about great intellectual things that are worth so much blood and tears! 29/3* p. 76 ( 96) 76 Glosses. But finally, stop making a cold, inwardly caricature of what each of us, more or less, pays dearly for with heart and soul and a serious tire. Glosses. My reform program. "RAILWAY, RAHN, free for all capable people," is what I said in the September session of the Reichstag. I admit, it is a word that is open to interpretation. I chose it based on the saying that brevity is the soul of wit. I will explain it here: I will use all

the means at my disposal to ensure that the Reichstag electoral law is first introduced in Prussia, followed by equal voting rights for the municipalities. I will then continue to strive with all my strength to ensure that the same institutions are created in all German federal states and will not hesitate to call on the Reichstag for cooperation if necessary. I am prepared to grant the Reichstag enough rights to achieve a state of government corresponding to a parliamentary system. I hope to reach agreement with the Reichstag on the form of the new system. However, to implement these plans, I need a reliable Reichstag majority that is also prepared to share all responsibilities, possibly by allowing its leaders to join the government, and to keep the state administration running by approving the budget. And since eternal peace will come later, and agreements on international arbitration courts do not yet exist and are unlikely to be introduced immediately even after the end of the current war, we will not be able to do without the army and navy immediately. The parties that want to help me implement my reform program will therefore have to continue to approve funds for national defense in the future, to the extent required by the world situation. The Social Democratic Party in its various hues will be indispensable in this if, as I hope, despite everything that has happened, it remains the strong party after the war, vigorously advancing on the path to a popular majority, which it was before and still appears to be. But since even its left wing has declared that it is rejecting the army credits and the entire budget only because it has no confidence in me, I can now expect approval. Or does the Social Democrats still want to withhold their confidence from me even after this programmatic declaration? That would be ill-considered. A Reich Chancellor can hardly guarantee more than equal voting rights for all citizens in the Reich, state, and community, alongside a parliamentary system of government, especially if I add that I will not oppose a democratic extension of the electoral law currently in force in the Reichstag if a Reichstag elected on this reform program so decides. Nor will I oppose the free rights of association and assembly, nor the protection of the right of coalition. Finally, I am prepared for a thorough reform of our tax system, combined with the takeover of major industries into Reich and state enterprises, and for a popular expansion of our military. The prerequisite for all these reforms is, of course, first and foremost that a Reichstag majority agree on this basis. This is essential for me as a democrat. . . . And for practical reasons, it is further essential that this majority be prepared to share with me the burden of responsibility for the entire state administration. Social Democracy now has the opportunity to demonstrate that it has understood the task of a political party. If, of course, it wishes to continue to reject responsibility for the

necessities of the state, which in this world of the still existing capitalist system cannot be brushed aside with rhetoric and resolutions, then I will have no choice but to resign myself, for better or for worse, to the wishes and interests of those parties that are willing to cooperate and give the Reich what it needs, but in the meantime take for themselves what they can get at the moment without renouncing anything else. For I myself am not as omnipotent as I appear according to the practice of Social Democracy, which completely contradicts its materialist theory, without formal parliamentarism. Even in the German Reich, a government needs parties on which it can base its policies. Or do Haase and his comrades believe I could pursue a policy consistent with the wishes of Social Democracy, while at the same time the parliamentary representatives of Social Democracy refuse me any cooperation and leave it to their fundamental opponents to continue pushing the state cart? In that case, however, Social Democracy would have no choice but to make a tangible revolution as quickly as possible, for which I already congratulate them. Or what are they still waiting for? For the current Chancellor, and also for all his possible successors, signed hw p. 78 ( 98) 78 Glosses. DIN The Sweet Secret. INSIDES shrouded in mystery have always had a captivating aura for naive souls. This has also been understood in our minority camp. From there, mysterious, unspeakable things flicker. Yes, if one could speak openly... if one could say everything that needed to be said, the party members would be amazed!! But under the current circumstances... censorship... state of siege... But when one can speak again one day - --- One can go home from meetings with minority comrades and, in private, press for the airing of the mystical corners of their secret material. One learns nothing that hasn't already been revealed since the outbreak of war through so many meetings and newspaper articles . At the Reich Conference, too, it was noticeable that the minority limited itself to the most well-known arguments. Above all, it was not pleasant that the majority was once again cheated out of the recipe for peace. Instead, one of the larger minority papers prefaced the conference report with a footnote stating that "this report, too, is official," "under current press conditions, it too cannot provide a verbatim reproduction of all the speeches. We request our readers to bear this in mind." The aura of secrecy is saved! - The play vividly recalls the man who was in battle with a powerful man in his locality, failed in all courts, but who nevertheless managed to cultivate the aura of a gagged warrior in front of his fellow citizens: yes, if only he could have said what he knew before all courts! But he was not allowed to speak . . . "Up above" they didn't want to tolerate it...up above"! But the time for his revelations would come. It had to be here soon... tenaciously and unshakably, he was preparing his hour! How

the world would then listen!! The man unfortunately died and took his secret with him to the grave and lives on in the memory of his fellow citizens, glorious and shrouded in mystery. . . If only he could have spoken, oh dear! Such a brilliant afterlife will unfortunately not be granted to our minority. For the day will come when the secrets of their material portfolio can no longer be hidden behind prevailing circumstances. Then contemporaries will be amazed at the barrage of old chestnuts that will rain down on the public. sh. THE comrades . . . Modern psychopathology has discovered that neurasthenic people occasionally suppress the awareness of their inadequacies by convulsive-heroic, even self-destruction. What applies to the individual can, in a metaphorical sense, become the psychological characteristic of entire national communities. The parallel points directly to the West: today's France certainly gives the impression of a nation whose war madness peeks out of every pocket of its neurasthenic nervous system. A new, drastic symptom was provided by the last September session of the French parliament. Turbulent scenes erupted because——because three socialists dared to express the opinion that France might, under certain circumstances, consider peace. Because they demanded for France something that the speakers of Germany's socialist majority had been demanding undisturbed in every parliamentary session for two years. The nationalist frenzy reached its peak when Raffin-Dugen's called the Socialists of Germany his "German comrades." He was forced to retract the criminal phrase under threat of punishment. Unfortunately, to this day, nothing has been heard of the Socialist parliamentary group in the Chamber advocating the permissibility of this merely human expression. On the other hand, it is reported that Parisian newspapers are trying to mobilize the public prosecutor against Brizon and Raffin-Dugens; the phrase "German comrades" is said to be high treason. Such is happening within a nation that in 1793 adopted the Declaration of the Rights of Man and, in Article 7, enshrined the right of citizens to express their thoughts and opinions. G. Die Woche. October 12. Some time ago, shortly after the conference of the three northern neutral states, and after the declaration of the Swiss Federal Council, which was by no means negative for all who could read, the claim appeared first in Swiss and then in Dutch newspapers: the Entente had declared to the neutral governments that it regarded any neutral attempt at peace mediation as an unfriendly act. This note came and went like so many others that come from the under-running bureau in Bern, whose soul is a journalistic English couple rich in fate. If there were a newspaper in Switzerland—in French-speaking as well as in German-speaking Switzerland —that would deign, from the high throne of its cantonal sovereignty, to visit

or inquire into the Federal Palace, no Swiss typesetters have been plagued with this correspondence. The fact that foreign editors of neutral or other newspapers in the Third World War still had enough collective thought to recognize the value of even the most free submission in the form and content will not be discussed further, given the shortage of important raw materials even in neutral countries. But there is really nothing to this alleged declaration by "the Entente," for the Quadripartite Alliance is not as foolish as its propagandists often portray in their clumsy overzealousness. The conference of European neutrals will take place in the foreseeable future; the three Scandinavian countries, Spain, Holland, and Switzerland, have promised their representation. Out of a natural compulsion for self-preservation, the question of how to end the global madness of destruction must be posed and discussed there. There is, of course, still a long way to go from there to intervention. But it can be shortened if an awakened public opinion in all the belligerent countries calls back the power-lifters and annihilators, the ludicrous "jusqu'au-boutists." Just as the "Nation" and some organs in England have now done with Lloyd George, the unrestrained Celtic politician. For, however tough England may be in the Quadruple Alliance, even this toughness has its sensitive pressure points; the coming winter, with its coal shortages and other ailments, will certainly not alleviate this pressure. * But of course: the still overheated war locomotive will not win the peace station if the switchmen fail. The bleeding world is still waiting for these or these. The monologue with which the German Chancellor introduced the confidential debate in the Main Committee in public session two weeks ago was only half the answer. Now, he will have a second opportunity to demonstrate his strength and skill. For the German people's representatives have just resumed their public work. Scheidemann portrays the mood of the people well and effectively; he formulates the "commands of the hour" both internally and externally correctly and convincingly. The myth that the Social Democratic Faction could be a weak-willed and hopeless protective force for a government wavering in its internal and external goals has been destroyed; the only foundation of national defense, internal freedom, has been sharply and decisively defined. The continuation of the debate, the government's decision that will bind or loosen the fate of individuals and worlds, is eagerly awaited. 1 p. 81 ( 101) DIE GLOCKE 30th Issue October 21, 1916 2nd Year. Reprinting of all articles with detailed source references is permitted. DR. PAUL LENSCH, M. d. R.: The Turnaround in the War Situation. Romania's Entry into the German Reich The entry into war undoubtedly marked the lowest point in the general war situation for the Central Powers. It was the culmination of the Brusilov Offensive, which in the West was

accompanied by the terrible slaughter on the Somme. It would be foolish to deny the profound impression that Romania's move made in Germany. One might assume that the Romanian diplomats knew exactly what they were doing when they staked everything on one card, and that failure would mean annihilation for them. Precisely because Romania had waited for years to make its decision, so as not to back the wrong horse, its final decision made such a strong impression. One and a half months have passed since then, and today one clearly feels that we are facing a new turning point in the war situation. The Brusilov Offensive has been halted with the most terrible sacrifices, Romania, which was supposed to bring about the decisive victory, has been defeated, and the Italian press is loudly chanting Cries for help for the "noble Latin sister." In the West, the English and French are barely making any progress and can only explain this by what they claim is a reinforcement of the German lines in terms of troops and artillery. In the Arctic Ocean as well as on the American coast, German submarines are operating with the utmost success, while at home the success of the German loan has exceeded the wildest expectations of the optimists. 30/1 p. 82
( 102) 82 The Turnaround in the War Situation. The impression that this impending turnaround in the general war situation in enemy countries must make is rarely realized in Germany because people here are all too much under the heavy pressure of food supplies and therefore easily overlook the other aspects. But imagine the reverse: we were allied with Russia, England, Belgium, America, Japan, Austria, the Balkan powers, Turkey, etc., at war against one France, which, let's assume, has Italy, Spain, and Portugal on its side. And this France would have taken the entire Rhine Province from us, including Aachen, Trier, Koblenz, Cologne, Elberfeld-Barmen, and Düsseldorf, as well as Mainz and Frankfurt, and despite the help of the whole world, we would not be able to clear our homeland of the enemy after more than two years of struggle. The mental state among us would probably be exactly as it is now in England and France, where the Briands and Lloyd Georges alternately deliver speeches in which madness and despair peek out from every buttonhole. This England, for the first time in its history, is waging a war in which it must make its own efforts, and where gold alone can do nothing. And now it must experience that one arm of Germany is sufficient to hold back the combined armies of millions of Anglo-French, and that the other arm is still strong enough to deal the most terrible blows in the East. It is only too understandable that the psychological reaction to this realization is terrible in France as in England, and must arouse both fury and profound hopelessness. For this reason alone, the prospects for peace in the West are extraordinarily slim. Lloyd George declares an intervention at this moment to

be "the triumph of Germany and the ruin of England." This, of course, must not deter the German government from pursuing a conscious policy of bringing about peace, which not only Germany and Central Europe, but also the peoples of enemy and neutral countries bitterly need. The fact that Lloyd George, from whose speeches the good, worthy Bernstein once saw the dawn of "better times," and Mr. Asquith expressly take responsibility for the blood still to be shed upon their own shoulders does precious little good to the bleeding peoples. It must be made impossible for them to prevent peace, and if peace cannot be brought from the West, that does not mean that it is also impossible in the East. And herein, indeed, lies England's Achilles heel. Some time ago, the "Berner Tagwacht," well-known for its anti-German sentiment, which had already rejoiced five-and-a-quarter years ago upon Italy's entry into the war that Germany's fate was now sealed, reported an impending separate peace between Germany and Russia. The report was obviously false, but its dissemination was just as obviously in England's interest, so that a German newspaper saw fit to report that the aforementioned socialist paper was "unconsciously" serving England's interests. The report was, of course, immediately and vigorously denied by both Germany and Russia, thus evidently fulfilling its purpose. However, it revealed with sufficient clarity how uneasily England observes any possible change in the political atmosphere in the East. It does indeed have a not entirely clear conscience. The economic dependence into which England has now strangled the Russian bear is truly unbelievable and directly reminiscent of Persian conditions. The Russian representatives outside Russia receive their funds only through English mediation. All the fairy tales told in Russia to justify the war, about the omnipotence of German capital in Fatherland, have now become living reality, indeed, have been surpassed by reality, except that it is not German, but English capital that is at issue. Here, England truly fears a breaking of the chain, and if the Berne report betrayed this fear clearly enough, then, on the other hand, it shows German diplomacy just as clearly in which direction it must move in order to overcome English resistance to peace. In the Reichstag, the only speaker who hinted at these things, albeit in a completely different, indeed opposite, light, was Dr. David. His speech was extremely interesting, but since it wasn't a soulful tinkling of Amalia, it didn't really attract much interest from the "high house." The entire speech was addressed abroad, primarily to the English, where it was intended to create the impression that even the few German politicians who still desire and consider a Western orientation possible are aware of how deeply England is to blame for the outbreak of the war, and that there can be no question of, as French children and socialists faithfully pray, Germany

"attacked unsuspecting France." These passages of David's speech are valuable because they represent a sharp rebuttal to that feminine method, which has its adherents especially in German Social Democracy, namely , seeking to overcome the enemy through concessions and concessions. It was no coincidence that Haase, as the spokesman for this feminine line of German Social Democracy, immediately spoke up to explain that only the end of the debate had prevented him from refuting David's "inaccuracies" about the prehistory of the war. Here, anyone who doesn't believe in the German war of conquest, in invaded France, unsuspecting England, unprepared Russia, and rapacious Germany is considered a temple desecrator and tree vandal. David described the "crucial point" in the peace question as the necessity of making our opponents realize that Germany cannot be subdued. "Even if we tell our opponents today that we don't want to take anything away from them, if statements are made that leave no doubt that Germany is territorially content with the status quo ante, we will still not achieve peace as long as our opponents still hope that they can put us in such a militarily unfavorable situation that they can dictate peace to us." This is quite true and finally states openly that there are illusions in wide circles about the effect of a possible declaration by the Chancellor regarding the fate of Belgium. Because no one in Germany is thinking of destroying England, people quite naively believe that no one in England is thinking of destroying Germany either, and that they would be delighted there if Germany declared that it did not want to annex Belgium. But this desire for destruction exists among the politically influential circles in England; to doubt it would be delusion. And not having drawn the necessary conclusions from this political situation, which would have led the speaker "towards the East," is the essential flaw from which David's otherwise excellent speech suffered. WILHELM BLOS, M. d. R.: Harakiri. The Reich Conference of German Social Democracy has shown that the vast majority of the party remains loyal to the faction's policies. The opposition is trying in vain to deceive itself and others with pompous phrases and heightened spite about the impact of the resolutions passed at the Reich Conference. Among the victors, however, the opposition's defeat has often aroused a feeling of magnanimity; indeed, it has awakened new hopes for the restoration of party unity. The majority already demonstrated magnanimity at the conference itself, when a fanatical Liebknecht supporter called the deputies who had voted for the war bonds "traitors" and was only given a reprimand for doing so. The longing for an end to the sad party dispute has, in some places, increased the feeling of magnanimity, and the desire has emerged that the party press of the majority should cease its fight against the opposition. We respect and honor

these fraternal feelings and this noble spirit, which places the unity of the party above all else. Nevertheless, we must state here that this emotional politics, in addition to the dangers that threaten us, conjures up a new danger against which warnings cannot be given urgently enough. The person writing this participated prominently in the all-poisoning fratricidal struggle between the "Lassalleans" and the "Eisenachers" and certainly felt no small disgust for such conditions. However, in such situations, one must not follow the wishes of those whose souls melt into butter souls under the melting longing for party peace. To possess such a soft soul is certainly no disgrace, but it can become a misfortune under certain circumstances. And these circumstances currently exist. The first and indispensable condition for the cessation of the fight against the opposition in the press, however, is that the same thing happens on the side of the opposition. But there is no question of that, for in the opposition papers, the attacks against the majority are continued with redoubled malice and increasing perfidy. As is well known, the opposition had behaved before the Reich Conference as if it possessed secrets whose publication would morally destroy the majority. Unfortunately, it was said, A state of siege and censorship prevented any use of this material. Now the Reich Conference took place within the protective walls of the Reichstag building; there was neither a state of siege nor censorship, and one could speak freely to the utmost. But what came of it? Only the usual phrases of the opposition, such as one had read a thousand times before in their papers. Those who eagerly awaited the "devastating revelations" were very disappointed; however, only a few of these gullible people were; the others knew the nature of the opposition. The leaders of the opposition now want to continue the deception of their supporters in the country. The opposition press claims that the "devastating" arguments presented at the conference against the majority cannot be published in the report, again due to the state of siege and censorship. This will be of little help now, because no one believes in this mysterious material anymore. But the perfidy of this method of struggle is remarkable. Incidentally, the "devastating" revelations, if the material for them had existed, would probably have been published long ago in the press by Sobelsohn and his comrades in Switzerland. And the "Berner Tagwacht" is still open to this. The opposition openly admits that it is striving to transform itself from a minority into a majority. This is its right, which no one can deny and no one wants to deny. But it all depends on the means by which this goal is pursued. If these means are accompanied by poisonous suspicion, the fight against it cannot be waged vigorously enough. Thus, the opposition admits that it had expected all sorts of strange concessions to militarism, imperialism, protectionist policies, etc. from the

majority. What a wonderful opportunity for magnificent moralizing! The "concessions" that had already been anticipated did not come, of course, which is not admitted, but the moralizing did come, and they culminated in the outcry against the David resolution adopted by the majority, as it appears in the opposition press: p. 88 ( 108) 88 Harakiri. "The utter hollowness and hopelessness of the Right's desire for peace stares back at us from this document, which certifies to the government that it is still waging a defensive war. The effect abroad can be measured. For this reason, too, we cannot cooperate with the Right itself in this area. For this reason, too, the conference has strengthened our realization that the opposition would have to abandon socialism if it wanted to abandon its independence, its determined policy, its tireless work for the soul of the German workers in favor of an unclear policy of glossing over gaping contradictions." At the same time, the opposition mocks the peace trumpet that is being blown by the majority; It openly states that it considers any unity that is being built over the current antagonisms within the party to be a deceptive sham (literally!); it therefore rejects any unity. It seeks to wrest the trust of the majority from the party comrades by insulting and suspecting this majority, and accusing them of originating reactionary projects that no one—neither the party executive nor the party committee nor the Reichstag faction—had thought of. The opposition seeks to prevent energetic action by the majority by constantly preaching to the majority the duty to consider the party comrades who are in the field. The majority has been lenient on this point, and the Reich Conference has contented itself with "resolutions," which the opposition also considered too far. But consideration for the field grays must be exercised by both parties if things are to proceed properly. There are indications from the opposition that they are not inclined to show the consideration for the field grays that they demand of the majority. Here, one should recall the well-known Brunswick resolution, which was intended to deny the representative of the first Brunswick constituency the status of a representative of the Social Democrats. In this resolution, not the slightest consideration was given to the field grays. The significance of the Brunswick resolution lies in the fact that it allows us to see the opposition's cards. p. 89 ( 109) Harakiri. 89 If the opposition became the majority, it would do so little They would show consideration for the field-grey soldiers, like the Braunschweig rabble-rousers, and would act against the new minority following their example. However, as long as the opposition has not achieved a majority, it will insist on consideration for the field-grey soldiers in order to paralyze the current majority. The opposition has not had a word of criticism for the Braunschweig resolution, except that some of its newspapers have

declared it "premature." In this case, one tacitly approves of what one strictly condemns in others. This allows for "deep insight." The demagogues of ancient Hellas and ancient Rome will look with joyful recognition on such modern disciples who apply their inherited practices with such virtuosity. . . . Let us summarize: The opposition, in a well-organized press campaign, seeks to undermine the trust that the majority possesses among the mass of party members through suspicions and insults. The opposition always presents itself as the only one oppressed. But a state of siege and censorship are certainly an obstacle to fighting the government, but not to fighting the majority.2 Under these circumstances, it is a childish desire that the majority should lay down its arms in the interest of unity and reconciliation, while the opposition speaks of unity as a fraud and seeks, by the most dubious means, to widen the rift in the party in order to gain exclusive control of the party's means of power. At this moment, the struggle 2 The perpetual Emphasizing oppression is an old demagogic trick. In the Convention, the old Vadier said of Robespierre: "This man always says he is oppressed, and yet he is the only one who speaks." p. 90 ( 110) 90 Harakiri. Giving up on the part of the majority would be committing harakiri, a Japanese suicide by slitting one's stomach. No, and a thousand times no, that must not happen. - Now, especially, the fight against the machinations of the opposition must be waged all the more decisively, since the "Working Community" and the "Internationale," who are otherwise at odds with each other, have recently joined forces to take joint action against the majority. However, if the fight against the opposition is to achieve its goal, it must be waged in such a way that it contrasts favorably with the opposition's fighting methods. Personal animosities must be avoided; however, the machinations we have identified above must be illuminated and exposed all the more energetically and thoroughly. In particular, those efforts, emanating from southern Germany, under the pretext of "impartiality" and "personality," seek to confuse the supporters of the majority and thereby advance the opposition's cause. At the same time, it is advisable to reprint relevant passages from the leaflets distributed, particularly in Berlin, to show how the malice and fanaticism toward the majority there have reached boiling point. The unity of the party will return, as it did after the great split four decades ago, although then the differences were hardly less sharp than today. The how and when remain obscure. But no one among us who has even a moderate grasp of things will seriously consider buying unity with our own suicide. We must not and will not give the opposition that joy. With such deep, historically established differences as currently exist in the party, the dispute must be fought out until the appropriate basis for reunification is achieved. p. 91 ( 111)

Persuasion 91 - or pitchforks? WILHELM JANSSON: IN Persuasion or pitchforks? In the "Vorwärts" issue on the Reich Conference, Karl Kautsky came up with the discovery that the majority was striving to substitute the tactic of "persuasion" for class struggle. Regarding the trade union struggle, he called me, among others, as a witness. He allegedly advocated for the renunciation of the exploitation of trade union power and now wanted to negotiate concessions with employers through persuasion. Either Kautsky had gone among the re-educators, or he had only observed the trade union work of the last 25 years through the meshes of a rather low-down nightcap. In reality, we have continuously practiced the tactic of "persuasion" during this time. The negotiations with the representatives of large industries, which sometimes lasted for weeks and months, were of course not conducted with the use of pitchforks, but always depended on the force of the factual arguments that could be brought forward to support our demands. These factual arguments included the strength and unity of our organizations, but they were not the only decisive factors; rather, the greatest emphasis had to be placed on the factual justification of the demands, which had to be derived from the actual situation of the workers and the industry. Even the strongest organization will have to be content with fewer concessions in a poorly prospering industry, and sometimes with none at all, whereas under favorable economic conditions it can extract a considerably larger share of the labor output for the workers. To survey this entire situation and It was always the task of the workers' representatives in negotiations to expediently demonstrate this to the employers' representatives. Whether the workers were able to derive the greatest benefit from the respective situation depended on their clear view and the efficiency of these representatives. Since the system of impartiality arose in certain industries out of the economic struggles, these demands on the workers' representatives grew enormously, and for many a union representative, the negotiations became a real nerve-racking exercise, something that a theoretician of the class struggle at the negotiating table need not know about! But one can at least demand that they moderate their demanding demeanor a little. The current situation is far more difficult than ever before. The war has presented the unions with tasks that had not even occurred to us until then. If our unions had followed the paths of Had they followed vulgar Marxism, their preparations for war would have been zero. However, we had created factors that made overcoming the consequences of the war possible in the first place: our large assets, our organizational apparatus carefully developed for independent purposes, our functionaries trained specifically for trade union tasks, our well-established support system, our solid discipline, and, last but

not least, our collective bargaining system. All these institutions, however, were created in the fiercest struggles with precisely that extreme party tendency whose theoretician Kautsky has now become without reservation, and for which he has "scientifically" justified the destruction of discipline. It was long ago that Kautsky taught us: "The essence of tactics consists precisely in unity, in the combining of various forces for a common, planned action. The great superiority of an army over congregated troops rests on unity, even when the latter are far more numerous and no less well trained." The superiority of a united party over the mass of the indifferent lies in unity.... On unity of tactics p. 93 ( 113) Persuasion or pitchforks? 93 rests on the unity of the party, and where the former is lost, the latter too soon falls apart." Of everything Kautsky wrote in more than thirty years, this is the only sentence that has become common property of the German trade unions. But it was precisely this principle of unity of organization and tactical outlook that contributed greatly to enabling the unions to adapt to the difficult situation of war; it formed an essential prerequisite for doing so. For the party, Kautsky has today thrown into the junk room this principle, upon which he made the unity of the party dependent in 1899. We can already see the consequences. The internal self-flagellation, the destruction of unity of action, will soon, if Kautsky predicted correctly, be followed by the process of dissolution. But here our paths diverge. The trade unions have fully accepted only this one principle from Kautsky, and it has proven itself more than ever during the war. At this moment, the German proletariat would be in miserable condition. If Kautsky had not been able to stand, the unions would have allowed themselves to be pushed into the mire by his cooperative discipline-breaking. Only by strictly maintaining unity of action have we succeeded in safeguarding workers' interests even during the war. Preserving them into peacetime is one of the most important tasks. Unity of union action in Germany was never based on the method of pitchfork fighting. The German unions have waged their struggles on the basis of the given facts and with the means that were possible here and promised success. Airy theories do not belong here. After the war, the union tasks will not become easier, but even more difficult than before. Food prices will not be persuaded or pitchforks? show, to immediately steer into the downward curve. The labor market will face a new disorganization due to the transition from the war to the peacetime economy, exacerbated by the shortage of raw materials in many industries, a problem that is already occupying government and military authorities as well as business and trade union circles. The disorganization of the labor market causes unemployment figures to swell, which in turn tends to result in a downward trend in the wage curve. War

industry wages will hardly be sustainable, at least not without agreements with employers, which can only achieve the goal if the employers show some willingness to compromise. It is therefore necessary to examine whether the actual conditions justify the union demand for such a compromise. I answered this question in the affirmative in an article in the Monatshefte[2]. Not from the particular entrepreneurial standpoint, of course; for this, if its horizon is as narrowly defined in terms of macroeconomics as Kautsky's union understanding, will Welcome the opportunity to suppress wages and thereby provoke the most severe economic struggles. Every trade unionist knows this, even without having been through the school of Kautsky. In this situation, I first apply the method of persuasion, which earns me the frown of the theorist of indiscipline, for whom there is no public opinion and apparently no common interests of the entire German economy. During the transition to a peacetime economy, the world market will have a great capacity for absorption. Years of warfare have severely depleted not only food supplies but also stocks of industrial products. This could be a favorable moment. Alongside this, however, is 2 Sozialistische Monatshefte 1916. Double issue 18/19, page 950: Economy and trade unions after the war. p. 95 ( 115) Persuasion or Pitchforks? 95 a tremendous drop in the exchange rate, which for Germany so far amounts to around 33 percent. Since raw materials and foodstuffs must primarily be imported from neutral countries, we must therefore reckon with a 33 percent increase in purchasing prices, resulting solely from the exchange rate situation, thus excluding other factors that increase prices, such as sudden strong demand, etc. Since Germany's pre-war imports (excluding precious metals) totaled around 10 billion marks, of which around 53 percent were industrial raw materials and semi-finished products and about 30 percent were foodstuffs and luxury goods, including livestock, we would have to pay about 3 to 4 billion more for this absolutely necessary import simply as a result of the drop in the exchange rate. How this must affect the household budget of the working class requires no special demonstration. The most important prerequisite for a return to normal conditions as quickly as possible, however, is the Raising the foreign exchange rate. This can only be achieved by promoting exports, for which there is also a great capacity on the world market. First and foremost, the export of those industries that can source a significant portion of their raw materials domestically must be promoted, because these can reach their full production capacity most quickly. This is what matters. For the war will hardly be over before not only the buyers of raw materials, but also the sellers of industrial goods from all countries appear on the world market, because all belligerents will have more or less the same needs as Germany. If

we succeed in returning to a normal peacetime economy without serious union struggles, then one of the possibilities will be open to overcoming the damage of the war somewhat more quickly. But this requires that an agreement is reached with business on the wage issue. If wages fall to a level that might correspond to the expected initial disorganization of the labor market, then the p. 96 ( 116) 96 - Persuasion or pitchforks? The later onset of the economic upturn must first serve to drive wages up again. Since the economic upturn is to be expected first in those sectors that source their raw materials domestically, the struggles would cause a delay in the exploitation of export opportunities, which is undesirable even from the workers' point of view. This is the reason why the greatest emphasis must be placed on a timely agreement on the wage question, because this undoubtedly has far-reaching significance. Supposing that Kautsky's pitchfork tactics were to prevail due to the lack of insight on both sides, or even only on the employers' side, what advantage could the workers possibly gain from it? At best, the transition to a peacetime economy would be prolonged by the duration of the strikes and lockouts that would ensue. But even this most favorable outcome would secure the English the lead on the world market, which they had achieved through a series of systematic We would therefore only be eliminating ourselves in favor of England and would then have to suffer for many years until, through low wages and increased labor intensity, the English could perhaps be caught up again. This prospect is certainly not tempting. And yet it would still be the most favorable. For it is more likely that no greater results can be achieved through open economic struggle immediately after the conclusion of peace than through a clever exploitation of the general economic situation through negotiations. Demobilization will, as already emphasized, result in a large supply of workers. These workers are economically weakened by the long war; their former savings, if any existed, have been consumed, so that their individual resistance can be estimated as very low. Many of them were also only proletarianized by the war, come from petty-bourgeois classes, and are to be won over and educated for the union struggle. p. 97 ( 117) From the German trade union press. 97 women and young people in the factories, whom the war brought into industry, and who are just as untrained in the trade union struggle. Anyone who sees such a situation as favorable for the trade union struggle only proves that they are out of touch with the whole issue. A. Grigoryants: From the German trade union press. The purely cultural role of the trade union newspaper becomes even more apparent during the war than before. In the economic arena, the outbreak of the war brought about a kind of truce between employers and employees. The ranks of trade union members began to thin the longer the

cruel war lasted. It was all the more important to maintain the organization and to rally those who stayed at home around it. In this respect, the trade union press had the extraordinarily important task to spread the necessary information and to provide the unions' great defensive with the necessary tools. The unions have happily survived this defensive period with unbroken strength, and it is to be hoped that they can also face the future with full confidence. Their main weapon in this has always been the union press. Unfortunately, the unions found themselves forced to considerably reduce the size of their organs and thus limit their content to the bare essentials. Due to the cessation of the struggles and the aforementioned predominantly defensive character of union activity, the union press also took on a somewhat changed character. People have, so to speak, "gone within themselves," they are more concerned with the most immediate "internal" matters, and they are necessarily dwelling on the practical questions of professional life and "perseverance." 30/2 p. 98 ( 118) 98 From the German union press. usually very long and devotes the greatest attention to them. Of course, the major events we are experiencing are also discussed. The trade union newspapers also have a great and important task to fulfill. They serve as a link between the trade union comrades in the field and the organization. They are called upon to convey to the proletarian, for whom organizational life is a necessity, the breath of the "holy spirit" of his union. This sense of solidarity among the trade union comrades on and behind the front finds expression in the specialized press, among other things, in the fact that numerous publications devote a relatively large amount of space to field post letters. The practical issues that the trade union press deals with in depth and with exceptional expertise are immensely numerous. These include, above all, the complex questions of national nutrition and food prices, but also the welfare of war-disabled persons, job placement, etc., in other words, the entire complex of socio-political issues as they have been enriched and exacerbated by the war and its consequences. New institutions, such as the working groups with the Entrepreneurs, were initiated and required journalistic information, preparation, and support. On the other hand, there is almost no profession that has not been affected by the raw materials calamity and, consequently, by wartime legislation. These phenomena require increased vigilance on the part of the trade press and necessitate a deeper penetration into professional issues. Due to this, as well as to the professional issues that directly concern workers, such as the training of young industrial workers, combined with the apprenticeship question, the maintenance of an experienced workforce in the profession, the female worker question, and more, all these highly important issues often compel

the press to address professional issues in as much detail as possible. p. 99 ( 119) From the German trade union press. · 99 The opponents of the policies of the Social Democratic parliamentary majority are placing the most serious pressure on the unions. Accusations are thrown at them, the meaning of which is that the unions, by unconditionally adhering to what is called the "policy of August 4th," have abandoned the principles of their existence, the class struggle, etc., that they have become "nationalist," and the like. Apart from the rejoinder that class struggle has never been and can never be an end in itself for the unions, doubts arise as to whether those making these accusations even see the union press. It is therefore instructive to familiarize ourselves with some statements, randomly compiled from the papers of the past few weeks, about how the union press envisions the organizations' immediate tasks. Given the well-known agreement of opinion and fundamental views in general within leading union circles, every such omission is noteworthy. In an editorial, "The Future of the Workers," the "Metallarbeiter-Zeitung" (No. 39 of September 23rd) after the recently published book by G. Myers, "History of the Great American Fortunes," the horrific ruthlessness of capitalist exploitation in North America and then comes to the conclusion: "Let us look around in the German steel industry to see whether there are not at least some beginnings of a complete transition to 'American' conditions here too? Let us also consider the tremendous strengthening of capitalist power now experienced precisely through the gigantic war profits. One must truly fear for the future of the German working class when we see that enormous masses of wage workers, threatened with enslavement, still indifferently allow the terrible doom to approach, quarrel among themselves over trivialities, pursue mindless nonsense, and even counteract the liberation efforts of the trade union organizations with spiteful criticism and super-clever talk. Man of work, wake up! It's about your future, about your freedom, about the future of your children and grandchildren! The capitalist polyp is powerfully spreading. Your place is in the union, brother of work! Wake up, for it's about the whole thing! Does the view expressed in this warning cry testify to a abandonment of time-tested union principles, to a renunciation of the true purpose of the unions: to raise the material and cultural situation of the working class, supported by the strength of completely independent workers' organizations? We encounter the same view, for example, in an article on the "devaluation of wages" that was printed in several union organs. We take the following quote from the "Töpfer" (No. 37 of September 9): "The aim then is to balance the difference between wages and inflation, to eliminate the devaluation of wages caused by the latter. That this union effort on the part of the workers, although

entirely justified, will not meet with great resistance seems completely out of the question. In most cases, the entrepreneurs, whose interests lie on the opposite side, will oppose these efforts with all their might and vehemence. Thus, violent clashes between capital and labor are likely to ensue, in which the quick-wittedness of each organization will play a decisive role. . . . It is our duty to point this out now. It echoes in the admonition: Strengthen your union organizations, keep them ready for battle! The unions have great and difficult, but also extremely necessary, tasks to accomplish after the war. Above all, they must eliminate the devaluation of wages caused by the war. This alone contains an entire program; its smooth implementation, however, depends on our strength and unity. Therefore, let's start propaganda for the union, diligently prepare the necessary work for the future! Various other union papers, in discussing the situation in their profession, conclude that the position of workers will be threatened after the war, that it is important to keep the organizations combat-ready and to strengthen them. p. 101 ( 121) From the German trade union press. 101 From this point of view, all the union papers that have already taken a position on the results of the Social Democratic Reich Conference regret that "actually everything remains the same" (quoted from the "Holzarbeiter-Zeitung" No. 40 of September 30). "In our opinion, with some goodwill, it would have been possible," the "Holzarbeiter-Zeitung" continues, "to achieve an understanding at least to the extent that the differences could be resolved in a comradely manner in the future. . . . The fratricidal struggle will continue in its previous, repulsive manner, thus causing further serious harm to the workers." In "Grundstein" (No. 40, September 30), A. Winnig writes a report on the conference he attended as a delegate under the heading "Destroyed Hopes," expressing the same sense of disappointment over the failed unification. He then continues: "Whether this process of separation will lead to complete separation cannot yet be foreseen, and it is at least not entirely inconceivable that the unifying forces will strengthen sufficiently by the time of the Peace Party Congress to prevent the actual and formal separation. Such forces exist, but they are still too weak to prevail today..." In his further exposition, Comrade Winnig seeks to explain the origin of the current crisis in the labor movement and writes the following: "This crisis is a growth disease of the party, from which we have long suffered, but which has assumed an acute state due to the war. When the working class first awoke and became aware of its position and its tasks, it could arrive at no other political method than fundamental opposition to the ruling classes. For these classes were older than it and had distributed all power among themselves. The young proletariat stood outside the state organism; it was merely a working and

suffering member of the economic body politic. Thus, the task of the workers' movement was, above all, a ruthless struggle against the existing order. But the older the movement became and the stronger it grew, the greater the sum of goods it won for the working class. These were positions of political power, this was an increased share in the profits of the national economy. The longer this process continued, the more the working class felt compelled to consider preserving and defending what had been achieved. Thus, the essence of our movement took on a new dimension. But every time it was a question of constructive action, of creating or preserving something new, the ingrained habit of the oppositional stance, of the revolutionary gesture, rebelled against the imposition of a change of front. . . ." And applying this method of observation to assess the national defense question and the recent crisis, the article concludes: "The comforting prospect lies in the fact that it is the old and historically obsolete that today opposes the new tactical position. According to human judgment, this dispute can end only with the victory of the new perspective, drawn from actual conditions. We will overcome the dispute all the sooner the stronger our movement is for the future." In our time of great controversy within the labor movement over the questions of "international" and "national," it deserves special emphasis that the German trade union press has remained true to its best traditions. It is unable to construct a contradiction between these two terms, and so this thread is often taken up to express the hope for the restoration of international trade union relations after the war. Are many people aware, for example, of the telling fact that the international trade union organs based in Germany, which are usually published trilingually by the international trade union secretaries, appeared without interruption throughout the entire war? p. 103 ( 123) The Transition to a Peace Economy. 103 ERNST MEHLICH. The Transition to a Peace Economy. 1. The Reich Commissariat for Transitional Economy. While the cannons still thunder and an end to the terrible massacre of nations is not in sight, the German Reich government has created an office to organize the transition from a wartime to a peacetime economy. The Hamburg Senator Dr. Sthamer, appointed Reich Commissioner, has thus been entrusted with a task on whose solution the future of our national economy will depend for several years after the war. It encompasses a large, almost incalculable number of individual issues and touches on the important interests of all sections of the population, especially the working class. Many equally important questions are indirectly related to this, and it will be the duty of the social classes involved to oppose an overly narrow limitation of the institution according to their substantive competence. Furthermore, efforts must be made to ensure that it is based on the most

popular foundation possible. Only understanding cooperation between equal representatives can prevent later disappointments. Of course, we are not thinking of a composition like that of the rightly much-contested Advisory Board of the War Food Office. Rather, we must strive for a representation that takes into account the number and importance of the relevant sections of the population, which, in a word, is composed proportionally. It might be objected that this would neglect industry and large-scale agriculture. To which it would be replied that their importance for the national economy must in any case provide the basis for all measures. Moreover, their political influence is far-reaching enough that their interests are adequately protected. Such a proportionally composed representation must not be too small, because in view of the number and complexity of the individual questions, a larger circle of qualified experts guarantees greater productivity. Thus, a truly democratically composed representation whose responsibilities are not too narrowly limited must be considered a prerequisite for an appropriate organization of the transitional economy. 2. Industrial employment. Since the German Reich is predominantly industrial, the development of our industrial economy after the war will undoubtedly be the focus of discussions. There is no question that industry will face a difficult situation with the cessation of hostilities. Production for the war will cease, and the export industry has lost many markets as a result of the war, and their recovery seems hopeless. While there is no reason to fear that the resolutions of the Paris Economic Conference will be fully implemented, it must be expected that former markets will be lost, entirely or for the most part, as a result of several years of supply from foreign industries. Sales, however, are the main prerequisite for the production of goods. Now, the Reich Commissioner and his industrial advisors cannot create new markets during the war. What he can do now, however, is to make thorough determinations about the market's capacity with regard to the type and quantity of goods at home and in the allied countries. 1 That American industry, in particular, is already eagerly considering plans to displace German products is evident from a report by JWT Mason in the "Daily Express" of August 10 (see "Vorwärts" No. 232: "American Peace Preparations"). It states, among other things, that the American munitions factories reaped such enormous profits during the war that they can attempt to conquer the markets previously dominated by the Germans without much risk and can be content with minimal results. In any case, America's participation in isolating German trade would cause enormous damage to our export industry. p. 105 ( 125) The Transition to a Peacetime Economy. 105 German and neutral countries. Since German industry will have to resume

the fight for the world market and can only expect greater success in the foreseeable future, a distribution of the determined production in accordance with its capacity can ensure perhaps weak, but consistent employment during the transition period. This involves, by all accounts, a considerable number of orders. First of all, the war destroyed much that must be replaced: factories, railway bridges, ships, automobiles, bicycles, wagons, etc. The railways, whose material was badly damaged, will have a great need; many factories that gave up peacetime production as a result of the transition to war material production and had to leave some machines and equipment unused or use them excessively, must consider supplementing them. This entire demand must be recorded and allocated equally to the companies in order to relaunch the peacetime economy, taking into account existing orders. In this way, the necessary "conversion" of industry will pose no greater difficulties than the "adjustment" to wartime production, facilitated by excessively high prices. 3. The supply of raw materials. Of course, one essential prerequisite still needs to be met for the resumption of peacetime production: namely, the availability of the necessary raw materials. Many companies could operate profitably even during the war if the war had not deprived them of this prerequisite. For many of these industries—we only need to think of the textile industry—the market is open, stocks are almost exhausted; they need not worry about sales, but can count on increased capacity upon the conclusion of peace. In such a situation, they must obviously be granted a special claim to the use of available shipping space. For this is the p. 106 ( 126) 106 The Transition to Peacetime economy. A question that must be resolved in the supply of raw materials; organizing a graduated use of cargo space according to need. The reduction in shipping capacity brought about by the war, which only allows for a gradual replenishment of the depleted raw material stocks, can plunge us into the greatest difficulties, which is why precautionary management will be particularly necessary here. The better this succeeds, the sooner a certain economic equilibrium can be achieved. The prerequisite, however, is precise knowledge of the most basic requirements, since, after all, other needs of our economy—just think of the food supply—must be satisfied through imported goods. It must be avoided at all costs that individual industries stock up at the expense of others whose production is much more important at the time. As long as the most basic necessities are lacking, the satisfaction of luxury needs is out of the question.2 2 The importance that industry attaches to the issue of raw material procurement is evident from a communication sent to the War Committee of German Industry sent to the press in August 1916. According to this, since the beginning of the year, the

committee has been dealing with the procurement of raw materials in numerous commissions immediately after the conclusion of peace and has collected valuable statistical material, which will be compiled in a memorandum and presented to the Reich Commissioner. The establishment of a raw materials procurement company is also described as imminent. The establishment of an import trading company for German industry, announced at the end of August, is probably related to this, from which it can be seen that industrialists have risen up in time to protect their interests. However, the final regulation will probably still have to be discussed in the Reichstag. But not only industry, but also the skilled trades are stirring. The Rhenish Craftsmen's Association demands in a resolution: "In the existing regulation of raw materials supplies, and in any case, the regulation that will continue after the conclusion of peace, the legitimate interests of the skilled trades, especially the purchasing centers of the raw materials cooperatives, must be given sufficient consideration." These wishes can undoubtedly only be met by a state-controlled organization that also has influence over distribution. p. 107 ( 127) The Transition to a Peacetime Economy. 107 Therefore, imports must not become the object of speculation, since it has been proven that greed for profit is the greatest danger to regulated supplies; otherwise, too many bitter experiences of wartime would be repeated. What is needed is an organization that, independent of all considerations of profit, takes general interests into account. A wide variety of proposals are already being made, but it will not be easy to create an institution that suits all parties involved. The question must be raised here as to whether the critical period of transition is precisely the right time for such economic experiments. During the war, the raw materials companies founded at the instigation of the Reich and strongly influenced by it managed the stocks and import of raw materials. They are emergency institutions, but precisely for that reason, it will be expedient to allow them to continue as long as the emergency lasts. Whether they should continue to exist or be replaced by state, private, or mixed monopolies will be discussed later; in general, it can be assumed that the final decision will be determined more by fiscal than by purely economic needs. But this is only incidental: the wartime companies are certainly still capable of improvement, and the war lasted long enough to gain a wealth of experience, while new organizations had to start all over again. For the reasons stated, efforts to see trade immediately restored to its former rights must also be rejected. It cannot be denied that wholesale trade, in particular, has, as the saying goes, a keen nose for economic needs. As long as it can draw on abundant resources, it will do its job even in times of need. But the moment a need has to be met with

diminished resources, it fails miserably, as wartime experience has shown. Then it becomes particularly clear that the principles of capitalism contradict general interests. Free trade can only plunge the transitional economy into new difficulties, which the people as a whole must be spared. Therefore, both procurement and distribution must be controlled by the Reich. 4. Currency Improvement. The Reich can all the less dispense with such control, as raising the value of German money abroad is one of the most important tasks in concluding peace. The value of the currencies of all belligerent states has certainly fallen considerably, and an improvement in their exchange rates after the war can be assumed with certainty. However, as long as the former value is not even remotely restored, we must pay so dearly for the food and raw materials we need from abroad that normal conditions are not imminent. We must also expect considerably lower export prices. The dangers arising from such a situation affect our entire economy; above all, the workforce would be harmed, since it can be assumed that the higher production costs of industry would have an adverse impact on wages. However, the reduced wages would be offset by expensive food. The low value of our currency is a consequence of the deterioration in the balance of payments brought about by the constriction of Germany. The strong demand for food and raw materials that is to be expected after the war, and on the other hand the difficulties that stand in the way of an immediate resumption of exports, give rise to fears of a further deterioration in the balance of payments at that time. The more haphazardly purchases abroad are made, the less this fear can be dismissed. Now that the greater part of the gold has been withdrawn from circulation, payment in this metal is almost impossible; moreover, a larger outflow of gold to combat the depreciation of the currency would be economically and politically undesirable. The only option left is to influence imports and exports, which can be carried out by a state p. 109 ( 129) From the "revolutionary mass will". 109 dominated center is most likely possible. In doing so, a distinction must be made between the greater and lesser necessity of needs, and the gradual but uniform supply of the domestic market must be envisaged as the goal. Even if the entire population had to impose certain general restrictions on its needs for some time, this would not be as bad as if haphazard trade allowed the excessive satisfaction of luxury needs, while on the other hand the most basic necessities were still lacking. By controlling exports, two birds are killed with one stone. When the improvement in the currency has been achieved and a uniform supply of the market appears assured, one can still talk about changing the system. RICHARD SCHILLER: On the "revolutionary mass will". Editorial Preliminary Remarks: The minority repeatedly claims that a

tremendous revolutionary energy is currently alive among the masses; the majority is systematically seeking to break this revolutionary mass will. Comrade Richard Schiller, who himself served in the army for a long time and now lives among the miners of the Silesian industrial region as editor of our Waldenburg party newspaper, writes us a lengthy article about the validity of this claim, which represents a fundamental and cornerstone of minority policy. The following paragraphs are taken from it: THE Social Democracy is a mass party, but it is still far from the mass party it would have to be if it wanted to violently fall into the arms of the fury of war. It comprises only a small fraction of the "mass." Even if we were to weigh the intrinsic value of the "mass" only by the number of Social Democratic votes, it is not sufficient for a Socialist victory, and how much less so if we were to weigh it by the gold content of the inwardly strengthened conviction p. 110 ( 130) 110 On the "revolutionary mass will". - wanted to weigh in. If the masses had been more advanced in their socialist understanding than they actually are today, then the tremendous catastrophe we are now experiencing would certainly not have occurred at all, or at least would not have been able to maintain the extent that it is growing day by day. We must therefore come to terms with our conscience and, let's say, recognize the status quo. If we are honest enough with ourselves to admit the reality of our socialist mass immaturity, then we must at the same time admit that we lack the only and absolutely successful revolutionary means to end the war through direct action. We lacked it before the war, it still did not grow decisively during the war, and will only become great and powerful after the war, not among one people, but among all peoples. Here is the Relearning is an unconditional duty of conscience. One must answer this question for oneself and for the "masses" before inaugurating a policy in the name of the "masses" in the midst of a situation of agonizing helplessness of peoples and states. But these statements about the revolutionary preconditions essentially only describe the state of the socialist crisis at the beginning of the war. And then, the sense of historical reality, as it is still represented by the majority of the party, seemed to have been far clearer than it is now, after these two terrible years. Now the men of the minority have withdrawn from the beneficial influence of this historical sense and are desperately wandering. They are deceiving themselves and, what is more dangerous, they are deceiving certain sections of the working class about the nature and effectiveness of revolutionary means! They claim that the revolutionary will, which was not particularly vibrant before the war, is now penetrating with elemental power through the horrors of war. The extent to which honest conviction influences views here will not be examined. Suffice it to say that

propaganda makes it somewhat difficult to assume good faith on the part of the minority in all its forms. In any case, the minority wants to assert that the revolutionary mass will now wants and can influence things. This immediately raises questions about the critical mind. If it is true that the revolutionary mass will is primary and the leaders only want to be considered secondary, then the method with which these same leaders, for their part, repeatedly whip up the "masses" to keep their passions afloat is surprising. One can speak of whipping in the truest sense of the word, and in this case, one need not even cite only the Spartacus Group as an example, but can also point to the Working Group. There is only a slight difference between the Liebknecht-Luxemburg Group's leaflet and the Working Group's leaflet against the Party Executive in terms of mass strike propaganda. In the former, the Party Executive is hit in the face with a dog whip, while in the latter, "shamelessness," "treason," and similar phrases are spat in its face. In both cases, the effort is to influence the "masses" by every means of arousal. One wonders why this is necessary, and why it is repeatedly attempted in doubly and trebly intensified forms, when the revolutionary consciousness of the masses is awakened and ready to will. Once consciousness is awakened, awakened from the circumstances, then one needs no whip, no tickle to keep it awake. But if one wants to whip consciousness awake with these reprehensible means, then all this talk of executing the conscious will of the masses is nonsense; then one is not acting according to the law of the Marxist conception of history, but is working according to the ideological methods of anarchism. With this method, one ends up claiming, on the one hand, that the active will of the masses is marching, and on the other hand, one believes one must make proposals for action to the same masses. Here the game becomes a farce. What the "masses" understand by action is not learned, and what the "pushed" leaders of the "masses" understand by it is not really learned either. They are not so revolutionary as to say what should happen, what means should help the mass will to victory. But now let us try to get an idea of whether the gravity of the mood out in the field and at home has really reached the point where it can hourly turn into revolutionary, all-destroying fury. For that can only be understood by "a willingness to act," as a recent editorial in "Gleichheit" put it. The author of this essay may perhaps express his opinion on this with more justification than many others. He has spent a year experiencing the mood in the field, and during the rest of the time, the mood in a large industrial region. Bitterness, anger, even hatred against this and that phenomenon, both inside and outside, are abundant. Outside, hundreds of thousands of people, even those who are not Social Democrats, feel the accursed fate of this war,

and fatal manifestations of class life, which have not been abolished outside either, are likewise carried around as bitter afterthoughts. It is always the same feelings, driven by the same causes, among us as among the enemy. And despite all this, the men endure the unspeakably terrible: ten to sixteen days of barrage on the Somme and elsewhere... Moods, individual moods, are always present, the rifle to throw away. But this is not the mass mood from which Liebknecht and others hope to achieve their goal. If those out there do not "turn the guns around," they refrain from doing so not out of fear of hardship and death, but because they recognize the senselessness of such an undertaking and know that they can bring peace neither to themselves nor to their loved ones at home through such a step. They understand that they have to defend the fatherland's borders deep inside the enemy's territory, and not just on the Rhine and the Oder, until the enemy is willing to give up the intention of overthrowing the borders. And this mass will is, at this moment, essential for the German p. 113 ( 133) On the "Revolutionary Mass Will". 113 people and for the entire future of Europe more important than another "mass will" that leads the German troops back to the borders, drags the enemy after them, and ultimately drags civil war and foreign troops into the country. But we also recognize the lack of revolutionary preconditions in something else: in the behavior of women. The suffering of war, which weighs particularly on the female sex, which is mentally and physically hardly less than that of the man outside, does not drive women to large-scale revolutionary actions of desperation. The excesses that occurred here and there had nothing to do with revolutionary will and did not even come close to the terrible will of the bourgeois women of Paris who dragged their Monsieur Capet tooth and nail from Versailles to the capital, showed him the empty bakeries, and delivered him as a prisoner to the town hall. The mental and physical suffering of the women of the poorer classes is, however, infinitely greater today than it was in 1789. Men after men are pushed away from their wives. The father goes off to war, the boy, just nineteen years old, follows. What is the meaning of husband and mother's pain? It is stifled in women's hearts and replaced with the terrible imperative: You must bear boys, boys for the war, for the defense of the country. The woman lives a torn life, filled with immense worry about feeding her family, yet silently and patiently joins the war effort with its unworthy work. And here, too, the same picture emerges among her own people as among the enemy, and everywhere the same will to bear the monstrous torment and not to throw it off. And today, one thoughtlessly or stubbornly overlooks this mass psychological condition. In his 1907 work "The Social Revolution," Kautsky warned in forceful and convincing terms against a

revolutionary change in conditions as a result of war. He said at the time: 30/3 p. 114 ( 134) 114 Silent Scene. 990 One could not wish for war as a means of unleashing revolution. For it is the most irrational means to this end." He then goes on to describe the horrors of an invasion and how enormous and insurmountable the difficulties would be for the revolutionary people to win under these circumstances. And finally, Kautsky crushes any further revolutionary optimism with the following reasons: 990 . . A revolution that springs from a war sometimes coincides with a failure of the revolutionary class, if the war prematurely calls upon the revolutionary class to solve tasks for which it is still too weak." -- This sensible idea was developed by the Kautsky of 1907; the Kautsky of 1916 seems to consider the "revolutionary class" more mature and "stronger." One should beware of political and revolutionary counterfeiting. Only the actual behavior of the "masses" is the standard by which the value of their maturity and the degree of their political willpower can be measured. And the behavior of the people is clearly recognizable to this day: It is bitter and angry, but it is not revolutionary. ERICH K. SCHMIDT: DE Silent scene. Autumn has unfurled golden flags. Yellow and red billow from all the trees. The last green leaves undergo hasty metamorphoses: It could be that an envious wind would come and tear them down before they burned in the colors of their luminous death. Then they would writhe on the ground in dirty brown beneath indifferent human feet. Who hears their cries? The flowerbeds are ablaze with color. In circles, squares, and ovals, the flowers rejoice in their last song, as if heading for victories, high festivals, with magnificent sounds. And yet it only leads into white nights, filled with the cold breath of extinction. p. 115 ( 135) Silent scene. 115 I greet the sanguine children of great Mother Earth with sad eyes; but behind blocks of ice I already see new, colorful shoots, even before the wind ruffles the last blossoms. The sun paints stripes of victorious yellow. Where the cool, white benches stand under tall trees, moistened by the night's dew, it shimmers warmly, as if friendly eyes were greeting; as if a new summer wanted to unfold in the bay between benches and trees. The last embers well up in the brownish gravel, as if children were about to once again perform their noisy dances. Or, lost in thought, dig their seeds. But behind the wide sandy path stretches the speckled carpet of asters, woolly and warm; it stretches wide, held up by the stems like pillars above the cool earth. I sit down on the bench at the apex of the bay; the sun has already absorbed the dew. To the right and left, in the foreground of the semicircle, two empty benches face each other. They stand bare and white, in the balsamic sun, purposeless, without significance. One wishes they were laden with human weight. A slurping sound emanates from the gravel where,

behind the benches, lush bushes arch their gold-sprinkled branches. The rounded back of a sick man appears, supported by a cane, with hand-width strides. One sees that he has been dragging his burden for decades. His face is wrinkled with weariness and pain. Bitter feelings hang in the pinched corners of his mouth. Thorns bend his back crookedly. At his side, in a black coat and black cap, with a young face, walks the nurse. Her eyes are full of nervous alertness, her hands hovering at the ready. A thick pillow for the sick man hangs in her armpit. This becomes a Left hand pushed back and forth. The back marker is filled with a thousand little wishes. His eyes become fixed and violent if his will is not obeyed before it is spoken. The nurse pulls a ball of wool and a torso of stockings from her pocket to knit. Peace wants to fill her face. Then the sick man twitches back and forth. His coat forms a hard crease beneath him. It must be removed. The nurse helps smooth out the coat with one hand. It is not easy, as the sick man hardly moves. But it succeeds. But then the ball of wool rolls from the nurse's hands deep under the bench. The girl crawls around on the floor, red-faced, while the sick man stares rigidly and unmoved at the ground. His hands lie limply on his knees. The stick is between them. Just as the nurse repeats her 30/3 p. 116 ( 136) 116 Silent scene.  Work begins. With a brief glance at the broad aster fanes, the sick man twitches back and forth on his pillow again. His place lies only in a band of shadow, yet he wants to feel the sun. They exchange seats. It is to be seen as a laborious procedure. O young girl, you, with your renunciation on your face. With your silent humility in your eyes. Always helpful. Subject to every sick whim. My soul trembles with admiration. But I wish for you a near, stormy redeemer who will tear your bonds asunder. Who will lead you to laughing lands. Who will free you from your nightmare before your youth withers under sick breath, as this summer withers under cool showers, frosty swirls that overwhelm it at night. . . . And there is a rustling in the gravel. Footsteps that arrogantly hurl the sand before them. A young soldier. He strolls, hands in his pockets, onto the bench on the right and sits down. down. His gait is elastic. The fires of youth lie veilless and undimmed in his eyes. One senses the taut muscles beneath the gray cloth. The play of tendons. The rapid rolling of blood. The soldier's eyes rest carelessly on the colorful asters, above which a late butterfly sways. His hands light a cigarette with short handles. Blue smoke curls through the autumn sun. But suddenly his gaze fixes, hypnotized. He sees his counterpart: the sick man, who has slowly raised his eyes and is piercing the soldier with long, straight, pointed gaze. Seconds pass. They do not move. The nurse interrupts her work and looks back and forth between the two. They do not move. It is as if their eyes were connected by a steel band. And slowly, from the

conglomerate of emotions that entwine in the sick man's eyes, a sharp ray of envy emerges, and suddenly there is a yellow ecstasy of horror within it. The sick man's hands begin to tremble. His knees vibrate. The stick clatters into the gravel. The soldier rolls his eyes to the side. His face twitches, and he jumps up. The end of his cigarette falls into aster blood. He whistles a bright melody. He walks with incredibly light and healthy steps around the bushes, which are slowly shedding their gold. The sick man closes his eyelids as if in a spasm. The young nurse bends down anxiously for his stick. p. 117 ( 137) The Dress of Poverty. 117 FRIGGA BROCKDORFF-NORDER: The Dress of Poverty. Dress of poverty, how gray you are, dress of poverty, worn in tears, a pale, muffled woman - has shyly wrapped you around her shoulders. Not in front of the mirror in candlelight, curved towards blooming lips, . . . . no, in dark, threatening Shrine—you have been dragged silently from the corner. No face shines brightly above you, no one ties you with silken ribbons, you feel how young limbs ripen in languishing greed towards misery. You see how from eyes so sore, so sore, wicked, bitter drops fall, you feel how a mouth mournful with death longs to drink its deepest refreshment. Your wrinkles, so stiff and gray, soon twitch in final pain, garment of poverty, why do you lie gray over weary hearts? Glosses. - Shaw on the English. - From: "The Man of Destiny" or "The Commander of the Battle" (Napoleon I). Shaw's works by S. Fischer (Volume II, page 249). "The English are a race apart. No Englishman is too low to have scruples, and none high enough to be exempt from their tyranny. But every Englishman is born with a wonderful talisman that makes him master of the earth. When the Englishman wants something, he never admits to himself that he wants it. He waits patiently until God knows how deep a conviction arises within him that it is his moral and religious duty to subjugate those who have what he wants. Then he becomes irresistible. Like the aristocrat, he does what he pleases and snatches after what he lusts after. Like the shopkeeper, he pursues his purpose with the industry and perseverance that come from strong religious conviction and the deep sense of moral responsibility. He is never at a loss for an effective moral pose. As a great champion of freedom and national independence, he conquers half the world, takes possession of it, and calls it "colonization." When he needs a new market for his shoddy Manchester goods, he sends missionaries to preach the gospel of peace to the savages. The savages kill the missionary; now he rushes to arms in defense of Christianity, fights and conquers for his faith, and takes possession of the market as a divine reward. To defend his island shores, he takes a ship's chaplain on board, nails a flag with a cross to the mainmast, and sails thus to the ends of the earth, drilling into the bottom, burning, and destroying everything that disputes his supremacy on

the sea. He boasts that every slave will be free as soon as his foot sets foot on British soil; He sells the children of his poor to factory owners when they are barely six years old and makes them perform sixteen hours of slave labor under the whip every day. He makes two revolutions and then declares war on our people in the name of law and order. Nothing is so bad and nothing is so good that you will not see an Englishman accomplish it, but you will never be able to prove an Englishman wrong. For he does everything on principle. He wages war on patriotic principle, he cheats on business principle, he enslaves free peoples on imperial political principle, he treats you roughly on manly principle, he remains loyal to his king on loyal principle, and he beheads his king on republican principle. His motto is always "his duty!" And he never forgets that the nation that seeks its duty where its advantage cannot be found is doomed. The redeeming formula. For the wavering figures who can no longer find their way in these difficult times, the redeeming formula has now been found. It is very simple and has only three points, which are: 1. I was initially in favor of approving the war loans. 2. I was then against approving the war loans. 3. I have not changed my conviction in the slightest. This ingenious formula has met with such resonance that it is used daily in one form or another in the press of the Social Democratic opposition. p. 119 ( 139) Die Woche. 119 DIE Die Woche. October 18. The German parliament has closed its general debate on the oral report of its Budget Committee on foreign policy without the Reich Chancellor, his deputy, or the head of the Foreign Office speaking. That was on Wednesday, October 11, 1916. After the end of the debate, which the two Social Democratic factions had voted against, rapporteur Bassermann was able, despite loud cries for adjournment, to present a very concise but entirely factual report "of the Committee on the Reich Budget, concerning the discussion of matters of foreign policy and war during the adjournment in the Committee on the Reich Budget." Then, at 6:13 p.m., the weary were relieved, and in the next few days there were interpellations about potato supplies. Will the debate on Bassermann's speech and the motion underlying it result in further statements from the Chancellor? Or will his monologue remain a monologue? Thus, the question mark continues to reign. The question mark and the denial. The latter was used lavishly in matters of rumors about a so-called separate peace with Russia. Every beautification council already knew that the time had come. From Katowice to Lindau, they whispered the great secret to their customers while rubbing their cheeks with caustic war shaving soap. And the newspapers, which shape the other public opinion, whipped up the lather, delivering enlightened descriptions of Mr. Protopopov's body and soul, so that the reader's eyes would well up at the twinkle between the

lines, and he would say to his lovely companion of his days over his morning drink, as knowing as a lecturer on Wilhelmstrasse: "You watch out, Helene, something's happening with the Russians, yes, Protopopov, he's the right man!" Well, when everything was so firm and certain that even those in charge in the German federal states heard something about it , the denial came. First in the Swiss press, it was carried out by Mr. Bibikow, who was formerly the legation secretary at the Russian Embassy in Munich and now represents the ailing Chargé d'Affaires in Bern. The diplomat in question, whose praiseworthy overzealousness made his departure from the Bavarian capital somewhat stormy, also put a measure of his resentment into his denial p. 120 ( 140) 120 Die Woche. and spoke spitefully of the "understandable effort to misrepresent hopes as reality." The Swiss newspapers then received this message from the responsible German authority in Bern: "The rumors circulating in some local newspapers about alleged German-Russian peace negotiations are in fact completely unfounded. The Russian embassy here claims in its statement yesterday that these rumors originate from German newspapers and adds the remark that, however, "the attempt to present hopes as reality" is understandable. It is thus attempting to retroactively shift responsibility for the origin of the news from the Russian press to the German press, which in fact has not reported a word about it. The attentive newspaper reader, who knows the source of the reports circulating for months, is naturally inclined to question the intention behind such a diversion." The responsible German authority is not entirely wrong regarding the earlier "circulated reports." They came directly and indirectly from Petrograd and were intended to promote certain Russian financial activities in London. However, in the reports that had been circulating for weeks, Aunt Voss's declarations of love for Russia were just as effective midwives as the profound review articles in the "Berliner Kreuzzeitung." When Mr. Spahn's solemn declaration about the Dardanelles was added to the chatter of the "initiates," the whispering really began. Such illusionary politics can only be harmful. The Entente wants to decide the war through war. This must be reckoned with militarily and politically. And it will be necessary to draw the appropriate political and economic conclusions both internally and externally, and especially not to postpone decisions such as those concerning Poland's fate, because habitual indecision cannot resist "taking hope for reality." However, the Reichstag, if it does not want to jeopardize its existence at a time when even the National Liberals are pining for the parliamentary system, should finally demand definite answers to certain questions and, as politely as forcefully, bring to the attention of state secretaries seeking merriment the very bloody seriousness of our German

and European times. Note! In No. 29, a technical oversight placed Wilhelm Jansson's name above Stauning's letter to Vandervelde as the author's name, thus creating the erroneous impression that the translation originated from Jansson. Rather, it originated from Stauning himself. p. 121 ( 141) DIE GLOCKE 31st Issue 28th October 1916 2nd Year Reprint of all articles with detailed source references permitted Dr. PAUL LENSCH, M. d. R.: O, my Austria! EVEN in enemy countries it must have become clear that no political business can be made with Friedrich Adler's revolver shots, which ended the life of the Austrian Prime Minister Count Stürgkh. They are the act of a mentally ill person whose nervous system was no longer able to cope with the strains that the World War also placed on those who remained at home. There are many such unfortunate war victims, in all professions and in all countries, although fortunately the final collapse rarely occurs in such a gruesome manner as in Friedrich Adler's case. The fact that this was a Social Democrat as the perpetrator and a political The fact that the assassination was the final result appears, in this context, to be a coincidence. Precisely because of his political views, the unfortunate man had to withdraw from his deed, since the Social Democrats had always and with the utmost emphasis rejected and condemned the "politics" of assassinations. Nevertheless, the assassination provides an opportunity to take a look at the politics for which Count Stürgkh was responsible and against which the crime was formally directed. Almost all newspapers agree that the murdered man lacked almost all the qualities that would make him a suitable target for a political assassination. He was the typical representative of the muddler's-bone politics, neither cold nor warm, without brilliant ideas or great political goals. Not popular with the parties, but not hated either, even if he lacked trust and was completely unpopular. Anyone who wasn't an avid newspaper reader and politician probably didn't know his name. This was the man whom Austria saw at its helm during the most terrible crisis this state had ever experienced in its crisis-ridden history. The other countries involved in the war weren't exactly headed by overwhelming geniuses either; after all, Count Stürgkh was the most unassuming figure among his colleagues. The complaints raised against his regime were initially the same as those heard more or less loudly in all belligerent countries: inadequate food supplies, excessive censorship of the press, and bans on assemblies. Especially in restricting the press, the Austrian censor even beat his French colleague, and that's really saying something. But all these grievances, which are just as loud in the countries of the Quadruple Alliance as in those of the Central Powers, were felt much more deeply in Austria than elsewhere, for here the outlet of popular representation was lacking. Since March 16, 1914, the

Austrian Reichsrat has been closed, and Count Stürgkh has refused to listen to the ever-repeated and increasingly urgent representations of the party leaders, to whom most members of the House of Lords also joined! Why did he do this? The difficulties facing the convening of the Reichsrat need not be overlooked. For example, the Czechs demanded that all elected representatives exercise their mandate. This in itself self-evident demand has only the minor drawback that some Czech representatives, such as Kramarz, have been convicted of high treason. In contrast, the overwhelming majority of both houses of the Reichsrat, through their leaders, have expressed that they consider the convening of parliament absolutely necessary. The Christian Socials, however, wanted to ensure the Reichsrat's ability to function beforehand, namely through an imposed set of rules of procedure that was intended to make scandals and obstructions impossible. The necessity of convening the people's representatives in Austria as well has become particularly urgent in recent weeks, as the renewal of the Compromise with Hungary, which ends next year, is imminent. The Hungarian Parliament met frequently during the war, but its understandable desire to control the foreign policy of the dual monarchy repeatedly failed due to the lack of constitutional conditions in the other half of the empire. Discussion of foreign policy is only possible in delegations; only there does Mr. Burian, the director of this policy, appear and face his critics. The delegations, however, can only convene if they are re-elected annually, as required by law. The Austrian delegation was elected for the last time in November 1913. The prerequisite for their re-election would be the convening of Parliament. Thus, for the Austrians, the situation arose, not exactly uplifting, that the preliminary fight for the restoration of constitutional conditions was being waged in Parliament in Budapest, particularly by the Independence Party there, which advocates the complete constitutional separation of Hungary from Austria. Thus, Austria remained the only one among all the states involved in the war where the people's representatives were not convened. We are far from being fanatics of the parliamentary system, and how ill-suited delegations are to the tasks they are called upon to solve is well known. Finally, it is only an unintentional self-criticism of the Austrian state, if it was at all possible to govern with Section 14 even during the times of the World War. This shows how little the Reichsrat means for the life of the "kingdoms and countries united in the Reichsrat." But nevertheless, what a major southern German bourgeois newspaper wrote a week ago remains true: "One cannot expect a people that is treated as if it were mute and immature to make the sacrifices that three terrible years of war have demanded of it. One cannot expose the

authorities, which after all only consist of human beings, to the temptation to conduct business permanently without public control and under the protection of relentless censorship. One cannot allow the suspicion to grow that what has brought Austria almost to the brink of the abyss is now to be concealed, and that the ruling gentlemen are primarily concerned with this. "What is to be done is to maintain the system under which it came to this. If that were truly Count Stürgkh's intention, if he did not want to convene the Imperial Council solely in order to postpone the establishment of certain incidents and facts and thus prevent the truth about Austria from reaching those whose duty and highest interest it is to learn the truth, then it would be a truly patriotic duty to eliminate the Stürgkh Cabinet by all legal means." Thus wrote the "Frankfurter Zeitung" on October 16. Today, Stürgkh is a pale, mute man, and the question remains whether the illegal means Adler resorted to will not achieve the opposite of what Austria's best patriots have so far endeavored to achieve by legal means. In terms of toughness and resilience, the old Austria, whose imminent end was an undoubted fact not only for the Quadripartite Powers, has exceeded all expectations. What matters now, however, is the internal renewal of the old state. No one will deny that the new orientation in Austria faces entirely different difficulties than in our Reich, but no one will deny that the World War in particular presents Austria with the prerequisite for a fundamental transformation. The main source of all the special Austrian pain was, in fact, fed by the fact that this state, oriented to the southeast by virtue of its geographical location, stood with its back to the world economy. The Balkans and the Near East were not the entities from whose economic rise it could have drawn forces of recovery and rebirth. p. 125 ( 145) East Asian Preludes. 125 They themselves were still on the cusp of capitalist development. Now that this war has broken down the old barriers, and new opportunities are blossoming for the world economy and large-scale capitalist development in the Orient, Austria-Hungary's position is changing at a stroke. While it previously lay at the outermost corner of European capitalism, and Europe, in a sense, ended at its southeastern borders, it is now moving to the center, becoming a transit country and a mediator between evening and morning. With this, the sharp winds of global traffic will finally sweep through these previously somewhat remote parcels, and they will carry away much of what is old, rotten, and above ground. HEINRICH CUNOW: East Asian Preludes. A colorful change of scenery has been taking place on Japan's political stage for several months. First, the Japanese-Russian treaty of alliance of July 3, openly directed against the imperialist ambitions of the North American Union in the Pacific Ocean, which was celebrated in Japan as a world event with large public

festivals, then the growing opposition against Count Shigenobu Okuma, the "Sage of Waseda," once celebrated as a great orchid grower and worldly statesman, then the resignation of the much-celebrated figure under circumstances that almost amounted to expulsion, and now the replacement of Okuma's ministry by the cabinet of Terautchi, the favorite of the Army Party and at the same time the leading figure of the Genroin, the Japanese Senate of dignitaries. A decidedly imperialist ensemble appears on the stage, including Marshal Terautchi, the previous Governor-General of Korea, and Vice Admiral Tomosabura Kato, the most zealous operator p. 126 ( 146) 126 East Asian Preludes. of Japanese naval armaments, and also the previous Japanese ambassador in Petersburg, Baron Motono, to whom the formation of the new Japanese-Russian alliance is primarily attributed. In the foreign press, the new Terautschi cabinet is interpreted as a victory of the conservative party groups over Japanese parliamentary liberalism, that of Rikken Doschikai Katsura, which emerged from the ruins of Okuma's former creation, the Shimpɔto Party (Progressive Party). That is true. But the Terautschi ministry means something more than a mere defeat of Japanese liberalism, which, despite all its Asian complacency, is quite strongly infected by English political views. Terautschi is the elected representative of the Army Party—in Germany, we might perhaps say the General Staff Party. He has hardly any sympathy for England. ever possessed. He received his education in France, in Paris, where he also served as military attaché from 1882 to 1885. Upon returning to Japan, he advanced quickly, participated in the heavy fighting on Formosa, and lost an arm. Nevertheless, in 1902 he was appointed Minister of War, a position in which, it is said, he proved himself an excellent organizer during the Russo-Japanese War. After Prince Ito, the previous Resident-General of Korea, was assassinated in October 1909 on a trip to Kharbin, and his successor, Viscount Sone, proved too weak for the "pacification" of Korea, Terautschi assumed the post of Governor-General of Korea in the spring of 1910. With ruthless energy, he enforced the pacification of Korea and then concluded the agreement with the Korean nobility that incorporated Korea into the Japanese Empire as the "Chosen" colony. This achievement, which Terautschi supplemented with the construction of strategic railways and military land and sea fortifications in Korea, significantly strengthened his standing within the General Party. At the same time, however, he became a favorite and confidant of the leading heads of the Genroin, p. 127 ( 147) East Asian Preludes. 127 of the influential Japanese Council of Elders, in which the princes Yamagata, Oyama, Matsugata, and the former Prime Minister Count Saionji set the tone today. And the conservative official hierarchy of Japan is closely linked to the

Genroin. Likewise, Admiral Kato is known as a determined imperialist. The naval officers in Japan are mostly supporters of the liberal party groups, and Kato, too, can hardly be considered an outspoken conservative. However, he is a supporter of that expansionist policy that sees the United States of America as the real adversary of the quest for a greater Japan, just as his naval construction program is primarily directed against Uncle Sam. But, and in this respect, he again approaches Terautschi and the Generals' Party: even if the battle for Japan's future must be fought on the Pacific Ocean against the Stars and Stripes, continental backing against Russia is, so to speak, the first prerequisite for its implementation. And this view likely agrees with that of Motono, who, as ambassador to the Tsar's court, skillfully pursued the policy of preventing an understanding between Russia and England in East Asia and, by exploiting the wartime emergency, persuaded the Russian government, through munitions deliveries, to conclude a treaty that would give Japan a free hand in the Chinese coastal areas of the Yellow Sea to implement his plans. The Terautschi cabinet therefore represents not only a defeat for the trade, financial, and political reform groups united in Sejukai liberalism in their struggle with the officer corps and the official hierarchy, but also a general commitment to Japanese expansionist policy. Imperialists are all Japanese politicians, both radical reformers and conservatives. The doctrine of the status quo has no hold in Japan in any party. Everyone agrees that Japan absolutely needs the annexation of new territories to fulfill its historical mission and to create space for its population surplus. p. 128 ( 148) 128 East Asian Preludes. The only point of dispute is where annexation is best begun, and whether it is more advantageous to initially pursue the annexation plans in a full or half-friendly relationship with England, with a certain degree of consideration for its Claims against Russia, or pursue them more quickly after reaching an understanding with Russia. The appointment of Terautschi means that Japan's leading circles have decided to pursue the latter path. The question of whether Japan should pursue "island policy" or "continental policy," which has repeatedly shaken the foreign policy of the Land of the Rising Sun and caused strange domestic political complications since the overthrow of the liberal Saionji Ministry by Katsura's War Cabinet in 1908, has been decided. Japan draws its conclusion from the weakening of Russia and England through the war against the European Central Powers, as well as from the strengthening of the imperialist current in the United States of America: it opts for continental policy, that is, for the establishment of a great Japanese continental empire on the shores of the inner Yellow Sea. And it seems that it does not want to wait until the Yankee Republic, suffocating in its increasing wealth, has succeeded in implementing its great naval

program and establishing naval stations in the Danish Antilles and the Galapagos Islands. Since the Peace of Shimonoseki, the fact that Japan's most fierce opponent in its expansionist efforts in China and the Pacific Ocean will be the United States has become almost a political dogma for Japanese politicians, even though shrewd Japanese diplomacy may find it advantageous to conceal this fact for the time being. Even before this, many a politician in Japan had recognized that the Pacific Ocean would play a major role in world history, and that if Japan desired a role, it would have to come into conflict with the great monetary republic on the eastern Pacific coast; but that time still seemed far in the future. p. 129 ( 149) East Asian Preludes. 129 Initially, Japan had enough to do with its internal reforms and its consolidation as a state power. But the interested concern shown by the United States government for the so-called integrity of China during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894/95, and the diplomatic-tactical position it took regarding the Peace Treaty of Shimonoseki and the opposition of Russia, France, and Germany to the annexation of the Liautung Peninsula, increased the distrust of the Union's intentions in the northern Pacific. And when the United States, without regard for Japan's claims, overthrew the native monarchy in the Hawaiian Islands in 1893 and formally annexed this archipelago in 1898, and when it further took possession of Guam and the Philippines after the Spanish-American War and equipped Manila Bay as a large naval station, it was clear to Japan's imperialist politicians that a struggle with the Yankees for dominance in East Asian waters would be "inevitable." In particular, Japanese world politicians viewed the annexation of Luzon as a direct thwarting of their plans, for after Japan had received Formosa through the Peace of Shimonoseki, they regarded this island as a sort of stopover on the way to the Philippines. To the extent that any doubts about the serious rivalry of the United States in the Pacific Ocean remained, these doubts were dispelled by the continued efforts of American capitalists to control trade and shipping in the Pacific. to draw conclusions, but above all, the founding of the Republic of Panama, carried out with North American money, and the resumption of Panama Canal construction by the American government put an end to this. Japan's imperialists saw in the creation of a connection between the Antilles Sea and the Great Ocean nothing other than a means of establishing the rule of the Star-Spangled Banner in the great "Mediterranean of the future." p. 130 ( 150) 130 East Asian Preludes. But initially, the Boxer Rebellion that had broken out in China occupied Japan's interest, as did the problem of regaining its lost role as guardian of Korea. More important than resistance to America's imperialist plans was, at first, support against Russia's intentions regarding Manchuria and Korea. This was

achieved through the treaty of alliance concluded with England in January 1902, which assured Japan of England's support in the fight against Russian ventures in northern China. After Japan had made these preparations, the Russo-Japanese War broke out in February 1904. Although it broke Russia's dominant position in Manchuria, it by no means brought Japan the desired results. The peace negotiations initiated by President Roosevelt in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, under pressure from American rivalry, left China in possession of its sovereign rights over Manchuria and transferred to Japan only the Russian leasehold rights to the Liautung Peninsula and the Russian-built railway from Port Arthur to Kwang-chengtse. Only the southern half of Sakhalin Island was granted to Japan as its actual possession. Korea was not handed over to it, but merely recognized as a political, military, and economic sphere of interest of Japan. Japan, whose finances had suffered enormously during the war, was forced by the Washington government to drop its demand for war reparations altogether: a condition that placed the country in an extremely difficult financial situation. Such peace agreements fell very short of the expectations of Japanese politicians. Street riots broke out in various Japanese cities, particularly in the capital, Tokyo. The Katsura cabinet was forced to resign. But every protest against the peace agreements was in vain. Japan had to submit. Dissatisfaction with the North American Union's interest-based policy grew, however, and when the United States banned the immigration of Japanese workers to the western states of the Union, p. 131 ( 151) East Asian Preludes. 131, and all the appeals of the Japanese ambassador in Washington proved unsuccessful, the danger of a Japanese-American war loomed ominously on the political horizon. However, with its sorry financial situation and in view of the confused Korean-Manchurian relations, Japan could not risk a new war at that moment. It recalled its ambassador, Aoki, from Washington, replaced him with the obliging Takahira, and prepared a ceremonial reception for the American demonstration squadron. First, the Manchurian question had to be resolved or at least adapted to Japanese interests. A few weeks before the conclusion of peace in Portsmouth, Japan had already renewed its treaty of alliance with England. In it, both powers promised each other mutual protection against the interference of a third power in their territorial rights, which also included Japan's protectorate over Korea and Great Britain's sovereignty over India and its border regions. Then Japan tried to reach a certain understanding with the Russian government, which, preoccupied with the revolution at home, had temporarily turned away from its Manchurian adventure. By the Russo-Japanese treaty of July 30, 1907, Russia recognized Japan's right not only to direct Korea's foreign policy, but also to place Korean national

administration and legislation under the supervision of the Japanese-appointed Resident General. The Korean judicial system was then taken over, Japanese judges appointed, the Japanese occupation army reinforced, and when an uprising broke out in Korea and Ito fell at the hands of murderers, as already mentioned, the Japanese Minister of War, Marshal Terautchi, assumed the Residency General and annexed the entire Korean territory in August 1910. This Japanese approach did not fit well into the plans of the Washington government. As early as the beginning of 1910, it attempted to counter Japanese efforts by creating the p. 132 ( 152) 132 East Asian Preludes. sought to obtain the consent of the Great Powers for the so-called neutralization of the Manchurian railways. The railways were to be transferred to the ownership and administration of an international syndicate under the supervision of the powers involved. Japan resisted this and, in a clever counter-move, concluded a new treaty with Russia on July 4, 1910, in which both states guaranteed each other their rights in Manchuria. - - With this Russo-Japanese understanding, a lower estimate of the value of English friendship took place in Japanese politics, for the view became more and more prevalent that in the event of war with the United States, England would side with America. Old traditional friendships, however, are not easily thrown overboard; Japan also concluded a new reinsurance treaty with England in 1911, but it was met with some derisive criticism in Japan because, as English diplomacy recognized quite well that England was to be indirectly obliged to provide assistance against the North American Union, it included in the treaty a clause that England was exempt from active assistance against those opponents with whom it had an arbitration treaty, and then concluded such an arbitration treaty with the United States of America. Nevertheless, when the Yamamoto compromise ministry, which had existed since 1911, collapsed at the beginning of 1914, Count Okuma was again appointed to lead the Japanese ship of state. Although he cannot exactly be considered an "Englishman," he nevertheless held the view that Japan could only implement its imperialist plans with English assistance. He was also tolerated in appointing the former Japanese ambassador in London, the liberal gentleman Kato, whom his opponents themselves refer to as "Sir Grey's private secretary," as Minister of Foreign Affairs. At first, even members of the Genroin and the high civil service found little to criticize about Okuma's policy, for the conquest of Kiautschou corresponded to the wishes of all Japanese imperialists. However, when the "Sage of Waseda," out of consideration for England, did not vigorously defend the claims made by Japan the previous spring to Fukien and all sorts of privileges in the Yangtze Valley, he was forced to disembark Lord Grey's private secretary.

Okuma now skillfully placed himself at the service of the efforts to bring about an alliance with Russia and endorsed the Japanese-Russian treaty of July. But this was not enough for Genroin. The opposition grew ever stronger. They demanded a stronger figure and found it in Terautschi. The new cabinet thus represents a shift in official Japanese policy, a stronger emphasis on imperialism. This is not to say that Terautschi will immediately proceed with complete ruthlessness. His Korean government has proven that, despite its relentless pursuit of its self-imposed goal, it knows how to wait for favorable opportunities and adapt to situations imposed upon it. Of course, it also does not lack the ability to create favorable opportunities, that is, to arrange useful incidents, and with the current tension between the Peking government and the South Chinese Cantonese Party, incidents can easily be provoked if one wishes. WALLY ZEPLER: GAVE lessons and transformations. IF there was any event that, with elemental force, could fundamentally undermine our entire worldview, it was this monstrous war of nations. Like one of the volcanic catastrophes, it broke over us, and anyone who was not already so ossified in spirit that no spark of fire wanted to ignite within them was once again irradiated by all the questions that had long since come to rest and seemed definitively answered one way or another. p. 134 ( 154) 134 Lessons and transformations. Such a storm of new trials and insights certainly roared equally over the adherents of all schools of thought and Parties. But more than any other, it had to grip us Social Democrats, and what one heard verbally or in writing from party members during these two years of war about their inner stance on a series of problems can only confirm this assumption. First and foremost, it is, of course, the political questions linked to socialism that seemed to demand new solutions. Many a Social Democrat felt completely torn from the paths of traditional thinking when he discovered within himself a passionate feeling for his own nation, the strength of which he had never previously been aware of. And here, as so often, the feeling was nothing more than the finely groping guide of thought. The apparent contradiction between the universal idea of humanity, the so-called internationalism of the labor movement, and the special love directed toward one's own people, as it was sharply revealed during the war against enemy nations, concealed only a profound error in the theoretical conception of numerous party members. The actual Development had long since driven wedge by wedge into the old socialist doctrine; new elements gradually and more and more dissolved the coherence of the earlier form. But only a few Social Democrats had become aware of the significance of these transformations or had attempted to conceptually construct the structure that seemed to be growing out of these new elements. Indeed, the

conservatism of human thought is perhaps nowhere more evident than in the unshakable tendency of even most of the majority to explain even the new actions in terms of outdated theory, old programs, dogmas, and convictions, and to present them as a consistent expression of long-followed party tactics, adapted only to the fact of war. p. 135 ( 155) Doctrines and Transformations. 135 In one respect, however, this view is justified. Where a closed political system Given that the present situation was not an ideological concept of becoming, but an idea of development based on real, factual knowledge, this war could not have come as a complete surprise, let alone disrupt the thinking of the comrades. The possibility of this terrible struggle between all civilized peoples and ethnic groups, the bloody unleashing of a power struggle that had not yet reached a state of equilibrium, must have long since found its place in the socialist worldview. This was, of course, partly the case. The outbreak of a world war was predicted as the ultimate consequence of the arms race and of "imperialism." But since both phenomena were supposedly linked to the very nature of capitalism, and since capitalism still positively dominated precisely the most advanced nations, even those with the most developed social democracy, the logical consequence would have been a realistic socialist stance on the problems of this dreaded world war, an active intervention by the socialist parties in the course of the war, promoting socialism and the working classes. Here, one wing of the party, the radical left, took this consequence into account in its demands. From the very beginning, it propagated the open rebellion of the peoples against a bloodbath that, in its view, could only bring about the struggle of interests between the capitalist classes among individual nations. The inevitable consequences of this rebellion against its own country would have been indifferent to it, indeed entirely desirable; after all, they could only accelerate the desired and hoped-for collapse of capitalism. What lay behind this collapse was, of course, shrouded in darkness, but action and thought remained in harmony, at least in the present. To those who see things differently, to whom probably the majority of the party belongs, this way of looking at things seems highly ideological because it contradicts everything that is happening before our very eyes; they see in it an eminent misunderstanding of the true relationship of forces between the individual classes, but also a misunderstanding of the will and development in the socialist movement itself, a simplification of the convoluted paths leading to socialism, which is bound to lead astray. But once again: one thing, the consistency of the thinking of the comrades at the top of the left cannot be disputed. But what about the majority? The party's history during the two war years represents

an almost helpless groping in a storm of political events, a tossing back and forth between old beliefs and new insights, between the previous socialist phraseology vis-à-vis other parties and the complete abandonment of any socialist standpoint of its own, a situation that could hardly be more hopeless. At the forefront of the flood of speeches and writings, one thing always stands out: the struggle for direction and the questions of breaches of discipline on both sides. It is both comical and tragic to read "Vorwärts" and the socialist dailies and follow the dispute over party events, which are by no means world-historical, while the earth trembles under the mighty blows of a truly world-historical event and upheavals in the history of nations are preparing that must profoundly influence all of humanity, and with it, not least, the working classes of all nations, in their future existence. The former belief in the revolutionary collapse of bourgeois society has vanished. We see the seeds and beginnings of a socialist development at a hundred points; but they all arose within specific state structures, in their various forms mostly with a specifically national character. The supporters of the labor movement, the social democratic parties, also exhibit this national character in a certain sense. Socialism will therefore—this is one of the cardinal points of our current conviction—be realized within state organizations, not simultaneously and uniformly across large areas, but in manifold, nationally diverse forms. This, first of all, indicates the direction of our work. We no longer have to prove that the working class, too, cannot be completely indifferent to the fate of the nation, that it can expect considerable material damage or, conversely, increased prosperity from the decline or rise of the country; Only on the basis of the people as a whole can the working class realize its particular class goals. The party thus becomes a responsible bearer of national policy, and its responsibility is all the heavier the stronger and more economically important part of the population the working class represents. The entire broad area of foreign policy, which determines the special position of each nation within the power groups, has so far been treated almost exclusively negatively by Social Democracy. It intervened with its criticism as soon as it perceived a tendency in its own government toward "imperialist" power development, that is, toward colonial expansion or even just an increase in land and naval forces, which brought the possibility of conflict closer. It did not establish its own positive guidelines; at most, it advocated for the rights of peoples to independence wherever the oppression of ancient civilized nations or primitive races by ruling great powers was considered. In this world war, all problems of international relations—alliances, dependencies, colonial possessions, naval power, etc.—have naturally become much more acute, or at least their significance for the

future of the proletariat has become clearly apparent even to the most superficial observer. How, then, is the party currently behaving? Even now, there were basically only two aspects for them: the old schematic condemnation of the "imperialist" striving for power, and an orientation not according to genuine considerations of state policy, but exclusively according to domestic political sympathies and antipathies. Characteristic of this is the attitude toward Russia on the one hand and England on the other. The rejection of Russian Pan-Slavism and thus supposedly the Tsarist suppression of violence, the strengthening of absolutist tendencies in our country as well, was the constantly repeated argument with which the manifestation of national sentiment in the party was virtually excused before the workers. In contrast, the "Western powers" appeared in radiant glory, with the wreath of glory of the free countries. Even if England (quite apart from the question of how great domestic political freedom really is there) exercised its ruthless tyranny in the war in the most blatant manner, even if it openly trampled on the rights of all neutrals and deprived the entire world of freedom of the seas, for a large number of Social Democratic politicians it nevertheless always remained, as the historic country of democracy and parliamentarism, the given ally, even in its relations with Germany. For Social Democracy, unlike every other party, was not primarily concerned with the interest of national economic development; for them, the belief in the influence of the domestic political conditions of one country on another was decisive, a belief that was rightly ridiculed here too when the enemy countries used it as an apparent reason for war against Prussian militarism. Yet reason and historical development should surely tell every thinking person that a mutual (and therefore indestructible) general influence in domestic politics does exist, insofar as similarity and simultaneity of certain series of developments tend to prevail among the peoples of a cultural sphere, but that direct influence through outward-directed alliances cannot exist at all given differences in the intellectual character of the peoples, in their economic structure, etc. Or have we really become Russian because supposedly absolutist tendencies drove the governments of both countries to a long-standing alliance of friendship in foreign policy? Conversely, has the enthusiasm of our democratic parties for French- 1 p. 139 ( 159) teachings and transformations. 139 Has English parliamentarism so far even been able to transform our different parliamentary life, resulting from the Germans' limited political education, in that direction? Must this approach be abandoned; where, then, lies the correct criterion for a Social Democratic foreign policy? It will, just like all other parties, have to emphasize the purely national political values of the best security of the country, its economic development potential, and a

position of power in the concert of states that fully corresponds to its production and performance potential. In these very general guidelines, however, the entire concrete complex of tasks of the nation's diplomatic and political leadership is only contained in abstract expression; what is now needed is the precise definition of the concrete individual goals for each country and for each epoch, so that from these mere outlines a politically useful influence on the course of events can arise. In the last appeal of the Party Executive, the general guidelines for a coming peace are probably developed in roughly the same sense; There, as in the vast majority of party publications, however, those very concrete objectives are entirely lacking. Other parties have developed specific, sharply defined programs that, whether right or wrong, can guide the political thinking of the masses and that can become the basis for public criticism. In Social Democracy, apart from the points touched upon above, all discussions revolve almost exclusively around the so-called right of annexation, the question: Is the party allowed to approve annexations, or more precisely, the annexation of territories alien to the people? Here, too, some go very far into the right-wing nationalist camp, while the majority dogmatically declare themselves, "in accordance with the program," against all territorial expansion. Now, and this is the second main point that remains to be considered by the social democratic politician, there can certainly never be any abstraction from the interests of socialism and the working class for a socialist party in foreign policy, even in 31/2* p. 140 ( 160) 140 Lessons and Transformations. But the representation of these interests must not be exhausted by meaningless slogans such as the rejection of all annexations, the preservation of the right of peoples to autonomy, and the like. Here, too, higher viewpoints may very well exist than this claim of nations to autonomy and self-determination, the mere formal standpoint of law and justice. The colonial expropriation of primitive tribes from their land, which is now recognized by all sides as justified, consciously sacrifices the right to freedom of these indigenous peoples to the overriding interest of intensive land use and increased production for the benefit of civilized humanity, just as socialism itself increasingly curtails the right to freedom of the individual in favor of higher-value collectives. The alternative, therefore, cannot simply be: national autonomy or power interests; rather, each individual case requires a sharp and precise investigation to determine whether, first, there really is a serious need to secure the country, and, second, whether this national interest is not opposed by stronger and inherently higher interests of international law, culture, or labor. Only by incorporating such values into the decision on each individual issue can the distinction between socialist foreign policy and that

of other parties be established. If the further development toward socialism takes place within the state-national organization, that is, to a large extent through the progressive socialization of national forms of production, then the parties that most actively promote the development of their country's production will lend the movement the strongest impetus. If, for example, as has been the case so far, Germany is the country with the most advanced socialist development among the European states, then Germany's greatest economic exertion and productivity will simultaneously be the greatest expansion of the power of the socialist social forces, as has been rightly emphasized hundreds of times: the prerequisite for an influential labor movement is, above all, a favorable material situation for the working class, whose roots can only lie in a flourishing national industry. The war has taught the party a terrible lesson about the significance of economic problems, which the majority of the party had rejected with indifference for decades, indeed, whose serious, objective examination would almost certainly have consigned every Social Democrat to the anathema of believers of all shades: the colonial, protective, and agrarian problems, and, in connection with them, the military and naval questions. In this sense, the war may indeed represent, if not (as Lensch believes) a socialist revolution, then at least a revolution for socialism. The old faith has collapsed; the majority of comrades are, for the time being, wandering uncertainly and groping along unknown paths. Rays of a new socialist light are shining everywhere into the darkness, but the directions leading to the newly recognized goals are still obscured to most. The theoretical work of the future therefore lies in the gradual construction of an economic-socialist system, in the examination of the major questions of a national and simultaneously socialist political stance towards foreign countries, and beyond that in the recognition and strengthening of the supranational forces and interests of the workers' movement, which can certainly mitigate the power conflicts between people and occasionally replace them with counter-tendencies, but cannot, as so many comrades believed before the war, drive the proletariat to its own policy opposed to that of the bourgeois classes. The task that thus arises for the theorists and leaders of the party is a comprehensive one: it encompasses a reorientation of all political and economic thought, abstraction from all preconceived beliefs, the unconditional opposition to the bourgeois parties, but on the other hand also... p. 142 ( 162) 142 Lessons and Transformations. Avoiding the error which has now often outraged the mass of the more radically minded comrades in the attitude of some right-wing party papers: the simple abandonment of any socialist-oriented sentiment and an almost unconditional agreement with political goals of

other tendencies, solely out of the justified feeling that we previously often condemned these goals without question. For this to happen, however, one thing is now necessary above all: unconditional safeguarding of the greatest possible freedom of opinion within the party. It is quite interesting and hopefully instructive for the comrades of today's minority how well they suddenly, now that the majority opposes their convictions, are able to meet the urgent need. They understand the necessity of expressing dissenting views, and indeed, how they, without any hesitation and without consideration for the damage to the movement's power of action, carry the dispute of opinion into the ranks of the trade unions, vote separately in parliaments, and thus directly disrupt party unity. However serious the consequences this approach may have for the party, and however unquestionably certain limits must be maintained on the personal freedom of action of the comrades, we wish to emphasize that even this absolute breach of the majority principle should not be rejected under all circumstances. For, in certain situations, the will of a minority to restrain the party from a direction it considers disastrous can be higher than all statutes, higher even than the unity and thus the political power of the movement. Here, too, it will be a matter of judgment on the part of the party members whether they are willing to recognize such exceptions to the majority rule as the expression of a truly higher interest. But one thing is clear: the protection of freedom of opinion must apply to all. Only in the most lively intellectual struggle, in the never-ending urge for study and progress, in the constant flow of observation of all economic phenomena, and in restlessly renewing thought, can a new theoretical foundation for socialism be created upon which the party policy of the future can be built. i p. 143 ( 163) Teachings and Transformations. 143 On this point, the party has sinned gravely so far. With a narrow-mindedness never surpassed by any religious dogma, it countered every attempt at spiritual reorientation, every objective evaluation of facts, every identification of habitual errors, and indeed every rejection of the phraseological phrases that had grown into agitational demagogy, with calls for the heretic court or, worse than that, the practice of silence. For more than two decades, the "Sozialistische Monatshefte" (Socialist Monthly Magazine) has existed as a social democratic organ. Until the outbreak of the war, it was the only one in the party that sought to meet the intellectual demands for a continuous development of socialist policy. Its contributors sought to critically evaluate every new stimulus and, objectively assessing all new developments in economic and public life, to develop a constructive socialist theory. This important intellectual and political work, which must be acknowledged even by those who, like a large portion of the "Glocken"

contributors, are quite critical of some of its results and continue to resolutely reject the old-school "revisionism," was far too little utilized in official party circles; indeed, precisely where it pioneered new ideas, it was met with indifference or mocking indignation. Instead of objective counter-criticism, which can easily and fatally strike at any truly untenable assertion, the familiar suspicions of party treason, bourgeois attitudes, and the like were raised, or attempts were made to keep wider circles of party comrades from becoming acquainted with the new views through systematic silence. Now this is taking its revenge on the majority itself. The war also suggested this hindsight. If we want to gain clarity about the paths we must take in the future, we must also unhesitatingly admit the mistakes of the past to ourselves. But the meaning of this reflection lies not in the past, but precisely in the future. p. 144 ( 164) 144 Once again: A pedagogical ruin. The much-lamented turmoil in party life will resolve itself; the working class will swear allegiance to Social Democracy with new, deeper enthusiasm if the party truly becomes what it has often only boasted of being: the unconditional representative of intellectual progress and freedom. BERNHARD RAUSCH: Once again: A pedagogical ruin. [An article in issue 15 of this journal, in which I conclude that the abolition of the humanistic Gymnasium represents a cultural advance in which the working class also has a keen interest, has prompted rebuttals from Comrades Heilmann and Pernerstorfer. To the extent that these rebuttals are based on the misunderstanding that my opposition to the humanistic Gymnasium is based on a misunderstanding of the historical and cultural significance of classical antiquity, I could let them rest. For the space of this weekly magazine would be too precious for a polemic on this basis. And I can gladly assure Comrade Heilmann that I read Pericles' speech, which he presents as a kind of model in issue 21 of the "Glocke," with all the greater pleasure as I was able to enjoy it in a good translation. Comrade Pernerstorfer, however, has thoroughly substantiated his opposing viewpoint in issue 23 of the "Glocke." For him, the value of the humanistic Gymnasium lies in its supposed quality as a "school of scholars." The nation must ensure that its membership includes those whom we call scholars. But in antiquity lie the sources of our own intellectual life. Whoever wishes to pursue human intellectual history in a scholarly and scientific manner must know Hellas and Rome thoroughly. That means he must master their languages. And since the scientific pursuit of the humanities never p. 145 ( 165) Once again: A pedagogical ruin. 145 will cease, the scholarly school based on ancient languages will remain an absolute necessity. He is therefore in favor of maintaining the humanistic Gymnasium, in which he recognizes all sorts of deficiencies, but which nevertheless "fulfills the

desired purpose." This is a humanistic standpoint, which in itself has the advantage of coherence and consistency. Essentially limiting himself to this cultural-political justification of the classical Gymnasium, Comrade Pernerstorfer therefore refrains from further elaboration on secondary pedagogical questions, such as those of formal education, which can only be resolved individually, psychologically, and not generally methodically. He maintains, however, that the type of education provided by the Gymnasium cannot be surpassed by any other type of school, nor can it be replaced by any other. But I concede to Comrade Pernerstorfer that classical-humanistic education can still provide the basis for a solid academic education today, and that it is indispensable for certain areas of the humanities. But this does not justify the current humanistic Gymnasium by any means. My Rather, the reply will have to demonstrate that Comrade Pernerstorfer is attempting to achieve a laudable and desirable goal—the cultivation of humanistic studies based on classical antiquity—with inadequate pedagogical means. The humanistic Gymnasium owes the outstanding position it occupied in the first eight decades of the 19th century, and which has not yet been completely shaken today, to that intellectual movement at the turn of the 18th century that we call Neo-Humanism. After the study of the ancients had first come to Western Europe like a revelation in the 16th century, in the 17th and 18th centuries, more independence vis-à-vis antiquity was regained. People no longer wanted to simply imitate the ancients, but to challenge them through their own... p. 146 ( 166) 146 Once again: a pedagogical ruin. constant creations in their own language. And in particular, the theory of natural pedagogy had already largely freed itself from the shackles of antiquity. But it was then completely displaced by Neo-Humanism. While it is true that our classical literature, whose high points are Goethe and Schiller, has drawn rich nourishment from antiquity, it is fundamentally wrong to equate the Neo-Humanist school ideal with that of our classics in literature and philosophy. It is well known that the pedagogical goals of Goethe and Fichte, for example, went far beyond those of FA Wolf, Humboldt, Süvern, and others. While the Neo-Humanists also strove in theory for the harmoniously developed human being, in reality their educational ideal was only the individual intellectual culture of a small minority of intellectual aristocrats. The rapidly blossoming classical philology and the concept of formal education derived from Kantian philosophy were the two pillars upon which the building of the Neo-Humanist Gymnasium was built. Nothing was further from Goethe's mind than to see ancient studies as the only valuable foundation for scholarly education. For him, academic pursuits should already be integrated into professional activity, because "activity and efficiency are far more compatible with

adequate instruction than one might think." Despite all their philological one-sidedness, the Neo-Humanists envisioned something like a national unified school as a single institution for national education. What actually emerged in the first half of the 19th century as a humanistic Gymnasium bears roughly the same relationship to the Neo-Humanists' school ideal as the distorted image of the German Confederation bears to the national political dreams of the time of the Wars of Liberation. However, apart from its undemocratic character, the humanistic Gymnasium was initially something like a "school for scholars" in the sense of Comrade Pernerstorfer. Since the first draft of a Prussian education law in 1816, the Gymnasium ceased to be a preparatory school for the four faculties of the university, and all subjects not related to classical antiquity disappeared almost completely from the Gymnasium curriculum. Of 320 teaching hours, only 60 remained for mathematics and 20 for the natural sciences. In 1837, these two subjects were even reduced to 33 and 16 hours, respectively, and German from 44 to 22 hours. Latin, however, increased from 76 to 86 hours. Since the middle of the last century, however, the pressing needs of modern life have fundamentally changed the original character of the humanistic Gymnasium. Amid fierce school struggles, modern languages, geography, modern history, mathematics, and natural sciences have increasingly displaced the ancient languages. This effort to adapt the Gymnasium to the growing demands of the age of technology and global commerce, without, however, seeking to displace the ancient languages from their dominant position, has led to a regrettable overburdening of the students and the confusing diversity of today's Gymnasium curriculum. Comrade Pernerstorfer is consistent enough to regret the restriction of ancient classical instruction. I consider all the recent reforms in this direction in Austria to be harmful and detrimental to the value of the Gymnasium." For me, however, it is not a Gymnasium as Comrade Pernerstorfer desires, but rather as it has historically existed in our present state. The school should not cram students full of knowledge, but rather guide them to scientific work. Absolutely. Only in limitation is the best achieved, in the Goethean sense. This certain renunciation, which lies in limitation, was demanded by the poet in his pedagogical province of The Wanderjahre, rich in lasting ideas, with a view to the coming age in which, through the development of the division of labor, something worthwhile can only be achieved through specialization. However, the modern Gymnasium has not lost a trace of this Goethean spirit. p. 148 ( 168) 148 Once again: A pedagogical ruin. And if one wants to speak of a "sausage factory of knowledge," then, I think, this is primarily appropriate for the humanistic Gymnasium. The profound economic and social upheavals that have taken

place in recent decades, particularly in Germany, are also clearly reflected in the statistics on the career choices of Gymnasium graduates. In the period from 1868 to 1891, 82 percent of Gymnasium graduates went to university, 3.5 percent to technical universities, and 14.5 percent took up other non-academic professions. The 3.5 percent became 11.5 percent in 1912. The number of attendees at technical universities has thus more than tripled. In 1912, 26 percent of the population entered non-academic professions, almost twice as many. In contrast, the number of university students fell from 82 percent to 62 percent, and this number is bound to continue to decline as more Realgymnasium and Oberrealschule graduates enter positions in life that were previously the exclusive privilege of Gymnasium graduates. However, the consequence of the outdated humanistic Gymnasium, with its completely different pedagogical needs compared to those of the past, looming as a privileged educational institution, is that a large portion of our youth is forced into the completely unnecessary and inappropriate detour via Greece and Rome, often contrary to individual inclinations, before they can reach their true goal. This means a great deal of wasted time and energy and stands in stark contrast to Goethe's admonition to guard students against all missteps "through which a large part of life, indeed sometimes the whole of life, is confused and torn to pieces." But the claim that education at a humanistic Gymnasium is the best preparation for all the demands of life is an unjustified classical philological presumption. Ultimately, all the serious deficiencies inherent in today's humanistic Gymnasium are rooted in its historical obsolescence. Comrade Pernerstorfer is not blind to them. "The greatest mistake of today's scholarly school, the Gymnasium, p. 149 ( 169) Once again: A pedagogical ruin. 149 - lies in the fact that it—and this applies to all Gymnasiums—always drags along a number of students who lack any inner ability to learn and the desire to do so. There are too many Gymnasiums and Gymnasium schools. The reason for the overcrowding lies in the eligibility system. Not only the one-year voluntary right belongs here, but even more so the state regulation that certain civil service positions depend on completion of the lower or entire Gymnasium. Furthermore, the Gymnasium is considered the most distinguished school, and a wealthy father believes he is letting his son fall out of his social class if he doesn't send him to the Gymnasium." But Comrade Pernerstorfer does not derive from this the demand to abolish today's Gymnasium, but continues: "In a reasonable social order that recognizes no privileges and highly values every socially necessary work, the current reasons for attending the Gymnasium disappear." In order to save the humanistic Gymnasium despite all this, he shifts the battlefield to the

realm of a better future. He admits, of course, that every era must create the educational institutions necessary for it. "But," he asks, "how does Comrade Rausch imagine the socialist future?" In this future, cultural work will celebrate its greatest triumphs, and only the preliminary training provided by the classical Gymnasium opens the way to this work. One sees that when it comes to ancient studies, Comrade Pernerstorfer is not concerned with a handful of grades. Even if the Gymnasium may have become outdated today and, through its privileged existence, the educational interests of all those for whom it does not provide a suitable basis of knowledge, he wants to persevere with the Gymnasium until that happy future in which it will once again be honored. I, for my part, must ask: How does Comrade Pernerstorfer envision the school of the socialist future? I think a greater contrast than that between today's Gymnasium and the national educational organization that we envision as the school of the future is probably unthinkable. p. 150 ( 170) 150 Again: A pedagogical ruin. It is a comprehensive school that, built on social work, gradually leads the students to the highest peaks of knowledge through optional activities according to their individual psychological dispositions and inclinations, in accordance with their abilities. In such a school system, even the classical studies find their rightful place. Indeed, they may only reach their full potential there. Comrade Pernerstorfer can rest assured; there will never come a time when "there won't be a certain number of people among Germans who no longer pursue the study of ancient languages." But to achieve that school of the future, it is necessary for today's humanistic Gymnasium to disappear, for with its forced mass feeding of dead languages, it is the strongest bulwark against a closed, nationally unified school in which ancient studies do not claim a privileged special position, but are integrated organically into the hierarchical structure of the national educational system. Comrade Pernerstorfer will perhaps now also no longer consider the description of today's Gymnasium as "reactionary" to be a "purely empty assertion." In the interest of developing our educational system into a national unified school, we Socialists must warmly welcome the fact that the efforts of the Realanstalten (university schools) to gain equal status alongside the Gymnasium (university schools) have already considerably shaken this once-superior institution. This does not immediately turn us into philistine apostles of utilitarianism, for our school ideal far exceeds modern bourgeois Realanstalten (university schools). But we cannot ignore the fact that the struggle against the humanistic Gymnasium (university schools) is providing us with valuable pioneering services. Comrade Pernerstorfer believes that the question of the humanistic Gymnasium is a completely neutral one for us Social Democrats, and that a

Social Democrat is not barred from declaring himself a supporter of it, just as he naturally has the right to oppose it. I am not in a position to be as broad-minded to be able to be. I see in the fight against p. 151 ( 171) A Piece of the Middle Ages. 151 not as Comrade Pernerstorfer wishes, but as it is, an indispensable prerequisite for the implementation of our educational policy goals, and it is for me, after all, a strange sight to see a socialist defending this high school. GEORG BEYER: A Piece of the Middle Ages. BASKETS chase, the semi-finished products glow, machines roll and press from Hamm to Düsseldorf: the most modern Germany feverishly produces tools for the most terrible frenzy of today's technology, the World War. Everything resounds with reality, the romantic-irrational is suffocated in iron; one is suddenly transported to an island from which, in the midst of capitalism, one enjoys a view of bygone days. Behind The outstretched hand of a privileged landowner is discovered in the shafts and chimneys, receiving a royalty for every ton of coal; an ancient land law compels the cartel magnate to pay rent to the feudal lord: the mining regalia. A piece of the Middle Ages, a reminder of a sad chapter in Prussian financial policy, of the worst piece of rotten yet vital sinecure that somewhere falls into the lap of a beneficiary blessed by birth. Until before the war, Engelbert Prosper, Duke of Arenberg, a member of the House of Lords and a member of the Belgian Senate, resides at Nordkirchen Castle in Westphalia. From 1909 to 1912, he was the incarnation of Bachem's longing in the Center Party faction of the Reichstag: "We need more Catholic millionaires." According to Rudolf Martin's Yearbook, his fortune was estimated at over 30 million in 1902, and his income at 1.6 million. 1912 Assets 63 million, income 3 million. These are only taxed amounts, referring only to Prussian property; the other, perhaps better half, was anchored in Belgium. Our Duke's assets and income are resplendent feudalistic branches on the tree of Prussian-German capitalism. No one knows for sure: is it the Bull of Charles IV of 1356 or the documented right of an ancestor from 1280 that guarantees the Ducal Arenberg family royalties on the sales value of the products produced for the 26 coal mines located in the city and district of Recklinghausen. This concerns the territory of the formerly imperial Duchy of Arenberg, which fell to Prussia in 1815. However, the dukes' old mining rights did not fall to Prussia: they could freely grant the right to claim minerals on their former land, if they did not do so themselves, to others and demand mining royalties from them. And even if the duke is entitled to only one percent of the sales value of a ton, his royal rights bring him a good two million annually from the enormous development of coal mining in the Recklinghausen region, without him having to lift a finger, except for signing the check receipt. The mining and metallurgical journal

"Glück auf" recently calculated that those mines whose entire fields lie within the royal rights area had to pay a royalty of 7 to 11 pfennigs for each ton in 1915. In 1913, the royal rights accounted for more than 2 million euros; During the war, they "dropped" to 1.85 and 1.82 million, respectively, but there is a reasonable prospect that this bitter loss will soon disappear. The Duke owes 25 million so far to this pleasant inheritance right, which also makes him a direct state beneficiary. The Prussian treasury owns several mines on his former territory and had to pay him 324,000 marks in feudal tribute in 1913, so that the Duke receives from the state approximately ten times what he is obliged to pay in taxes. The Prince of Salm-Salm is an orphan boy next to the Duke of Arenberg. His regal district borders the former County of Recklinghausen to the north; only the Baldur mines of the Trier Mining Company and the Fürst Leopold mine of the Consolidation Mining Corporation are subject to tribute, not in the form of tonnage, but 12,000 marks are paid to the regal lord for each field in addition to a permanent levy. Nevertheless, the old privilege provides the prince with 200,000 marks annually. Arenberg, Salm-Salm – both are shimmering with the late glory of old serfdom; rent from the land, from the produce, from labor – the most feudal dreams flourish around us, whose roots remove them from modern class hatred. The situation is similar with the Prince of Bentheim-Steinfurt, the Prince of Bentheim-Tecklenburg, the Duke of Croy, and the Prince of Rheina-Wolbeck. There are also a number of such millionaires in the Upper Silesian industrial region. - p. 153 ( 173) A piece of the Middle Ages. 153 We mentioned that the Prussian treasury also annually distributes hundreds of thousands onto the medieval castle table. It is therefore not unimportant to shed light on one of the most glorious chapters of Prussian financial policy, which is connected with this regalia economy. It not only triumphed over parliamentary crossfire and legal challenges; at the same time, it provides an unsurpassable demonstration of how big capital defeated old Prussian absolutism in the area of financial policy. In 1830, Duke Arenberg offered to add his mining regalia to that of the Prussian state, for which he demanded an annual annuity of 1,000 thalers. The offer was rejected because there was a lack of clear vision of the economic and financial treasures that lay waiting to be mined here. Instead, the old Prussian fundamental asset, the "state share in the mining of coal resources," was snatched from the hands of private exploitation piece by piece over the course of the 19th century. The old Prussian Land Law stipulated the ownership rights of the "state representative of the minerals." If a private exploiter came along, he could be "granted" the mining rights by the state, paid for them, and was under the "supervision and direction of the Prussian Mining Office." The Prussian

state was thus in full possession of a mining right; the funds for the transfer of the right of use flowed annually into the state treasury like interest. These remnants of the old Prussian state economy provided the state with substantial revenues and gave it complete decision-making power over mining production, and in the first third of the last century, Prussian land law was a difficult barrier to overcome for exploitation and drilling companies. But the stronger the young capitalist drive for expansion became, the more zealously it sought to free itself from this shackles. It is characteristic of the bourgeois revolution of 1848 that it was accompanied by a violent movement demanding absolute mining freedom for capital and the abolition of the old royalties. The victory of reaction initially prevented this goal from being achieved, but Prussia was unable to resist it permanently, so insistently did capitalism knock at its gates. Piece by piece, the old royalties were shattered, and step by step, the old mining taxes were reduced. In 1851, the reduction of the royalties from ten percent of gross revenue to five percent, along with the remission of other taxes, was implemented. In 1861, the rate fell to four percent; in 1862, the ore mines were exempted from all royalties, and three years later, royalty taxes were reduced to two percent of gross revenue. In the fire of economic development in the fifties and sixties, this had been transformed from the old state regalia in barely fourteen years, and it continued merrily even after the founding of the Empire! Amid the groans of the mining capitalists over the new burden of workers' insurance legislation, the last remnants quickly fell away. In 1893, the last two percent levy was abolished by a law that came into force on April 1, 1915. Even that was no small feat: in 1894, the state treasury still received its 6 million marks, and if one considers only the small two percent levy, one can safely say, given the enormous increase in gross revenues, that the Prussian treasury, assuming peacetime, would have derived at least its 30 million secure annual income from it. This unrestrained surrender of the old state privilege could rightly be called an irresponsible squandering of national wealth, which cost both the people and the treasury dearly. But amidst this crumbling of state privilege, the privilege of the imperial sovereigns remained unshakable. The treasury has magnanimously renounced its right, and the millions in levies must continue to be paid to the most important owners of Rhineland-Westphalia and Silesia: no mine in the Recklinghausen region is not subject to tribute of more than 100,000 marks to the Duke of Arenberg, in peace as in war. The world is falling apart, nations tremble in distress and anguish, traditions are shattering; the six-century-old coal percentage continues to flow into the pockets of the Arenbergs and Salm-Salms, rounding up their millions. Will they also survive the financial

reorientation? More significant than the characteristics of this privilege, which today is arguably one of the most tried-and-true Prussian state institutions, is the incomprehensible surrender of the old state monopoly to exploitative capital in financial terms. It is no exaggeration to say: had it remained the regularly flowing source of finance for the treasury at its original rates, and thus had revenues increased commensurately with the development of coal and ore mining, the relentless reorganization of the finances of the Reich and the individual states, the fiscal legacy of the war, would have stood on different ground today. Hundreds of millions would have accrued for the state; Perhaps Prussia's resistance would be less, allowing the Reich to draw on its financial resources. p. 155 ( 175) A Piece of the Middle Ages. 155. By giving up its mining rights, however, Prussia has also raised its own organized private monopoly in mining; the child it nurtured is now beating it, and its desperate attempts to influence the policies of the syndicates, if one wants to take them seriously, have been shattered by the iron capitalist logic. Now and then, timid attempts were made, such as in 1907, to restrict mining freedom somewhat; during the war years—it is like an irony of the past in mining law—state intervention led to the compulsory maintenance of the coal syndicate, since this had become nothing more than an obstacle to the really big players. One sees the tax authorities in touching efforts to secure for others what was once their own. . . . In the face of harsh times, the idea of nationalizing the coal mining industry (or rather, of nationalization) has once again entered the sphere of fiscal considerations and fundamental changes in the economic structure. Imagine the chain: first feudalistic state authority, then the onset of Manchesterism, the unrestricted validity of free competition; finally, new ties in the cartels, whose shell is slowly but surely being shattered by the dawning mining trust; the war has only further fueled its power. State against trust, power against power: where is the bourgeois state today that could simply swallow up the foundation of its economic life, transform the gigantic engines of profit into regularly clattering financial mills? Even if a state were not a prisoner of the cartel and thus the capital magnates, from this perspective all discussions about the necessity or possibility of a state coal monopoly are quite pointless. The problem can only be reduced to one common denominator: capitalism or socialism. We know that the war has given us new weapons for this decisive battle. The privilege of the Duke of Arenberg and the Prince of Salm-Salm, meanwhile, hopscotches between the ages like a grotesque fool's game. As Theseus says to the louts in "A Midsummer Night's Dream": "But come, your Bergomasque dance! Let the epilogue run!" 31/3* p. 156 ( 176) 156 A Lesson. ERNST ALMSLOH: A A Lesson. A Sketch from the Garrison. Move to

the schoolyard of the girls' middle school!" "Yes sir, Lieutenant! - Turn right, march!" In the schoolyard, the company forms a circle around the young lieutenant. His First Class Cross sparkles in the golden evening sun. From the schoolhouse windows, the peaceful accoutrements of a school greet him: blackboards, maps, animal specimens in spirit, test tubes, and jars. On one side of the schoolyard, the school garden stretches wearily, as if rejoicing in the coming night. Straightforward, demarcated, clean. The principal tolerates no disorder, even among the flowers and vegetables. From the other side, the courtyards and kitchen windows of the neighboring street look into the schoolyard. From time to time, a woman approaches the window. She thinks of her husband, who, who knows where, is reporting for roll call at this very hour in a foreign land. In the corners of the schoolyard, men from another company stand at long boards cleaning their rifles. The group around the young lieutenant is a diverse group. Most of the people have already left the field. Their wounds have healed and are waiting in the reserve battalion for further deployment at the front. Some wear the Iron Cross. Among them are veterans of the Landwehr, younger reservists, very young war volunteers, and active troops. On the right wing stand thirty newly conscripted Landsturm soldiers, experienced in life, gray-haired and gray-bearded, but here again, beginners and newcomers. Stiff, awkward, and eager to serve, some, others a shirker. The lieutenant stands somewhat embarrassed in the middle. He laboriously takes off his gloves, searching for the right beginning. "So I'm supposed to teach about honorifics and behavior in the trenches—it's not nice how lazy some people are when they salute—I have to salute too, first of all when the other officer is older, and then when someone is carrying something in their right hand, they obviously can't get their fin on their cap. Recently p. 157 ( 177) A lesson. 157 someone comes towards me with a mess tin—true!—and yanks the tin to my cap and wants to hit me on the head with the mess tin. Discreet laughter from the crew. It's really true!—it's true. I think, of course, that guy 66 is being nonsense, saluting like that ! Then you just walk past at attention. You know everything, don't you?" General murmuring: "Yes, sir, Lieutenant!" Well, the other thing: "And then about the trenches! What am I supposed to tell you? I was in there long enough, 21 months, and most of you too, right? It was fine there, Meyer, wasn't it?" Meyer smiles meaningfully. "Above all, keep it clean! When you have to lie there for that long, it's no fun when it stinks! Stinks enough as it is! If someone lay in one place for weeks, there were piles of corpses on the left that couldn't be removed and gradually began to stank horribly. To the right was the latrine, I was in the middle. Discreet smile, 46 "Yes, you're laughing, but my laughter gradually faded. We wanted to bury the bodies. It

didn't work. Then we ordered chlorinated lime, but we had to wait and wait. And when the stuff finally arrived, we went out into the storm. There was nothing there either! So always keep it clean! And then, never leave your post. It's no fun when those beasts come flying at you. Always like that! Down with your head, whether you want to or not! But most of the time they don't hit, otherwise we'd all be gone, right Lehmann? It was a real mess at height 304, wasn't it? But did we escape? That's unbelievable! You got the Iron Cross back then, didn't you?" "Yes, sir, Lieutenant!" "They deserve it too! But Schmidt deserves it too, and he still doesn't! That was when we had to go back one day. The blacks came at us like cats. But we shot them away, one after the other, until I had my shot. Then Schmidt held the communication trench. With hand grenades, one after the other, like pft, pft, pft! Until reinforcements arrived. What, you know Schmidt, did he deserve the Iron Cross?" General agreement: "Yes, sir, Lieutenant!" "I won't let up until he's got it! Well, what else should I tell you? It's none of my business! Here in general p. 158 ( 178) 158 Glosses. - -- in the garrison! Daft! Outside it's a different story! A bit life-threatening, yes, but you had to die sometime, you think. And then you go crazy like Blücher, and then I should talk about gas masks too, right? Oh God, you all know that stuff, don't you? Just make sure you fit the thing properly! It hurts when it constricts your skull. But it's no harm , there can't be any cracks. Otherwise you'll die! Better none at all! Well, you were all there - His gaze falls on the old Landsturm soldiers. "Aha, not you yet! No harm! They're not going to the front at all. And if they are, well, not tomorrow. I'll have to leave something for the next lesson. And then, it's only half as bad! You learn everything in time! Step away!" Glosses. The Tax Liability of the Rich. (Horace, Satires II, 2, 99 fi.) ..,,You rightly criticize Trausius," he says, "it's different with me; I collect more than three majorat lords in rents and customs duties." And have you no better use for the little you don't need for yourself? Tell me, why does anyone starve while you're rich? The church and schoolhouse are dilapidated, so open your money bag: contribute your mite for the good of your own country! IN The Week. October 26. In unusually brief terms, the official Telegraph Bureau, usually talkative about trivial matters, announced on October 20 the nevertheless significant fact that Major Deutelmoser had left his post as Chief of the War Press Office in agreement with the Supreme Army Command and joined the Foreign Office. There he will "initially familiarize himself with the affairs of the Intelligence Department under the leadership of Ministerial Director Hamman, in order to later become his successor." From the explanations devoted to this event by the semi-official press, one learns that "soon after the outbreak of the World War, a special Intelligence Department was

created in p. 159 ( 179) Die Woche. 159 AA, headed by Privy Councilor Hamman." The extent to which this department has so far flourished like a violet in secret is evident from the fact that without the "significant change of position" (as a major southern German newspaper announced the event), German journalism not based on the ground floor of a certain building on Wilhelmstrasse would have known nothing of it. Mr. Deutelmoser, once he has completed his apprenticeship with Hamman, will now be tasked with helping this previously secret institute gain effective publicity; that is, to direct the news being brewed there to its true purpose. At the end of the first quarter of the third (in words: third) year of the war, this is no longer a hasty effort and completely dispels the base suspicion that the secret gold treasure of precious news has been inappropriately squandered. Mr. Hamman has outlived three chancellors. He was less to blame for the third's political blunders than for his oratorical fame. Ninety-nine percent of the diamonds with which Herr von Bülow was adorned as soon as he stepped onto the Reichstag platform were collected by the hardworking veteran on the lowest floor of the building on Wilhelmstrasse. A man in the shadows, he served each master according to his taste. And when Herr von Bethmann came along, who preferred ethics and solidity rather than the momentarily dazzling, Hamman was a prudent and prudent advisor. One may judge this officialdom from the democratic perspective however one wishes and not reject all the bitter things that have been said about the man, one thing remains: he has done such a considerable amount of grueling work that he has a right to be tired; and he was never an agitator. News work, however, was not his thing. That is a field in itself, demanding its entire man and the apparatus that goes with it, which is neither simple nor cheap. How Major Deutelmoser is supposed to master his dual task, which he approaches without any professional knowledge of modern press operations, without any experience abroad, and without any knowledge of politics other than that acquired during the war in the Press Office, which was created primarily for censorship purposes, remains a mystery for the time being. Thus, the cheerful courage that produced the daring feat of this sudden appointment is to be admired, although it does at least provide one piece of evidence: that all rumors of the current Chancellor being ousted by Mr. von Falkenhayn are mere fumes. For however inexhaustible the spring of good nature that springs from the Chancellor's bosom may be, Mr. Deutelmoser, the most loyal of his former superior Falkenhayn, certainly had to put a stop to the activity of proclaiming the fame of this glorious soldier to a willing circle of journalists in all tones. The malicious remark of a diplomat, even one very experienced in the chattering that comes with the trade: "Now F. has his

listening post in Wilhelmstrasse" is therefore completely misguided. Now that, thanks to the genius of our Supreme Command and the unwavering spirit of sacrifice of the allied German-Bulgarian troops, Romania's destiny is being fulfilled, the Balkan question is entering its acute stage for the Entente. One can now look forward with great composure to the decisions emerging from the feverish conferences of the Quadruple Alliance, and wait until they are born, and then evaluate the product according to its significance. The German defense has certainly delivered a masterpiece. And this time, entirely in the spirit of those of our party friends on the extreme wing, who never tire of pointing out the instructions of our great masters. For what is now unfolding lies entirely in the path of that foreign policy that was pioneered with the Social Democratic interpellation in the Reichstag in September 1886. The third, decisive point of this interpellation was: "What do the allied governments intend to do to safeguard the gravely threatened German interests in the face of Russia's ever-growing influence and the expansion of its sphere of influence on the Balkan Peninsula?" Hans Blum, the exemplary national-liberal historian, in his political history of the German Empire, dedicated to the glorification of Bismarck, still recorded this Social Democratic action in 1893 as "a crocus," "a masterpiece of Liebknechtian legend-making, wisdom, and patriotism," praised Bismarck's betrayal of Bulgaria to Russia, and rejoiced like a king that "the Social Democratic interpellation, due to a lack of support, never even reached the Reichstag." One sees that not only the booklets, but also the interpellations have their fates. Entirely in the spirit of the worthy Terentianus Maurus: pro captu lectoris - according to the understanding of the reader or the esteemed contemporaries. K - p. 161 ( 181) DIE GLOCKE 32nd issue, November 4, 1916, 2nd year. Reprinting of all articles permitted with detailed source references. DR. PAUL LENSCH, M. d. R.: War credits and protective custody. It was during the deliberation of the charming Zabern case. The then War Minister Falkenhayn had, with the exception of Westarp's group, antagonized the entire house by his appearance. It was Philipp Scheidemann, the spokesman for the Social Democrats, who, in the manner customary at the time, attempted to exploit the case politically in the interests of Social Democracy. He pointed out to the bourgeois parties that it was a contradiction that they would approve enormous military proposals for "this reactionary War Minister" just as unhesitatingly as they had already approved them for his predecessor, Herr von Heeringen. At that time, Peter Spahn countered him by pointing out that the bourgeois parties did not approve military and other proposals for the sake of any minister, but rather they approved them for themselves and the German people. Scheidemann's

words, which triggered loud applause from the parliamentary group in the spring of 1914, seem to us today like a fairy tale from bygone days, and Spahn's sober wisdom seems old-fashioned and trite. That's how quickly people change when things change. But those who have not "re-learned", who still argue today as they did 200 - oh no, 2 years ago - the members of the working group, they appear like ghosts of the past risen from the grave: 32/1 p. 162 ( 182) 162 War credits and protective custody. They had been dead long ago and hardly knew it themselves. The contrast between today and yesterday was seldom expressed as sharply as on Friday and Saturday of last week, when the Reichstag approved a war credit bill of previously unheard of amount on the first of these two days, only to enter into a reckoning with the government on the second with a violence hitherto unheard of in war. If what was considered true for the Social Democrats in the spring of 1914 were still true in the autumn of 1916, namely that the government or even the individual minister was granted the bills, so that every loan approval was a declaration of sympathy for the incumbent Reich Chancellor or minister, then the Social Democratic Working Group would certainly be entirely justified in its rejection of war loans. For there can be no question of any sympathy for Mr. von Bethmann, let alone for his deputy, Mr. Helfferich, among the Social Democrats. Mr. von Bethmann has failed to do everything that would have been suitable to revive the spirits of the great masses of our wonderful people in the terrible ordeal of this world catastrophe and to increase their confidence in a better future. He has surrounded himself with a circle of collaborators whom one does the best service by not speaking of them, or if one does so only in the abrupt style of shy admiration in which Elise Reimarus once wrote to Lessing after the publication of Nathan: "Such a Jew, such a Sultan, such a Templar, such a Recha, Sitta, what people!" Indeed: such a Helfferich, such a Jagow, what people! On the other hand, however, the government of Mr. von Bethmann, through the way in which censorship, the state of siege, and the imposition of protective custody were handled, created a mood in wide circles which finally had to be released if it was not to reach dangerous heights. For years, right after the outbreak of the war, attempts had been made to bring the complaints before the commission and thus to p. 163 ( 183) War Credits and Protective Custody. 163 to be resolved as quietly as possible. This concerned consideration for the interests of the Reich proved inappropriate in the long run. Instead of improving, conditions worsened. And so it was necessary for the Reichstag to take the whip off its nail and let it dance vigorously. Indeed, the descriptions given in the Saturday session of protective custody in practice were so horrific that one was torn between indignation and shame.

It seemed as if all the decrepit scoundrels, well known before the war as uniformed slave drivers, whose accursed actions had primarily given Prussian militarism that reputation whose echo now resounds across continents and oceans, had been revived by the implementation of "protective custody" and were taking pleasure in the old pleasure of delighting with sadistic lust in the torments of the defenseless. It was only natural that the Reichstag was unanimous in its condemnation of the facts presented, but it was nevertheless remarkable that Mr. Helfferich's whining ranting about damaging the interests of the fatherland by publicly presenting these things no longer met with any understanding in the House. Half a year ago, his argument would have still made an impression. But now, the recognition of the sentence we had expressed here eight days ago had taken root. in which the Frankfurter Zeitung had characterized the Stürgkh system in Austria: "One cannot expose the authorities, which consist only of human beings, to the temptation of conducting business permanently without public control and under the protection of relentless censorship." But then, the Reichstag's view expressed the feeling of strength that the situation in the Reich can tolerate public criticism of all abuses. And that is perhaps the only, albeit very significant, positive aspect of the matter. When the Dreyfus Affair in France uncovered a veritable sludge of corruption, it was said at the time, not without justification: Corruption and abuses occur everywhere; but these abuses in all To discuss and thereby overcome public debate – that's something only a country with a strong public political life can do. Well, indeed! Germany, which is in the most serious struggle for survival against almost the entire world, has now become so politically strong that, even in such a terrible situation, it can publicly criticize internal grievances without having to fear endangering the country's interests. This conviction prevailed throughout the House, and only one person did not share it: the Reich Chancellor's representative, Herr Helfferich! This debate took place—as already pointed out—exactly 24 hours after the approval of the largest loan proposal that Herr Bethmann's government had ever submitted to the Reichstag. The only speaker against the loan proposal was good old Eduard Bernstein, who, as the spokesman for the "radical" movement (!), demanded the rejection of the loans, partly for this reason and partly in addition. Among his arguments, however, he certainly didn't forget that no credit could be granted to a government governing under a state of siege and protective custody. And how was the declaration of credit refusal received? No outcry, no mention of "abandoned interests of the fatherland," as Helfferich railed against the working group's speaker the following day. An atmosphere of compassion, cheerfulness, and light mockery mercilessly enveloped the

"radical" spokesman. When Liebknecht, the only one to reject the loans by sitting down, a murmur of indignation swept through the House two years ago; when Geyer, for the first time, justified the rejection of the loans on behalf of a larger number, the mood was serious and the House silent. When Bernstein now rejected the loans on behalf of his newly formed faction, the response was general cheerfulness. This is how much the rejection of the war loans has lost its significance as a political demonstration. Herein lies a change in things and people, the stormy pace of which best shows how quickly we live and how quickly, especially in times of war, views that were previously considered unshakable can fade. were valid. Basically, Bernstein now spoke as Scheidemann had spoken against Falkenhayn two and a half years ago. But of course! Those two and a half years are quite something! How is the situation in Russia? In St. Petersburg we receive the following description: The second anniversary of the war in Russia was marked by the completely absurd Supreme Decree issued on July 15th concerning the conscription of the Home Guard for ten years. By this decree, over ten million of the male population were called to the flag, and this during the harvest season, when in agricultural Russia the grain had not yet been harvested, the harvest work was not yet finished, a labor shortage was evident everywhere in the countryside, and schoolchildren had to help out with the field work. The absurdity of this mobilization was so obvious that public opinion could only explain it by the desire to intimidate Romania, which was still hesitating about its declaration of war. The Military Council for the Procurement of Ammunition and Food for the The Army convened for an extraordinary session to discuss measures to prevent the implementation of the aforementioned decree. Duma President Rodzianko and the Chairman of the War-Industrial Committee Konovalloff ruthlessly criticized the imperial manifesto. However, they were cut off by the chairman of the assembly, War Minister Shuvalov. Only Reichsrat member Gurko and the well-known reactionary deputy Markov were able to complete their speeches, in which they expressed the idea that only Russia 's enemies could have suggested this measure to the Tsar, and that the Tsar was surrounded by Germans at the front. p. 166 ( 186) 166 How is it in Russia? With this in mind, the assembly sent a telegram to the Tsar pleading for a reversal of the measure. that would ruin the country and with it the army. As is well known, the implementation of the decree has been postponed indefinitely. However, the country was not saved, and conditions are worsening day by day. This mighty empire presents a truly sad picture through its impotence to combat the impending famine. A country that was the breadbasket of Europe is no longer able to provide its own population with bread. Hundreds of people stand for

hours in long "queues" to obtain a pound of white bread. Meat has become a luxury item, even for the wealthy, for half a year now. Large crowds surround the city shops selling half-rotten meat. In Moscow and Petrograd, and in all major centers, children and women gather at the city shops, where a pound of meat per person is supposed to be distributed three times a week. They wait all night and often half the day to receive the promised pound. Half of them have to leave empty-handed, as there isn't enough meat to supply everyone with the promised ration. A few lucky ones occasionally receive a few pounds of meat through patronage or bribes, paying one ruble per pound, whereas the regular price before the war was 16 to 18 kopecks. Similar crowds of women and children gather in front of the dairy shops, heedless of the rain, cold, and dirt, and even there, the majority leave without supplies. Only the crowds in front of the sugar shops are doing better now: they don't have to wait long, since the notices "Sugar Out of Stock" are posted in all the sugar shops throughout the country. Incidentally, a sugar card was introduced, entitling one to three pounds a month whenever sugar was found. Meanwhile, tens of thousands of poods of meat, fish, and flour were rotting in city warehouses. In Petrograd, the rotting supplies in the city warehouses emitted such a stench that the workers assigned to clean them up refused to do so. So, they had to turn to the war command. But even the soldiers who had been assigned to work could not go to work because of the smell. With great difficulty, the fire brigade finally cleared the warehouses with the help of chemical agents. But the Russian city administrations were not impressed by such "disagreements." No sooner had the spoiled meat supplies been removed than the fish began to appear, also beginning to rot in Petrograd's municipal warehouses. The police reported to the city administration that the fish supplies were probably in poor condition because they emitted a stench. It had to be inspected. After the inspection, the city administration reassured the population that only a third of the supplies were spoiled, while the rest could still be made usable. The situation with the firewood that the Petrograd city administration had accumulated for the population's needs is such that it cannot be used at all, despite the extreme shortage of wood and the terrible price of wood. These wood supplies were stored near rivers that overflowed their banks during the floods and washed away all the wood supplies. Other cities are by no means behind the capital. Kiev, for example, has managed to moisten several million rubles' worth of flour, which is now in acute short supply. The situation is similar throughout Russia. It is impossible to cite all the individual facts. The population grumbles, is dissatisfied, but does not know how to help itself. The government issues laws against speculators, punishes small traders, has

them arrested administratively, and incessantly appoints all kinds of commissioners, extraordinary commissioners, purchasing commissions, subcommissions, central commissions for sugar, flour, firewood, meat, etc. All these persons and institutions only complicate the p. 168 ( 188) 168 What is the situation in Russia? Food supplies are being disrupted and prices are rising, as the country's customary mismanagement and bribery are no less prevalent in all these institutions than among the notorious Chinovniks. Now, the appointment of a food dictator is being planned. Prince Oldenburg is being considered for this position, a man known for his arbitrary actions and brutality, tempered neither by reason nor by a sense of responsibility. Abuses and arbitrariness of an irresponsible government, the greed of municipal leaders, and the helplessness of society itself—all this caused the great disarray in the food supply that currently plagues Russia. Daily, riots arose on the basis of this food shortage, which were suppressed by force of arms (Urals, Don region, Moscow). The Duma members, returning from their vacation, decided in their deliberations to once again approach the Tsar about changing the Cabinet of Ministers, with Stürmer at its head. Rodzianko was entrusted with the task of informing the Tsar about the country's threatening situation. But Stürmer, who had gotten wind of this entire plot against him, thwarted him by offering Vice President Protopopov the post of Minister of the Interior, thus depriving Rodzianko's mission of its meaning and purpose. Moreover, the government is so discredited in the eyes of society that no changes to the Cabinet can inspire its confidence. For example, the Chairman of the Supreme Council for Army Supplies, Guchkov, in a letter addressed to the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Alexeyev and known to wide circles of Russian society, called Stürmer a traitor. No wonder, then, that all those social circles which at the beginning of the war were ardent in the cause of the fatherland are now completely hopeless about any significant change in the current conditions in Russia. p. 169 ( 189) What is the situation in Russia? 169 No less discouraging for these social circles are the conditions at the front. The military situation has shown no significant change in favor of the Russian Empire for more than two years. For a whole year, the country's vital forces have been mobilized, and what is the result of all these great efforts, all this expenditure of energy? The entire Russian war industry supplies only 7 percent of all the munitions that England, America, and Japan combined produce for Russia. By all human standards, all these large quantities of ammunition should have been more than sufficient, and yet the offensive on the Northern Front launched this spring failed to produce satisfactory results for Russia, despite the Russian army's tenfold superiority. Among the many purely military reasons that led

to this failure, one circumstance deserves special mention, one that is more closely related to the internal situation: the extremely low percentage of intelligent fighters at the front. Every reasonably intelligent and educated person in Russia knows how to shirk and already finds ample opportunity to avoid military service—and anyone who is unintelligent and uneducated ends up at the front. In this respect, there is currently no prospect of improvement in Russia; on the contrary, abuses are constantly increasing. It is therefore understandable that no one in Russia believed in the ultimate success of Brusilov's great offensive. Not even Brusilov himself believed in a successful outcome to his military action; but, contrary to all expectations, it initially took a favorable course for Russian arms. For a moment, spirits were revived. There was triumph and rejoicing. The Black Hundreds even succeeded in organizing street demonstrations in some Russian cities. But this euphoria of victory did not last long. For soon afterward, the typical short General Staff reports began to appear about the immutability of the front. Lviv—the Tsar's dream and longing—was not taken. Kuropatkin's new failed attempts on the northern front have shown once again that hopes for a final victory over Germany must be abandoned. This pessimistic outlook is shared by both military and civilian circles. Amid this general disappointment, the voices of Miliukov and Shingarev, who speak of the final defeat of Germany, sound comical. Chatterers from the Cadet camp continue to trade on the specter of famine supposedly haunting Germany. But in Russia, things are really happening. Indeed, the general expectation is that the consequences of the food shortage will affect Russia this winter and trigger major popular unrest. Therefore, the police are already taking energetic measures to prevent coming uprisings as far as possible. Special units are being trained specifically for the purpose of countering the expected outbreaks. According to a newly enacted law, police control will be introduced into all social organizations. Workers who distinguish themselves in any way will be arrested and exiled to Siberia. TH. STAUNING: Social Democratic Policy in Denmark. Dear comrades! You asked me for a few words for the "Glocke" about the policy of Danish Social Democracy. This can be described in brief as a practical workers' policy in which reality is the main thing. We have never blurred the dividing lines between us and the bourgeois parties, and we have never lost sight of the socialist goal, nor any socialist theory. p. 171 ( 191) Social Democratic Policy in Denmark. 171 far from all doctrinalism. But we have taken the necessary consideration of social life and its demands. On the basis of the prevailing electoral law, we have often cooperated with the liberal bourgeois party in elections, and have thereby succeeded in pushing aside and weakening the decidedly reactionary parties. However, our

candidates have always stood unswervingly on the ground of the social democratic program. Now, after the electoral law has been changed, we are determined to conduct the election campaign in all directions; But this does not, of course, mean that the Social Democratic Party has degenerated into an insignificant sect that no longer wants to pursue practical politics. We will continue to enlist the support of liberal circles in solving practical problems, and, as before, when faced with the choice of either achieving nothing or making significant progress, we will choose the latter, and in doing so, we will by no means shy away from the accusation of a lack of firmness of principle. Our policy was pursued in the manner described during the war, and the practical work of the past years has made it easier for us to adhere to these lines; our situation would have been far worse if the force of circumstances had forced us to break with doctrinal politics. --- The latest political event in Denmark—the entry of a Social Democrat into the ministry —must be viewed from the same practical perspective that has been the prevailing one so far; We must not, by passively standing aside, contribute to the politics of our country being subjected to fluctuations which could have had unpleasant consequences for the working class and perhaps for the entire population. The sound, practical sense of our party made it clear to all comrades that we had to act as recommended to us by the Reichstag faction, and this was done with a unanimity which will extraordinarily strengthen the political representation of workers' interests in future work. p. 172 ( 192) 172 On the social psychology of horror images. Under all circumstances, however, the party has followed the path of having its responsible organs in hands for the decision; this is what happened now, too, when the political situation made our participation in government work necessary. The Reichstag had to wait for the Social Democratic Congress to be held, and its decision demonstrated such political maturity and political understanding that the best can be hoped for for the future work of the party. My entry into the ministry changes neither my nor the party's view of conditions in capitalist society. I sit in the ministry as a socialist and work for the interests of my class both here and under all other circumstances, and I will sit there only as long as my party approves of my participation in government work. If I ever leave this seat, it will be without my having wavered in any way in my socialist convictions. Th. Stauning. HERMANN WENDEL, M. d. R.: On the Social Psychology of Horror Images. THE - THE reflection of the war in the more or less dubious artistic creations behind the front is not particularly pleasing in any country. But there are differences. While German war writings and war pictures mostly slip into the realm of the kitschy and cloying, indulging in a vile sentimentalization of the war—Ludwig

Ganghofer and "Lustige Blätter" form an embarrassing average—they only very rarely come across as mean, repugnant, and disgusting, even in their excesses. Unfortunately, the situation is different in France, to such an extent that anyone who knows and loves only the finest blossoms of Gallic culture would hardly believe their eyes. Apart from honorable exceptions, almost all French war art gives rise to the suspicion that the late Marquis de Sade's unfortunate "Justine" provides the guide for the daily work of the French war artist, for even artistically not profound— p. 173 ( 193) On the social psychology of horror pictures. 173 standing papers like "Le rire" persistently perpetuate in word and image to this day the delusion that our field-grey soldiers make the war more varied by chopping off children's hands. An example of this plague, which seems to have gripped an entire nation, is "Le livre rouge des atrocités allemandes par l'image," an album of drawings by Domergue, published by the academician, yes! academician Jean Richepin and the deputy, yes! deputy Paul Escudier. The most degenerate sadistic imagination has run riot on these pages without restraint. That innocent Frenchmen are torn to pieces by Germans on horses or crucified, that the Teutonic barbarians, namely doctors with the Geneva Cross on their armbands, cut off the noses and gouge out the eyes of defenseless prisoners —that is, so to speak, only the beginning of the horror of these trashy drawings, and one shudders to wonder what it must be like in the minds that invent such things, and in the minds that believe them. The superficial observer will complacently imagine something of mutter the unmistakable signs of decay of a declining people under their breath, but anyone who knows how often in history the slogan of the decay and enervation of the French has been shamefully disgraced should beware of such commonplaces. Moreover, a memory of the century that ended at the beginning of the 1890s protects against deceptive self-righteousness. Back then, when "the socialism of the stupid" was at its height, the anti-Semitic party in Saxony threw tens of thousands of Glöss's picture sheets into the political fray. These, repugnant in meaning and repugnant in execution, attributed to the Jews roughly the same bloody atrocities and wild vices as the French horror pictures did to the "boches." Even in the face of these fabrications, people wondered in amazement about the nature of the minds from which such things sprang and into which they entered. But the same effects arise from the same causes, and if one now views the spread of such scribbles as a social problem, then the classes for whom the anti-Semitic imagery was intended turn out to be the same ones in whom the French inflammatory images are intended to inoculate with rabies against everything German: the petty bourgeoisie and the peasants. Only in France,

peasants and certainly the petty bourgeoisie, by their numbers and influence, shape the face of the nation with far sharper features than in Germany. Since the Great Revolution shattered feudal property, France has been the classic country of the small farmers, and even if industrial development has thinned the population of the countryside in favor of the city dwellers, almost half of the French population still lives from agriculture outside the cities. Not only in such light-shy regions as Brittany and Vendée are these peasants mired in dullness, brutality, and superstition; in all parts of the country, they constitute the core troops of the frighteningly large army of illiterates. As recently as 1910, in 7 of a total of 87 departments, one-tenth of those entering into marriages were illiterate; in Corsica, the proportion of illiterate people among those entering marriages rose to one-fifth; only in 9 departments was it less than 1 percent! No wonder this section of the population accepts everything it sees in print or pictures as pure truth and therefore readily believes the gruesome images of the atrocities of German soldiers. But what is commonly called the French national character is determined considerably more by the nature of the petty bourgeois than by that of the peasant. Although France's economic development made tremendous leaps forward during periods such as those under Louis Philippe and Bonaparte III, it lagged far behind Germany in terms of its final results in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries for a variety of reasons. In this country, which exports money rather than goods, small-scale industry still dominates to a degree not even in economically backward Austria. Of every hundred people working in industry, according to the last census, they were employed in companies in the size category 1-5 further 6-50 99 51-100 99 over 100 99 in France 54.02 16.43 5.17 24.38 in Germany 28.78 25.12 10.31 35.79 And while Germany has more than forty large cities with over 100,000 inhabitants, France has only fifteen. The average Frenchman is therefore far more of a petty bourgeois or small-town dweller than the average German. As a result, the petty-bourgeois element has permeated the political essence of France throughout history from 1789 to the present day. This is particularly evident at the opposite poles of society. The petty bourgeois peeks out of every buttonhole of Poincaré and Briand, and also p. 175 ( 195) On the Social Psychology of Horror Images. 175 The working class has never been able to rid itself of petty-bourgeois ideas. If Marx once said in 1848 that in France the petty bourgeois does what the industrial bourgeois should normally do and the worker what would normally be the task of the petty bourgeois, the truth of this saying has not yet died out. Even today, the ghosts of Lèroux, Considérant, Proudhon, and Louis Blanc still haunt the enlightened working classes, and the relapse into Blanquism, which was carried out in practice by

the French party majority during the war and glorified in theory by Gustav Hervé, is nothing but the determined turning away from proletarian to petty-bourgeois viewpoints. As in politics, so naturally also in the general character of the people. What is universally regarded as an expression of innate and unchanging Celtic racial characteristics is in truth a petty-bourgeois trait. Karl Hillebrand, the refined connoisseur of French culture, writes: "Just as the mood of the nation is sometimes elated, sometimes desperately sad, so its fate is sometimes brilliantly dazzling, sometimes miserably pitiable." Passionate participation in the state and hopeless indifference, enthusiasm and skepticism, routine and the desire for innovation, spirited sacrifice and selfish withdrawal into oneself, the urge for freedom and contentment in absolutism, follow one another quickly and almost immediately in public life." This is, stroke by stroke, the successful intellectual portrait not of the Frenchman per se, but of the petty bourgeois in general, as shown to us in the classical literature of scientific socialism: because in economic and therefore also in political terms he vacillates between extremes, easily inflamed and just as easily despondent, composed of one thing and the other, but always susceptible to illusions and always fooled by imaginary gods and ghosts. In an excellent study of the psychology of the petty bourgeoisie, Bruno Schoenlank has explained how, from generation to generation, a sum of old-fashioned ideas accumulates in the minds of the petty bourgeois, "the power of which is all the stronger the longer it is stored up. This inheritance has a fatal influence on the class intellect; delusions mix with mental processes, doing and not doing, feeling and willing fall under the spell of pathological motives." Since, in addition to all this, the petty bourgeoisie harbors an ineradicable belief in the original wickedness of human nature, the mixture of these components explains the mental constitution, p. 176 ( 196) 176 On the Social Psychology of Horror Images. which, for one thing, does not even seek the deeper causes of the war, but blames the ruthlessness of people, here: the Germans, then, without any firm ground under its feet, derails into pathology, lapses into delusions, and finally allows itself to be talked into the most adventurous horror stories as hard cash. Such horror stories have always had an unusual vitality in France. Despite all the tremendous political upheavals on the face of the earth, it became clear that in 1789, with the rise of the petty bourgeoisie, the unconditional doubtfulness of the ancien régime, which no longer believed in anything, had been replaced by a blind faith that considered everything possible and immediately accepted the possible as having happened. Only gradually did unbiased research into the history of all French revolutions since the storming of the Bastille have to weed out the filth that had

stubbornly taken root there thanks to the petty-bourgeois credulity of contemporaries. Thus, for a long time, the figure of Mademoiselle de Sombreuil, who in 1792 was supposedly forced by the September Butchers to drink a cup of human blood as the price for saving her father, haunted revolutionary legend. After June 1848, it was said in all the bourgeois taverns that the workers who had been shot by Cavaignac had drunk wine from skulls and had sawed the mobile guards between two boards. Finally, Louis Dubreuilh writes in his 1871 history of the Commune: "After the defeat of the Commune, the press "echoed, if it did not invent, the hideous tales fabricated to mislead and embitter public opinion, to deceive France, to deceive Europe, and to deprive the dead and dying of any feeling of compassion. In its columns, the fable of the petroleum workers took flight, which was to cost the lives of so many unfortunate women, as well as the fable of the rocket-throwing battalions, of the gummed notes with the inscription: Good to burn!, of the subterranean Paris with its aqueducts, sewers, and catacombs, undermined and connected by electric wires, and of the poisoned drinks served to the soldiers. This newspaper invented and described the special apparatus with which the Communards That paper told the story of the arsonist who was found to have 140 meters of sulfur thread in his possession. These ludicrous and gruesome inventions provided food for both the army and the city and daily incited the fury of the soldiers with their executions and that of the reactionary crowd with their boasting, insults, and abuse." Old acquaintances are recurring here: the arsonist battalions and the petroleum sprayers were as well attributed to the Germans in 1914 as they were to the Communards in 1871, and with little effort, it could be proven that every atrocity now attributed to the "boches" has already been attributed to Frenchmen by Frenchmen throughout history, from the virgin forced to drink blood to the honest man sawn in half. Ideas handed down from generation to generation and stored in the mind of the petty bourgeois are awakened when he contemplates the images of horror, which in this case, too, were invented "to deceive France, to deceive Europe." But the recognition of the social conditioning of belief in horror stories protects against pharisaism and leads to the insight: You French have absolutely no need to be conceited about your civilization, since the masses of your people still fall for such trashy images and writings! We Germans don't want to get too high-headed, since, assuming the same social stratification of our people, we would fall for the same trashy pictures and trashy writings to the same extent! FRANZ DIEDERICH: A Madame Legros. The seminal poems of our time will be born from the mass movement. We, the people of the world war catastrophe, certainly have no reason to compromise on this conviction.

Everyone feels, whether consciously or only dimly, the connection between their life, the everyday and the great destinies, and an event that we can only halfway grasp as a mass movement. The belief in this complex of power, which finds religious expression in many people, is therefore likely 32/2 p. 178 ( 198) 178 Madame Legros. have expanded its field limitlessly, and the poetic impetus will prove it. However much the tremendously shaking, thrusting forces of the World War may have served this development, it would not have needed the World War for its great course. This event, which dominates us with its thunder, takes on the more modest dimensions of the episode, inserted into its great path, admittedly an impetuous one, which, as we feel today, will have a significant impact on the pace of all further political and social developments, determining the historical picture of the next generation. This applies, of course, to both forward-moving and obstructing movements and will manifest itself in the mass character of the actions. But doesn't the last pre-war art already show us this characteristic? Everywhere a struggle for new rhythmic movement is at work, striving to grasp the world of impressions that assail and oppress individual life, compel it to struggle, to shape it, to dominate it, and to unify it into a coherent order. Walt Whitman's strong influence on recent German poetry, which culminates in Franz Werfel's work, is no coincidence. A new emotion, born in the individual psyche from the infused awareness of a thousandfold, active world dependence that conditions every moment of life in a mysterious confluence, seeks in contemporary poetry to obey the necessity of creating the power of linguistic expression for its spiritual content. In this exercise of the will to language, the will to self-assertion is at work, driven into motion by the force of change within and outside the cultural edifice. Here, too, succumbing and overcoming, being swept along and dominating, weigh heavily alongside one another, separating from one another. The individual knows that he is not an absolute individual, that his psyche receives its most essential elements from the psyche of the masses he experiences, and that his influence somehow flows back into the masses, in a small circle, in a large circle. In this contact, which no one escapes, destinies grow. They always grow where p. 179 ( 199) Madame Legros. 179 inner compulsion determines the individual to act, for the mass is a divided structure, its parts highly dissimilar, the mass of things and events, like the mass of people. Only in an abstract sense can one speak simply of the milieu of the mass; the social poetry of the last decades proves how this general splits itself into infinitely diverse divisions in reality. Here the profound progress of social knowledge is revealed. The concept of the mass in Renaissance culture, which was strongly dominated by contempt for the

masses, is now obsolete. It had its last heyday in the philistine hatred of Romanticism, and its offshoots reach into the individualistic endeavors of the present in poetry. We have experienced this in the last decade. But now it is a matter of elaborating the relationship between individual and mass, which is meaningfully present in everyone. As a creative artist, the poet is subject to the question: how does the individual receive from the mass, how does he give to it? This must take mass drama beyond Shakespeare, Schiller, and Hauptmann. If it has succeeded in portraying the mass as a hero, the contemporary task now remains to express the content of mass relationships borne by the individual in dramatic, fateful action in such a way that the individual hero, with the greatest individualization, embodies the movement of the masses. And this is given in the three-act drama "Madame Legros" by Heinrich Mann, which was first published in the August issue of "Weiße Blätter." This work therefore has a right to be taken as an event. Mann's drama is a shaken outcry of the soul, wrung from the torment of deeply offended humanity, trembles through street revolts, and stirs up the world in all its layers until it forces what seemed impossible. A stone strikes smooth water, causing it to leap excitedly at the point of impact, sink, leap again, and then a rapidly spreading wave-like circling begins to 32/2 p. 180 ( 200) 180 Madame Legros. Now such circular activity spreads from other places as well; the circles intersect, and everywhere- The water surface trembles in a network of flowing meshes. At the first point of impact, the wave-generating force finally ebbs away, but another movement passes over it, carrying its excitement ring by ring into the distance. Where the game began, who can still determine the point? Even when the beginning is over, it matters little, but the beginning was once valid and remains interwoven with the whole as a germ and part. An artistic power that penetrates primordial depths can make this essence visible again. Daumier's picture, which paints a popular movement in the street, is a great example. There is only a detail, bringing one face into the light, and a sea of waves and faces grows before the senses. Thus, Heinrich Mann now paints an episode of the popular passion that gripped Paris in 1789 on the eve of the storming of the Bastille, and the figure he places in the foreground, gathering the whole, is the small, clean woman of Legros, a hosiery weaver, whose millinery shop is located in the alley into which a Bastille tower looks down over roofs and walls. This woman, as she presents herself at the beginning of the drama, truly has nothing revolutionary about her. Industrious, well-behaved, and entirely subservient to her husband, she is concerned with nothing but her domestic happiness. She has to run a household errand, from which she does not return with the same composure with which she left. Frightened, she holds a

piece of paper in her hands, which she tries to hide from her husband's eyes. It fell from the tower. From the Bastille. She has already read it, and when her husband asks about its origin, she blurts out the words: "It is so monstrous that I felt complicit when I read it." Her husband is astonished: "You?" And she continues excitedly: "All people are complicit." And when her husband mocks her coldly: "A fool wrote it. And you're wasting your time on it," her words tremble: "A fool? A man who has been sitting innocently in the tower for forty-three years." She has seen the man who threw the written paper down from the tower, saw him wave and be snatched away by a soldier above. The paper reads: "O passerby! Whoever you may be, an innocent man calls to you. During the previous reign, in the time of His Majesty our most gracious King Louis, I was thrown into the Bastille for an indelicate attempt to attract the attention of the Marquise de Pompadour, and for forty-three years I have been forgotten here. Not even my guards know who I am anymore. O friend, to whom the wind or the breath of God blows this paper, tell the people! Tell them what no one knows anymore, for as many as are born and die: My name is Latude, and I am an innocent who suffers!" This moving cry for help now also grips Legros; he no longer speaks of foolishness and fun, but he does not give in to the impression like his wife. His words are: "One does not concern oneself with such things. It would be unwise." We won't tell anyone about it." Mrs. Legros says it's certainly difficult to tell people, since no one will believe it; but to remain silent and do nothing in this matter—to hide away out of anxious egoism—is something her simple, firm honesty rebels against, and she, the exemplary obedient wife, stands, as this conversation comes to an end, in sharp rebellion against her husband. Legros acts with a petty concern, driven by the feeling that everyone is their own best friend; Madame Legros, on the other hand, has the instinct of humanity. "Not to become complicit in the injustice that is happening, no more guilty than all those who don't know about it, man, it's a matter of a human being!" In such phrases, her attitude toward the event quickly and clearly emerges. When Legros, emphasizing the burden of time, says: "What happens to our neighbors shouldn't concern us; We must close our eyes, otherwise it will affect us too," she flares up: "And even if it did! Do you think I can let it go if someone next door is screaming for help? Safe here in the shady alley, waiting for customers, fending off the people who want our money; eating, chatting, and finally p. 182 ( 202) 182 Madame Legros. closing the door to go to sleep with my husband? But at the end of my good, comfortable alley, chains clang, and someone, a skeleton and eternally weeping, is dragging himself through damp cellars. You want me to believe it's nothing? I can hear it: he's screaming!" These words rumble out of

growing inner anguish. Calming down is no longer possible. Whatever her husband may say, comforting or well-intentioned, the woman evaluates everything according to the nameless, unredeemed injustice and her desire to erase it and to assist the innocent. She calls her husband stubborn, saying he alone is like that... "But people want what is good, oh, I know that. I need only call them, speak to them, and right now, this very hour, they will go with me and challenge the innocent." The fanaticism of honesty, which knows nothing of people, gives her the faith of an optimist. She renounces her husband's obedience, something she has always been willing to do without question, and she pushes open the door and calls the neighbors over. All of this, succinctly accomplished, is contained in the first four scenes of the drama. And now begins the struggle that the will to humanity, in agony and indignant, wages against a thousand obstacles, whipped up by every resistance to increased effort, determined to make the final sacrifice. The poet has thus chosen the plot in such a way that the justification of Madame Legros's act is absolutely clear from the outset. The name of the Bastille, the specific case of rape, the pathetic subservience of the lawless, exploited petty bourgeois Legros, the sincerity of his wife's rebellion, all this excludes any doubt as to the necessity and goodness of the act. It thereby immediately acquires more general significance, and Mann's art intensifies this content from scene to scene. Madame Legros has to traverse and fell a forest of resistance. We know that her act belongs to the masses, but it is precisely from the masses that stupidity, unbelief, mockery, faintheartedness, cowardice, baseness, envy, and malice bar her path, and those who are quickly overcome by it- p. 183 ( 203) Madame Legros. 183 witness and allow themselves to be swept away are few in number. All of this crowds around her as soon as she takes the step onto the street. The service of truth, freedom, humanity goes through thorns and spears. Only the purest honesty of will and necessity can complete it. And if she must sacrifice, can she herself remain pure? The goal is what matters. This cannot be achieved without winning over all the masses and powers. But how is that to happen when so much of the human world has been corrupted from understanding selfless honesty and the highest humanity, when power believes it has a right to brutally destructive violence! Madame Legros's very first step onto the street quickly leads to a riot. Soldiers intervene; there is a scuffle; From the curbstone, onto which the people pushed her to better hear what she wanted, Legros's cry rang out in the tumult: "Make way, we are marching against the Bastille! The innocent will be freed!" May they all die, the soldiers, the impudent riders there in the square, the heartless ladies in their sedan chairs, the murderers!" The soldiers pull the furious orator down from

the stone and take her prisoner. In vain does Legros accuse the officer that his wife is sick; in vain do neighbors intercede on her behalf, claiming she is one of the most serious businesswomen in the neighborhood. But a nobleman, who had witnessed the scene with other members of his class, intercedes on her behalf and, appealing to high connections, even on grounds of state, secures her release. The scenes that begin with the intervention of these figures of the ancien régime, especially the Chevalier d'Angelot, also belong to the first act. Representatives of the class of whom history says danced on the volcano of the revolution, the sight of the revolt has for them only the welcome charm of an exciting spiritual diversion. They have enjoyed a spectacle, that is all, and from the conversation with Madame Legros, who also immediately seeks to use her contact with these people for her own cause, they merely gather that they have made an interesting discovery; they have found a fine example of virtue, as the Countess d'Orchat says, remarking that she will never be bored again and that the Queen must be informed of this. The Chevalier remarks: "If we opened our eyes on the first day of a still virgin earth, then perhaps we would see things as Madame Legros sees them." And while his companions take the opportunity to enter Legros's shop and see a bourgeois home for once, the conversation he has with Madame Legros in private reveals that he senses in this woman a clever, ambitious woman who wants to transcend her narrow-mindedness. He calls her the most skillful of his caste's enemies and would like to facilitate her rise. "To see them at work, to see them growing, like the danger I love, like the passion that is within me. This is how I like it. I walk through this city that smells of unshed blood. I inhale the vapor of desires and the poison of spirits. Justice, reason, and virtue: I do not believe in them, and yet I carry them in my own heart, I, whom they are meant to overthrow! Daily a revolt licks up: I enjoy the hostile moment in which I breathe. Think how young and lost I was born into this moment, in which everything, and even I myself, is pushing toward my downfall, and I want to live in no other. I love my time, this festival of hate. I never knew it as well as today, in this alley, when a woman cried for blood. . . " - In this scene, in which simply healthy popular nature reveals its initially noticeable intimidation before the Stripping away the superiority and strangeness of aristocratic intellectual and formal culture, Madame Legros's instinct for purpose comes to the realization that one must prudently take people at their own pace, since none of them is capable of understanding the good will of others without prejudice, if they are to become submissive and useful to the work of others. Nevertheless, she has with the essence 1 p. 185 ( 205) Madame Legros. 185 Nothing in common with hypocrisy, what she does is

done, as she once said, from the knowledge "that people long for the innocent," for "All have the same heart, and I need only draw away their vices and their scorn like a curtain"—but how she now organizes her actions demands the greatest sacrifices that can ever be expected of the self-pride of a pure nature. Already in the ecstasy of revolt she approached this path; but then it happened in the unconsciousness of passion that she suddenly sought to seize the people, who had just poured insults upon her and into whose faces she then, in searing impatience, cried glaring dishonor, with alluring images and glorious promises. But now it happens consciously, in clear, simple calculation, with a cruel, necessary awareness, that she, whose marital fidelity is beyond doubt, says to the Chevalier, who just now takes pleasure in turning a revolt into a tryst, with surprising determination: "Help me, and I'll be yours." The second act allows the emotional impact of this path of sacrifice on the part of the combatants to be felt. The poet has set it in the garden of the Countess d'Orchat, which leads through a gate onto a meadow from which the people can peer in through the garden railing. In the midst of the playful aristocratic company, the expected Madame Legros appears, led by the Chevalier d'Angelot. The act climaxes in a scene with the veiled queen, who has been lured by the interesting case of sensitivity and virtue. But everything that Madame Legros experienced during all those days of toiling for the innocent man comes through in the scenes, the final stretches of her sacrificial path, with the rumbling ferment of a terribly tested passion. It will take artistic natures like Else Lehmann to master the task presented here. A hurricane of fate must be depicted, a supreme spiritual struggle. I have been working for weeks. I dig, exhaust myself, I lie, I play a game... Ah, p. 186 ( 206) 186 Madame Legros. What am I saying! I suffer, I suffer. I have not reached him. There are people before me, thousands upon thousands of people, all of whom I must win over, all of whom I must touch and conquer, until I can reach him who is waiting for me. . . "Again and again, experience and will to achieve one thing break forth in such words. "I will make sure that everyone, in the alleys, palaces, garrets, down to the gutter and up to the throne, will see only one thing, will be troubled by only one thing, will want and long for only one thing!" Until, before the Queen, at the Chevalier's whispered warning to her to beware, the torment suddenly rears up: "I have been careful enough! One must finally hear the truth! How much I have flattered people so that the duty of the heart became their pleasure. I have taught market women feelings like saints. I entered houses and spiced the bourgeoisie's digestion with beautiful sensations. And I climbed into carriages in which colorful ladies took me in so that they could sigh, since they already had a little monkey with them to laugh with! How

ashamed I was before him, the innocent, who watched me from his dungeon! How I hated you: the concerts in your palaces where frivolous singers appeared first, and then I! Hated—your cooing and flirting, your amiability without love, your idle benevolence, your beauty and your splendor, who do not know how poor and sober they would be if the innocent, just once, were to appear among you! . . . But I have seduced you, I have brought you to want the good, to sigh for it. The chains that you yourselves forged, you now cover your ears when they clang. You yourselves now press yourselves against the tower until it bursts. Yes: I have bored through, burrowed up to you, to the greatest lords, to beneath the throne. I was in Versailles..." She saw the queen; the wheels of her carriage, which carried her from one trivial pleasure to the next, threw their filth upon her, but only now has she reached her goal, and even here only at the price of a comedy that panders to unnatural, erotic desire. p. 187 ( 207) Madame Legros. 187 Thus, Madame Legros insulted and desecrated her best: she lied, acted, promised her body as a prize, and committed treason. When she obtained the Queen's order freeing the innocent, and when she, who, to the Queen's astonishment, demanded no mercy for herself, was offered the Academy's prize for virtue, and yet her behavior showed no sign of happiness, it was said among the nobles that this was intellectual arrogance that nothing could satisfy. And now, speaking for herself, the words of the liberator fell, heavy with the world: "It cost too much." The impression this remarkable drama creates when reading it is that Madame Legros is the spark that leaps from class to class in society and ignites fires everywhere in the meshes. She acts on her own initiative, awakened to action in a moment, like Schiller's Tell, and her uniqueness compared to him could be suggested by the fact that Melchthal's passionate zeal is vividly revealed in her. What is significantly and broadly developed in Schiller's work are the scenes that prepare for the Rütli Oath, and this Oath itself, remain entirely outside the Bastille drama; one feels clearly enough that the people of Paris are agitated, that Madame Legros's will is a drop in a trembling sea, but like Tell, this woman too has no connections to revolutionary groups. It knows nothing of such things, represents the most original degree of revolting popular fury with all its elemental impetus, all its blindly optimistic belief in itself, and only in the last act, in which the signs of the imminent storming of the Bastille become audible and visible, do signs also appear that there must be leading revolutionary communities. An armed mob, noisily passing through Legros's alley, calls on the woman to join them, wanting her to be their leader who will ensure victory. But now she is strangely perplexed. She, who was ready to give herself completely to her deed, has not yet awakened to the general

idea of this deed. p. 188 ( 208) 188 Madame Legros. Even the most intellectually inferior person is capable of great emotional achievements. In this being, Mann has taken his heroine. As she was at the beginning, so she remains at the end. She is simply not what the aristocratic scent, which concluded from its own nature, suspected in her: a creature whipped by ambition, who resorts to acting in order to make better progress. Because she is different, in these final scenes the Chevalier approaches her, confessing that she is the first human being before whom he has been ashamed. She has given his misanthropic doubts the belief that there is something called virtue after all. In a sublime, chaste manner, the poem dissolves the contract Madame Legros made with this helper. And once the full impression of the first moments of the act of liberation is present, one now understands that it is logical for Madame Legros to scream and hurl the name of murderer at the people, whom she wants to compel to join her in the fight and then stabs the Chevalier when he leaps forward to protect her. Over the corpse of the fallen man, her words lament: "Why did it strike, why did I free the innocent!" The words have a double meaning. It also applies to the Chevalier: "You have pierced a human heart at the moment when it beat at its highest, higher than yours, higher than mine." And the crowd does not know: should this woman, who was found with the nobleman, follow the slain man? What is to be done: she has freed the innocent. With confusion and conflict of feeling and thought, the great drama of the revolution begins, which the crowd rushes outside to meet. The cloudy heaviness of the hour, of time, darkens this scene. Outside, the masses roll toward the Bastille; outside, in the neighborhood, a festival is being begun that is meant to honor the liberator, but in which she refused to participate. This refusal is not only explained by the fatigue that had overcome her since she had relaxed after her tremendous spiritual achievement; it corresponds to her essence. Both are at work in all the final events of the drama: her characteristically drawn nature and the emotional state of the moment. She looks back on her deed with trembling, with fear, and believes she cannot repeat it, that she is now used up and ruined. And finally, she is again the woman she was at the beginning of the drama: full of busy concern, she resumes her everyday cares where she still had to do with caps and lace and had been lying dormant for days. That this does not seem petty and soft is something the poet has also ensured in the last and penultimate scenes – in this one, an emissary of the Academy, a believer in reason ready for revolution, speaks with Madame Legros. The academic, who honors the despondent woman, offers her the words of regret: “Poor creature, who was a heroine! Thus, others after you will put into practice what reason decrees." The mass

movement, whose drums and shouts now resound from the streets, did not depend on Madame Legros, but she was an element of its fullness. Therein lay the dramatic task, which Heinrich Mann understood sharply psychologically and energetically carried out. The first theaters have already incorporated the work into their work, and it is likely that the Freie Volksbühne will not be the last to gratefully ensure the continued existence of its stage presence. THE glosses. First, everything must be ruined! On Sunday, October 29, the Central Executive Committee of Greater Berlin presented its eight Berlin constituencies with a resolution that will retain its value as long as there is still an understanding of good and bad jokes in this world. And as soon as a new edition of the immortal book about the Schildbürger comes out, one should revel in the enrichment that their funny pranks bring through the cheerful camaraderie Haase-Hoffmann-Ledebour learned, the decision to freeze contributions was too dangerous. They left it to the poor in spirit from Teltow, who were running headlong into the wall for their convictions. For themselves, they took a different path to break the "policy of violence of the party executive." p. 190 ( 210) 190 Glosses. With the sure instinct for the fiery breath of revolution that distinguishes him, the trained Marxist Adolf Hoffmann tied in with the best revolutionary traditions of Prussian philistinism, the principle of tax refusal, and proclaimed the principle: Get the "Vorwärts" delivered to you, but don't pay for it. Pay nothing! Can there be a more incendiary slogan for the social revolution? Wasn't Marx also a tax evader, and didn't he even call for armed resistance against anyone who wanted money? Long live Marxism! Down with the social imperialists! — — - But wait! What are you saying? Armed resistance? We're not offering any resistance at all! We're merely Berlin social revolutionaries, and it's not for nothing that Haase is at our head. When we no longer know what to do, and we've already unanimously adopted a revolutionary resolution, we always set up a commission. We call it an action committee here in Berlin; it sounds more revolutionary and always reminds us a bit of the famous Committee of Public Safety from 1793. But otherwise, it's quite harmless. And so it happened! At Haase's request, an "Action Committee" was established, which was initially to sue the party executive in the civil courts for violating the statute, and which was also to provide all Berliners who did not pay for "Vorwärts" and therefore no longer received it with another party newspaper. A truly fantastic plan, bound to collapse in a very short time and which only proves that behind all the Berlin braggarts there lies nothing but much fear and little hope. But that's not all! The editors of "Vorwärts" find themselves in an almost farcical situation, and one must look up to these tragic men in admiration and say to oneself: Oh, how principled

those must be who, out of principle, persevere in such an undignified position against a fixed salary! The General Assembly therefore laid its admiring respect at the feet of these martyrs and further called on them to persevere unwaveringly. But consistency above all! If the editors are now paid for not working, it is quite logical that the non-editors are not paid for their work. Therefore, the decision the editorial team had previously made is quite logical: people like Stampfer, who now fill the "Vorwärts" without their manuscripts having been submitted to the democratic editors for archbishop approval and bearing their imprimatur, will not be paid any fee. Incidentally, the editors' "not working" is, of course, to be taken with a grain of salt. Not that they are lazy! On the contrary, they are still far too busy for their current situation. They still plan ahead with criminal impartiality, as they did in May: this will be the leading article, and that will be an entrefilet! Until the typist comes and explains to them: Müller has made other arrangements. Then they fall silent. Indeed: to persevere here is heroic! The bitterly evil Friedrich. It's the illusion about the masses. It was quite useful that on October 27, during the debate on the Liebknecht trial, MP Rühle also took the floor, and it was equally gratifying that the Reichstag received the remarks of this close comrade and friend of Liebknecht, which, incidentally, were expressed with dispassionate coldness, with the utmost calm. Rühle doesn't hope for parliament; he hopes for the masses. If he had wanted to speak out in favor of organized economic self-help in unions and cooperatives, if he had intended to counter parliamentary belief in miracles, well, that would have been a merit. But that was not his intention. Rather, his words expressed a much more childish belief in the power of the masses, simply as a numerical mass. "The working masses will liberate Liebknecht, the working masses will remember their historical duty, they will use their means of power," he calls upon them, "to do their duty." Not a single word about how they will do it. The admirer of the mass merely as a mass must not be clear about this. Only the obscure concept of a mass powerful in numbers maintains his belief in its power, its threatening power with which one can intimidate those in power. What a gigantic illusion! The merely numerous mass is absolutely powerless, precisely because of its great number. A merely enormous crowd is a misfortune in itself because of its disunity and the confusion that inevitably arises from it. A mass can only become powerful through leaders who transform the mass into an organized and disciplined army, enthusiastic about clear common ideas. But then the mass does not remain a dark, threatening force; then it becomes the expression of a clear A principle of order that seeks to realize itself through state or at least state-like organization. The structuring, organization, disciplining, and clarification of

the masses, their enthusiasm for great common goals, is also not possible in secret silence, but only in the clear light of publicity. Even small sects perish through betrayal and spying, their power broken at any moment. But organizations encompassing enormous masses can only flourish under the protection of the public opinion that sustains them. If the masses, the working class, want to attain real power, if they do not want to forever threaten only theatrically with their dark numerical power, which in truth is only powerlessness, then they must themselves seek to conquer and represent the sovereign powers that decide on the world stage, and this is only possible through organization within the state, through a An opinion-based organization in a fundamentally affirmed state, which the goal is to transform in accordance with one's own ideals. If Rühle had made even the slightest attempt at the end of his speech to say how the masses should reflect on their duty, then he would have come to the admittedly arduous, but nevertheless immediately rewarding organizational work that has been active within the German working class as a great social-democratic popular movement for decades now in the party, trade union, cooperative, and general educational movement. Then, of course, one must free oneself from all mass mysticism, then one must begin to build the new state of the future, the new society, today in factual and practical terms, and then one must not allow the war to mislead one into continuing the work that the working class began with so much pride and love before the war, on a higher scale after the war, with doubled and tripled strength. The future belongs to the masses, but only to the organized, A structured, disciplined, enlightened, well-led, and positively constructive mass, not chaos. The initiated Haase. H. Peus-Dessau. The telegram from the highest level about the "decisive victory in Dobruja" could only briefly astonish the uninitiated. There, too, the picture typical of this war emerges: after the arrival of Russian reinforcements, the front has stiffened. There, too, the battle will, in all probability, drag on with varying success." Thus spoke Representative Haase in the session of the Reichstag on October 11 of this year, according to the corrected shorthand, page 1729. Now that Constanza and Cernavoda have been taken and Romanians and Russians have been rounded up on the Harsowa-Braila line on the Danube, Haase must have realized that it is not always a good idea to act like an initiate when one is not. p. 193 ( 213) Glosses. 193 "Thunder of the Spheres." An anonymous manifesto has gone out from Charlottenburg, the author of which has discovered the means by which the World War can be ended at one blow. We can only speculate about the author's personality, which we do not wish to express, although the manifesto was sent openly, lest others immediately cry "denunciation." The means is: "Immediate

disarmament and compulsory arbitration!" Regarding the implementation of this proposal, the author merely states that the proposal would immediately resound with "the thunder of the spheres" into the "nailed-down brains" of his contemporaries. Thus, the author sees only the "nailed-down brains" as the cause of the outbreak and duration of the World War. This proposal could, however, be realized, albeit not immediately, if its highly wise author became Chancellor. Then the Entente would undoubtedly prevail and force "disarmament" for Germany. England, France, Russia, and Italy would constitute themselves as a "compulsory arbitration court" and undertake the reorganization of Europe. It's high time the wise man in Charlottenburg became Chancellor! Phrases or class struggle? Listening to our radical wordsmiths, one might believe that the party majority and the unions have renounced class struggle and that the interests of the workers are now represented only by those "revolutionary" tribunes who, from the darkness of anonymity, hurl their curses against the "re-educators." It looks as if the class struggle consists in the repetition of revolutionary slogans, in the incitement against the non-politically petrified party comrades, or, at best, in the organization of empty demonstrations in parliament or on the streets. But what exactly is class struggle? Isn't it the sum of the work done to protect the interests of the working class against the interests of the propertied classes? To win the workers a better standard of living, more rights, and more power, and thereby give them greater influence in state and society? Certainly! And who does this work? Are these the ones who make revolutionary speeches at assemblies and conventions? Who, in regrettable delusion, stir up fratricidal struggle instead of class struggle, splinter the organizations, and condemn our movement to impotence? Those who believe that the "fellow travelers" must be expelled instead of being held and enlightened? 32/3 p. 194 ( 214) 194 Glosses. Those who look with contempt at practical work for fear that they might come into contact with bourgeois people and suffer damage to their spiritual well-being, that is to say, to their socialist convictions? Or are these not rather those numerous self-sacrificing comrades who, through ceaseless, detailed work, help to lay the foundations of a successful class and mass struggle? Who weld the workers together into solid organizations and thereby forge the power the workers need for their struggle? Who still today recognize the undoubted truth that the workers are nothing when divided, but everything when united? Are these not the people who, every day, practically advocate for the welfare of the workers? Who, as workers' representatives in the workshops and on the construction sites, defend their interests? Who, in long, exhausting negotiations with employers, struggle for higher wages, shorter working hours, and more protection for

the workers? Who work on the collective bargaining committees and arbitration commissions to ensure compliance with collective bargaining agreements? Those who offer protection and assistance to workers in the workers' secretariats? Those who, in the editorial offices of the workers' press, seek to sharpen public conscience and ease the lot of workers through objective criticism and practical suggestions? Those who, during the war, seek to improve the miserable lot of workers as much as possible by collaborating on all kinds of war commissions? They seek to promote the welfare of workers, or is that done by those chatterers whose every third word is "class struggle" and whose entire activity is a mockery of real class struggle? Who counteracts the impoverishing tendencies of capitalism? Isn't it the trade unions with their struggles for higher wages and shorter working hours? For a higher standard of living and more time for the education of the working class? Are the movements to obtain cost-of-living allowances during the war, the measures taken by the trade unions to protect their members against deprivation and hardship, a sign of harmony-mongering? Isn't the struggle for social legislation and worker protection a piece of class struggle? Does the class struggle express itself only in chatter, in demonstrations, or in revolution in the pitchfork sense? The worker who does not go through life blindly experiences firsthand, every day, what class struggle is. The entrepreneur drums it into him! The entrepreneur ruthlessly advocates for his interests, not by chatter, but by representing them practically: in his factory, on his building site, in his office, in his association, and his party. Through cooperation in his organization, in the state and community, he seeks to gain influence and power for himself and his class. And he seeks to exploit this influence and power in his own interest. That is his class struggle. Against this kind of class struggle, the workers cannot get by with revolutionary phrases and empty demonstrations. Revolutionary cries and demonstrations will not bring down the walls of the capitalist world like the walls of Jericho once did; for these walls are stronger than those of the ancient Amorite city. Here, it's not about talking, but about acting, about acting practically day after day, just as entrepreneurs act practically every day. Only in this way are the interests of the workers represented. Only in this way is real class struggle waged. A. Ellinger. WHO The Wandervogel. - Doesn't HE know the Wandervogel? This youth movement has developed from small beginnings with unimagined success. Misunderstood, ridiculed, slandered, praised exuberantly, and condemned to the abyss – thus it grew into a gigantic force, unfortunately, over time expanding more in breadth than in depth, but nevertheless healthy and meaningful at its core. We watched this development with astonishment, sensed its powerful driving

forces, but could not find the right standard that fully did justice to the movement. The spiritual state of the Wandervogels, the new lifestyle of this youth, and their new culture of friendship—all these were problems whose origins were suspected or felt, but not recognized. Blüher's book[1] brings this insight. — An expert stands up and tells the story of the Wandervogel—not the club's history or the result of local group statistics, but the birth and development of its inner, spiritual content. And it is surprisingly rich! To escape the unbearable stifling atmosphere that filled schoolrooms and nurseries around the turn of the last century, a few began to work on their liberation, following their healthy intuition for better or for worse, and emphasizing and nurturing the natural romantic moment as a reaction to the violent classical and distorted historical education. Blüher creates a gripping description of the desolation of the schoolrooms and family rooms; He describes the battle that young, enthusiastic schoolmasters had to fight beneath the surface for the emerging reform ideas against the traditional conception of youth education. He illuminates the relationship between parents and youth, between teacher and student, and then shows how, all of a sudden, the romantic urges smoldering beneath the surface in the misunderstood and spoiled youth were released and how they united in a powerful alliance. Starting from a small, but conflict-ridden focal point, the Wandervogel grew like wildfire, spreading across the entire country. Soon after its peak, it was curbed by the efforts of voluntary and involuntary firefighters, diminishing its true value. The true content of the movement was grossly misunderstood and suppressed when leadership passed into the hands of partially unsuitable adults (headteachers, etc.). Blüher writes the intellectual history of male bourgeois schoolchildren, not of the youth of the people as a whole. He is ignorant of the hardships and torments of proletarian youth, whose minds are exhausted in factories and workshops and atrophied to the point of failure. The author also cautiously steers clear of the education of female youth. But he knows the bourgeois youth of the Gymnasium inside and out. The slavish bondage to teaching methods and materials alien to the healthy minds of youth, the effervescent urge for free thought and romantic living, the inspiring beauty and inner authenticity of the youthful friendships that blossomed in the Wandervogel – all of this, once awakened, caused youth to flock together. They slipped from the tight reins of the school bullies, allowing the poetry-filled life of the traveling scholars and customers to blossom again – not as a regression, but as a return to an old but natural, better sensibility. They dreamed away their best youth and unnoticed allowed a nurturing of personality to emerge from the Wandervogel. Real men grew up, healthy in body and soul, with the first

seeds of a new form of society in their blood: The Wandervogel paved the way for the union of like-minded individuals into a form of society that would transcend the family. Blüher writes a remarkable section on the alcohol question, or rather, abstinence from alcohol, in the Wandervogel. It is not as thorough as the matter deserves, but it is excellently reasoned. Contrary to the popular assessment of abstinence as a stomach issue in some circles, he elevates abstinence from alcohol to a cultural viewpoint. He says: "And the youthful abstinence movement is, for the most part, nothing other than one of the forms that the general struggle of youth against the preceding age had to take throughout life. The abstinence movement is revolution!" Blüher demonstrates a keen insight in his treatise on the schisms and the development of the individual branches of the Wandervogel movement. It was high time that the organizing hand of an expert tamed the confusing abundance of phenomena and traced them back to their fundamental value. It takes courage to do this, p. 197 ( 217) Glosses. 197 to say what is; Blüher has the courage. He finds the right word for things in The Wandervogel, correctly interprets Romanticism as an indignation against the spirit of discipline in school and home, and clarifies a problem that no one before him had dared to tackle: "The Wandervogel as an erotic phenomenon" (the foreign words are the author's; it is a tiresome bad habit and a tremendous hampering of "popular" education that scientific works are still brimming with Latin and Greek fragments). The most peculiar fact about The Wandervogel, the deep-rooted love of friends, the misunderstood isolation of male youth, and the (probably largely unconscious) avoidance of the opposite sex, finds its thorough, rigorous, and clearly thought-out explanation in the third part. This is the most important section for the educator of youth, shedding light on so many peculiarities in the lives of growing youth. The entire area the author explores here is an achievement of modern times, which have thrown overboard so many old sexual views and, in particular, have learned to distinguish more fairly between natural and perverse sexual feelings. The book, like The Wandervogel itself, is an act. This gives it great value. It also provides new material and new inspiration to the educators and leaders of working-class youth; it is earnestly recommended to them. A. Emmerich. Georg Büchner. In these times, drawing attention to new books is either meritorious or dangerous. Both for one and the same reason: a good nine-tenths of current literary production is trash, even if it passes the censorship. Now, however, Georg Büchner's works, recently published by Insel-Verlag, are not "novelties" in the true sense of the word. But if you indulge yourself with the pleasure of asking around, well, the result is simply the familiar. Why might that be? Part of the blame certainly lies with the schools, which

transmit to us the most insignificant anecdote about rulers in the realms of literature and politics, but "know" men like Bürger, Grabbe, Büchner, and others, either not at all or only superficially. — I believe that Karl Gutzkow was filled with admiration for the young poet when he read "Danton's Death." Who wouldn't be swept away by it? Precisely because it is so difficult to stage due to the rapid scene changes. There are no "decent" stages at all; it isn't even "classical." That is precisely why it is so real. It is a piece of torn-out, bloody life, and it encompasses everything that is called "life": brutality and love, death, life and rebirth, meanness, eroticism, and the tenderest feeling. Is life any different? . . . p. 198 ( 218) 198 The Week. While in "Danton's Death" all aspects of human life are gathered together in terribly urgent, ingenious haste—an unsurpassable monograph on the poet!—in the other two plays, more individual moments of life come to the fore. Satirical in "Leonce and Lena"—bitter, oppressive in "Wozzek." The Wozzek fragment is a drama of realism, the likes of which has probably only been achieved since then by Gerhart Hauptmann in his first stage poems. The novella "Lenz" is shocking, unique in German prose poetry. (Here again, one can ask: Who knows Lenz?) Raging, laughing, shattering, twilight madness! In a certain sense, I found something related in Maupassant, but only insofar as the psychological aspect is concerned. And this novella has no "novella style" at all; the sentences are brief, abrupt, its tone, one might say, unfeeling, cold. And yet tearful and gloomy. Of Büchner, like no other, one can rightly claim that he was a political poet. For both his politics and his poetry are dominated by each other. Politics is a cold, sober thing in which only the most realistic facts have validity, and yet it is life when it is a politics of the people and for the people. How true this is is demonstrated by the "Hessian Messenger," this brilliant pamphlet of agitation that has lost none of its freshness and fire to this day. A pamphlet of the harshest facts, bitter accusations—and full of love. And this proud, self-confident, harried man, who was so completely different in his letters to his fiancée, tender and happily serene, died because his time didn't understand him. His time! I doubt he would be understood now. Genius is—at most—never understood by those among whom it lives, at most admired. It must be happy, and it is, when its corpse becomes a "dunghill of freedom"—if there ever is any freedom! Die Woche. November 2.—if there ever is any Carl Diesel. .. On the other hand, I saw a very numerous and influential party which, far more to avoid giving up sweet habit than out of self-interest, far more out of intellectual laziness than out of a lack of willingness to make sacrifices, described in the harshest terms as high treason and treason everything that aimed at an improvement in conditions, especially a better situation for the

lower classes. p. 199 ( 219) Die Woche. 199 Even if General von Möllendorf's opinion could not exactly be considered a conservative expression, according to which he no longer wanted to eat in a restaurant while the state parliament was in session, because he might meet a Hansemann, a Lichnowsky, or a Beckerath, and if he were alone with such a person in a room, he would have to ask his conscience and his God which injustice was greater: committing murder or allowing such a villain to live, it is nevertheless significant enough that a Prussian general could use such rhetoric. And all those who later belonged to the ultra-conservatives treated the pursuit of estate representation, of estate rights, as semi-regicide, because such a pursuit, following the example of 1789, would inevitably lead to regicide. My striving to achieve as much in the sciences as all my other comrades and to truly deserve the preference that easily fell into my lap due to my position and name was already considered an offense to aristocratic sentiments, so that some of my closest relatives, even if only half-jokingly, called me a democrat, simply because I had learned something and not only wanted to become something, but also achieve something." This assessment of a certain Prussian upper class can be found in the notes of Prince Kraft of Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, late General of the Artillery and Adjutant General to His Majesty the Emperor and King Wilhelm I. The chapter from which our quotation is taken deals with the "ferments before the revolution" in the autumn of 1847. The observer was by no means biased toward the "lower classes." For he saw in the ferment of the people nothing "but a striving from below upwards, directed only toward robbery and destruction." His judgment of the ruling caste, to which he himself belonged, is all the more reliable. And which, in substance, is the same today as it was then. Only it finds itself in almost better circumstances. Back then, when it came to it, it had to place itself in the government's bureaucracy. Now it has its affairs taken care of by industrious people of the Helfferich type. From which it remains to be seen that progress is no empty delusion, and that, despite all the wicked disturbers of the truce, we live in truly bright times. A long way from Chantilly to Boulogne. A path scurried by the ghostly laments of the dead, studded with glowing spikes p. 200 ( 220) 200 The Week. of disappointment. Mr. Briand has experienced bitter hours, and he may decide for himself what was worse: the pointed reference by his English opponent and friend to the warnings of that time or his stubborn refusal to send new supplies of blood and powder. Add to that the slim prospect that Cadorna or Brusilov will send swift and generous aid. One thinks that the forced declaration of war on Germany could turn the exposure of his front on still unredeemed ground into a dangerous venture. For another, the Galician shirt is closer to his heart

than the coat of his Romanian ally, who, moreover, operated on his own initiative in Transylvania instead of adhering to useful Russian instructions against Bulgaria. Incidentally, the Eastern powers are complaining about a significant reduction in Japanese and American ammunition supplies. The yellow gentlemen and Wilson's compatriots without a hyphen seem to be more concerned at the moment with replenishing their own stocks than those of the destroyers of Europe. This can be seen from a careful reading of English newspapers. In vain does Bratianu and his alcoholic king remind their Latin brothers of the glorious consecration hour in which, barely six weeks ago, Deschanel electrified the French Chamber with that fervent demonstration of thanksgiving in which he praised noble Romania, "which now occupies in the sacred struggle the place assigned to it by the nobility of its origins, and whose armies will now bear the laurels together with the heroes of the victorious allies." Note! In my article in No. 31 of the "Glocke," a change was made without my knowledge in the section dealing with the politics of the "Sozialistische Monatshefte" that completely reverses the meaning of my words and also contradicts the entire thrust of the article. Therefore, for the sake of the matter, I attach importance to recording the original version of the sentence here. It read: "This important intellectual and political work, which should be recognized even by those who have not yet become aware of the coherence of the views represented here and who may therefore sometimes reject its results, was given far too little use in official party circles; indeed, precisely where it pioneered something new, it was met with indifference or mocking indignation." Wally Zepler. We would only like to point out that, in our opinion, the meaning of Comrade Zepler's article, which we published with great pleasure, has by no means been "completely reversed" by the changes we made. Unfortunately, timely communication between us and Comrade Zepler was thwarted by a misunderstanding during a telephone conversation and by the erroneous addressing of a correction mailing, for which the editorial staff bears no fault. Editorial staff of the "Glocke". p. 201 ( 221) THE GLOCKE 33rd issue, November 11, 1916, 2nd year. Reprinting of all articles with full source citation is permitted. HEINRICH CUNOW: IN Athenian Entente Policy. [In its fight against the "energyless" foreign policy of Asquith's cabinet, the London Morning Post recently described the latest tactics pursued by Anglo-French diplomacy in Athens as a foolishness, fittingly joining the long list of previous follies and errors of the Allies in their handling of Greek affairs. Some German liberal papers, which find a certain satisfaction in discovering not only signs everywhere of English longing for peace, but also of increasing English self-awareness, immediately appropriated this wisdom from the former organ of Pitt and Palmerston and

spoke of a "collapse of Venizelos," a "defeat of English foreign policy." Naive exaggeration. Entente diplomacy in Athens has certainly committed some foolish acts in recent months, but whether its latest tactical shift also represents such a shift is still quite questionable. In my opinion, it is far more likely that this was a clever move, one that sacrificed a few pawns in order to save some of the game's key figures from a dangerous position. The Entente's aggressive policy in Greece had gradually reached a dead end, leaving only two options: civil war or withdrawal from the dangerous position that had been pushed too far forward. Under these circumstances, if it did not want to resort to a hopeless gamble, it had little choice but to withdraw, which it carried out skillfully, without significantly impairing its position of power and prestige, although admittedly without having achieved its goal. This goal, which the English and French governments have been pursuing since the beginning of the war, and towards which both have worked with increased energy in recent months, is to force Greece to abandon its neutrality and to take an active part in the war. The means by which the Entente sought to achieve this goal have, however, changed several times. At first, both powers, England and France, tried to persuade the Greeks with promises of part of Syria, with Smyrna, as sure booty, and with agitation, encouraged by generous bribes, for Greece's direct accession to the Entente. When these stimulants failed and the king, with the help of the great men of the army, resisted the impetuous wooing, Mr. Elevtherios Venizelos, the Cretan epigone of the cunning Odysseus, translated into the lawyer's language, was called upon to openly fight the king, and at the same time his strenuous war agitation was supported by ever-increasing pressure on the official Athenian government. A few months ago, when Romania declared war on Austria-Hungary and its army rapidly invaded Transylvania, it almost seemed as if the moment had now come when the Greek government, despite the warning lesson of Serbian fate, would give up its resistance to active participation in the war. But just as the king had previously resisted the temptation to take up arms against the Bulgarian "hereditary enemy" after the defeat of Serbia, he now again refused to step out of secure neutrality. This refusal determined the Entente to use the most ruthless force. Venizelos and his followers, under the protectorate of Sarrail, proclaimed revolution against the official Athenian government, formed a revolutionary counter-cabinet in Salonika, and called on the Greek troops to fight against the Bulgarians, while the representatives of England and France in Athens intervened with a rough hand in the internal affairs of Greece, making one excessive demand after another to force the king to submit to their wishes. to make them submissive. The Entente press maintained the

fiction with hypocritical subtlety that the Greek people longed for active participation in the war and were only prevented from uniting with the Western powers by the King's dirty maneuvers. Under pressure from the Anglo-French embassies, one ministerial crisis followed another in rapid succession. After the Zaimis cabinet resigned at the beginning of September after three months of maneuvering, the Kalogeropulos ministry took over on September 16. Although it complied with the Entente's orders to the greatest extent possible, it too was forced to resign after just 18 days. As early as October 3, Reuters Bureau reported that the ministerial posts were vacant again. However, among Greece's experienced politicians, there was little inclination to take the empty ministerial seats under the strict supervision of Entente diplomacy, until finally, after After several days of attempts, it was possible to form a kind of emergency business ministry, which has so far survived due to its complete political insignificance. And while the Entente powers paralyzed the Greek administration through provoked cabinet changes, they continued to make new, imperious demands on the king and ministers under the threat of the Anglo-French-Italian fleet stationed in the port of Piraeus. A large portion of the army and reserve units were disbanded on the orders of Entente diplomacy, the post and telegraph were placed under the administration and censorship of French and English officials, important railway lines, primarily the Piraeus-Athens-Larissa line, as well as the Greek navy were handed over to the Quadruple Alliance, and at the same time, it was forcibly granted control over the capital's police force. 33/1 p. 204 ( 224) 204 Athenian Entente Policy. Yet the king still resisted the request to provide military assistance to the Entente in Salonika. To break his recalcitrance, the London and Parisian propaganda press was allowed to whistle bloody revolutionary melodies and threaten the state guillotine. If the revolution in France led a Louis XVI to the scaffold, and in England a Charles I, why shouldn't the head of a Constantine fall in Greece as well? General Sarrail was a strict republican and, as such, a supporter of the idea of a Greek republic. If the king continued to oppose the will of the revolutionary people of the Hellenes, he would let fate take its course. However, Mr. Elevtherios Venizelos and the Entente diplomats he advised had underestimated the king's energy. Although the king could not prevent the Entente from usurping important state rights, he persisted in his resistance to the involvement of the Greece into the maelstrom of the World War. And the more arrogant the Entente diplomacy became, the clearer it became how strong the support of the King's resistance enjoyed among the broad masses of the people. Enthusiasm for the great national hero Venizelos could not withstand the reluctance to go to war; even the common man recognized

that Venizelos's appointment to the helm of state would result in the conscription of all capable of bearing arms to fight alongside the foreign invasion troops, and this fight, as the conquest of Montenegro and Serbia had proven, and the fighting in Dobruja is now demonstrating again, would result in a bloody sacrifice of Greek youth. Venizelos was only able to attract a war-ready following in the northern Greek regions, which were under the rule of foreign bayonets and from whose unhealed wounds, received in the Balkan Wars of 1912/13, old hatred of the Bulgarians still bleeds. and even there, despite the incitement of belligerence by English gold, the influx to the banners of the provisional Venizelist government remains small. According to the reports of English correspondents, there are said to be barely 17,000 to 18,000 men who have so far heeded the cry "On to the fight against the Bulgarians!" And even more characteristic is the fact that when the Greek navy was seized, only a small part of the crews were willing to transfer to French or English service, although there is undoubtedly strong sympathy for the Entente in the Greek navy. But if enthusiasm for war is a rare phenomenon even in Macedonia and Thessaly, it is even more so in Hellas and the Peloponnese, where hatred of the Bulgarians is often replaced by hatred of the Italians, the trading rivals who dispute the position of the Greek merchant in the Levant, occupy the Greek group of twelve islands with its center in Rhodes, and speculate on Syria, whose possession, according to the concepts of the Greek trading world, undoubtedly belongs to Greece. Neither the merchant of the southern Greek port cities nor the suspicious townspeople and small farmers have any particular inclination to fight alongside the Italians and their allies. Without the consent of the king and the Athenian government, the Entente can therefore only enlist the conscripted male youth of Greece into the army of Sarrail if it is willing to risk civil war, dangerous coercive measures, and bloody street massacres. The establishment of a Venizelos regiment in Athens would only be possible if the Entente troops occupied certain troubled areas and the French, English, and Italian ships anchored in Piraeus aimed their cannons at Athens. However, Sarrail's wedged-in, undisciplined troop force, consisting of a diverse mix of peoples, was incapable of risking this dangerous game. It could easily happen that such a situation would not only be exploited by the Bulgarian troops for energetic advances, but that hostile pockets of ferment would also form in the rear of the Entente army, seeking understanding with the Quadruple Alliance troops stationed on the border. p. 206 ( 226) 206 Athenian Entente Policy. And even if, after suppressing the internal unrest, it were possible to force the Greek government to declare war against the Quadruple Alliance, what value would such reluctant military assistance

have? If the fate of the war in Macedonia tips against the Entente, might it not turn against the imposed alliance at the first favorable opportunity? Under these circumstances, driving the Greeks to revolution through further increased pressure would be a very risky gamble. Entente diplomacy in Athens recognized this quite well, albeit somewhat late, and accordingly, with undoubted skill, implemented a political change of position that leads them out of the straits without depriving them of the advantages they had gained. It is naive self-deception to speak of a complete collapse of Venizelos and the Athenian Entente policy. Indeed, as far as can be judged from foreign press reports, the King seems to have been assured that further encroachments on his rights would cease and that the administration of Hellas and the Peloponnesian peninsula would be left to the Athenian government, but in return he had to concede control of Greek Macedonia to Mr. Venizelos. Two different administrative districts were created, a larger royal one and a smaller Venizelist-Anglo-French one, which were to be separated from each other by a neutralized Thessalian border region, that is, a region placed under the supervision of the Athenian Entente diplomats. And to ensure this Entente rule in Macedonia, the King had to guarantee that no hostile troops would be formed behind the Salonica army. The majority of the troops stationed in Thessaly will be transferred to southern Greece. Furthermore, the seizure of the Greek navy and the Entente's supervision of the Greek postal and telegraph systems, as well as the Piraeus-Athens-Larissa railway line, will remain in place. p. 207 ( 227) The Polish Problem. 207 - remain in place. Furthermore, the Greek government has undertaken to immediately withdraw the troops it has sent to northern Epirus to prevent an Italian occupation of this region—albeit under the assurance of Entente diplomacy that the Italian troops will also stay out of northern Epirus and that the claims to this territory will be settled after the war. It certainly requires an unusually strong dose of modesty to view such an agreement as a brilliant victory for the King over Venizelos and his patrons. What has come about is merely a lazy compromise, a modus vivendi which, while on the one hand somewhat freeing the Athenian government from the previous harsh pressure, on the other hand granting the Entente provisional control over Greek Macedonia and covering the backs of the Salonika army. Admittedly, the Entente had to renounce Greece's involvement in the World War—but only provisionally. Whether this renunciation becomes final depends entirely on the outcome of the current fighting in Romania. GUSTAV NOSKE, M. d.R.: The Polish Problem. UN, the discussions on the most satisfactory possible settlement of the border questions with Russia raised by the war have reached a provisional conclusion with the proclamation concerning Poland.

Poland is to remain free from the Russian yoke. There will be no lack of criticism directed against the provisional settlement of the Polish question that has been reached. A satisfactory solution to the Polish question, while safeguarding the interests of Germany and Austria-Hungary, is just as difficult as the decision about how best to shape the future of the tribes living in the conquered, previously Russian territories of Courland and Lithuania. The beautiful, ideal demand that peoples should not be degraded to the object of diplomatic negotiations cannot easily be taken into account in harsh reality, given the extraordinary diversity of desires harbored by the population groups of Poland, Lithuania, and Courland. The complexity of the problems in question will be outlined below. It can only be a matter of highlighting a few of the most essential aspects. The liberation of Poland from the Russian yoke, which was often discussed in the past, especially in Social Democratic newspapers and writings, and for which not a few of our most renowned leaders advocated, was certainly a fine goal. Despite all their sympathy for the oppressed Polish people, the German Social Democrats did not advocate waging a war of liberation against Russia on behalf of the Poles. The German soldiers did not advance eastward for Poland's sake, but rather to keep the war as far away from their own borders as possible. The liberation of the Poles was certainly not the purpose of the conquests in the East. Despite the intimate alliance between France and Russia, the French Socialists, too, were careful not to demand or do anything serious for the Poles languishing under the rule of the Tsar, apart from occasional platonic declarations of sympathy. Wars are not fought out of idealism. In the World War, nations are bleeding for power, economic interests, and future development opportunities. After the troops he led invaded Poland, General Morgen, in a proclamation to the population, first spoke of the country's liberation from Russian rule. These were surprising words, for until the outbreak of war, Prussian publications had mostly spoken of and to the Poles in quite different terms. With the occupation of Russo-Polish territory, the Polish question suddenly became topical again. The same applies to Lithuania and Courland, whose liberation from Russian tyranny was envisaged as a war aim from the moment the Russian armies were expelled. While it has often been noted with regret in Germany that Germanness in the Russian Baltic provinces is increasingly falling victim to Russification measures, no one seriously considered a military liberation operation. Germany did not even consider it necessary to obtain detailed information about the conditions in the Baltic provinces. When, during the Russian Revolution after the war with Japan, Latvian peasants and day laborers in the Baltic provinces rose up against the German landowners and planted red

roosters on many a manor, this was reported with undisguised satisfaction in the German Social Democratic press. What German farmers, and especially German citizens, struggling to survive, had to endure and endure in the small towns of Courland, I recently heard in amazement, as I sat together in Goldingen with such quintessentially German men who have been waging a tough battle for their Germanness for decades, a battle that, admittedly, must remain hopeless unless the war brings about a fundamental change in the country's conditions. When the predatory Russian invasion of Memel prompted a German counterattack that allowed our troops to advance swiftly to Riga, and when Courland came under German administration, it was understandable that the future of the beautiful old German colonial land with its vast areas awaiting settlement was considered, and the possibility of annexation to Germany was discussed. This problem became all the more pressing the further the victorious German troops drove the Russians back, until finally, after Lithuania, all of Poland had been conquered, and now p. 210 ( 230) 210 The Polish Problem. the reconstruction of the sorely tried Polish country could be seriously considered. The question of the future of Courland assumed increased importance in view of the horrific fate that Russian brutality had inflicted on the hundreds of thousands of German settlers in the interior of Russia, but especially in Volhynia and Podolia during the war. As promoters of the deserted country, as valued bearers of culture, the Russian government at that time summoned hordes of German colonists. In the midst of a culturally backward population, these Germans acted as role models. The fact that they preserved their higher culture and their Germanness ultimately proved to be their downfall. They were driven en masse from the land they cleared and brought to fruition, and driven into poverty. Their land was confiscated and, in many cases, sold off to Russian plunderers. A migration of German peasants from Volhynia and Podolia to Courland had begun several years before the outbreak of war, prompted by German landowners as a countermeasure against the Russification intentions of the Tsarist government, which had planned to settle hundreds of thousands of Russian settlers in Courland, where a full third of the land was crown land. What becomes of the Germans in Courland, as well as of the hundreds of thousands of German colonists in the rest of Russia after the war, cannot be regarded as entirely unimportant. If the Tsarist regime can deal with them as it pleases, their fate will be extraordinarily dire. Therefore, it has been considered to enable those German-Russian colonists who feel inclined to do so to establish a new, secure existence in Courland, where a few hundred thousand peasant families could find a good living. Surely no one would want to claim that, under all circumstances, every inch of land

that now belongs to Russia must remain the property of the Tsar forever. Absolute security against military attack does not exist as long as armed states exist side by side. The degree of security of a country against attack undoubtedly varies greatly depending on the nature of its border. It is hardly possible to imagine Germany's border with Russia being much more unfavorable than it has been so far. This makes it understandable that the idea of pushing the border back after the German armies occupied Lithuania was considered. We experienced with great anxiety how difficult the defense of East Prussia would be in the first months of the war, when ever new, vast Russian armies flooded into the country, reaching close to Königsberg and even threatening Elbing, so that the defense of the Vistula seemed in doubt. When the danger was averted by Hindenburg's great victories, the idea arose of drawing a different border along the Narew River, promising far better protection. In Germany, Lithuania is commonly referred to as a part of Poland. However, the region can by no means be considered Polish, even though it did belong to the old Poland for a time. Along with the numerous Jews in the cities and a percentage of Poles, the inhabitants are Lithuanians, who stand in sharp contrast to Polishness. When all of Poland came under the control of Germany and Austria-Hungary, many believed that the best way to regulate the border was to retain the entire conquered territory. From the Gulf of Riga the new border would then extend almost in a straight line to the south, extraordinarily shortened compared to the present situation and running through a lot of marshy terrain, which, as the fighting still going on now shows, is relatively easy to defend, since it presents obstacles to an attacker that are difficult to overcome. Such a solution to the border question in the east would have destroyed all the Polish people's hopes for a national rebirth, would have filled the Poles with deep hatred of the "liberators," and would have made them easily accessible to Russian courtship. Poland's autonomy would then appear attainable only with Russia's help. Under these circumstances, the Poles would not constitute greater protection against the Russian threat, but would be a sharp, constantly piercing stake in Germany's body. Any attempt at Germanizing the Poles would be an absolutely futile undertaking. Previous experiences with Prussian policy on the Eastern Marches make any thought of the possibility of absorbing the Poles seem absurd. One can quickly see for oneself in Poland that not all sections of the Polish people, nor all Jews, long for liberation from the Russian yoke. scream. One often hears in Warsaw the phrase that Russia is the freest country for all those who possess enough rubles to be able to give generous tips or bribes. Large-scale Polish industry, unhindered by any restrictions on the exploitation of workers, has so far done brilliant business from the rapidly

increasing sales of its goods to Russia. Separation from Russia means serious long-term damage to business. But Poland has a good future if, through systematic organization and strenuous work, the rich natural resources of coal and timber are better exploited and the often good soil is brought to a better level of cultivation. German experts have calculated that Poland's agricultural yield, increased only to the level of the Prussian province of Posen, would increase the purchasing power of the peasant population by billions, so that more than the current total export of goods to Russia could then be consumed in the country. Until then, however, many years will pass, and Industry has to overcome a difficult transition period. Almost all of them are prosperous Jews, called Litwackis, who came to Poland from Russia. They count on Russia's great economic future and blame the poor Russian government, not the Russian people, for all the hardships suffered so far. It would also be foolish to assume that all Polish peasants are enthusiastic because the German soldiers brought them liberation from the Russian yoke. A section of the peasants p. 213 ( 233) The Polish Problem. 213 does not think beyond their most immediate interests in the near future. These do not consist in a more or less independent Poland with more or less democracy. The Polish peasant is often still in sharp conflict with the large landowner, with whom he has old land accounts to settle. This conflict of interests has been vigorously fueled by the Russian government by implementing agrarian reforms. from which the peasants expected satisfaction of their hunger for land. They see their expectations dashed by the war. What they could expect in an independent Polish fatherland still seems quite uncertain to them. The plan for a renewed partition of Poland has been abandoned. Austrian Poles, including the socialists, have vigorously propagated the idea of creating an independent Poland in such a way that it would form a state community with the Danube Monarchy, somewhat like the unity of Austria and Hungary. When right-wing German newspapers demanded that the discussion of war aims be made public, this was particularly so for a time because they were keen to take a stand against such a plan, which they felt did not sufficiently take German interests into account. How the Polish question could be settled in a reasonably satisfactory manner was then the subject of negotiations between the German and Austrian governments for a long time. Only the discussions in Germany and Austria-Hungary about the future of Poland have recently caused a section of the French and English press to pay somewhat more attention to the Polish question. It is clear that, in the event of the Entente 's victory, France and England would not, and ultimately could not, force Russia to completely release Poland. The most frequently recommended proposal was to grant the Poles autonomy, but while

maintaining their ties with Russia. The oft-heralded proclamation by the Tsar, in which the Poles would be promised freedom, has still not arrived. But p. 214 ( 234) 214 The Polish Problem. even if the Tsar had agreed to make promises to the Poles during the war for the sake of a moral impression, this would have had very little value for the future. The current ruler of Russia, like his ancestors, has sworn to respect Finland's rights – and yet continues to trample them underfoot. But any new settlement of the Polish question would have done nothing to change the future threat to Germany's eastern border from a tsarist-capitalist Russia. Poland would remain Russia's military deployment area against East Prussia, West Prussia, Posen, and Silesia. A strengthening capitalist Russia, and only such a Russia can be expected in the long term, increases the military danger to Germany if a Russian government feels inclined to attack. It goes without saying that with Poland remaining part of Russia, any thought of bringing Courland into any form of closer relationship with Germany would vanish. The German and Austro-Hungarian governments began to accommodate the Poles' desire for autonomy soon after the occupation of Warsaw. Before the war, only Warsaw had a tiny beginning of self-government in Poland. The rest of the country, cities and villages, was under the control of Russian officials. Even in the large city of Lodz, with almost 400,000 inhabitants, there wasn't the slightest hint of citizen participation. In the villages, however, an assembly of peasants nominally decided on communal affairs. The ruler in the village, however, was the official village clerk, alongside the mayor, and in all important matters, what the Russian district chief decided had to happen. Now, in July, there were regular city council elections in Warsaw, with election campaigns the likes of which we saw nowhere in Germany during the war. Strangely enough, the right to vote for professions with proportional representation introduced in Warsaw met with remarkably little opposition among the six different voting classes, even though it had to be 215 ( 235) The Polish Problem. 215 The property owners had an extraordinarily large preponderance over the mass of poorer and completely propertyless voters. To begin with, people were already satisfied that elections and participation were possible at all. District municipal associations have also been established in the countryside, in which the General Government has mainly adhered to the model of the Prussian district ordinances. In each district with about 300,000 inhabitants, one-third are urban representatives, one-third farmers, and the last third large landowners. The idea of a completely independent Poland is a dream of the future that can be fulfilled when the peoples of Europe form a large, united family in the most beautiful harmony. Hopefully, the urgently desired general understanding between the Western

European states will come about when peace is concluded. Unfortunately, things are not looking very rosy in this regard either. If the Western states desired an agreement over conflicting interests and did not consider conquests, continuing the war until victory would not be necessary. Nevertheless, one can retain a shred of hope that reason will ultimately prevail and some possibility of understanding will emerge. The prospect of obtaining guarantees from semi-barbaric Russia at the conclusion of peace that it will henceforth renounce any western border shift for all time to come seems much smaller. If a lasting understanding with Russia is not possible at the conclusion of peace, but new advances against Western Europe, i.e., against Germany and Austria-Hungary, are to be feared in the more or less distant future, then the question of certain security guarantees cannot be dismissed with a contemptuous wave of the hand, as if it were none of German Social Democracy's business, and even more foolish is the accusation that anyone who considers such future questions is an annexationist or social imperialist. What Karl Marx wrote in 1860 is still true today: "When Russia annexed by far the largest part of Poland proper through the treaties of 1815, it obtained a position so advanced to the west, and it wedged itself so tightly not only between Austria and Prussia, but also between East Prussia and Silesia, that even then Prussian officers (Gneisenau, for example) were drawing attention to the intolerable nature of such border conditions against an overpowering neighbor. But when the defeat of Poland in 1831 left this territory at the mercy of the Russians, the true meaning of division first emerged. The fortifications, built on a grand scale near Warsaw, Modlin (Novogeorgievsk), and Demblin (Ivangorod), served only as a pretext for suppressing Poland; their real purpose was complete strategic control of the Vistula region, establishing a base for attacks to the north, south, and west. Even Haxthausen, who adores the orthodox Tsar and everything Russian, sees this as a definite danger and threat to Germany. The Russians' fortified position on the Vistula threatens Germany more than all the French fortresses combined, especially from the moment Poland's national resistance ceases and Russia has Poland's military strength at its disposal as its own offensive force." There has been quite a bit of talk and writing, both earlier and during the war, about Poland as a buffer state that would have to absorb the impact of barbaric Russia on the Western civilized states. Not long ago, the "Wiener Arbeiterzeitung" described with extraordinary force how the fear of the Russian threat constantly weighed on the minds of the inhabitants of Austria-Hungary like a nightmare, and how the Danube Monarchy would breathe a sigh of relief if the Russian border were pushed a considerable distance further east. The Poles would probably

most resent, and must resent, the task of forming the protective wall of Western Europe and having to organize and maintain military resistance against possible Russian attacks on their own. Even if an independent Poland wanted to, it could not take on the role of buffer because it lacks the money and men. Russia's neighbor will unfortunately have to remain armed for some time to come, since it is not very likely that the peace agreement will bring about general disarmament. Poland must therefore place itself either in a certain state and military dependence on Russia or on Germany. All other assumptions are gray theory that cannot withstand the harsh facts for 24 hours. A completely autonomous Poland that remained militarily dependent on Russia would mean a worse position for Germany in the East than it existed before the war. Such a Poland would become a Russian battering ram against Germany, aiming to unite Prussian Poland and secure possession of the Vistula port of Danzig with West Prussia. The fact that such differences could perhaps be reconciled in the distant future, so that any possibility of conflict between Germany, Poland, and Russia would disappear, does not justify ignoring the fact that, for some time to come, a serious threat to Germany's territorial existence would exist, against which it must protect itself if it is not to be expected to pursue a suicidal policy. For the time being, attempts have been made to settle the Polish problem in a manner that is as compatible as possible with German interests. A lasting solution can, of course, only be found through peace negotiations. WILHELM JANSSON: THE On the Question of German-Russian Understanding. The lively comments in the foreign press on my essay "Germany-Russia" in issue 23 of the "Glocke" make a renewed discussion of the problem seem appropriate even at this stage. I will pass over the witty observations of some papers which, like "Vorwärts," express the laudable intention of wanting to keep an eye on "that current" which 33/2 p. 218 ( 238) 218 On the Question of German-Russian Understanding. Understanding with Russia, namely, in "sight." There is nothing to object to this. More important are the omissions in the "Rech" of September 14/27, the "New Statesman" of September 30, and the two antipodes, the "Social Democrats" and "Nya Dagligt Allehanda," Stockholm, of September 13 and 12, respectively. In these cases, we are dealing with directly interested parties. The "Rech," the organ of Miliukov, the leader of the bourgeois "Progressive Bloc" in the Duma, immediately addresses the crux of the matter, apparently skilfully navigating the censorial pitfalls. We note with pleasure that it dares not mention the name of our journal (our editor does not enjoy real sympathy in the "ultimately decisive" circles of Russia!), and that it translates the word "Tsarism" as "Russian order." This at least gives us a small foretaste of that "free Russia" that the diligent Entente

agents have been promising us since the beginning of the war as the fruit of the military alliance with the Western powers. The Stockholm "Social Democrat," who in his time, with touching simplicity, characterized the Russian reaction as a German fabrication and "justified" it in column-length articles, should not carelessly overlook these minor blemishes! Rietsch is initially offended by our remark that an understanding with Russia would, among other things, ensure the German economy the activity it needs more than ever. It finds that "the ultimate motives of German "friendliness towards Russia" are hidden in this point." Well, of course, that is a very important reason for our position. As Wilhelm Busch already pointed out, one doesn't shed a tear for a bag with nothing in it, probably not even in Russia! We desire an understanding with Russia not because of Miliukov's beautiful eyes, but because such an understanding seems valuable to us in Germany's interest. On the other hand, the "Rjetsch" certainly also knows that a considerable portion of Russian exports before the war were absorbed by the German market, and that respected Russian economists, even during the war, argued for good economic relations with Germany as necessary for Russia. The disruption of Russian finances, the low level of the foreign exchange, and many other factors forced Russia to increase its exports as much as possible immediately after the conclusion of peace. Russian export performance, however, is based on agriculture, as well as certain industrial raw materials. In both cases, Germany is an excellent buyer, which, although not absolutely dependent on Russia, is nevertheless, due to its own industrial Export interests will be a factor in promoting trade relations with Russia. The "Rietsch" will hardly want to claim that Russian industry itself is capable of meeting domestic demand for industrial products. No industry in the world has yet achieved such efficiency, not even in Germany and England. The economies of these countries also still require industrial imports from other countries, despite the high level of development of their own industries. Russian industry is only at the beginning of its development; it has neither the capital nor the workforce nor the intellectual and technical leadership necessary for such efficiency. Even a spokesperson for Russian industrialists should not ignore these things. For the time being, the backbone of the Russian economy remains agriculture. In addition, with favorable developments, the production of industrial raw materials and semi-finished products will soon be able to provide an important export item. Germany has a need for these Russian export products; the exchange of goods between the two countries is therefore based on real needs on both sides. It is not superfluous to note this when seeking means and ways to achieve peace. The realization that we have something to offer each other tends to best

promote the reconciliation of existing conflicting interests. But we had also, and primarily, promised ourselves a lasting peace for Germany from an understanding with Russia. 33/2 p. 220 ( 240) 220 On the Question of German-Russian Understanding. What the "Retsch" replies to this is essentially a repetition of Mitrofanoff's train of thought in his letter to the "Preußischen Jahrbücher" of April 1914, which I quoted extensively in my article in issue 23 of the "Glocke." The "Rjetsch" still sees the Balkan and Oriental question as the greatest obstacle to understanding. The foreign policy paths of Germany and Russia, it is stated, not only touch in Poland and Courland, but also intersect in Constantinople. Furthermore, the "Rjetsch" raises the question of Austria's future, which, given Miliukov's position on this issue, means that the Russian route to Constantinople still goes through Vienna and is intended to block the German route to the Orient there. The destruction of Austria is the goal that the "Rjetsch" circles do not want to abandon. They want to determine the "future of Austria." As long as these ideas prevail in Petersburg, it might seem superfluous to talk about peace. For there is no understanding on this point. The future of the Danube Monarchy is decided by its peoples themselves, and as far as it is decided militarily, Hindenburg still has a small say. There is no hiding the fact that an independent Austria-Hungary is a vital question for Germany. Russia was able to shove a fortified Aaland into Sweden's face without encountering serious resistance, but this must not lead St. Petersburg circles into the delusion that Germany could be content with a Russian bridgehead in Vienna. It is well known that we are dealing here with one of Russia's war motives, but it is nevertheless interesting that it is openly expressed again in a leading Russian newspaper. The futility of the attempts by industrious Entente agents to absolve Russia of blame for the outbreak of war is thereby further illuminated. This Russian war aim, which shamefully calls itself the "future of Austria," did not arise during the war; it had long been in the Russian government's bag before it ended up in Miliukov's paper bag, as a variant of a Nordic proverb might go. However, the war situation provides no viable basis for these Russian hopes. The road to Vienna is long, and Russian stamina will hardly last there. Therefore, Petersburg should calmly abandon this illusion, which only uselessly contributes to prolonging the war. The discussion about the crossroads in Constantinople promises much greater results. For as soon as Russia renounces possession of Constantinople and is content with an agreement under the recognition of an independent Turkey, a Accommodating the actual needs of the Russian Empire in the transport question is quite possible. How this could be achieved cannot, of course, be determined through discussions in the press. This requires, as we already

stated in the previous article, discussion among the responsible statesmen. With a certain amount of goodwill on all sides, we believe in the possibility of a satisfactory solution. Before the war, this was impossible because of the more far-reaching Russian goals, as Sazonov clarified them to Turkey after the outbreak of war. As soon as Russia admits the unattainability of these goals, which has been proven after more than two years of war, the day for negotiations would have come. The "New Statesman" objectively reports statements by Schippel, Quessel, and me, which are moving toward the same goal, and then concludes that it is "a small irony of life" that German socialists coldly dismiss what was decisive for them at the beginning of the war, namely the fight against Russian barbarism, as "Humbug" or at least a mistake. Only someone who studiously ignores the "war map" can reach this conclusion. For the German socialists, the decisive factor at the outbreak of the war was the fact that the million-strong Russian armies crossed the East Prussian border, and their actions here should have convinced even the "New Statesman" that our fear of the barbarism of the Cossacks was entirely justified. Meanwhile, it seems to me at least, the situation has changed slightly. The Russian armies, however much they enjoyed the support of England and France, were long ago expelled from East Prussia, and the border of their power is now where it was some 12 centuries ago. Hardly anyone in German Social Democracy has entertained any further aspirations. The Rejecting the Russian threat from the German border in order to talk about peace. If the socialists in England and France have any further aspirations, then they and their countries took a completely wrong path in the days following the outbreak of war. The German government undoubtedly strove diligently to achieve England's neutrality in the war and also urged France to stay away from the war. But Sir Ed. Grey refused to even mention the conditions for English neutrality, and France had only the hollow phrase of its "interests" to defend. That they are not blind to the Russian threat, we know from Branting, who, as we shall see below, has confirmed it again. The leading French circles want to overthrow Germany with Russia's help, conquer Alsace-Lorraine and possibly much more, and only then graciously assign to a thus weakened Germany the role of buffer state against the Russian threat. That this policy was approved in England is evident from England's behavior. Branting advocates this policy, as well as all Entente policy, and dedicates an article to me entitled "The Journey Downward" in response to the statements in issue 23 of the "Glocke." It is characteristic of Branting's "world-political" journalism that he makes not the slightest attempt to convey my statements to his readers—to learn about them, they would have to turn to Rietsch, which is published under Russian

censorship! Instead, Branting attributes to me such nonsense as he needs for his polemics. For example, I am supposed to have declared, "One need not reckon with England at all, because it p. 223 ( 243) On the Question of German-Russian Understanding." 223 is heading towards its dissolution!" Of course, I did not write such nonsense at a time when every German schoolboy knows that England is Germany's toughest and most powerful opponent. Rather, I explained that England's economic heyday, its domination of the world market through the efficiency of its industry and its trading and shipping population, belongs to the past, and that therefore its lasting supremacy is no longer economically justified. What makes it unduly prominent is England's colonial power, over which, however, very dark clouds are gathering in the East. Where is there anything here about the "dissolution" of England? A country naturally loses its supremacy as soon as other powers overtake it economically and the world's political center of gravity leans in another direction. The global economic development of the last few centuries has been western-oriented, which is connected with the discovery and development of the New World. Everything indicates, however, that the coming centuries will bring an eastward-oriented global economic orientation, whereby I have given priority not to Germany, but to Russia, otherwise so dearly beloved by Branting. To respond to Branting's equally casually thrown-out personal invectives would be beyond the scope of the matter, and they do not interest me at all. Branting's frown, so disastrous for Swedish party comrades, has no significance in Germany. However, the following sentence, in which Branting confirms the views I have reported in leading French circles regarding the future struggle against Russia, is of political interest. Branting expresses it this way: "The idea that the Western powers, once reconciled with a democratic Germany, should form a collective force that can hold in check any possible outbreaks of expansive chauvinism in the Russian sea of peoples, appears to his (Jansson's) Prussian arrogance worthy of only a contemptuous smile." p. 224 ( 244) 224 On the question of German-Russian understanding. Certainly, yes. We in Germany have no inclination to wait for the moment when the Western powers intend to reconcile with a democratic Germany in order to initiate an anti-Russian policy. They had the opportunity in July 1914 and missed it. Germany had to absorb the blow of expansive Russian chauvinism on its own and also withstand the onslaught of the Western democracies, which refused to adopt an anti-Russian or even neutral stance in this war. In the "Socialdemokraten" of August 9 of this year, Branting, in a polemic against Ellen Key, translates these facts into German, motivating France's military alliance with Russia as follows: "Where would one stand at this hour, with all the demands for justice

and freedom for peoples and individuals, which are closest to Ellen Key's heart, if in the autumn of 1914 it had been only France, poorly prepared, and England, without any preparation for land warfare, that alone had had to absorb the entire blow of Germany's military superiority? The question only needs to be asked in order to have a clear answer. Without Russia's cooperation splintering the German attack, Paris would have been taken, France would have been shattered, to name only the beginning. Perhaps the constitutive "injustice" that Ellen Key sees in the alliance with Russia also has other aspects than those she sees in association with others." A more outrageous falsification of history is hardly possible. German efforts to ensure the neutrality of England and, ultimately, France are simply ignored as nonexistent, in order to deceive the Swedish workers into believing that Germany is the great dog that only wishes to pounce on poor France. The fact that the conflagration of war arose in the East is Hecuba to this history-maker! We don't even want to talk about the wonderful political morality according to which a German-Russian understanding is a crime, while the alliance of the "Western powers" with Russia is praised as a meritorious deed. p. 225 ( 245) On the question of German-Russian understanding. 225 These two quotations should also suffice Georg Bernhard in the "Vossische Zeitung," who was in doubt as to whether he could judge the politician Branting according to the recipe of the late Oxenstjerna. The conservative "Nya Dagligt Allehanda" in Stockholm, which publishes a longer excerpt from my essay, criticizes my cool attitude toward Sweden's situation after the fortification of the Åland Islands and sees the Swedish danger particularly in that connection between "socialist and banking policies," which it rightly attributes to Branting. For it is the irony of fate that the same Branting, who hurls the most severe insinuations at me because I advocate an understanding between Germany and Russia, propagated Sweden's most intimate relations with Russia throughout the war for the same reasons that made Russian friendship so worthwhile to the Swedish capitalists. make it seem insignificant. And when one of his friends from the Stockholm banking world brokered the American loan for the Russians, he received a hymn of praise in the "Social Democrat." "Nya Dagligt Allehanda" aims at these things. But let that be done in Sweden. We have no connection with this banking policy; rather, we are simply advocating German peace interests, which are also the interests of German workers. The lack of concern for Sweden's fate that "NDA" sees in my remarks is by no means present. But Swedish policy is made in Stockholm, not in Berlin. The fortification of the Åland Islands can seal Sweden's fate; if Branting of 1908 is correct, it is even likely. Only, this is not a German matter, but a Swedish one, in which we

cannot interfere here. Everyone has enough of their own worries. Now, the conservative paper is of the opinion that the Swedish government has taken the wrong stance on the Aaland question, but that this mistake can be corrected. Furthermore, the Gulf of Bothnia and the Aaland Sea are "according to the treaty" and are still half Swedish. Therefore, I have no right to speak of a Russification of the Gulf of Bothnia. This view of Sweden's treaty-based possession of the Bothnian Sea has already been disputed in Sweden, among others by the conservative "St. Dagblad." But that is not the point. The fortification of the Åland Islands is also prohibited by treaty, yet it was carried out nonetheless. Only the situation created by this treaty ultimately determines the validity of the other treaties. I am well aware that the NDA has resolutely opposed this development and warned of the dangers. But it is only the voice of a preacher in the wilderness. The government and parliament are decisive in Sweden, and only through Steffen's interpellation were they forced to express an opinion on the Åland question. That the NDA views an agreement between Germany and Russia as a threat to Sweden is a common view in Sweden. Whether this is correct is currently beyond my judgment. However, this agreement could have an effect that seems very worthwhile to me, namely the promotion of Scandinavian unity. As long as the Germany-Russia antagonism exists, Scandinavian domestic particularism will be reinforced by a very important foreign policy factor. Not only would this end with the disappearance of that antagonism, but the foreign policy situation would imperatively demand Scandinavian unity. A unified Scandinavia, however, would not be a sparrow in the crane dance, as the NDA fears for Sweden, but a serious power. Since I have always advocated Scandinavianism, the NDA will understand that I would consider such an effect extraordinarily gratifying. And I am by no means alone in this view, even if it does not appeal to certain Greater Swedish circles. Of course, no one in Germany is thinking of throwing themselves into Russia's arms, willy-nilly. The situation in which we find ourselves today with regard to Russia is not the same. However, it is very appropriate to counter the Western illusion within our democratic circles. The hand of time points to the East, where the problems of the future must be solved. Foreign policy must not be determined by domestic political sentiments. Whether a Germany has no say in whether phrase-mongering lawyers rule in England, or a money-hungry bourgeoisie, or whether Tsarism, the "Russian order," reigns in Russia. But Germany's orientation will be decided in Germany. And we must, however, try to shape it in a way that ensures peace as much as possible, while at the same time opening up a broader economic perspective for us. The role as a buffer state for the

Western powers, which Branting and his French friends have envisioned for us, would not be German, but English policy. And Germany has enough of that today. HEINRICH SCHULZ, M. d.R.: Aims and Limits of Our Educational Work. M November 15th marks ten years since the Party School first opened its doors. At the same time, the party's Central Education Committee also began its work. If the war had not interrupted the normal course of events, the course of the first ten years of systematic socialist educational work would have been sufficient occasion to take one of the usual critical looks back at what was intended and achieved. But what is the situation now? Is it worthwhile to undertake such retrospective observations in the midst of the most terrible turmoil of war that world history has ever seen? If it were only a matter of looking back, this effort could be postponed without harm to later, calmer times. But the question must be examined whether the war, with its stirring lessons, p. 228 ( 248) 228 Goals and Limits of Our Educational Work. has also affected proletarian education, and whether this will significantly influence the future of this part of our work. In the immediate period after the outbreak of the war, two predominantly views on the value or worthlessness of our previous educational work could be found. The fact that numerous leading figures in proletarian education, teachers and organizers, stood from the very beginning on the basis of fundamental refusal to grant credit and, through the consistent development of their views, became the leaders of the extreme left in the party, has created a hostile mood on the opposing side against educational work in general. For it was inevitable that some teachers would drag some of their students and pupils along with them, thereby significantly increasing the number of oppositionists. But such hostility is completely unjustified. It is easy to overlook the fact that the supporters of minority policy in the circles of educational officials are opposed by at least as large, but probably far larger, numbers of supporters of majority policy. However, these supporters, especially in the early days, naturally did not come to the forefront and therefore did not attract as much attention as the more active and conspicuous advocates of minority policy, who were already in the opposition. However, the more the discussion of the major controversial issue spread within the party, the more each individual was forced to deal with it objectively and personally, the more educational officials who supported majority policy came to the fore. This phenomenon is not to be regretted; it is also nothing less than an argument against intensive educational work and the nature of its activities before the war. However, it does speak strongly in favor of it. In the initial period after the outbreak of the war, one could still be of the opinion that the opposition in the party was the work of malcontents and troublemakers. I have never held that opinion,

though. Even though I have vehemently deplored the methods of the opposition from the very beginning – I personally had to experience their hurtful ruthlessness firsthand very early on – I soon realized that minority and majority politics are not about personal dogmatism but about fundamentally different factual starting points that lead to completely opposite answers to almost all current questions of party politics p. 229 ( 249) Goals and Limits of Our Educational Work. 229 had to.[1] This also results in the necessity to represent the various points of view against each other, that is: to wrestle with each other for every inch of ground both in theoretical justification and in practical work; that is: to work out the opposing views objectively with all conceivable clarity and sharpness. That in this important clarification- [1] In diary entries that I made in the first months of the World War out of a need for self-understanding, the following remarks can be found under September 26, 1914: "While I have so far only occupied myself theoretically with the idea - more as a trial balloon for myself - that the party will not survive this crisis unscathed, but is facing a split, after yesterday's discussion (a number of Reichstag and State Parliament deputies and other leading comrades who, at the instigation of the Berlin Central Executive Committee, discussed the question of whether and how the war question could be addressed in Berlin general meetings for the first time since the beginning of the war), I am almost convinced that a split is inevitable. The differences are too great. Previous differences, which led to differences of all kinds but never to a split, were either of a theoretical-academic nature, or they arose from a subordinate issue, subordinate in relation to the whole. The national problem was never a subject of debate. The existing contradictions slumbered peacefully. But now these contradictions are in the foreground. The war has suddenly unleashed them and elevated them to tremendous importance. The national question will dominate all public life in one form or another for years and decades to come. Now, for the party in its present form, how it views the question of Germany's existence has become a vital question: Is a strong Germany with a strong economic life and strong imperialist development a necessity for the German labor movement and German Social Democracy, or is it more of an obstacle? For us German Social Democrats, is Germany's victory in the war and its subsequent strength indifferent or even detrimental? Or is this the prerequisite for the further development of Social Democracy, especially for its political-democratic demands? On this most important issue of our time, where the stance of Social Democracy is important far beyond its very existence, important for Germany and Europe, indeed for the entire future development of global politics, opinions are sharply, irreconcilably, and

hostilely divided. We are already speaking past each other in two different languages. This is a terrible fact! Shocking for every Social Democrat. But one must not give in to sentimentality before it, but must look it courageously in the eye." p. 230 ( 250) 230 Goals and Limits of Our Educational Work. The fact that representatives of educational work on both sides are determined and passionate spokespeople is an honorable fact for educational work itself in every respect, if indeed it has ever correctly recognized and strove for its purpose. This purpose consisted in imbuing social democratic workers with an understanding of the theory of socialism and, at the same time, teaching them how to apply the theory to the contemporary tasks of the working class. It is no wonder that socialist intellectuals and workers, who took this task of educational work very seriously, found themselves in the most violent conflict, partly with themselves and partly with others, when the war destroyed the party overnight. and forced, quite unprepared, into an application of its principles, which brought either the Socialist International or the German nation to the brink of the abyss! Whether one chose one option or the other, such a decision would in any case mean the igniting of the most lively revolt within every intellectually active and seriously struggling Party comrade. It goes without saying that it is primarily the teachers and employees in the Party's educational system who are such active socialists. It would be the worst reproach for the educational work to date if it had been otherwise. This also readily explains the active participation of educational officials in the Party's war debates. I am leaving aside the form of these debates. That is largely a matter of personalities. However, personal deficiencies, such as the lack of the necessary sense of responsibility, the delight in strong and abusive words, malice of mind, and dishonesty in the fighting style, are to be lamented, for they can The factual resolution of differences of opinion can be very difficult and poisonous; but they must not be held against the cause itself. Has the objective of proletarian educational work been called into question and shifted by the war? No! Its main task remains, even after the war, the introduction of workers to the essence of socialism and their intellectual preparation for the struggle to realize socialist goals. But the further question immediately arises: Is unified educational work within the party still possible after the war? Do the factual differences within the party, which are already working on both sides to create their theoretical justification, permit a uniformly oriented educational work on the goals of social democracy and the means of their realization? p. 231 ( 251) Goals and Limits of Our Educational Work. 231 Unfortunately, I no longer dare to ask this question. to affirm. It would be ostrich politics to believe that one could

preserve educational activity within the party in the face of what is developing with greater and more glaring clarity from day to day. On the other hand, it would be the beginning of the end of proletarian educational work if it became a plaything and object of dispute between the various factions within the party. Its task is not to actively intervene in the struggles, but rather to create the intellectual prerequisites necessary for a fighter, regardless of which side he is on. This seems to be a contradiction, but it is not. Just as little as we previously recognized a science without presuppositions and therefore allowed our own views, especially on economics and history, to be presented, just as little is there a socialist science without presuppositions that stands, as it were, impartially above the socialist factions. It is grotesquely ridiculous when one group in socialism solemnly and fanatically hurls a bull of excommunication against another because it Socialism "betrayed"! Fortunately, the initially so popular game of quoting Marx and Engels has recently lost interest. Even in socialism, one may not swear by the master's words. Even less may any harmless intellectual descendant of the two greats, regardless of gender, demand that the socialist world swear by his words. It follows from this that unified proletarian educational work is not possible as long as the party is torn into two or more parts that oppose each other with the sharpest contradictions in thought and action. Despite all this, however, educational work is not only possible but urgently necessary within the individual groups. How the other groups do it can, of course, be of no concern to us majority politicians. We must therefore be all the more careful not to allow interest in educational work to wane within our own ranks, but rather to engage in intensive activity as soon as possible after the war to familiarize the old masses of socialist supporters, and those newly won over by the war, with its essence and will. The second complaint, which one encountered more frequently after the outbreak of war, concerned the insufficient effect of the educational work carried out so far on the thinking and will of the working masses. This shows how much is still lacking, it was often said, socialist knowledge has not yet penetrated deep down, otherwise the proletariat would have behaved differently at the outbreak of war. What is true about this complaint is that the systematic educational work carried out over six to eight years had only reached a very small fraction of German workers. From 1907 to 1914, the Central Education Committee organized 882 courses throughout Germany with 4,795 lectures, in which a total of 137,120 men and women (the latter constituting slightly more than a tenth) participated. In absolute terms, the number of 137,120 seems like something. But one must consider that it was spread over seven years, so that a rough average of about 20,000 attendees

per year. Furthermore, one must take into account that the participants in different years and courses were very often the same people, which considerably reduces the number of people participating in the courses. On the other hand, it is certainly increased by the fact that in larger cities, numerous courses were also held without the involvement of the Central Education Committee. But one should not deceive oneself that the statistical data in the annual reports of the Central Education Committee are indeed of great value in demonstrating the growth of the movement and in stimulating the competition between the education committees. However, they should not be overestimated in view of the overall scope and the immense area not yet fully covered by educational work. It should also not be overlooked that the lecture courses certainly represented a good, and under the existing conditions, the most suitable, means for profound enlightenment of the workers, but that, on the other hand, they remained a deficient and inadequate means. What are four, six, or even eight evenings in an entire year? The audience is quite unequal in its intellectual level. The teachers, for their part, had to re-familiarize themselves with the pedagogical practice required for such courses to be delivered to adult and critical workers. Under such circumstances, it would have been foolish presumption to expect political effects from the party's youthful educational work that would have brought about a different decision on the war question, quite apart from the fact that this decision is not at all a matter of the more or less developed socialist intellect. How one answers the core question depends not on greater or lesser familiarity with basic Marxist views, nor on more or less quantity or quality of knowledge, but on the significance that the evaluator assigns to one or another series of facts, on the conclusions and conjectures about the future that he is inclined to derive from certain events and phenomena. Emotional considerations also play a role that should not be underestimated. We have thus arrived at the limits of proletarian educational work. Before the war, the German working class found itself in hostile isolation from bourgeois society as a whole and from its guardian, the state. It fundamentally rejected both and expected its elimination and replacement by socialist society through irreconcilable struggle and the rejection of all compromises. Before August 1914, a leading trend in our movement saw revolution, using the mass strike, as the sole means of sooner or later doing away with bourgeois society; in particular, a possible European war would bring about the collapse of the rotten and incompetent capitalist state in the shortest possible time. Things turned out differently. When the state faced the most dangerous situation in its existence, and our negative decision would likely have dealt it a fatal blow, we did not deny it, but affirmed it with

every means of proletarian-socialist energy. In that fateful hour, we demonstrated through our actions that we do not expect socialist society to come from revolutionary, desperado politics, but that we fully appreciate the existing realities, that we no longer see the state as merely a commissar of the ruling classes, but also as an organ of the working class, which we must not destroy, but rather, through systematic and determined work, advance as a helper on the road to socialism. To this end, at the outbreak of the war and during its duration, the ruthless defense against all enemy plans of destruction was necessary; later, a no less ruthless fight against all domestic political obstacles will be our primary practical task. Through the policy of August 4, we have emerged from our former isolation. This does not mean, of course, that we are in the least abandoning our socialist distinctiveness, but we are certainly using it more freely and unconstrainedly than before at every opportunity that presents itself. Our isolation was once a strategic strength for us, just as, to choose a contemporary military example, the "isolation" of the English fleet is an important factor of strength for England. But times may come—perhaps they already are—when this isolation cannot be maintained, when the fleet must face the enemy, at the risk of losses, if it does not want to cause greater damage to the country. For German Social Democracy, too, its isolation had gradually become a danger, a danger that had only been averted so far because, in reality, isolation had long since been abandoned. It was only solemnly maintained in declamation. And it will be maintained for all time by the particularly steadfast. The result is that we can now safely abandon some of the positions we had to maintain under previous strategic conditions. We can then deploy the resulting freed-up resources elsewhere with greater prospects of success. This also applies to educational work. Before the war, our educational committees were responsible for all cultural and educational work for the workers in their localities. Apart from a few isolated locations, there were no bridges between bourgeois and proletarian popular education. Often enough, both sides wasted energy and time on the same or similar tasks without the success commensurate with the effort. Nevertheless, this isolation was a strategic strength for proletarian educational work until the war; it was absolutely necessary, firstly, to win the workers over to an organized educational system in the first place, and secondly, to assert proletarian claims against the long-standing, widely promoted and supported bourgeois educational system and to justify them through their own achievements. The general change in the situation due to the domestic political events since August 4th has not left the education system unaffected. There are a number of educational measures that stand entirely or largely beyond political

contradictions, such as, among others, the organization of good and inexpensive theater performances and concerts. A certain worldview can certainly resonate in the spoken or written introductions to such events. But this danger need not be great, or it can be eliminated by allowing the visitors led by the workers' education committees to joint events to receive their own introductions. Thus, in the future, we can talk about proletarian educational organizations working hand in hand with bourgeois ones, just as a preliminary attempt at this cooperation has already been made by the central educational bodies. p. 235 ( 255) Goals and Limits of Our Educational Work. 235 communities of different worldviews. There is a "Committee of German Adult Education Associations," which the educational organizations of the German and Austrian Social Democrats have joined, and in whose administrative committee our Central Education Committee is also represented. But the statutes of this committee state, right at the forefront, what was the conditio sine qua non for any cooperation of the Central Education Committee and must also be for all local and district education committees: no interference in the internal affairs of the affiliated associations; cooperation must not lead to a blurring of differences in worldview and political convictions; joint work must leave these differences untouched. If that happens, the likely result will be greater respect from one side for the other, an effect that should not be lamented, but the urgently needed struggle and resolution of the factual differences will not be hindered in the slightest. On the contrary! If our educational committees save time, resources, and energy in the future through expedient cooperation in the secondary areas of their work and in general cultural activities, they can devote themselves with all the greater energy to their primary task: the systematic, intensive education of workers about the goals, nature, and intentions of socialism. I therefore wish for nothing more urgently than that the time may soon come when our educational committees can establish the most well-structured system possible of individual lectures, traveling courses, local party schools, and district Sunday schools, headed by the thoroughly improved party school in Berlin. But I am also aware that alongside this there must be a richly structured and well-funded general public education system, which is organizationally and financially based on the Reich, the state, and the community, especially on the latter, and on the cooperation of voluntary educational work, but which, as its natural further development, must be based on the public education system, on elementary schools, middle schools, and continuing education schools. Therefore, proletarian educational work is directly and strongly interested in every school reform. How I imagine proletarian educational work in the second

decade of its life, I reserve for later times and opportunities to describe in detail. 33/3 p. 236 ( 256) 236 Glosses. Glosses. Training the eye. Who has not yet taken heartfelt pleasure in some kind of picture? There are certain moods in every human soul, certain experiences in every existence that do not, or at least not exclusively, require literary supplementation. Our strongest emotions and impressions are often only weakened by words. The emotional content of a landscape can almost never be interpreted literarily. The violent gesture of a human experience at its peak loses its force in literary form. A certain proof of this can be seen in the fact that young people rarely have a favorite book. But they almost always have a favorite picture. At the age when they are not yet capable of shaping their lives from within themselves, a picture always replaces their future goal. Be it that they see their ideal woman in the Mona Lisa, or that a picture gives concrete form to other instincts of their life. Man's path to his future leads from thought, first through the senses, to realization, and on this path he finds the picture as a much more concrete fact than the book. This undeniable fundamental problem of every culture has unfortunately long been obscured by our otherwise productive scientific education, so that in reality we are taking a completely different path than the natural one. Just as we have a particularly high percentage of spectacle wearers among us, literary glasses are often enough a hindrance to our spiritual well-being. Only in this way can it be explained that the culture of the visual arts in our popular circles is still at a rather modest level. Anyone who reads the annual reports of our public libraries is repeatedly and most pleasantly surprised by them. The need for truly good books is equally acute across all social classes, and the works of Goethe and Gottfried Keller are no longer a mere ideal in the German working-class family. But it is sad that these books are usually read under a poor color print of a woman dressed very elegantly in midsummer, or under a depiction of a silly, touching scene, rather than under a work by Dürer or another German master, available for the same price. How is it that our people have such an ineradicable predilection for the very worst pictures? That the upper classes think this way is by no means always a surprise. They have simply become accustomed to viewing art as a means to an end, and so a not overwhelmingly beautiful aristocrat still prefers to be painted beautifully but badly by Kaulbach than ugly but well by Liebermann. The working man is generally more sensible. He has long known that beauty does not advance the world, and that a work must be judged not by its deceptive appearance, but by its true quality. So why does he still stubbornly hang the bad picture in his home instead of the good one? The first reason for this is a very shameful and foolish longing, a misguided urge for something higher,

which can be deceived by the mere appearance of something higher. It is only human to confuse certain externals with the essence and to love a painting because it strongly emphasizes these externals. It is precisely the same false inclination that leads artisan families who have achieved wealth to build themselves a salon with plush furniture, on whose elegance they, out of sheer reverence, dare not sit. With just as much reverence, they treat paintings in which some decorative dolls contort themselves into such absurd positions that are impossible to achieve without years of distortion. I have tested this out and have actually not found a worker's portrait by Meunier in any better artisan family. The subject matter simply wasn't refined enough for them. Our public education associations cannot be absolved of grave guilt for these things either. They push the best books into the people's hands, they drive them to the theater, they overfeed them with classical music. But toward pictures, they mostly display a truly divine indifference . Most likely because they imagine that it will happen automatically, and that anyone who reads good books and listens to good music will automatically hang decent pictures in their room. Or they consider pictures to be a completely unimportant matter, unworthy of the attention of public educators. In both cases, they are on the wrong track. The education of the eye has nothing to do with the education of life or the education of the ear. One can be a Goethe philologist and still be a complete idiot when it comes to the visual arts. And on the other hand, the excessive lack of education of our eyes has an incredibly damaging effect on our entire culture. It is not for nothing that Pernerstorfer recently spoke out in great earnest in favor of the classical Gymnasium in the Glocke. The Greeks are still exemplary for us; we only need to understand them correctly. They have become the leading people of culture because, for them, the education of the eye was the most important and was cultivated, and because all other forms of education were built upon it. Whoever sees correctly also thinks correctly. But whoever thinks correctly can still see very incorrectly and will be repeatedly irritated and hindered in their correct thinking by this incorrect p. 238 ( 258) 238 Glosses. vision. Unfortunately, our school has not recognized this most important principle and is acting sadly contrary to it. It would be a fine and noble task of the adult education associations to correct this serious error as far as possible. Tamen. Editorial note: To our colleague, whose explanations are very noteworthy It seems to have remained unknown that in the last years before the war, the Central Education Committee of the Social Democratic Party began to comprehensively engage in the training of workers' eyes through exhibitions and the sale of equally solid and inexpensive artistic wall decorations. It goes without saying that

the success of such educational work cannot mature overnight. Seeds of war. The war events of the present have given rise to an almost incalculable abundance of poetic gifts. Mostly inferior, filled with flickering, one-day enthusiasm or blind hatred. The good remained sparsely sown. And yet the appointed men from the ranks of the working class gave some of the best of the little that will remain and can also endure into the future. Karl Bröger and Max Bartels shaped their wartime experiences into captivating, deeply moving verses. And now Franz Diederich has also brought a book of verse onto the market, entitled "War Seeds" (Berlin. Publisher of the bookstore "Vorwärts." Price: stapled 1.50 marks, hardback 2 marks). These verses were not born of trench life, nor of cannon fire, nor of assault. The effect of the war on those who remained at home formed into beautiful rhymes the deep sense of humanity of a man who struggled his whole life for light and truth. This poet does not allow himself to be swept away by the bloody frenzy of the present. In the tremendous misery brought about by this global conflagration, he consistently maintained the direction of development that must carry humanity upward and forward. Diederich sees the war through the eyes of a socialist. And therefore, he repeatedly finds the most urgent admonitions to remain faithful to the old ideals, to continue on the tried and tested paths. For this war would be senseless if it were to rage unused across the earth. Organization was the mighty magic word of our past; organization must also remain the magic word of our future! Thus, all the poems, however different their content, point to the same thing: "I p. 239 ( 259) The Week. 239 grew up, I am a tree, I want light, I want air, I want big space." Each stanza is strong and sturdy and rich in rhetorical individuality, and every line is characterized by intellectual depth. Anyone who reads Diederich's new book of verse will soon find that it is not one of those that one can occasionally "leaf through." The poet's style is too heavy-blooded for that; he demands too much of his reader! As a document of its time and as a sign of contemporary poetic creativity, we welcome this elegantly produced book, which we hope will be widely distributed. LL Some of the poems collected here by Diederich first appeared in the "Glocke." In the family tree for our usurers. (Hugo Grotius, Mare liberum, Leyden 1609, p. 61.) In all states, usurers are hated and even punished, and no trade is considered as nefarious as the aforementioned price-gouging. Rightly so, for it violates nature in a way that is beneficial to the community. And one must not imagine that trade was invented for the benefit of a few, but rather so that what one lacks could be replaced from the abundance of another, naturally with a corresponding compensation for all those who undergo the effort and risk of transporting it. The Church Father Gregory of Nazianzus (a student of

Athanasius in the 4th century AD) castigates those who buy up goods and hold them back, thus profiting from the lack of others. Indeed, according to this divine sage, anyone who drives up prices by hoarding food should be publicly branded and cursed. The Week. November 8. - EBER Holland receives news from New York from the German official news bureau in London via Reuters—our foreign service is now making such detours—that the majority of electors in the United States have chosen Hughes. Thus, Woodrow Wilson's fate is decided. On March 4, 1917, at noon, he must vacate his seat in the White House in Washington. For four years, the other branch of bourgeois capitalism, the Republican one, will then have power in the Union, and the usual purge of the offices can begin. p. 240 ( 260) 240 The Week. There is no news yet about the number of votes for the elected candidate and the vote totals for the other candidates. Nor is it clear whether it is true that bourgeois "German-Americans," Poles, and Irishmen supported Wilson's opponents in large numbers. It is equally unclear whether the Union's foreign policy will undergo a change this winter, now that Wilson is free for the remainder of his term, and whether the plebiscite of the first Tuesday in November 1916 will point the way in this direction and influence the attitude of the other so-called neutrals. We must wait patiently and without illusions. For the American armaments industry had its irons in both fires in this election campaign, and Mr. Hughes will represent its interests no less zealously than Mr. Wilson. So the prescient angel who, just a few weeks ago, had praised candidate Hughes with all his virtues in a German liberal newspaper, may surely have the right instinct, since he now lisps elegiacally: "We have no advantage to expect from the election of Hughes as President. As President of the United States, Hughes has solely and exclusively to represent their interests, and it is highly probable that he will basically strive , just as Wilson did, to exploit the economic situation for the benefit of his country. Indeed, after the end of the war, Hughes, as a representative of the highly protective Republican Party, will in all probability strive even more than the Democrat Wilson would have done to keep our industrial products out of the country by imposing the highest possible protective tariffs." The decision, as one can see, was somewhat off-key for our prophet, after, for who knows what reason, he had briefly curbed his crush on the victor ante festum. And there is currently no reason to value his gift of clairvoyance with regard to the future of trade policy. However, in this case, it must be respectfully emphasized that it would have been solely "right" if the quoted seer and with him many other foreign politicians in the German press had followed the entire American election proceedings with the same calm from the very beginning. The good habit of keeping one's nose out of the internal

affairs of other nations is, of course, a flower that only grows in the garden of tact and modesty. But these are sorely lacking in the, oh so young, political soil of Prussia-Germany. Otherwise, so much would be quite different! p. 241 ( 261) DIE GLOCKE 34th Issue November 18, 1916 2nd Year. Reprinting of all articles with detailed source information is permitted. ERNST HEILMANN: IN The One Great Company Germany! In the third autumn of the war, the German will to win has blossomed anew. It is No longer a jubilant urge for self-sacrifice for the nation, no longer a radiant certainty of one's own exuberance of strength, but a bitter, dark determination to defend the unscathed future of German labor tooth and nail. The battle of the giants on the Somme first powerfully impressed upon us that England not only puts the last shilling and the last Frenchman, but also ruthlessly puts its own national strength into the service of its policy, the aim of which is simply to make its German competitor harmless for as long as possible. England's resolve and strength cannot be taken too seriously. The two great social reformers Lloyd George and Albert Thomas have become energetic fulfillers of the cry from the field: more rifles, more cannons, more grenades—always more rifles, always more cannons, always more grenades. Every enemy attempt to break through on both fronts was a new, higher peak of armed force, which they had climbed with great effort and sacrifice. For three months, the Battle of the Somme revealed Germany's lag in the provision of war material. New men are now supposed to stabilize the old superiority of German weapons technology in quantity and quality like a rock of bronze. 34/1 p. 242 ( 262) 242 The one great company, Germany! The hour of danger has once again struck loudly for every person with a sense of responsibility. "Now join together firmly, you knightly band! You probably had no inkling of such threatening danger, the overwhelming hordes, they are storming forward with a torrent." But the will for German victory is under strong and firm protection under Bethmann's Reichsverweserschaft and Hindenburg's General Staff leadership, with the organizational work of Ludendorff, Stein, and Gröner. Only from this perspective can individual political deeds be evaluated. The re-establishment of Poland strengthens our fighting army and brings us the hearts and hands of a new ally. That is the German goal; balancing it politically with Germany's and Poland's future interests is the task of civil policy. But the re-establishment of the Kingdom of Poland is probably only a trifle in human history compared to the overthrow of all existing economic orders by the new War Office of November 3, which is now preparing the complete mobilization of the Home Army. The individual mobilization measures are still undetermined. The order and extent to which individual age groups of both sexes and the various professions will be called

up for indirect military service in the rear remains open. There is room for many doubts and reservations here, and of course the Reichstag should participate. But it is not the political form and the individual call-up orders that are decisive, but the success of the overall economic plan. In the future, a Reich office will assume responsibility for the distribution of labor, the allocation of raw materials, and the supervision of all types of production. The geographical and occupational relocation of workers must not and cannot, of course, be carried out without the consent and cooperation of the trade unions. They must be the focus of the War Labor Office's activities, not merely a concessionary miller. The idle, who can be led from a lazy lifestyle of pleasure to labor service through recruitment or coercion, are always only the few; the masses are the workers, the men and women of the proletariat. Their work performance is a function of their standard of living; ensuring that both are not depressed but rather increased will be a primary task of the War Labor Office and the Technical Chief of Staff of the War Office, Agriculture Department. Universal compulsory labor service means a social upheaval; until now, only those who did not receive sufficient means of subsistence through the labor of others, living or dead, were forced to work. But after all, Austria-Hungary already had its War Service Law before the war, which included the obligation for those unfit for military service to contribute to the country's defense. Ultimately, this is simply an extension of universal compulsory service. The harder the struggle becomes and the longer it lasts, the more all-encompassing it must become: women's suffrage is due the day on which the duty of service to the state no longer rests solely on men. Democracy rests firmly on compulsory service. All purely money-grubbing rights become unbearable as soon as the highest personal sacrifices and contributions are demanded of everyone. Yet democracy and capitalism still got along, albeit only through all the arts of cunning demagogy. An economy driven by the pursuit of private profit is completely and fundamentally incompatible with the economic side of the new War Office. According to the unerring words of Lieutenant General Gröner, the War Office has founded the one great company, Germany. This one great company will henceforth control the raw materials, take cotton from this one and give it to that one, have saltpeter transported from here and there. There are no longer any operational or organizational secrets before it: it sends technical experts to all factories, and whatever ingenious intuition has discovered in one place to raise labor productivity to the highest level, it makes the common property of all factories. It procures the people, raw materials, and machines to produce from every piece of land the type and quantity of food 34/1 p. 244 ( 264) 244 The one great company, Germany! to extract what is producible

and most urgently needed. For example, it grows early potatoes in southern Hungary when the autumn potato harvest in northern Germany is too scarce. That, at least, is the idea! In practice, this achievement requires an enormous organizational effort, and its leaders will be happy if they can meet the enormous tasks imposed on them by the harsh necessity of war with even a halfway decent degree. But is private entrepreneurial profit still compatible with this one large economic enterprise, Germany? Can compulsory labor service be introduced so that stockholders can earn their 20 or 100 percent dividend? Can any moral justification for profit still be found if all organizational work is performed by the appointed representatives of the community? Immediately following the state organization of the munitions industry in England, the outcry for the permissibility of further entrepreneurial profits arose among the people and their representatives. How much more must the war socialism of productive labor, which we now face in Germany, shake the foundations of our current economic system, with far-reaching effects into the future! Does a new epoch in human history begin from here? Perhaps in the future, we will be better off speaking of a policy of November 3rd rather than August 4th. The puns about "Potsdam" and "Weimar" will sink into meaninglessness, and we will all become versesmiths: "In the fire of my anger I forge armor and weapons for the needs of the day, and truly my swords cut sharply." We are all spiritual munitions workers: "Let, O let the verse welding be, lay the iron on the anvil, iron shall be the savior." We all serve the one great company, Germany. We want to be Germany, but Germany will also be ours. p. 245 ( 265) Poland and Peace. 245 Dr. PAUL LENSCH, M. d. R.: HOW Poland and Peace. The revolution of the World War swept over us like a storm tide, undermining and carrying away everything that seemed built for eternity. Now, the outlines of the new world are gradually beginning to emerge from the floodwaters. First in the East. With the proclamation of the new Kingdom of Poland, the Central Powers have begun to liquidate the results of the war, and they have begun this liquidation process where it is most important for the security of Europe in general and the Central Powers in particular. Only future generations will be able to fully appreciate the significance of this truly world-historic act. The burdens and worries of the present lie so heavily on our minds that we are inclined to measure its importance solely by the extent to which it seems capable of relieving us of these worries. Two questions arise: What effect will an independent Poland have on the internal reorientation of the German Reich? And secondly: does it bring us closer to peace or not? — It is a remarkable fact that the Poles in Prussia and Austria have retained their national consciousness more strongly than in Russian

Poland. The Russification process in Congress Poland was close to gaining the upper hand. The strong development of Polish industry, as Rosa Luxemburg once described the development of her homeland, made the bourgeoisie the dominant class in the country. It set a program: renunciation of all political action. With it, it assumed leadership in literature and the press, in society as a whole. But that was not all. The more Polish industry conquered the Russian market, the more Polish industry's interest grew in influencing the Russian administration as well. Political renunciation had to be abandoned, but not in order to preserve the old national p. 246 ( 266) 246 Poland and Peace. Not to resume the traditions, but to subdue Russian despotism by submitting to it. And the Polish nobility followed the path taken by the Polish bourgeoisie. "The ruling classes of Russian Poland have voluntarily taken the yoke of oppression upon themselves; it no longer even chafes their necks. . . . If the Polish proletariat wanted to inscribe the restoration of a Polish class state on its banner, a class state which the ruling classes themselves want nothing to do with, it would be performing a historic carnival play. . . . The times are over when a bourgeois revolution could create a free Poland; Today, the rebirth of Poland is only possible through the social revolution in which the modern proletariat breaks its chains." Today we see a Polish class state emerging anew, and it would be fatal blindness to deny that this has removed a multitude of obstacles to the rise of the Polish proletariat. Despite the country's tremendous industrial development, Russian Tsarism had succeeded in lowering the country's general intellectual level. While 100 years ago, in purely agrarian Russian Poland, approximately 35 percent of the population was illiterate, it is now 70 percent! Absolutism had brought about Irish conditions in Poland. While the capitalist class, some of which, incidentally, was of Belgian, French, and German origin, made its peace with the ruling system, the working class sank into hopeless misery and increasingly lost the possibility of a promising class struggle. This, however, threatened to become the prey of the Russification. It could have drawn the inner strength for national resistance only from its social and cultural rise, i.e., from the class struggle; precisely the class struggle has always proven to be a nationalizing element of the strongest kind for the working class, and Tsarism made this class struggle ever more difficult and hopeless. Thus, it was indeed high time that something decisive happened if Poland was to be saved from Western culture, to which it belongs according to its historical origins. In the Austrian and especially in the Prussian parts of former Poland, the social and cultural conditions of the working class were incomparably better, and herein lies the explanation for the fact that Polish national consciousness lives stronger and more vigorously in them than in

the inhabitants of Russian Poland. How, then, will an independent Polish state, which is maintains close contact with the German Reich, affect the internal development of our own situation? No one who knows the significance of the Polish question for the overall character of the Prussian administration will underestimate its importance, but no one will be able to deny that the emergence of an independent Poland on our eastern border has brought the Polish question to a new stage for us. The old recipes are certainly over, and in Berlin, a new orientation in the liberal spirit will have to be adopted in the question of how to treat Poland. Here again we see the consequence of the revolutionary role into which Germany was forced by the war, and which, much against the will of its reactionary elements, it can only fulfill if it takes a revolutionary stance against its own past. This explains why the reactionary elements in Germany are sour-faced about the proclamation of an independent Poland; for they feel that their influence has been dealt a severe blow. Prussia's previous policy towards Poland had by no means, as it is often called, its roots in the "Clumsiness" of the Prussian administration, which did not "understand" how to internally reconcile the few Poles with the German character. The reason for their failure lies deeper. It lies in the fact that, through their joint participation in the partition of Poland, Prussian policy towards Poland was closely linked to that of Russia. This was never more evident than in Bismarck's early days, when Prussia, through its policy towards Poland, wanted to gain Russia's goodwill, especially for the armed conflict against Austria that had already been contemplated. One need only recall this situation to become fully aware of the total upheaval that the new formulation of the Polish question represents. First of all, Russia is eliminated as a factor in Poland's fate, although it by no means ceases to to have Polish subjects. The other two powers, however, Germany and Austria-Hungary, are no longer hostile to one another, but are faced with the necessity of transforming their present relationship of comradeship in arms into a permanent, close, political, military, and economic alliance. Thus, the Polish question ceases to be a European affair and becomes one of Central Europe, of which the new kingdom will form an important link. A new era thus begins for German-Russian relations. The "atavistic" friendship, which Bülow once so passionately emphasized from his dynastic standpoint, is over, and this undoubtedly represents a great service to Germany's internal development. One of the darkest chapters of Prussian history has thus ended. Another begins, one that will contain nothing of those undignified acts of love shown by Prussia to Russia with which the first was filled. From this point of view, we welcome the establishment of the new state on our eastern border as a pledge of a free development, significantly relieved of reactionary dangers,

not only for the Polish but also for the German people. The economic difficulties with which this country, which has so far controlled the large Russian market, will have to contend cannot yet be fully appreciated, and how they will be overcome remains to be seen. Much will depend here, too, on the general relationship between Central Europe and Russia in the future. This leads us to the second question, which we posed at the beginning of this article: Does the step of November 5th bring us closer to peace with Russia or not? And then: Is it likely to permanently endanger our future relationship with Russia? p. 249 ( 269) Poland and Peace. 249 In a similar way, perhaps, to how the reconquest of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871 permanently damaged our relationship with France? One can understand how serious this question is. A hostile relationship between Germany and Russia would make English world power, for which the World War was a terrible shock, forget all the painful things it had experienced in that war. For it would not be the dissolution, but the prolongation of the coalition existing against us, despite the peace treaty and the "arbitration court," and at any moment England would again be in a position to unleash the Russian bear against us. Concluding a peace with England that simultaneously implies hostility towards Russia would mean nothing other than making Lloyd George and Grey the masters of Germany's destiny. Squeezed between the two world empires of England and Russia, Central Europe must first ensure that it is as strong as possible in order to be able to offer a leading position to both powers, but beyond that, its policy must absolutely prevent a renewed hostile union of these Western powers against us. But this only seems possible to us if we achieve a tolerable relationship with Russia through peace. How the establishment of the Kingdom of Poland, by a unilateral act of the Central Powers without Russia's consent, will work in this regard remains to be seen. Finally, it is possible that the very creation of a fait accompli will make the future conclusion of peace with Russia is relieved, especially since it may already have come to terms with the loss of Poland. First, however, a revival of the war mood, or rather of the warmongers, is to be expected. How long this will last and how profound its impact remains to be seen. The question of the West-East orientation, set in motion by the step of November 5, was further revived by the Chancellor's major speech to the Reichstag Budget Committee. The speech was extraordinarily skillful and highly impressive, and well suited to serve peace. It was a response to Lord Grey, whose earlier remarks stood in remarkable contrast to the rude fox terrier speech of his colleague Lloyd George. The speech of the German Chancellor is not only distinguished by its succinct demonstration of the non- While the accusations of Germany's guilt for the outbreak of war will also make an impression abroad, the willingness with

which the Chancellor accommodates Anglo-Saxon wishes on the arbitration issue will perhaps have an even deeper impact. For here, one has indeed had to thoroughly "relearn" and adjust to a worldview that was rejected in a most harsh and unpolitical manner before the war. It remains to be seen whether Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg is now convinced of the feasibility of such wishes . The fact that he expressed his willingness to seriously cooperate in their possible realization proves that historical developments have also inculcated dialectics in the Chancellor and is to be welcomed as a step towards peace. Now it remains to be seen how the speech will work in England and whether the peace parties in England will finally find the courage to openly advocate for their cause. Grey's next speech will demonstrate this. Moreover, especially in Social Democratic circles, where the word "arbitration court" has a special connotation, one would do well to guard against excessive expectations. The Chancellor already pointed out in his speech that the international peace guarantee that Mr. Grey had in mind seemed to have a peculiar character, tailored to the particular interests of England. For fundamentally, this peace guarantee from neutral countries was only intended to guarantee the maintenance of English world domination—newly founded by the war, as is taken for granted in England—just as the limitation of naval armaments suggested by England at the time was intended merely to perpetuate English naval supremacy. The basis and prerequisite of English pacificism is and remains the supremacy of England, and under world- - - p. 251 ( 271) The American Presidential Election. 251 Even the most democratic philanthropist in Great Britain only understands the pax Britannica when it comes to peace. First of all, therefore, when the German and English statesmen speak of peace and peace guarantees, they use the same words to mean quite different things. This must be made clear if one wants to properly assess the value of the Grey-Bethmann dialogue. M. BEER: The American Presidential Election. IN THE MIDDLE of a catastrophe the likes of which the Old World had never known before and an economic boom that was unparalleled even in the history of the New World, a presidential election took place in the United States of America whose feverish tension and comprehensive excitement find little explanation in the platforms and candidates of the two major parties. In almost the same words, the Republicans and the Democrats recognize: the Monroe Doctrine, Pan-American solidarity, the need for a strong army and navy, the protection of American citizens at home and abroad and their rights on land and at sea, the demand for women to have full political equality, the equity of protecting child labor, the necessity of careful management of the still idle and unappropriated natural resources, the benefits of rural credit relief and

similar reforms, which have been demanded and recognized for many years but not implemented. There are, however, some important questions on which the two parties take a more or less opposing position. These questions, which are also symptomatic, relate to the merchant navy, the tariff, and the Philippines. The Democrats advocate a commercial fleet to be built and administered by the federal government. 252 ( 272) 252 The American Presidential Election. fleet. The Republicans oppose this demand and consider private shipowners to be the most suitable persons to build and manage the merchant marine. Both parties demand the establishment of a tariff commission, but their motives are different. The Democratic Party is looking for material to support its free trade principle and to assign tariffs primarily to financial purposes, while the Republican Party wants to obtain further proof that American economic life cannot survive without high protective tariffs. The conquest of the Philippines in the Spanish-American War was viewed by the Democrats as a departure from the spirit of the American Constitution, as the beginning of an imperialist policy that does not allow for equal rights among conquered peoples and countries. The Democratic Party, therefore, strives to grant the Philippines independence sooner or later and to fulfill the promise solemnly made by the federal government in Washington in the preamble to the Philippine Government Act. The Republicans, on the other hand, are not inclined to rid themselves of the "white man's burden" or, as they say, to forget their duty to civilization. These differences already indicate that both platforms correspond to different class interests. The same is true of the two candidates. Charles E. Hughes, the Republican candidate, and Woodrow Wilson, President of the Union since 1912 and candidate of the Democrats, both declared themselves for "preparedness": for armaments on land and at sea, as well as for the federal principles of enforcing peace. But these similarities are those of the representatives of an advanced capitalist society, while the differences in the treatment of the tariff question, the subjugation of foreign races, and the position on social problems mark them as representatives of certain classes and the ideas corresponding to them. The Republicans are the party of big business, the Democrats the party of the middle classes. The interest of American big industry is the monopolization of the domestic market, the conquest of the Pan-American resources and consumer circles as a broad base. to expand into the Far East. The Philippines is its gateway to China. For them, the subjugation of Mexico is a stage in the Pan-American program. On the other hand, the middle classes of the Union, for the time being, only feel the burdens and dangers brought to them by the high protective tariff, the "preparedness," and the trusts. In the final week of the election campaign,

the struggle between Republicans and Democrats seems to have almost unconsciously assumed the character of a contrast between imperialism and anti-imperialism. The anti-imperialist atmosphere in which the Union and its Constitution were created benefited the spokesmen of the Democratic Party and gave them a radiance that formed a halo around the head of Woodrow Wilson, all the more so because it is filled with the ideas of the philosophy of English radicalism. To the voters of the central and western states of the Union: the farmers, ranchers, traders, and workers who still live in the old American traditions, for whom Washington, Jefferson, and Lincoln are still living figures, Wilson must have been much more sympathetic than Hughes, the representative of finance capital in the "un-American" Eastern states: Morgan, Rockefeller, and Wall Street. Behind the dry lawyer and almost inarticulate imperialist, Theodore Roosevelt walked with the "big stick" and shattered all illusions about the similarity of interests between the big capitalists and the middle classes. The European war also exerted an influence on the voters of the Union. It revealed the dangers of international economic struggles and imperialist antagonisms in a frightening way. Even if the sympathies of the majority of Americans lie with the English and their allies, it has become clear there in recent months that the real cause of the European catastrophe is to be found in global economic competition and not, as the spokesmen of the allied powers claim, in German lust for power or Prussian militarism. It is therefore America's duty, they say, firstly, to remain as neutral as possible, and secondly, to curb the rule of big business and the efforts of the imperialists. These arguments were particularly effective among the two million female voters in the Western states, who opposed any militarization of the country. The repercussions of these trends on Wilson quickly became apparent. The same Wilson who had prepared for war against Germany in April 1916 declared at election rallies in September and October that the causes of the European war had not yet been clarified and that "Peace and Prosperity" would be his election slogan. The American trade unions, which had abandoned their apolitical stance since 1906 and sought to influence Congress through their votes, worked with great zeal for Wilson. Currently, 17 trade unionists sit in the House of Representatives and one in the Senate, forming the nucleus of a nascent workers' party. Under President Wilson's administration, the trade unions achieved three important labor measures. First, the exemption of workers' and farmers' organizations from antitrust law. Until 1914, labor organizations were subject to antitrust law and often declared punishable. The Sherman Act of 1890 against trusts had until then often been applied against labor associations. This option was The 63rd Congress (1913/15) eliminated this by declaring that human labor is not

a commodity but is tied to the human personality, while the antitrust laws only apply to commodities (Section 6 of the Clayton Anti-Trust Act). The 64th Congress (1915/16) passed a law to protect child labor by excluding all goods manufactured by wage-working children from interstate freight traffic. Then President Wilson forced Congress to pass an eight-hour work law for railroad workers (September 3, 1916). p. 255 ( 275) The Center Arms! 255 - Despite these factors favoring Wilson's re-election, his success was doubtful until the last moment. And as late as November 9, two days after the election, the result was uncertain. The President's lead was un- Indicative. With a total of approximately 17 million votes, Wilson's majority amounts to only a few hundred thousand. We intend to return to the election results of the socialist candidate when more detailed information is available. J. MEERFELD: In a recent work by Dr. Richard Berger, "Factional Split and Party Crisis," published by the Volksvereinsverlag in M.-Gladbach, we see the most powerful political opponent of Social Democracy at work, preparing for the new internal political struggles that will follow the conclusion of peace. Here, we equate the Center and the Volksverein, for in political practice it makes no difference that there is an organizational separation between the two, and that the Center persistently maintains the appearance of interdenominationalism, while the Volksverein emphasizes its purely Catholic character in its very title. In reality, this denominational organization, a final creation of the far-sighted old Windthorst, is the spiritual mother of the Center; The People's Association today almost everywhere provides the core of this party, drills and educates the young generation, and even rouses the old ones who have become indolent. The underestimation of an opponent, be it external enemies in war or others in times of peace, is always a bad thing, and the work of the People's Association for Catholic Germany loses nothing of its significance as a result; its activity against Social Democracy is not weakened in its effect if we occasionally add to the cage of our teeth the p. 256 ( 276) 256 The Center is arming! — Letting "priests" escape from the Social Democratic Party. This is by no means in the sense of a deeper understanding of all phenomena of public life; it is precisely from the Social Democratic side that this superficial and frivolous approach has been repeatedly attacked. We are not missing out on anything when we acknowledge that very diligent work is being done in Magdeburg, that this work is based on clever method and tenacious will, and that the leading men of this mighty organization command our respect, even if certain literary works of Magdeburg, especially during election times, do not smell of rose oil. The war is also shaking and rattling the Center Party. If the public hears much less about this than about the crisis in Social Democracy, there are

special reasons for this. The Center Party has entirely different organizational forms than we do, is above all much less democratic, and its followers are accustomed to strict discipline. Moreover, The causes of the crisis are fundamentally different from ours and therefore produce different effects. The upheaval itself is already hardly less severe today than it was in our country, but after the war it will probably increase dramatically. The violent clash between town and country, for example, must act like explosive powder within the center. Added to this are the enormous social shifts resulting from the accelerated concentration of capital and the fragmentation of the middle classes, as well as the self-confidence of the working class that grew significantly during the war. The questions of electoral reform and the unified school system are becoming urgent and demand a solution. Furthermore, however, the confessional differences have become blunted, the last remnants of the "Kulturkampf," a previously quite welcome means of robust agitation, will disappear, and, moreover, the center will be unable to wage the fight against Social Democracy either with the previous methods or with the previous success. August 4, 1914, robbed it of precious assets. Added to everything else is a religious crisis. The "cannon piety" of the first war period has long since disappeared; in its place have come sentiments that are causing the Center Party ever more severe discomfort and filling the Catholic Church with anxiety about the future. Finally, the world organization of the Church has also failed the terrible test of this war and is cracking at the seams; in particular, the conflict between German and French Catholics has developed into unprecedented bitterness. The political impact of all these phenomena can already be observed, despite all attempts at cover-up and concealment. The leaders are too clever to fail to recognize the dangers. But they have long been plotting defenses. Under these circumstances, the dispute within Social Democracy must have seemed like a gift from heaven to them. It is most welcome as a means of distraction from their own troubles; but it is perhaps even more welcome because Social Democracy becomes less dangerous to the Center Party as it tears itself apart, and the opposition's tactics also allow it to resort to old agitation clichés. Even in the era of the truce imposed on all parties, the Center Party cannot hide its joy at the developments within Social Democracy. It follows our disputes with burning interest. Even its leading newspapers have difficulty concealing the direction of its desires: the "Kölnische Volkszeitung," for example, cannot conceal its satisfaction at the growing opposition in our ranks. Meanwhile, the People's Association is gathering its material. With what diligence and methodology, Dr. Berger's work mentioned at the beginning demonstrates. After leafing through this

hundred-page document, one has only one wish above all: that each of our comrades might read it, but especially that those whose political activity is currently completely absorbed in party strife might devote themselves to it. We particularly recommend that our comrades in the strongholds, be it Berlin, Leipzig, or elsewhere, and all those who do not feel entirely comfortable without a lively, cheerful party war, study this collection of quotations. Even we, we hardened ones, are astonished and shocked by the extent and nature of this material and can already imagine its agitational exploitation in the post-war period. Over in northern or central Germany, of course, no one gives it a thought. For over there, unlike here in the West, there is no bitter struggle for the souls of the workers: party work is much easier, much more inwardly focused, more organizational, which always carries the danger of becoming rigid in formulaic rhetoric. Dr. Berger describes the Berlin comrade as a special type, never imbued with the seriousness of the organizations' work and sense of duty to the same extent as his party friend in the Rhenish-Westphalian industrial region, on the Saar, or in Upper Silesia. "The completely different nature of Berlin's industry, which lacks the gigantic dimensions of the West, the Brandenburg surroundings, and the Berlin milieu have an influence, and the enormous masses of workers who immigrate every year further underline the fundamental tenet of all human striving to achieve as much recognition as possible within their own species. It would be tempting to draw a comparison between the Berlin working masses and the Roman plebs in the pre-Caesarian era." To what extent this characterization is accurate remains to be seen; the marked difference between the Berlin movement, as well as that in Leipzig, Hamburg, and Bremen, and that in the industrial regions of Rhineland-Westphalia is certainly a fact and can be explained both by the different conditions of development and by the difference in social structure. The Center and the People's Association are known over there only by name. They are not encountered in day-to-day agitation, and their activities have no noticeable political impact. Even for many a Social Democratic leader in Northern and Central Germany, political clericalism is merely an interesting curiosity. No wonder, then, that no consideration is given to his work! We would, however, urgently recommend reading Berger's writings to those who believe they cannot conduct the current party dispute loudly, sharply, or ruthlessly enough. Perhaps one or the other will be troubled by the fact that the most dangerous political opponent of Social Democracy is the third party laughing in this savage squabble. Berger has collected the material with immense diligence. His work cannot be accused of tendentious distortion, as is the case with so many other works by M. Gladbach. He carefully compiles,

sifts, and organizes the spoils of the Social Democratic debate of the past two years; the author himself retreats almost entirely behind the material. In a brief concluding remark, he lets it be known that, in the interest of a healthy development of conditions within Germany, he desires the strengthening of the Social Democratic majority group. In this, Dr. Berger differs from that crude centrist press that, out of partisan self-interest, longs for the growth of the Social Democratic opposition. Incidentally, the brochure contains a number of careless errors and, in particular, numerous distorted names. Berger's publication was published during the Burgfrieden (Civil Peace) and therefore does not openly reveal its agitational purpose. Nevertheless, it is a truly precious treasure trove for the unscrupulous opponent of Social Democracy. We will feel its effects in due course. And it will not stop with this one publication. In M.-Gladbach, the collection continues; we are supplying new material day after day. Further brochures will follow this first one, thus completing the agitation fund. And once the barriers of the Burgfrieden (Civil Peace) have fallen and the elections are in sight, less emphasis will be placed on literary decency than Dr. Berger does. Undoubtedly, the dispute within Social Democracy has come at just the right time for the Center Party. With its help, it hopes not only to overcome its own crisis more easily, but also 34/2* p. 260 ( 280) 260 State Socialism or Politics of Desperation? also to obtain new weapons in the fight against an enemy whose danger had increased considerably as a result of the act of August 4th. Finally, the comparison that Dr. Berger draws between the conditions in our party in 1890/91 and today is noteworthy. Even this outsider does not fail to notice that the struggles immediately after the abolition of the Socialist Law are confusingly similar to the current ones. As proof, Berger cites the well-known register of sins that the "young ones" compiled against the party leadership at that time. At the party congress in Erfurt, the hopelessly mired Ignaz Auer dealt with it in detail. It is quite amusing and instructive to read today: "No more revolutionary spirit, dictatorship of the party executive, degradation to a bourgeois reform party, renunciation of revolution, rapprochement with the bourgeoisie, compromises at the expense of principle." And so on. And so on. Who doesn't think of the blessed Ben Akiba! PAUL UMBREIT: - State socialism or politics of desperation? The shot with which Dr. Friedrich Adler struck down the Austrian Prime Minister, Count von Stürgkh, in Vienna triggered a wide variety of demonstrations in the socialist press. The "Wiener Arbeiterzeitung" called the perpetrator a wretch, "a brooding and theoretical fanatic, whose irritable nature and his absorption in his convictions were such that he could have sacrificed his own life for the cause that filled him. But that he could shed the blood of others, no one

would have believed." In the "Vorwärts" Friedrich Stampfer judged: "Fritz Adler was insane when he committed the horrific act; no one who knows him, who knows his family, can doubt it for a moment. . . . Only a madman could have thought of pointing his murder weapon against Count Stürgkh. 66 The "Fränkische Tagespost" wrote: "But it is not the disputes within the party that are likely to have triggered the unfortunate act; it was caused by a serious illness that struck catastrophically." The "Leipziger Volkszeitung" judged: 99 We are faced with an agonizing riddle. We are faced with a riddle that can only be solved by assuming that Friedrich Adler acted in a state of mental derangement, that the senselessness of his horrific act was the product of madness. Only through the destruction of his mind could the firm barriers that existed in his worldview against political murder . . . have been torn down." In "Neue Zeit," however, K. Kautsky dedicates an obituary to Friedrich Adler in which he describes the act as an outgrowth of abnormal, desperate times, polemicizes against the perspective of "Vorwärts," and undertakes the Marxist task of investigating the conditions under which the act was carried out. Kautsky chooses the edifice of Marxist socialism, the foundation of which is trust in the proletariat, as the starting point for his investigation. Only the mass movement of the proletariat brings us closer to socialism, and every kind of mass movement is considered, from the election campaign to the mass strike. (Kautsky does not seem to consider the calm force of the organization of the working class suitable for bringing us closer to socialism.) The socialist who has lost confidence in the proletariat can certainly remain a socialist, but no longer be a Marxist. Of course, confidence in the proletariat does not mean the assumption that it knows the right path everywhere and under all circumstances. Marx was not that naive either. But one must be convinced that the proletariat, despite all occasional wrong turns in its class struggle, will ultimately always take paths that bring it closer to international socialism. p. 262 ( 282) 262 State Socialism or Politics of Desperation? Marx maintained this conviction when complete apathy of the working class or even a decisive turning away from socialism seemed to be destroying his life's work, after the suppression of the 1848 revolution, as well as after the collapse of the International. Marx possessed the strength, in such times of decline, to renounce any attempt to awaken the working class through violent stimuli. He possessed the strength to wait, not to stand idly by, but to prepare for new struggles. However, it is not for everyone to trust in the future. There are, above all, those who cannot wait, successful politicians who want to see immediate results and seek another power to carry them forward when the proletariat disappoints them. Thus, during this war, many of our most radical Marxists sought refuge in the state bureaucracy; They

became state socialists, mocked the old "illusions" of trust in the proletariat, and persuaded the proletariat to put itself on good terms with state power, and then it would be in good hands. However, there were not only successful and momentary politicians among those who could not wait, and there were situations in which quiet preparation for the future was impossible. Marx withdrew to the British Museum at a time of general churchyard calm. In such a wildly turbulent time as the current war, it was almost impossible for an energetic man with strong, altruistic feelings to withdraw to his study. If he found no response among the masses, he was easily seized by wild despair, which led him away from strict Marxism, but not in the direction of state socialism, like the successful politicians. In such a frame of mind, Kautsky found the key to Fritz Adler's unfortunate deed. Kautsky's "investigation" is certainly a highly complicated and thorough. He researched the motives behind the political assassination, right up to the revolutionary years of 1848 and into every corner of the British Museum. For this, this investigation also comes to the surprising conclusion that the act is actually an expression of temperament. The true Marxist with confidence in the future, with confidence in the proletariat, can wait. Marx withdrew to the British Museum to prepare for the future; only the misguided cannot wait. The worst among them are the wavering ones, the momentary politicians who seek protection from the state bureaucracy and turn to state socialism. Fritz Adler was far too firm a character to have been able to pursue a turntable policy; - he went the other way! Had the wretch possessed the temperament of Marx or his humble representative, he would have waited and withdrawn into his study until the proletariat realized that it needed him. Not those who step forward at the critical moment and assume the responsibility of action, not the momentary and successful politicians who are portrayed as political charlatans, but the withdrawn, who prefer to bring their principles to light again at a more opportune time. This result also offers the advantage that the so-called successful politicians can be identified as the real culprits, as those who have inserted themselves between the proletariat and the leaders of the future, like a dividing wall, who have caused the incomprehension and apathy of the masses, which must drive a noble character to despair. It is self-evident that this kind of investigation cannot remain unchallenged. The very classification into those who believe in the masses and the future, and those who are less trusting and are denied entry into the edifice of scientific Marxism, appears more dogmatic than scientific. Socialism is not a biblical paradise from which the angel of the Lord drives out doubters of the high mission of the mass movement with a flaming sword. Moreover, there are people who, despite all

their milder or stronger doubts about the redeeming power of mass strikes, nevertheless have a rock-solid faith in the power of the proletariat's organization. Are these, too, no longer worthy of being Marxists? Even more precarious seems the distinction between people who can wait and those who lack this enviable patience. It is not even supported by the contrast between the strategy of defeat and the strategy of attrition, for the theoretician who withdraws to his study is anything but a strategist of attrition, quite apart from whether a strategy of defeat of the proletariat would be appropriate during the national defense of the people against superior enemy forces. Kautsky seems to completely overlook the question of whether the proletariat would have been served if its leaders, following Marx's example, had withdrawn to the British Museum or their study instead of pursuing their cause as successfully as possible in the moment of danger. It would never have occurred to Marx to suspect these leaders of being momentary and successful politicians who sought refuge in the state bureaucracy. Marx described state labor protection to the working class as a means of liberating them from unbearable pressure, held state industrial inspectors in high esteem, and regarded their reports as terrible indictments. It is also quite natural that the working class has more immediate interests in wartime than the realization of socialism, for which the true Marxist must arm himself with the necessary patience to wait. The proletariat is suffering terribly from the war and demands immediate help. Even the highly valued art of organization and adaptation of official Germany could not provide sufficient help quickly enough, and so the leaders of the working class had to pull out all the stops to bring about state aid. They helped build public war welfare, redirect the production apparatus, regulate the food economy, and make preparations for the restoration of the peacetime economy. Can one contemptuously criticize this as state socialism? No one else p. 265 ( 285) State socialism or a policy of desperation? 265 It was Kautsky himself who wrote in the "Neue Zeit" at the beginning of the war: "In all the belligerent states the necessity has already become apparent for the state and local communities to intervene in the capitalist economy for the benefit of the poor and the needy in a way that appears to be socialist. And it is primarily due to this that the emergency has not yet become as great as one would have expected on the basis of purely theoretical considerations." Certainly, an overestimation of the lasting value of these measures may have taken hold here and there. Even undoubtedly Marxist organs have not been immune to this danger. The Leipziger Volkszeitung wrote on December 11, 1914, in view of the first preliminary steps towards regulating national nutrition: "These measures certainly do not mean an undermining of the

capitalist mode of production, but they show first and foremost that in the emergencies of the time the present state and economic order could not manage without the great socialist idea of a regulated, unified organization of the national economy. The measures also demonstrate that public intervention in the current economic conditions is not possible without undermining the cornerstone of the current mode of production, private property. On December 19, 1914, the same newspaper continued: "We repeat from our first article that, while all these measures ultimately do not attack the current mode of production at its very foundations, they nevertheless provide conclusive proof that the current conditions of production are no longer adequate to meet the greatest challenges of the time, and that catastrophes can only be avoided by respecting the great idea of socializing the national economy, even if timidly and hesitantly and without any fundamental action, and whether one likes it or not, it must at least be attempted as the only means of saving the national economy. It is only a beginning, but we are also only at the beginning of all the political and economic upheavals that the war has brought about." We believe that these statements by the tireless Leipzig newspaper can confidently be placed alongside the so much-mocked "war socialism" p. 266 ( 286) 266 Should we demand the nationalization of the mines? - This shows that even the most radical Marxism and the most devout mass confidence do not protect against derailments if, in critical times, one cannot retreat to the British Museum but must step out into the arena of the day-to-day struggle. Even Kautsky in those days had words to justify our people's hopes of victory and to defend the approval of war credits by the representatives of German Social Democracy, whereas today he knows only strict Marxists on the one hand and momentary and successful politicians on the other, of whom the latter are nothing but contemptible state socialists, while the former, insofar as they have not learned to wait, easily fall prey to the politics of desperation. Does Kautsky mean to imply that the politics of desperation are much closer to true Marxism than the politics of success? We believe that such a result would certainly be quite questionable and rather subscribe to the view that the strategy of desperation is to be sought far removed from any sound policy. ANTON BREDENBECK: Should we demand the nationalization of the mines? One of the most urgent tasks immediately after the war will quite naturally be the complete restructuring of the foundations of the financial economy in the state and Reich. After the war comes the big payment. It is hardly possible for the ordinary citizen to comprehend the Chimborazo-like amount of debt of the state and Reich with which the German people have been burdened by the war. It is inconceivable how it can be made possible to

pay interest on and repay these debts. The usual tax-making formula one can no longer do without; it is impossible to burden the broad masses of the people with further indirect taxes. There are better and fairer sources of taxation; Social Democracy has long since demonstrated them. But the problem cannot be solved with taxes alone. In order to find the means to cover these costs, new paths will have to be taken. These paths, too, have already been clearly identified by Social Democracy: state monopolies and the nationalization of certain branches of industry. Even far into bourgeois circles, there is understanding for the demand that the armaments industry must finally be nationalized. Reasons of economy speak in favor of this demand, but its fulfillment is also necessary for political reasons and for reasons of state security. This demand is of such a compelling nature that all capitalist resistance to it must be ruthlessly broken. There are other industries that are ripe for nationalization, such as the explosives factories, the large shipping companies, and many others. Recently, the question of nationalizing the mines has been hotly debated again in mining circles. This question is certainly as important as the question of nationalizing the armaments industry. It was already being discussed in the workers' press about 12 decades ago. Back then, admittedly, under very different circumstances. Comrade Hue was already a resolute advocate for nationalization. He naturally had very sound reasons for his position. At the time, I was a staunch opponent of nationalization and, of course, had my reasons. Nationalization does not yet mean socialization in the socialist sense, so it is not a question of principle. Rather, it means carefully weighing the pros and cons and then deciding accordingly. The penitentiary policy prevailing at the time, the Hilger system at the state mines in the Saar region, and many other things made it seem entirely undesirable to me and others to further strengthen the extremely reactionary state power by handing over the mines. Given the way the state was willing to accommodate the agitators and Junkers, I saw nationalization as a direct threat to the workers' organization. My point of view was shared by the widest circles of workers at the time, and the party press also largely agreed with me. But there is movement and development everywhere in the life of the people, in the state and also in mining. If anyone, it is the miners who can tell of the sharpest, most unadulterated class struggle. The old, battle-tested miner feels quite strange when he hears so many wise theoreticians propound oracles about class struggle. They could all still be in his school. No working class class has such powerful opponents in the entrepreneurial movement as the miners; no working class is more involved in the struggle than the miners. But all the many hard struggles have not been in vain. The

miners can no longer be ignored today, because too much depends on mining. The government knows this. The mine owners know it too, but they have learned very little from decades of experience. The spirit of the famous ministerial overthrowers' conference at the Hotel Adlon, in which the miners' protection laws were derisively ridiculed as "white ointment," still lingers today. But another fact must be stated: for two decades, the number of fiscal mines in the northern Rhenish-Westphalian industrial district has increased considerably, but the earlier fears have not been realized. Comrade Hue was right; the conditions in the Saar-Arabian region could not be transferred to Westphalia. Nothing should be praised, but it can also be said that the organization of the miners in the fiscal mines district in Westphalia had to overcome no greater difficulties and endure no greater pressure than in the private mining districts. Added to this are the striking lessons of the World War. The World War posed enormous problems that still await solution. We Social Democrats are not so naive as to expect great things for the workers from the announced reorientation. expect if we do not take active part ourselves and play a formative role. We strive for the complete democratization of the state, which we are trying to shape, so that it can also offer the working class a livable place. Working in this direction, I recognize the nationalization of the mines as necessary. Our self-evident duty to protect our workers from new, unaffordable burdens points us, among other things, to the mines with their enormous profits as an extremely valuable source of income for the state and the Reich. Nothing is more natural than to think of the nationalization of the mines, over which the state already has a certain title of ownership. The coal stored in the womb of the earth is a national asset, which, however, is quite inadequately valued and protected. The right to mine is granted through a claim. But how was this granted right then acted upon? It is well known that German miners had to allow themselves to be exploited excessively by foreign capitalists. Given the omnipotence of capital, capital always sought to exert a decisive influence on the government, and not the other way around. It is the system that weighs on the people and the government. If things are to improve for the miners, if miners' protection is to mean more than a "white ointment," if miners' conditions are to finally undergo a general, completely satisfactory reform, then the system must be broken, then private mining must be eliminated. The behavior of the mine owners towards the workers during the war can only strengthen the conviction of the necessity of nationalizing the mining industry. This is a chapter that will likely be discussed quite thoroughly after the war. Anyone who cares about the welfare of the workers and the security of the state must realize that, although the administrations

of the fiscal mines have not always been found blameless, they have nevertheless demonstrated considerably more wisdom and insight than the administrations of the private mines; they have, after all, recognized the organization of the miners p. 270 ( 290) 270 Should we demand the nationalization of the mines? and have, after all, come quite close to the principle of minimum wages. One would think that all that is needed to remove the obstacles and arrive at the conclusion of proper collective agreements is good will. But here it also means holding on to the advantages gained. The objections of bourgeois politicians to nationalization are mostly quite meager and specious. These are the same arguments that are raised against the urbanization of commercial enterprises. They claim that private capitalist enterprises operate more efficiently and prosper better than state and municipal enterprises. But that is nonsense. It may be true that the big captains in mining still snatch many capable officials from the state and are distinguished by a certain ruthlessness in their pursuit of profit. But that by no means means that only private mining employs capable officials; less capable officials can be found everywhere. It may also be true that state-run mining still sometimes suffers from bureaucratic red tape, but it seems that certain critics are the ones least in a hurry to eliminate this red tape. They need the deficiencies to be able to fight against the idea of nationalization. But as far as the rational nature of operations is concerned, nationalization is necessary precisely to promote this. Only then will good, rational mining be possible and the irresponsible waste of national wealth prevented. Today, many a seam remains unmined, and incalculable quantities of coal are lost forever. The nationalization of mining would represent a major step forward on the road to socialism. To move closer to this goal, the determined will of the workers and the strengthening of the political power of social democracy are required. Big business rightly sees its strongest position in mining; anyone who remembers the struggle that arose at that time over the intention to nationalize "Hibernia" (only now has the struggle ended, and all shares of the Herne Group have passed into state ownership) can imagine what resistance can be expected from that side. The expectation of the most difficult struggle, however, must not deter us from striving with all our might for the goal we recognize as right. EDGAR STEIGER: There was a time, barely a generation behind us, when people shrugged their shoulders when someone mentioned the name Leibniz. All respect to the last polymath that humanity had produced! But as a philosopher, he was hardly to be taken seriously by a modern person. What was he, after all, but a skilled eclectic who diligently gathered the truths of all centuries and, from the great ideas that others had thought before him, fashioned for himself, on the basis of the

scientific discoveries of his time, an elaborate system that slowly crumbled even when it was merely thought through, but burst like a soap bubble at the first contact with reality? Aristotle, Duns Scotus, Giordano Bruno, Descartes, Spinoza had to provide the building blocks, Bacon, Locke, and Newton the mortar for the new construction. One could imagine the result: the well-known reconciliation of antiquity, the Middle Ages, and the modern age, of scholasticism and humanism, of knowledge and faith, of teleological and mechanical worldviews, in a word: of theology and worldly wisdom—the ideal of all philistines of all times who want to be modern without hitting a stumbling block! Wasn't it even likely that the widely read and widely traveled man had simply stolen his two most important discoveries, to which he owed his world fame as a scientist and philosopher, from others, as Eugen Dühring claims: the differential calculus from the English physicist Newton and the monad from the Italian pantheist Giordano Bruno? - - p. 272 ( 292) 272 The Monad. - - The Monad how the materialistic age, which calculated the weight of atoms and molecules numerically, smiled at the metaphysical monster that was supposed to explain the riddle of the world to us, this dimensionless point of force that did not reflect the entire universe in its own special way (for to do so it would have to have windows, and the monad is, as Leibniz expressly says, windowless!), but, as the first human brain came along, imagined itself, or, as Leibniz's ambiguous language put it , represented itself (much as the historiographer Leibniz of the Duke of Brunswick had to represent his sovereign now and then in his state affairs!). I can still remember how medieval and scholastic this mythological figment of a theological mathematician's imagination seemed to us moderns, who worshipped the atomic theory. It claimed to be simultaneously atom, soul, and God. And today? Today, as the reel of time has just unwound 200 years since the disgraced courtier and philosopher closed his eyes in Hanover, the much-ridiculed monad, and with it its discoverer and godfather, has once again come into honor—not among theologians who cannot do without miracles, or among idealistic philosophers who derive the world from concepts, but precisely in exact natural science, which relies solely on the facts of experience. Only now, in keeping with the scientific fashion of the time, Leibniz's microcosm has taken on a new name. Or what are the ions with which one today seeks to explain the mysterious phenomena of electricity, other than monads, i.e., metaphysical points of force for which there can be no question of extension and impermeability—precisely what, according to previous views, constituted the essence of matter? The same thing happened to natural scientists with electricity as it did to jurists. When they wanted to classify the theft of electrical power as theft, it became clear

that our criminal law, with its ancient Roman definition of theft, was powerless against this new offense; for there could be no question of "another's movable property" here, nor of "unlawful appropriation" in the sense of the legal concept of property. And so, for better or for worse, one had to make do with all sorts of sophistic analogies. p. 273 ( 293) The Monad. 273 conclusions in order to be able to prosecute the matter, which was not a matter at all. But were natural scientists any better off once they examined electrical phenomena more closely? No. For here, where everything was merely force or, to put it more scientifically, energy, nothing of matter and atoms could be discovered. Therefore, however, people were honest enough to give the new thing they were confronted with a new name, and so they christened the immaterial force points, which had necessarily been presupposed to explain electrical phenomena, ions. Once that had happened, however, matter, which had hitherto been the cornerstone of all modern natural science, vanished along with the atoms, all by itself. Thus we have the edifying spectacle of one of the most famous chemists of our time, Wilhelm Ostwald in Leipzig, loudly preaching the overcoming of scientific materialism. To this end, he replaces the mechanistic with the energetic worldview and declares matter to be nothing but a spatially arranged group of energies. What does this mean other than that for the natural sciences of our time, matter is nothing but a delusion—just as it had been for the ancient Indians and the two Greek antipodes, Parmenides, the preacher of the All-One, and Heraclitus, the teacher of the eternal change and flux of things. Not to mention all the countless thinkers of later times, from Plato to Kant and Schopenhauer, for whom, depending on their era, education, and position in life, and the more theological or scientific coloring of their thinking, matter increasingly evaporated from a mere intellectual object into a pure negation (pv). I have intentionally omitted Leibniz from this mention of the conqueror of materialism. He stands among them like a Janus figure, one face looking backward, the other forward, with his world-encompassing mind summarizing once again the entire knowledge of the past in its fundamental truths and fertilizing and correcting it through the great physical and mathematical discoveries of his time, but at the same time, out of this vital thought process, anticipating a series of future truths, at least as hunches or, in his 34/3 p. 274 ( 294) 274 The Monad. Language, as dark and confused ideas of his soul monad. But what does this mean other than that Leibniz is one of the rare scientific geniuses in whose mind a piece of the future is reflected? Certainly, like everyone else, even the greatest thinker, he was a true child of his time. His soul was a mirror of that turn of the century which, disparaging or completely denying the will, enthroned human reason and

hoped to make the world happy with it alone. Therefore, his favorite creature, the monad, has nothing more to do than imagine the world and to ascend from darker and more confused to ever clearer and more distinct ideas. Entirely in the spirit of the French and German Enlightenment, which, like Greek sophistry and Socrates more than 2,000 years earlier, taught virtue like a multiplication table. Just like the French Revolution, which sought to make humanity happy with a few abstract political concepts. But by explicitly emphasizing that his monad has numerous ideas at every moment that do not reach its conscious awareness, Leibniz pointed for the first time clearly and distinctly to those obscure psychic processes that take place beneath the threshold of consciousness, and thus discovered new territory for human knowledge that had only been plowed by countless scientific workers towards the end of the last century. Thus, his monad, with its "petites perceptions," became a precursor to modern psychology. Yet this microcosm, which is supposed to represent the entire outside world without coming into contact with it in any way, is again a clear copy of its own age, when state and society in Germany dissolved into atoms and the theories of natural law and constitutional law saw the state as arising from a contract between individuals. Machiavelli and Hobbes, Grotius and Althus always have the centuries of disintegration in mind in their political textbooks, when the old feudal state fell apart with the last remnants of the gender constitution and the new territorial states laboriously glued themselves together from its loosened building blocks. No wonder that in their state constructions, if I may say so, they only work with monads that are artificial, without any inner connection, such as that found, for example, in the monad. B. the proto-Germanic clan, medieval knighthood, or the later artisan guild, are welded together into a community. But as deeply as Leibniz's monad is rooted in its time in this respect, it also grows beyond it in other respects. As with so many philosophical ideas that only become fruitful in entirely new ways for future generations, it was precisely the ambiguity, shimmering, and contradictory nature of this imaginative creature that guaranteed it such a great future. Leibniz's monad is, as it were, an embryo in which neither sex nor species can be distinguished, and which develops in one way or another depending on the living conditions it finds itself in. As the 15-year-old Leibniz went for a walk in the Rosental near Leipzig, he wanted to decide whether he should follow Democritus, the father of atomism, or Aristotle, who taught the purposiveness of nature. After much reflection, he decided to allow the doctrine of one to be fertilized by that of the other, and from this union, the monad emerged. But as the matter of the atom evaporated in the monad, space also disappeared. And so, a century and a half before Kant's critique of

reason, Leibniz, although he arrived at this by a completely different—Kant would say dogmatic—path, sought space, to which Newton still ascribed a real, absolute being, only in the way we imagine it. Yet, his monad remained conscious of its descent from the atom insofar as, in it, what was formerly called matter, in contrast to Descartes and Spinoza, was divided into a myriad of tiny units. Thus, it became the great-grandmother of Herbart's "reals," which are likewise a multiplicity of entities whose contradictory appearances the philosopher is supposed to break his teeth on. From these few examples, one can see how, looking back and forward, one could develop almost the entire history of philosophy from Leibniz's monad. But what do these bold intellectual poems of post-Kantian German idealism have to do with us? We live in the age of psychology, which smiles pityingly at these latecomers to mythology. But just read what Gustav Theodor Fechner, the father of the glosses, wrote. modern psychophysics, writes about the physical and philosophical theory of atoms, and then imagine how a natural scientist of the caliber of Wilhelm Preyer, through his own research, comes to deny the distinction between organic and inorganic nature and to re-establish the universal animacy of nature, as taught by the great pantheists and pantheists of the Renaissance, in modern scientific method! Are we not then again encountering the monad as it once sprang from the fantastic brain of the great heretic Giordano Bruno, who, intoxicated by Copernicus's worldview and the concept of infinity, equated the infinitely large and the infinitely small and thus recognized God, the world, and the atom as one and the same? Just as his heir Leibniz, the inventor of differential calculus, arrived at the idea of general development in nature and spiritual life through the continuity of the smallest increase in size and thus at least anticipated Darwin's great ideas. But enough of this cruel game! I don't want to write a history of philosophy here. I only want to offer fleeting hints and pointers for those who are concerned with the great intellectual problems of the present. Whenever the 100th or 200th anniversary of the commemoration of a great man comes around, we living today would do well to take stock in the ledger of human thought. If only so that we become a little more modest and, even in the days of our greatest triumphs—who would deny those of our time?—never forget on whose shoulders we stand. - Glosses. National dignity. A Saxon court recently sentenced two female workers to prison terms. The offense: one had accepted a photograph from a Russian prisoner of war, the other had procured a brooch for a second prisoner of war for his money and on his behalf. Nothing more, nothing at all. The scene: a shoe factory where the girls and the prisoners worked together. The case is a particularly drastic link in a chain of similar cases that we have heard about ever since prisoners

of war have been among us. Women and girls were given police fines because they were said to have behaved conspicuously in front of prison camps. Maids were punished because their attraction to prisoners of war had developed into love with all its consequences, and at the beginning of November of this year, the Erfurt criminal court sentenced a factory owner's wife to half a year in prison for having had an affair with a Frenchman. Taste is certainly a matter of debate in some of these cases. When women and girls lack the generally desirable dignity in front of prisoners of war, that may be anything but a pleasing spectacle. But gradually a penal code has become established in our country that outlaws any female attraction to prisoners of war, whatever its nature, and threatens imprisonment . The fact that things are this way in all warring countries makes neither things nor the countries better. We will disregard the torment that years of sexual abstinence mean for a healthy prisoner whose daily life takes place among women. The male degeneracies rooted in this should also remain undiscussed. But to say that any love that develops between members of the female sex and prisoners of war should be a disgrace for the female part means, above all, that women are also deemed to have inferior rights in this respect. Fortunately, we have not yet heard of soldiers being publicly morally stigmatized for the pleasures of love enjoyed in enemy territory. In contrast, the women and girls who showed love to prisoners of war are said to have universally sinned against "national dignity." Even the two girls from the shoe factory had, according to the court's findings, violated their dignity as Germans (by procuring a brooch, accepting a photograph). To stay with the last case: the two girls, as nurses, would have been allowed to care for dozens of prisoners of war with feminine warmth, watch over their beds, and provide confidential assistance – that would have been humanly noble, femininely beautiful, and worthy of decoration. Procuring a brooch, on the other hand, must be punished with imprisonment. What with national dignity? National labels are usually flimsy, but when morally tacked on to the relationship between the sexes, they seem hieroglyphic. The prisoner of war's war is over, and if a woman of another nation gives him love, that is a case that should concern only the two of them, let the world think what it likes. Wherever genuine poetry has taken hold of this problem and placed sexual love between warring peoples, the poet resolves the conflict (assuming it even exists!) individually. And it is no coincidence that precisely the most kitsch literary purveyors allow national feeling to triumph in such conflicts. RG p. 278 ( 298) 278 Glosses. Our soldiers' wives in the field post letters. The field post goes NOT only from the front, but also to the front. Hundreds of thousands of filled sacks. Millions of letters, moistened with the

tears of wives and mothers, go to their loved ones in the field. These letters, which contain the finest sentiments of the German female soul, which testify to the devoted love of the woman, the worries of the caring mother, the fears of the young bride, they will remain hidden from the profane gaze of the public. They were not written for the public; as a precious memento of difficult times, of lost happiness, they are carefully preserved. And that is a good thing. Even though they would offer a future historian quite suitable material for assessing the psychology of women in the World War. But do these field post letters really remain "secret documents"? No! For even the most sacred feelings are mercilessly sacrificed to war and its purposes. Numerous such letters fell into French hands when German soldiers were captured. Appropriate passages were extracted and compiled into a leaflet distributed by French pilots to the German field grays at the front. With calculating malice, passages were selected in which the women describe to their husbands the difficulties of food supply. The rising cost of food, the hardship of obtaining it, and, ever-recurring, the anxious worry about the children. Justified resentment against usury. All of this is understandable. The woman, deprived of her male advisor and companion, forced to take on unfamiliar work and the entire burden of domestic worries, has to cope with almost insurmountable tasks in the World War. Add to that the ever-pressing fear for her loved ones outside, the grief for lost family members. Who can bear the emotional pressure that falls on our To properly assess the burden on soldiers' wives? Therefore, not a word of reproach against them. But our women should keep one thing in mind: All their complaints and accusations are satisfaction and just as much joy for our enemies, for the opponents of their husbands in the field. They are used to show the German soldiers the sorrows of their loved ones at home in the blackest colors and in heaps, to make them sullen, unwilling to fight, and to diminish their resistance. But the letters are meant to show their own country how bad things are in Germany, how depressed the mood there has gradually become. The French are meant to forget how much they themselves are suffering from the war. The aim of exploiting such letters is to inspire new fighting spirit and new confidence in victory. The hope for the imminent exhaustion of Germany. And the desires for peace that are stirring in their own country are meant to be silenced. p. 279 ( 299) Glosses. 279 The war should continue until Germany is completely defeated. It would be a horrible thought if our soldiers' wives had to admit that with their letters they had contributed, even unintentionally, to prolonging the war even by a single day. Therefore, these letters to the field should be drafted very carefully, and everything that could benefit the enemy or prolong the war should be avoided! HP THE The French Confidence

Loan. The financial geniuses of France are experiencing severe disappointments. According to the report finally submitted by Mr. Ribot, 10 days after the close of subscriptions, the result of the second French war loan turned out to be even more unfavorable than the large "Victory Loan." In keeping with the spirit of French journalism, for which a striking, dazzling headline is usually the most important thing, the major Parisian newspapers had endeavored to find attractive titles for this second public loan as well. Judging by their frequency of use, the terms "Peace Loan" and "Confidence Loan" must have been the most popular. But what good is a title without adequate funding? Even the touted "emprunt de confiance" has proven to be a mere "beauté d'emprunt"; for, far more than genuine confidence, the subscription results testify to the distrust of French savers in their country's financial strength. The Victory Bond at the end of last year yielded a nominal amount of 15,130 million francs: a sum that, however, was reduced to 13,243 million francs due to the low issue price. Since more than half of this amount was covered by the old 3 percent annuity and so-called national defense assets, the French treasury ultimately received only 6,368 million francs, slightly more than 5 billion marks, in new money. This time, the result is even more hurtful to French national pride. According to previous information, 11.36 billion francs have been subscribed, of which, however, the largest portion was again due to exchange for national defense bonds and National defense bonds are no longer available, so that Mr. Ribot can only count on a cash receipt of 5.5 billion francs. It is likely to be quite painful for France's financial politicians that the confidence of English capitalists in France's much-vaunted financial strength is also declining. Over 600 million francs were subscribed in England for the first French war loan; this time, although the new loan, taking into account the capital gains and special compensation, yields over 54 percent interest, and the unfavorable French exchange rate guarantees a considerable extra profit, Old England has only managed a participation of approximately 500 million francs. And what trouble has official France gone to in order to trumpet a brilliant result to the whole world! Political philosophers and financial greats, poets and painters, the press, schools, and Pulpits were used to promote the trust loan and to make the smallest French pensioners understand that non-participation would be a shameful "desertion from duty". Even the cinema was put at the service of the high national cause. A massive advertisement! There was no shortage of colorful posters. Thousands of these garishly colored patriotic pictures were sent to the small mountain villages of Savoy and Gascony. All the well-known illustrators and caricaturists, such as Faivre, Leandre, Naudin, Roubaudy, Poulbot, Nau, and others, were consulted to create designs that

offered something for everyone's taste and mood. Those who weren't comfortable with Faivre's charging soldier with the beautiful caption "On les aura!" (We'll get them!) might have been impressed by Roubaudy's austerity Marseillaise or Nau's symbolic Gallic rooster. And in addition to the government, the major municipalities and financial institutions also produced their own special posters and "souvenirs": the Bank of France, in triumphant confidence, produced a picture in various sizes depicting the passage of the returning victorious army, with Joffre and Castelnau at the head, beneath the Arc de Triomphe in Paris. And now, despite all this expenditure of intellect and art, despite the enlistment of the French clergy in loan propaganda, the mass issuance of archbishop pastoral letters, and the reading from the pulpits of urgent warnings modeled on the "Monitoires" of the Ancien Régime, only 52 billion francs for the state treasury. Much ado about an omelet! On peace terms. (Lamprecht, German History, VII, 2, p. 452.) Y. "On the Peace of Westphalia: The torch of war had been extinguished not out of a desire to express clear power relations in a clear treaty, but rather out of exhaustion. Therefore, the articles of the peace instrument bore, to a large extent, the character of ambiguous armistice conditions, regarding whose wording the contracting parties had different ideas and whose differently interpreted conditions they silently resolved ratified, to circumvent or break them as soon as possible." A timely warning for all concerned! p. 281 ( 301) DIE GLOCKE 35th issue 25 November 1916 2nd year Reprint of all articles with detailed source information is permitted Dr. PAUL LENSCH, M. d. R.: Friedensillusionen. The campaign that Comrade Scheidemann has been waging for some time in favor of world peace has brought him attacks from both the right and the left, and even a newspaper as sympathetic to our energetic comrade as the Berliner Tageblatt recently wrote that, with all due respect for Scheidemann's excellent motives, it sometimes seemed to him as if the Social Democratic representative were perhaps somewhat overemphasizing the intentions and views of the Reich government and the Reich Chancellor. It is possible that this may also seem so to others. However, we fully understand that in the service of such a great and sacred cause as the establishment of peace, one might sometimes reach an octave too high and, given the ruthlessness required by such a struggle, even momentarily disregard considerations of so-called good taste. Whether this really happened, as the Berliner Tageblatt claims, We do not know what the reason is; we would not be willing to use it to hang our comrade. All that matters to us is the matter itself, and there is certainly much to say about it. A special edition of the "Basler Nationalzeitung" had, as is well known, "reliably" learned that a preparatory step by the neutral states to mediate

peace was planned. Whether or how much of these rumors is true cannot be determined at present. In itself, it would not be unlikely that Mr. Wilson, now after his re-election, would want to acquire, in addition to his other services to America's well-being, the international merit of initiating peace. Another question, of course, is whether the current war situation already offers any prospects for this. This question demands all the more cool judgment, as emotion and desire threaten to overwhelm our reason. Peace is such a hotly desired commodity today that one is only too inclined to believe what one longs for, and anyone who holds it in the near future finds a grateful audience. Now, the speech delivered by the German Chancellor to the Budget Commission was certainly a speech explicitly in favor of peace. Germany's readiness for a cheap peace with the Western powers was expressed in it more clearly than ever before. But how was this speech received in the English press? To cite only two moderate papers, and to mention only the Morning Post, the Times, etc., the Daily News stated that some time would pass before the world recognized the burglar from Belgium as a guardian of peace, and the Westminster Gazette called the speech an incredible impudence. This echo of the Chancellor's speech sheds a highly significant light on Grey's speech, in which one so readily sees an English peace feeler, and whose alleged extensive agreement with Bethmann's speech even led Representative Scheidemann to conclude that the time had now come for an honest attempt at peace mediation, and only subsequently allows us to recognize what Grey really meant. In large circles of the German people, and especially in German Social Democratic circles, people still shy away from the realization that England will not lay down its arms until Germany is prostrate and is subjected to the dictatorship of the victors without contradiction. This insight is sought to be dismissed by saying that only fools could believe, even today in the 28th month of the war, that one group of powers could succeed in beating the other so that it dictates peace to them. Here lies a misunderstanding of the facts that could prove disastrous and must therefore be eliminated. Quite uninhibitedly, one transfers one's own peaceful attitude to England and believes that because the German working class and the German bourgeoisie would rather end the war sooner rather than later, the same applies to England's bourgeoisie and proletariat. One completely overlooks Great Britain's exceptional position in world politics, which I examine in detail in my essay on the end and happiness of social democracy and draw conclusions from England's almost incomprehensible attitude arises quite naturally. What is the real meaning of Grey's "peace speech"? A well-versed expert on England, who lived in Great Britain for decades and whose works betray a deep sympathy for English

character, recently wrote the following apt words: First, Germany must be beaten, defeated, and overthrown; But then the whole world should see to it that Germany does not rise again, and if it does rise to settle accounts with its tormentors, it should have all the powers affiliated to the International Peace League against it, in order to secure the conquests of the English, French, Italians, Russians, Serbs, and Romanians and to keep Germany subdued: "That is the true meaning of Grey's peace speeches: first, war to the end, until Germany's destruction, then an international league to hold Germany down. During the war, a coalition, after the war, a world league. And always against Germany. The peace speeches of English and French statesmen are therefore even worse than their war speeches." This insight must be impressed upon the German workers, and whoever speaks about peace and the path to achieving it is at the same time obliged to openly identify England as the real enemy of peace before his listeners. Naturally, not in the sense of inciting hatred from one nation to another, but rather as an objective result of England's exceptional position in world politics. The more calmly and objectively one describes the special position that England has occupied as world ruler for more than a hundred years, the more obvious it will become that the demand for freedom of the seas, that is, for the overthrowing of English world domination, is not the result of a war-mad whim, but rather the prerequisite of the Social Democratic demands: political independence, territorial integrity, and above all, freedom of economic development for Germany. Nevertheless, it should be acknowledged that the recognition of the true nature of English politics has made progress in the German party press in recent times. Georg Gradnauer, who just a few weeks ago had taken up the wild diatribes in the "Dresdener Volkszeitung" and added explicitly approving comments that Friedrich Stampfer offered in his correspondence about my aforementioned book, now writes the following in the same "Dresdener Volkszeitung": "If one examines the English peace bliss more closely, it always becomes clear that the prerequisite for this eternal peace is the defeat of Germany. The future peace alliance of nations is to be under English sovereignty. All other nations must accept this and may live freely and peacefully, provided they do nothing that runs counter to English world domination. How strong this conception of world peace is in England has just been shown by the replies of the English press to the Chancellor's last speech." - Here we see a very welcome clarification of the political view, which we can note with satisfaction. Regrettable as it may be, and difficult as it may be, it must nevertheless be stated that the opposite of Scheidemann's view is correct and that the time for peace mediation now would be extraordinarily poorly chosen. Does one really believe that England has taken

on the extraordinary shocks to its social structure, such as those represented by the introduction of general conscription, the abolition of trade union rights, or the nationalization of grain imports, only in order to break off the struggle before a decision? The words of Lloyd George: p. 285 ( 305) Illusions of Peace. 285 "A peace mediation in the The current situation would be a "triumph for Germany" is more than a demagogic phrase; it is the truth. In this respect, Scheidemann is absolutely right when he recently stated in one of his editorials in "Vorwärts": "For Germany, the defense against an enormous superior force is victory enough." But precisely because this is the case, and because this "sufficient victory" would be linked to a tremendous expansion of German power, the current masters of the world cannot and will not yet resign themselves to it. Indeed, the mere preservation of Germany and Central Europe would be the most terrible defeat the British Empire has ever experienced and the beginning of its end. Let no one imagine that this fact, which every Briton is aware of, can be airbrushed away with friendly phrases. If England were a state like any other, if it did not have to lose dominion over the world and the seas, it would be much more able to be content with an inconclusive outcome to the war. But England cannot do that. And that is why things are so bad with regard to peace and peace mediation. England has only slowly grasped what is at stake this time, but now that it has grasped the true, great, and dangerous meaning of this monstrous war, it grips its sword more firmly and pushes its helmet further down its brow. The greatest naval power has simultaneously become a respectable land power; all of England is a munitions factory. The last neutral powers: Norway, Sweden, Holland, and Switzerland are being groomed to either enter the war on England's side or, at the very least, submit to its commercial dictatorship. English blood is flowing on the Somme, not as usual the blood of those well-paid traveling butchers who previously formed England's army, nor just the blood of those "black and colored Englishmen" of whom the German army reports so often speak, but the blood of full-blooded and fully-fledged Englishmen from Yorkshire and Kent, from Northumberland and the Midlands. For England to make peace in the current situation would mean accepting the defeats p. 286 ( 306) 286 Illusions of Peace. of Kut-el-Amara, at the Dardanelles, and at the Skagerrak, and admitting before the whole world that, in alliance with the whole world, it is incapable of overcoming little Germany, let alone firing a single shell at German coastal territory, while the English fleet was unable to secure the English coasts from enemy visits. This fact cannot be overcome even with the friendly suggestion: what is German should remain German, what is French, French, and what is Belgian, Belgian. That sounds very plausible and

harmlessly modest, but it meant nothing less than the surrender of the German colonies. In these colonies, however, England has secured an object whose value is recognized only by a few circles in Germany, but all the more clearly by all circles in England. If Germany is defeated and loses its colonies, it will be eliminated from the ranks of the great trading powers of the future, but England will have secured possession of the second continent, after the acquisition of German New Guinea would have already brought it total possession of Australia. The French and Portuguese possessions in Africa would then be merely a blemish on the map. In alliance with the Anglo-Saxons of the Union, in possession of Canada and India, Southern Persia, Arabia, and Mesopotamia, the As the economic ruler of its allies Russia, France, and Italy, England would indeed be the unrestricted ruler of this planet. These are not fantastic, nebulous figures that England is chasing after; these are tangible possibilities that could become realities tomorrow if the central powers collapse, and which only seem like feverish phantasms to us because the journey from Berlin to Basel already seems like a trip around the world and because we have barely overcome the stage of small-state mentality. Let us beware of all fantasies of peace and not paint a picture of possibilities for which all prerequisites are lacking. There could be a rude awakening. For the time being, the prospect of Germany's salvation and future lies only in new German victories. We want to work for them. p. 287 ( 307) The English Legend. 287 PACIFICO: The English Legend. When it became apparent at the beginning of the World War that the neutrals were almost unanimously turning their sympathies to the Entente, there was considerable astonishment in Germany; however, the explanation came quickly enough from Neutralia itself: Germany had demonstrated by the rape of little Belgium that it regarded treaties as mere "scraps of paper," that it did not respect international law, etc. Thus, the sympathies for the Entente had arisen from antipathies toward Germany. Then, however, a complete reversal would have had to take place over the course of two years; for what Germany was accused of, the Entente practiced to a much greater extent and with much greater ruthlessness. Nevertheless, "public opinion" throughout Neutralia, with few exceptions, remained on the side of the Entente and continued to regard it as the bastion of freedom against Teutonic oppression. The fact that the Tsarist Empire was a fully legitimate and very important member of the Entente didn't even bother the Jews, who were heavily represented in the press in Neutralia; they even used old pogrom images to depict "German atrocities." France and England had a halo strong and bright enough to outshine the shadows cast by their ally Russia. The socialist press, with very few exceptions, showed itself in complete

unanimity with the liberal and bourgeois-democratic press of the neutral countries, indeed surpassing them in one-sidedness and blatant prejudice. And individual socialist organs were distinguished by their particularly vicious nature. We don't mean the "Social Democrat" of the Swede Branting or the "Berner Tagwacht," which provides the "spirit" of the Radek Sobelsohn Parabellum; There is something personal, all too personal, at work there, which will perhaps one day be fully uncovered in an investigation into how influences of the darkest kind can prevail in a democratic party. p. 288 ( 308) 288 The English Legend. * Here we are only speaking of those press organs where honest obscurity is present. This brings us to the real topic, the legend, namely the liberal-democratic legend of the nineteenth century. The fact that this has so far been naively parroted uncritically in the socialist press, including that of Germany (the few exceptions only confirm the rule), can be explained by the fact that, for lack of a social-democratic presentation of history (only individual episodes have so far been dealt with independently by social democrats), the common bourgeois-democratic accounts have been accepted without examination. Was this already the case in "thorough Germany," and even more so in other European countries, where not only were the socialist parties small and limited in resources and personnel, but also a much closer connection with bourgeois democracy, even with vulgar liberalism, existed. - France is the land of human rights, of revolution, of free thought, of democracy in essence and form, says the legend; 1789, 1792, 1830, 1848, 1871 are the shining dates that have been imprinted on every democratic mind. Only rightly should there be moderation in things, and one must not forget, amidst all the splendor, that there are also very deep shadows, and that the working class, in particular, can exert very little real power in the republic of lawyers and pensioners, and that socio-economic progress, to put it mildly, is hardly to be seen. It would be a rewarding task for a social democratic researcher to examine the last century of French history. history and to show how slogans and deeds contradict each other. Here we would like to devote a few lines to England, the "bastion of freedom and the protection of the peoples." * Editor's note: In contrast to our esteemed colleague, we are of the opinion that in Radek-Parabellum, too, no other influences than "honest obscurity" (albeit in the highest potency!) are decisive for his attitude. p. 289 ( 309) The English Legend. 289 The English Legend dates back to the time of the "Holy Alliance." It grew in the 1840s and 1850s, and today it is the "common property" of both bourgeois and workers' democracy. Its essential sentences are these: Despite some old-fashioned ways, England is a democracy in which the will of the people unconditionally prevails. England enjoys

complete civil liberties at home, grants them to its colonies, and consequently supports the struggle for freedom of other peoples. England has a law and a jurisprudence that cannot be abused and operate without distinction of person or class. England knows no oppression of individual sections of the population, no interference of state power in political and economic struggles. England has the most extensive freedom of the press imaginable. Let us begin our considerations with the last point. Certainly, the English press is spared all the petty and petty snark that we Central Europeans have had to endure. The right to criticize individuals and institutions is almost unlimited. Not even the so-called "minor lèse majesté"—the criticism of individual or categories of officials—is prosecuted, and trials for insulting all officers and non-commissioned officers of the army, such as we have already experienced several times in Germany, are simply unthinkable in Great Britain. Nevertheless, even freedom of the press has its limits, and then there are severe penalties for the offender. One area protected by barbed wire is "good morals," or rather, moral hypocrisy. Of course, we are completely disregarding commercial pornography; that falls and should fall under general criminal law, like poisoning wells or spreading epidemics or other publically dangerous acts. But serious discussion of moral harm is something else entirely. Yet it is precisely here that the English press is severely restricted, not only by the country's customary, highly exaggerated prudishness, but also by judicial practice. An example: in the 1980s, the "Pallmall Gazette Revelations" were a world sensation; it concerned the activities of girl traffickers and pimps in London, the exposure of their hideous practices, etc. The fact that the then Prince of Wales, later King Edward VII, and a continental monarch friend of his played a role in it (they were not named, but it was easy to guess who the "Minotaur of London" was) was incidental; the judiciary did not take action on behalf of the heir to the throne. Rather, it intervened because these things were being talked about at all! Indeed, Mr. Stead, who later became very well known and who had written the "Revelations" in genuine indignation about the procuring and brothel business, was sentenced to a long prison term for "indecent writings." He learned the limits of press freedom. However, it is compatible in England that certain newspapers, especially those read in society, report on the court proceedings in divorce cases in detail and are careful not to overlook any of the intimate details! But as far as the area of political freedom of the press, which interests us most, is concerned, it must be said that this freedom exists for all strands of bourgeois party life. The king may be called an idiot, the ministers may be called sheep, even traitors, and all the Lords and Commoners may be called sheep if one is not satisfied with

them. This is part of the alternating system of the two parties, of which the one that is currently "in" will soon be "out"; both therefore have an interest in securing the greatest freedom of the press. But what would happen to freedom of the press if a real class struggle broke out in England, if, for example, the working class were to form a large party with Whether they would join forces with real, vigorously defended political and social goals is another matter. There would hardly be any freedom of the press for "revolutionaries." We recall that at one time the anarchist Hans Most was sentenced to eighteen months of hard labor, or penal servitude, for a newspaper article, and that four or five years ago a certain Bowman had to go to prison for six months because he had written an anti-militarist leaflet. Freedom of the press therefore exists in England - with the exception of the moral sphere for the press of the ruling classes. Whether it would also exist for a socialist party, if the latter appeared dangerous to capitalist society, is at least doubtful. In peacetime, no particular obstacles were placed in the way of the few existing socialist weeklies; they were harmless, since, firstly, they were not read by the mass of workers and served only as an exchange of opinion among small circles, and secondly, since they generally who strove for "respectability" and avoided harsh words. If they did go too far, a small civil lawsuit with the high costs customary in England was enough to bring them to their senses. See Quelch and the "Justice," not long before the war. So much for freedom of the press, which would actually also include the chapter on Irish newspapers. - Now to another point. The legend says: "England knows no oppression of individual sections of the people, no interference by state power in political and economic struggles." Apparently true. But apart from Ireland, have there been any political struggles at all in England since the end of the Chartist movement, apart from the disputes between the major bourgeois-capitalist parties? Once Whigs and Tories, now Unionists and Liberals, with Radicals and Liblabs (liberal labor representatives) in their wake, and recently also the Labour Party, which even includes several real or perceived socialists, are vying for a majority in Parliament and thus the composition of the government. The principle of continuity in foreign policy (which also includes relations with the colonies) is always only about implementing or preventing more or less important domestic reforms. The "state power" is not upset about this because, as the "government," it is itself in question and does not know whether it will change companies due to the election failure. Moreover, there is a conviction, gained from long experience, that nothing is as hot as it was cooked. For example, of the enormous reform program that was controversial in the last parliamentary elections, nothing, as far as we can remember, was

carried out by the Liberal Party, which won under its banner, except the settlement of the question of the Welsh Church. Reduced to its basics, however, it means nothing more than that the numerous sectarians in Wales are no longer legally compelled to pay taxes to the established church for the salaries of clergy, etc., with whom they want nothing to do. This enormous and highly controversial "reform" thus aims to For a part of the country, this is achieved very simply in Germany by obliging anyone belonging to a religious community to contribute to its maintenance, but leaving everyone free to choose such a community or to renounce it by leaving. Incidentally, this "church question" is also an illustration of the personal freedom that, according to legend, is guaranteed in England! It remains to be examined how the situation stands with the non-interference of state power in economic struggles. Certainly, in this respect, things have long been better in England than in most continental countries. As a rule, i.e., in "normal" strikes, the police and courts maintain a neutral stance. None of the disgusting and bitter harassment of the workers, the blatant partisanship of the state organs for the employers, which we have so often had to experience. But that only applies to "normal" strikes, in which the workers also maintain English "respectability," i.e., strikes led by upper-class workers united in trade unions. In the strikes of "unskilled laborers," things have sometimes turned out differently: the London dockworkers' strike, Featherstone (where, on the orders of the current Prime Minister Asquith, the military shot at the strikers), the Dublin transport workers' strike. We fear that from the day England's monopoly ends and the workers' demands no longer have the opportunity to be met, p. 293 ( 313) The English Legend. 293 speaks of simply raising prices, the beautiful passivity of the state will end. On the Irish question, throughout the entire nineteenth century, the press on the continental states gave only the portrayal that pleased the English newspapers. We did not get to the bottom of the matter. How many, apart from a few specialists, knew anything about the history of Ireland, about its oppression, about the barbarities of the bourgeois hero Cromwell, about the cold-blooded starvation of a population of seven million, which the English exploiters reduced over time to about four million, just enough to provide cheap agricultural laborers for Ireland itself, and cheap henchmen for the English ports and industrial sites! What did the European public learn about the Fenians and their predecessors other than that they were bloodthirsty criminals, at best fanatics incited by priests! It has been a long time since the Irish were last hanged, and this was seen as an atonement for crimes committed. That the Irish were at least as much martyrs for their people as the Italian, Spanish, Polish, and Hungarian victims of political

justice praised by the English and subsequently by the Continental liberal-democratic press was not even considered. For Great Britain is, after all, the promised land of democracy and the greatest guarantees for the impartial administration of justice. That these... Even the incorruptible, conscientious English judge and the impartial jury are part of the legend. But they are really just a legend! In his essays on England, Heinrich Heine occasionally described the cold-blooded cruelty of the English justice system against poor devils. The truth is that the conglomerate of laws, both ancient and modern, which forms the basis of English jurisprudence, precisely because of its confusion, allows the judge endowed with common sense to apply it when everyday matters are concerned, and that only seldom will a judge be inclined to make a breach of the peace out of a scuffle or brawl. p. 294 ( 314) 294 The English Legend. to construct a breach of contract. But in cases where "sacred property" is at stake, the sentences were and are, as a rule, terribly harsh by European standards. Well into the nineteenth century, there were death sentences for property crimes; the punishment of lifelong deportation to Australia was considered a mitigating factor. But further: In the last years of Queen Victoria's reign, two boys of twelve and fourteen were sentenced to death; they had killed their father. In no other European country would such a sentence have been conceivable; in England, it was carried out according to law and order. But the execution of children seemed a bit harsh, even to the robust sense of justice in Old England at the end of the nineteenth century. The press raised a fuss. What happened? The government hanged only one of the boys and pardoned the other. Around the same time, a French governess was sentenced to death for infanticide. Special circumstances caused "public opinion" to stir; Thousands of women appealed to Her Most Gracious Majesty for clemency; it was rejected, and the girl died on the gallows. But the legend of the praiseworthy English justice system persists. But civil liberties, the vaunted! They exist, however, to the greatest extent only for the ruling classes. A recent example of this is the tolerance of preparations for a full-scale armed uprising, such as those carried out in Ulster under the leadership of Carson, the later Minister, to prevent the introduction of Home Rule. But when the ruled wish to exercise their vaunted freedom, it is a different matter. Remember the Chartists, if you don't want to think about Ireland, just remember the 1890s, the abolition of freedom of assembly for workers, the arrest and conviction of John Burns, the mass swearing-in of City of Londoners as special constables to club disobedient workers, and the like. p. 295 ( 315) On German-Norwegian Tension. 295 But civil liberties were never an export article for England, at least not to its possessions. At the same time, around the middle of the last

century, when the Italian uprising was being supported directly and indirectly by England, a very similar uprising in the Ionian Islands, then under English rule, was suppressed with cold-blooded cruelty; the rebels were hanged. An economic-political movement of black workers in Jamaica again gave the executioner work, as did a later uprising in Canada, etc. We will not speak of the great rebellion in India and its suppression and punishment. With the self-confidence that characterizes the Englishman, he always claimed that his actions should be measured by a different standard than those of foreigners. Thus, the suppression of freedom by British force was always presented as the most legitimate, necessary action, but the same procedure, carried out by "continental tyranny," was condemned. European liberalism and democracy, however, saw only this, and thus the legend was formed that still haunts us today and even has its proponents among German socialists. Should we be surprised by the followers in neutral countries? WILHELM JANSSON: On the German-Norwegian tension. For a month now, official relations between Germany and Norway have been tense, which, while posing no direct danger, can nevertheless be regarded as quite serious. The immediate cause of this crisis was the Norwegian government's submarine decree of October 13, which denied access to the submarines of a belligerent power equipped for war use. p. 296 ( 316) 296 On the German-Norwegian Tension. Norwegian waters are prohibited unless the purpose of their presence is to save human life. Other submarines, i.e., those engaged in commercial traffic, may only enter in broad daylight, in clear weather, and in the upper water position with the national flag hoisted. The regulation also contains some saber rattling. Violators are threatened with the danger of being attacked with armed force. All submarines are held responsible for any damage or destruction inflicted upon them. This regulation may not be intended by the Norwegian government to be anti-neutral. Nor does the right of a neutral state to exercise sovereign control over its waters need to be questioned. But this Norwegian regulation has at least an unneutral effect because it affects Germany unilaterally. In the discussion on this, the similar Swedish regulation has been used for comparison, and both in the Norwegian The opinion is expressed in both the Swedish press and the Swedish press that there is no difference between the two regulations. This may be formally correct. But in principle, it is quite different whether the Swedish regulation affects both English and Russian submarines as well as German ones, or whether the Norwegian regulation affects only German ones. The decisive factor in assessing the question is the effect of the regulation, not whether it has a formal counterpart in the sphere of another state authority. Therefore, if the German side raised objections to the unilateral discrimination against

Germany, precisely those circles on the Scandinavian peninsula that so decisively supported the Entente powers' protest against the Swedish government over the closure of the Kogrund channel should be the least likely to object. The Norwegian contributor to the Stockholm "Social Democrat" has attempted to attribute the "anti-Norwegian sentiment in Germany" to the "inflammatory" reporting of German journalists in Norway. These p. 297 ( 317) On German-Norwegian Tension. 297 had spread the view in Germany that the Norwegian press was adopting a hostile attitude towards Germany, that it was carrying out propaganda for the Entente and inciting its readers against Germany. He therefore sees the activities of German newspaper reporters in Norway as the main cause of the crisis. That is far too simple a formula. If one wants to reproach German reporters about Norwegian conditions at all, then at most it is that, long into the war, they pretended to their German readers that Norway was friendly towards Germany, when in reality it did not exist there. It is simply not true that Germany ever enjoyed general sympathy in Norway. Immediately after the outbreak of war in "March," I warned against taking the Norwegian sympathies described to us at face value, which they never were and probably never will be. The economic ties of this highly seafaring nation to England stand in the way of this, even if some of its intellectuals harbor German sympathies. Norway has one of the largest merchant fleets in the world and is one of the smallest countries in Europe, employing only a fraction of its merchant fleet on its own voyages. The vast majority of this fleet sails in English service. This is more true than ever during the war, when almost the entire tonnage has been mobilized for England. In general, England plays a crucial role in Norway's economic life. But that also determines the "sympathies" of the people, whose love goes through the stomach. We should therefore be spared such arguments that do not correspond to the truth. In fact, the Norwegian press as a whole has adopted a completely hostile attitude towards Germany since the beginning of the war. This can be proven by countless quotations, but the German press has only rarely taken notice. However, Norwegian writers who have still retained an objective judgment have protested against the activities of their own press. 35/2 p. 298 ( 318) 298 On German-Norwegian Tension. Erik Lie even felt compelled to raise his protest in a Swedish newspaper in order to achieve a stronger effect. A small and obvious example of the inflammatory work of the Norwegian press may be the To shed more light on the situation. The Norwegian contributor to the Stockholm party newspaper is also a member of the staff of the "Social Democrat" in Christiania, so he must have been well aware of this paper's stance. This paper has long had Professor PG

la Chesnais "enlighten" its readers about many of the "fundamental problems" of socialism. Currently, the professor is printing a series of articles on "The Nationality Problem and Socialism" in Christiania, which produces the most absurd distortions about Germany, German politics, and the situation. I am highlighting Continuation XI, which appeared on October 19 in No. Issue 243 of the "Social Democrat" (Christiania) appeared, a few days after the Norwegian decree that led to the German protest. Despite the tense situation that had arisen, the paper found the following "clarification" appropriate: "I have no doubt that the majority of the German people would have preferred peace, but the war was nevertheless received with goodwill, and they did not submit to it with resignation, for they hoped for an expansion and increase of German power. The German people knew that they had been offended by no one, that they had no national demands to represent. They were ambitious, pan-Germanic in the anti-national sense that this word had acquired. In this way, German national sentiment played a decisive role in the declaration of war: it made the war possible because it had become a perverse national sentiment. All of this is worrying for the future. One does not see how Germany could reform itself. And yet, if this war is to lead to a lasting peace, it must settle the nationality question as far as possible. Therefore, Austria-Hungary must be abolished. No reasonable objection can be raised on this point because it corresponds to the wishes of the population. And therefore, German unity must be achieved by granting freedom to Poles, Schleswigers, and Alsace-Lorrainers in Germany, and by uniting the Germans in Germany and Austria. . . . I know well that the German people would by no means be satisfied with such a solution. To achieve it, it will be necessary to enforce it. I am evidently compelled to assume that one is in the position and has the power to enforce this solution. Even then, I do not forget that all coercion is abhorrent and not without drawbacks, even when it enforces justice... Therefore, Germany must be treated not according to its own wishes, but according to what it would wish if its national feeling were healthy." This achievement by the Norwegian party newspaper, at a time when German-Norwegian tensions had arisen, requires no comment. But its contributors should not flatter the world that the German press is to blame for the crisis! It is free of sin. The arrow goes back to the archer. Norway's attitude on issues other than the submarine question seems essential to us for assessing the crisis, for it gave sufficient cause to complain about a one-sidedly pro-British policy. The fact is that Norway has submitted to all British demands over the past year, that it has agreed, so to speak, through negotiations, to cease almost all its exports to Germany, and that it has even begun to export salted herring to Sweden.

had to have English permission first. It is not acceptable to excuse the country's weakness vis-à-vis England. The Norwegian merchant fleet is such a strong factor in the relations between the two countries that even the suggestion of a ban on the shipment of banned goods would be enough to protect Norwegian interests. But the Norwegian shipowners were content with the business; they made great profits from the shipment of banned goods and cared little about the impression their activities would make in Germany. When our party newspaper in Bergen demanded a halt to the shipment of banned goods in the interests of Norwegian sailors, it met with no response. And yet, Norwegian newspapers have been very upset about the torpedoing of banned goods ships! Nothing would have been easier than avoiding the torpedoing. 35/2* p. 300 ( 320) 300 The Latest Development of the German Iron Industry. ization, namely by prohibiting the trade in contraband goods. In this, the social-democratic Norwegian newspaper is quite right. But such a ban does not serve the interests of the shipowners. If the last available ton of shipping space is mobilized for English purposes, and if, on the other hand, the Norwegian government submits to all of England's demands in the trade war, then this may still be considered neutrality under international law in Entente circles, but one cannot expect sympathy from Germany and the German press for this game of blind man's buff. Anyone who participates in the boycott against Germany must also reckon with the consequences. We therefore see in the German-Norwegian tension more than a mere dispute over the U-boat regulations, even though this is the main issue. In addition, however, and this seems to us at least as important, a clarification is necessary as to whether Norway is an English satrapy or a country real neutrality also in the area of trade policy is, or wants to be. The current situation is in any case not a suitable basis for future relations. HEINRICH CUNOW: The Latest Development of the German Iron Industry. The important role that once the sheep wool and then the cotton industry played in the economic development of the industrialized countries has long since passed over to the ever more powerfully expanding iron industry. King Cotton, which around the middle of the last century almost sovereignly dominated the industrial market of that time, has been dethroned by iron. It is by no means a coincidence that not only in Marx's "Capital," but also in other economic works of that time, the cotton industry is viewed as a type of large-scale industrial development and the phenomena of p. 301 ( 321) The Latest Development of the German Iron Industry. 301 examples of the production process and the circulation of goods through this industry were illustrated. Cotton goods were the major staple items for the domestic market as well as for the world export market of that economic era only five

or six decades ago. The iron industry, however far back its origins can be traced, was of only secondary importance. In 1840, for example, the world's total pig iron production was only 2.9 million tons, and of this total, almost half came from Great Britain, which supplied 1.4 million tons of that amount, while Prussia at that time produced less than 0.08 million tons. England initially retained this lead. The proximity of the best iron ore and coal directly by the sea, the favorable shipping conditions, which enabled the convenient importation of foreign ores and the easy transport of the produced iron and steel, and the rapid rise of English industry after the end of the Napoleonic Wars, which generated a strong domestic demand for iron machines, tools, and equipment, secured England—by all appearances, forever—a vast preponderance over continental iron production, all the more so since all iron technology at that time was rooted in England and all valuable inventions originated there. Nevertheless, over the next three decades, the German iron industry gradually began to lag behind the English and reduce the latter's lead. When the Franco-Prussian War broke out in 1870, German pig iron production had already overtaken that of France. The German states participating in the war produced 1.39 million tons of pig iron in 1870, while France produced only 1.18 million. However, the United States of America made even faster progress after the end of the Civil War, producing 1.69 million tons in 1870. Admittedly, neither Germany nor the North American Union could compete with England. Great Britain still supplied approximately half of the entire world production, 6.06 million tons (total world production in 1870 was 12.09 million tons). Even more than in pig iron production, Germany had now drawn closer to its English competitor in steel production. At that time, Germany was already supplying 169,951 tons of flux iron (crude steel), Great Britain 286,797, followed by France with 94,386, and then the North American Union with 68,507 tons. The German iron industry had achieved this success despite facing stiff competition from English domestically. Under the influence of List's protective tariffs, the German Customs Union had imposed a duty of 2 marks per quintal on pig iron in 1844 and raised the duty on bars and rails to 4.50 marks. However, the unstoppable advance of the English free trade doctrine across the Channel in the free trade era of the 1860s resulted in the pig iron duty being reduced again to 1.50 marks in July 1865, then to 1 mark in 1868 and then to 50 pfennigs in 1870. Three years later, from October 1873 onwards, it fell completely at the request of the then still free-trading Prussian conservatives, whose spokesman, Baron von Behr (Greifswald), exclaimed pathetically in the Reichstag on May 26, 1873: "You can rely on this, gentlemen, as long as a German ship sails our Baltic Sea, as long as we in

the provinces on the Baltic Sea, where we do not dig out iron, but have to dig in a great deal of iron in order to have a harvest, as long as the farmer there has to cultivate his land, then we will demand free iron!" At the same time, the duty on bar iron, iron sheets, cast iron and other coarse iron goods was reduced indiscriminately to 2 marks per quintal, with the stipulation that this duty would also be abolished on January 1, 1877. With Baron von Behr's beautiful declaration that the Prussian landowners would support "free iron" as long as the farmer When iron was dug into the soil of the Baltic Sea, it happened like so many other fine promises and promises. When the export of agricultural products to England declined more and more and American-Russian food competition appeared on the German domestic market instead, the agrarian enthusiasm for free trade quickly dwindled. As early as 1877, the conservatives sought rapprochement with the iron and steel industrialists in order to buy their support in enforcing grain, livestock, and timber tariffs in return for the concession of iron tariffs. The conservative tax and economic reformers formed an entente cordiale with the Central Association of German Industrialists, which had been formed under the aegis of the Reich Party member Wilhelm von Kardorff. Bismarck made his well-known economic policy shift, and on July 12, 1879, the Reichstag adopted a new tariff with a substantial majority. This tariff set a tariff of 1 mark for pig iron, 2.50 marks for bar iron and coarse cast goods, 3 to 5 marks for iron sheet, and 10 to 15 marks for coarse iron goods per quintal. The Caprivian Trade Agreements of 1891 essentially left the tariff rates of the 1879 tariff in place; however, the Bülow Tariff of December 1902 and the new trade agreements concluded on the basis of this tariff brought a series of further tariff increases. The German iron industry experienced rapid growth under the protective tariff system introduced in 1880 and completely surpassed England's iron and steel production. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to see this development as a mere consequence of tariff legislation, even though a certain promotion of certain individual branches of the steel industry through the defense against English and American competition on the domestic market cannot be overlooked for the period from 1880 to 1890. In any case, the powerful overall economic development of Germany after the Franco-Prussian War, which enormously increased the domestic demand for iron, contributed more to this upswing than the protective tariff system. Immediately after the war, despite the tariff reductions of 1870, a strong increase in the entire p. 304 ( 324) 304 The Latest Development of the German Iron Industry. iron and steel production began. While in 1870 pig iron production had amounted to only 1.39 million tons or 13.9 million quintals, it rose to 15.6 million quintals in 1871, 19.9 million quintals in 1872, and even 22.4 million quintals in 1873,

entirely as a result of the enormously soaring domestic demand, which in the five-year period 1866-1870 had only amounted to 70 pounds per capita, but had risen to 137 pounds in 1873. The enormous construction activity following the war, with its billions in benefits, the expansion of the railway network and the addition of rolling stock, and the numerous new factories founded, naturally created a strong demand for iron. The "great crash" that followed pig iron production initially reduced production, but by 1879, pig iron production had almost reached the level of the boom year of 1873, and in 1880 it was even 22 percent higher. A new, tremendous rise followed, which, although temporarily hampered by crises, always resumed with renewed vigor after they were overcome. Examining this development in detail using statistics and, at the same time, observing how the German iron industry is increasingly shifting to the manufacture of quality goods is of great interest to the economist; a few figures, to which the figures for English and American iron production are added for comparison, must suffice: Pig iron production (in million tons) 1870 1890 1900 1913 Crude steel production (in million tons) 1900 1913 Germany Great Britain and 1.39 4.66 8.52 19.31 6.64 19.03 Ireland 6.06 8.03 9.05 10.65 5.13 7.77 United States 10.38 31.08 of America . . 1.69 9.35 14.01 31.46 The figures show how steel production is growing much faster than iron production: in 1890, Germany produced only 45 percent of England's crude steel output; in 1913, German steel production already exceeded that of England by 145 percent. This proves that with the expansion of production, a shift in quality must have taken place within the German iron industry; and in fact, if one looks at the individual branches in their Development, we can state with the greatest certainty. Not only is the mass of production increasing, but technological progress is being completed even more rapidly, and the transition to quality work is taking place more rapidly than in England and France. This progress is linked to manifold organizational changes. Small businesses are disappearing and finding a home only in precision engineering; companies are expanding and combining with other businesses to form so-called mixed factories, while factories at the same production levels are uniting to form cartels and syndicates. The increasing size of companies, however, necessitates the expenditure of larger capital. Individuals are no longer able to raise the resources necessary for the constant expansion of the ever-expanding giant factories. The joint-stock company is displacing the private individual business. This simultaneously brings about a closer connection with bank finance and the exclusion of foreign capital. The World War only partially hindered this development; it slowed the expansion of production, the increase in production, and Production mass was hindered, but the effort to produce

quality goods was greatly promoted. Mobilization, the associated mass withdrawal of qualified workers from the factories, and the disruption of rail traffic necessitated severe restrictions on operations. In addition, considerable parts of the German iron ore fields were located in dangerous proximity to the war zone, especially in Lorraine, where of the 56 blast furnaces in operation before the outbreak of war, 48 were steamed and 3 were blown out; further in the Saar region, where of the 26 blast furnaces, 15 were steamed and 3 were blown out; and then in Upper Silesia, where of the 26 blast furnaces, 7 were steamed and 3 were completely blown out. Pig iron production, p. 306 ( 326) 306 The latest development of German The iron industry, which had amounted to around 1.56 million tons in the month before the war, in July 1914, fell to 0.59 million tons in August. And flux iron production fell even more sharply, declining from 1.63 to 0.57 million tons, almost a third. Although the German armies soon advanced victoriously on the Western Front, September also brought only a slight recovery; in October 1914, however, iron production began to rise again and has increased month by month since then, despite a certain shortage of quality iron ore later emerging. The often-heard claim that the war set German industry back 20 to 30 years is not true, as far as the iron industry is concerned, even in terms of quantity, and even less so in terms of quality. At most, one can speak of a decline in production to the level of 1909/1910. In the first ten months Pig iron production in the current year amounted to 11.05 million tons, compared to 10.62 million tons in the same period in 1909 and 12.21 million tons in 1910. This result was achieved not only with a considerably smaller, but also less qualified workforce. While production volumes declined under the influence of the war, qualitative output has experienced a decisive increase. This fact is partly reflected in the fact that flux iron production has far surpassed pig iron production. While only 11.79 million tons of pig iron were produced in 1915, flux iron production amounted to 13.19 million tons. And within steel production, the production of the better grades is again showing an increase at the expense of the inferior grades. Thomas steel has continued to gain ground over the lesser steel grades, and Baden Siemens-Martin steel has again gained ground over Thomas steel, although the latter requires a lot of scrap and manganese to produce. are, and since they could only be imported in very inadequate quantities, there was a shortage of high-quality manganese ores, so that p. 307 ( 327) The latest development of the German iron industry. 307 one was forced to resort to Nassau brown and red iron ores, Siegerland spar iron ore, and similar substitutes. And the same development is evident in the rolling mill industry. Everywhere, there is an increasing focus on quality goods. Quite understandably, the manufacture of

raw rolled mill products, for example, iron building materials, has largely ceased. In its place has come the manufacture of war materials, ammunition parts, gun barrels, carriages, armor plates, steel tools, barbed wire, etc. However, the highest quality is required to manufacture these war supplies. The business reports of the large ironworks therefore often report a further Transition to the production of better quality articles, although naturally this development is stronger in factories that already manufactured certain specialized materials, such as the Bochum Cast Steel Association, than in large mixed factories, which, due to their operational organization, rely on the production of a variety of average qualities. The German iron industry will therefore emerge from the war significantly different from how it entered it. The lead it had already achieved over the English and French iron industries in terms of both mass production and technical development in the last two decades of peacetime has expanded even further. This is especially true as far as France is concerned; for the most important of its iron-industrial districts are in German hands or lie in the middle of the combat zone. The Briey and Longwy ore basin alone supplied France with four-fifths of its total iron ore production, over two-thirds of its pig iron production, and approximately half of its steel production in the last years before the war. If one includes the other iron ore basins occupied by German troops or whose production activity was affected by the war, If we add the French territories hindered by the war, it follows that almost 80 percent of France's total blast furnace output has been put idle by the war. - p. 308
( 328) 308 From the German trade union press. However, during the war the German iron industry gained a very strong competitor in the American industry, which, as soon as the supply of war material to the Entente powers ceases, will probably not only try to gain further sales territory in South America and East Asia, but also to gain a firm foothold in the Western European countries bordering the Atlantic Ocean. This competition, however, threatens the English iron industry far more than the German one, which finds a ready market in the countries of Central Europe, the Balkan Peninsula, the Middle East, and Russia. A. Grigoryants: From the German trade union press: "After the war, when passions have cooled, there must be a return to international understanding among the workers—there is probably no disagreement on this point among the enlightened workers of Germany," writes the "Metallarbeiter-Zeitung," the organ of the largest free trade union organization in Germany (No. 42 of October 14). Indeed, the international idea dominates and permeates all expressions of opinion in the columns of the trade union press, even if deviations in tone may be expressed here and there. The community of interests of the workers of all countries, not least to

prevent future wars and maintain peace, must ultimately and definitively assert itself. True to this general conviction, the German trade union press expresses its abhorrence against ethnic oppression and rape in the strongest possible terms. Two particularly characteristic cases can be mentioned in this connection. Johann Leimpeters told us in the "Glocke" No. 28 that he had "ample opportunity every day to associate with our comrades in the mine and steelworks, and almost all of them, without exception, are annexationists!" The "Bergarbeiter-Zeitung" (No. 43 of October 21) protests most emphatically against this generalization and believes that the overwhelming majority of unionized miners are against annexations. The other example is taken from the "Landarbeiter." In discussing the welfare of war victims in connection with the capital compensation law and internal colonization, the "Landarbeiter" points out the nationalist tendencies of these measures towards the Polish population, only to then remark in the boldface: "The working class rejects these Germanization plans with all determination." In recent months, the German trade union press has devoted much attention to a question at the heart of practical internationalism: the treatment of foreign workers in the coming peacetime: According to the last census in 1910, there were over 1,259,000 foreigners in Germany, of whom probably four-fifths were employed. In the construction industry, one-seventh of all employees are foreigners, the vast majority of whom are Italians. This explains why the stimulus for a debate came from among construction workers. In May, the "Grundstein" published two articles from members, with whose overall thrust the editorial team agrees, but not with their wording. "In the future, we want to welcome with open arms every foreigner who comes to us with the association book of their home organization, as we have done so far. But we want to regard the unorganized mass of foreigners as what they really are, as enemies whom we want to confront ruthlessly everywhere and at every opportunity," is the quintessence of the author's line of thought. In the Swiss and Italian press, these thoughts were seen as a break with the former policy of absolute tolerance, which was the highest law in the German trade union movement. That may be so; but that the stated principle in itself contains a fundamental rejection of internationalism is by no means correct. The commandments p. 310 ( 330) 310 From the German trade union press. of loyalty to the International as an organized power should be satisfied by welcoming every foreign organized member "with open arms." And as far as the unorganized are concerned, the native worker, who by staying away from the organization usually thwarts its activities, is also, in a sense, an "enemy." It all depends on how the opposition to immigrants is to be expressed. In this regard, it must be emphasized that the lively discussion in "Grundstein,"

which during the last six months has published statements and articles from circles within the Construction Workers' Association almost weekly, revealed great resentment, particularly against the Italian workers, because of their persistent opposition to the idea of organization. "If ever and anywhere there has been systematic and emphatic agitation for the unions, then it has been among the Italian construction workers in Germany," says A. Winnig in one of his two articles concluding the discussion, "On the Immigrant Question" (Grundstein Nos. 35 and 36). The result of this great educational and organizational effort was pitiful. In this context, one should consider the extraordinarily sharp escalation of the struggles in the construction industry. The "Bildhauer-Zeitung" (No. 43 of October 26), which also addresses the issue in an article entitled "The Foreigner Question and the Trade Unions," has no doubt whatsoever that, after the war, employers will soon resume their previous practice of recruiting foreign workers. Consequently, the trade journals concerned are advocating for legislative or government intervention to curb the import or mass influx of wage-cutters. The "Metallarbeiter-Zeitung" (No. 42) warns against such measures. It emphasizes that constant educational work must remain the only means of influencing the indifferent. Legislative measures would result in reprisals from abroad. The "Correspondence Gazette of the General Commission" (No. 37 of September 9 and No. 45 of November 4) puts the entire problem on a broader basis by advocating the legislative tackling of the immigration question in all its implications. The purpose of this action must be to ensure that all "workers employed in Germany, whether they are nationals or foreigners," enjoy increased worker protection. This would perhaps make the recruitment of foreign workers less profitable for the employer, thus indirectly serving the interests of the workers. The "Correspondenzblatt" reserves the right to take a more detailed position on the entire issue. In the discussion conducted so far, a certain one-sidedness in the assessment of the foreigner question cannot be overlooked, so that the position proposed by the "Correspondenzblatt" must be of particular interest. While one speaks of foreign workers in general, one usually has workers of one or another profession in mind and insufficient consideration is given to the entire range of issues. The question of foreign agricultural workers—to pick just one—also belongs to this chapter. Whether legislative measures in the sense suggested by the "Correspondenzblatt" are achievable specifically in this area is a question in itself. The abolition of all restrictions and the complete equality of foreign workers with locals would, in our opinion, make special legislation superfluous and at the same time have the advantage of making strikes and wage-breaking trades disadvantageous. -- The working class, however, is not

only divided nationally by borders, but also politically by ideologies. The war brought about a practical rapprochement and cooperation between the three main trade union movements—the Free, Christian, and the Hirsch-Duncker unions. This also gave rise to the idea of a closer union or even a merger. p. 312 ( 332) 312 From the German Trade union press. It is interesting that the "Central Journal of the Christian Trade Unions of Germany" (No. 19 of September 11) justifies the importance of the rapprochement of the three major trade union movements during the war on practical issues by pointing to the "constantly growing concentration in the business community." The "Bergarbeiter-Zeitung" (No. 40 of September 30) points to signs of an evolution of views within the Christian trade union movement, referring to the 1915 annual report of the Christian trade unions published in the above-mentioned issue of the "Central Journal," which, among other things, addresses "future economic and trade policy, especially tax policy": "We note with satisfaction that the Christian Trade Union Central Office has abandoned its previously held position that questions of economic and trade policy (customs policy) do not fall within the competence of the trade unions." However, no illusions exist regarding the possibility of a merger. The difference in fundamental views is universally described as unbridgeable. While the "Zentralblatt" emphasizes that "practical community work does not require the abandonment of one iota of fundamental views, but rather that it is entirely compatible with the jealous preservation of the fundamental position," we read in the "Holzarbeiter-Zeitung" (No. 43 of October 21, "Unified Workers' Organization"): "It is questions of ideology that separate the various trade union tendencies. These cannot be resolved by majority decisions." A merger is out of the question in the foreseeable future. The article "The Unity Union" by A. Winnig, which has been widely reprinted in the trade union press, comes to similar conclusions. In both articles, the area of wage and working time demands is described as the one in which the interests of all groups converge and where mutual cooperation and support are already taking place. p. 313 ( 333) I would like to be able to wear my blue work clothes 313. That the yellows will be excluded from this once and for all is a given. The Woodworkers' Newspaper expresses the conviction that in time the contradictions within the working class will disappear, that the hard school of struggle will bring all workers together. BRUNO DIETEL (in the field): I would like my blue work clothes... Often in the solitude of a field watch a wish has arisen: I would like my blue work clothes, a hall of machines, filled with the song of iron down to the last corner; and to the old familiar sound, stretch my limbs; and, surrounded by the glow of the wheels, step to the vice... Believe me, my grasping would be like a fervent prayer!

WITH glosses. Political characters. ERNST VON HEYDEBRAND. [With a serious, brooding face, the little man sits in his corner seat in the Prussian parliament. Few follow the speeches as attentively as he does. He is rarely disturbed by a visitor, a letter, a brief discussion with the president or a minister. With grave seriousness he walks through the corridors to the committee meetings, his gray head thoughtfully bowed - almost too large, this peculiar head with the broad temples for his small figure. And never even a smile. In the Reichstag, to which he once refused to hand over the wallets of the wealthy, and where, on the last day of the House of Representatives elected in 1907, he fought that great battle with Bethmann over Morocco. "The strong need not always have the sword in their mouth," the Chancellor replied. In the Reichstag, he has fallen completely silent. What will he say in the state parliament, where he has been called "King Heydebrand" for so long? What will he say? He is simply not a normal person unaffected by thought. What does he always think? He resembles more than the corpulent men who sleep well at night, the hollow-eyed Cassius who thinks too much. What is he thinking? How can his party most effectively oppose everything new in the future? Or is this conservative fighting for the conviction that the state exists for everyone and can only win if it grants everyone equal rights? Does this zealous thinker finally see the state as the most secure when it realizes that it can be nothing other than the existential association of its people? Is his mind turned to the difficult problem of giving a physically inert party mass a different direction? – A receipt. The "Vorwärts" lost about 100,000 subscribers because of the war. In the "Leipziger Volkszeitung," Bernstein polemicizes that this is the fault of the previous Vorwärts editorial staff and their attitude. Adapting to the undiscerning masses is not the task of the social democratic press. The fact that subscribers have been lost is not disputed, nor is it disputed that bourgeois newspapers, especially the "Berliner Volkszeitung," have gained a corresponding number of subscribers. Where, then, is the revolutionary, party-oppositional Berlin proletariat?! In the last election, nearly 600,000 voters in Berlin and the surrounding area voted Social Democratic. But now, according to Bernstein, this electorate is a "discriminate mass," because only about a tenth of these 600,000 support the "Vorwärts" newspaper! The masses can only achieve validity and significance if they are organized, disciplined, and inspired for directly practical purposes. But this is only possible to the extent that one remains within the framework of what is immediately feasible. However, one must adapt to the "undiscerning masses," not by abandoning one's ideals, but by choosing paths to ideals that the masses can support. Only if we have the people on our side can we

declaim more than fine principles. The lost hundred thousand subscribers are the price for a wrong policy. H. Peus-Dessau. p. 315 ( 335) Glosses. 315 RA "Annexationists." Radical newspapers are incessantly sniffing around for "annexationists" in Social Democracy and yet cannot find a real one. We want to help them on a historical trail. On December 3, 1863, a well-known German Social Democrat wrote regarding the Schleswig-Holstein affair: "I have come to the conclusion 1. that the Schleswig-Holstein theory is nonsense; 2. that in Holstein the Augustenburgers certainly seem to be right; 3. that in Schleswig it is difficult to say who has the right of succession, but the male line only as vassals of Denmark, if at all; 4. that the London Protocol is unconditionally valid in Denmark, but not in Schleswig and Holstein, because the estates were not consulted; 5. that German law is limited to the south, which is German by nationality and free will, and therefore Schleswig must be divided; 6. that at this moment Germany's only chance of liberating the duchies is to start a war against Russia on behalf of Poland. Then Louis Napoleon will be our obedient servant, Sweden will immediately fall into our arms, and England will be paralyzed; then we will take from Denmark We can do what we want with impunity." The Social Democrat who wrote this letter was named Friedrich Engels, and his letter was addressed to Karl Marx. (See Correspondence between Marx and Engels, Volume 3, page 148.) Without applying Engels's remarks to today's questions, it should be pointed out that the two old masters assessed the annexations on a case-by-case basis. Engels wanted to present his view of the Schleswig-Holstein question in a pamphlet, and Marx agreed, asking Engels to wait for events. Engels' pamphlet has not arrived, but perhaps a "radical" criminal trial will still fall on him later. DR. A defendant. R. Franz Soukup is standing before a Vienna military court on charges of high treason. With him are two Prague journalists from the Czech progressive "Cas," which was formerly the organ of the professor and deputy Masaryk, now in England. Masaryk is no Tsarist servant; he was always a liberal, modern man, a Marxist to boot, and a fierce opponent of clericalism and all regression. I don't know what drove him to the Entente side; earlier, he had opposed the Pan-Slavic constitutional fantasies with the realpolitik of an Austria of national autonomy. What Soukup committed cannot currently be ascertained; but it is unlikely to have been the most dangerous act of high treason, in which the (co-accused) chief of the Prague state police, Hofrat Olic, is said to have aided and abetted, and it does not indicate particularly serious suspicion that Soukup was left at large. Franz Soukup! A towering figure in Austrian Social Democracy. One of those blond, serious, tough Czech types, iron-heads. They may not always know what they want, but they pursue it with unbreakable determination,

and they will make any sacrifice. I still remember a joint meeting of the German and Czech party leadership in Bohemia during the deep, slack peacetime. We were aware that, so soon after the conquest of the same Reichsrat electoral law and after its bitter disappointments, we would not be able to lure a weaver or grinder out from behind the stove for a campaign for the Landtag electoral law. But Soukup resolutely, harshly, and grimly demanded the battle cry. At party conferences and at large demonstrations, Soukup's dark, fiery speeches always captivated. Wit and irony were not his thing; it roared like a volcano hurling glowing blocks vertically into the air. The electoral law fight and victory carried him into parliament. Even as a student, he had caused a tremendous stir. The fact that he, of all people, took the lead in the nationalist reorientation of Czech Social Democracy, the fragmentation of the trade unions, the split of the faction, and the disintegration of the unified Austrian party embittered us particularly. We would have expected such "retreat from chauvinistic demagogy" from Soukup last of all. Today, perhaps, we understand it differently. Czech workers in the German-speaking region were burdened by simultaneous social and national pressure. Deep in the hearts of all Czechs, however, the memory of old struggles for national prestige and their own statehood, and of the "woe to the vanquished," which this people had to endure in all its gruesome grandeur, still burns red in the pavement in front of the Old Town Hall in Prague, the marks of the executions after the Battle of White Mountain in 1620. The old Czech rebel spirit gave much to the Austrian workers' movement. His representative is this tall, slim, blond-bearded Frantisek Soukup: rebel, Hussite. RB p. 317 ( 337) Glosses. 317 The Grain of Salt in Democracy. The Polish Manifesto of the German and Austro-Hungarian governments offers an opportunity to examine the applicability of a demand that, at first glance, appears to be a democratic matter of course. The manifesto promises the Poles—previously Russian—state independence in the form of a hereditary monarchy with a constitutional constitution. At the same time, with reliance on the Central Powers and with their cooperation in organizing internal affairs. Social Democrats have countered this with the fairly general demand that the Poles simply be granted the right to state independence and that the new state itself be left to decide what form and internal institutions it wishes to create for itself and how it wishes to shape its postwar destiny. In the name of democratic justice! Let us look this matter squarely in the eye! According to historical experience, the Polish people of the old, independent Polish Empire, through incessant internal strife and a ruthless clique and vested interest system, prepared the ground for the downfall of the once great empire, which only culminated in the so-called

Partition of Poland. The masses of the people, a dull, exploited, economically and spiritually stunted mass of land slaves, played no part in this. The current Polish people are certainly no longer the same as they once were. But they are divided along class lines, just like other peoples caught in the maelstrom of capitalism. The difference compared to more advanced nations consists, at most, in the fact that the working classes in the cities, and even more so in the countryside, lag behind the proletariat of other nations economically and, above all, intellectually, and are also further removed from the propertied classes of their own people than the proletariat of developed capitalist states is from its propertied classes. The demanded right of self-determination of the Polish people would thus amount to a preferential right of self-determination for a small propertied class, particularly heavily dominated by aristocratic large landowners, in which the working population would have no noticeable share. Or, after calm reflection, would anyone seriously believe that the popular strata that will comprise the ruling class of the future Poland will grant the Polish proletariat an equality that might possibly exceed that already achieved by the German working class? This will happen all the less after the municipal elections in Warsaw showed this proletariat, hopelessly divided and fighting among itself. The Polish proletariat would therefore be more disadvantaged than advantageous from the right of self-determination granted to the Polish people. The propertied classes, however, will gain their rights, whether with or without a formal right of self-determination. This is because they will be indispensable in the administration of the new state. On the other hand, the so-called right of self-determination harbors a danger that should not be underestimated. In reality, it would mean nothing more than leaving the Polish people helpless to fend for themselves. It was inevitable that fierce internal struggles would arise over the establishment of the new state, so fierce that it would probably be easy for the Russians, who had no qualms about people's rights, to calmly take the newly liberated Poland back under their paternal protection. Especially since there is still enough sympathy for Russia among the population of Russian Poland. Moreover, granting the orderly new Polish state completely free self-determination in all its politics—thus eliminating its "dependence" on the Central Powers—would ultimately amount to nothing other than leaving it helplessly at the mercy of the Russians. ---- That would be a fine success in the application of our democratic principles for the Polish proletariat, the entire Polish people, for Germany, for democracy, and for the future of European culture. Even democratic practice requires a grain of salt, or several. hw The end of a demagogic trick. With the carefree zeal that corresponds to their nature, certain agitators, idle agitators, turn every

demagogic trick that the moment suggests into a kind of principle. One of the most malicious tricks of this kind, which has already prevented and poisoned many a fruitful debate and incited the crowd to fanatical "crucification" against many an honest man, is the not-so-recent claim that a Social Democrat is about to betray his principles. stand if it finds the approval of bourgeois parties. Naturally, the danger of betraying principles increases the further away from him the party and its views whose approval he has received in this particular case. Without anyone really noticing, this trick died an inglorious death, after unfortunately having lived far too long and caused far too much harm. The rooster has barely crowed three times since the founding of the Social Democratic Working Group, and already it has had the misfortune more than three times to meet with the ultra-conservatives in the fight against Bethmann-Hollweg's policies; it is only a sign of the weak parliamentary p. 319 ( 339) Glosses. 319 strength of the two most extreme parties in the Reichstag that, despite their combined forces, they were unable to remove the Chancellor. Have the members of the working group now become "traitors"? Furthermore: We have recently witnessed a growing agreement between left and right, almost to the point of convergence in the center of all parties on a question of truly fundamental importance for our political life: namely, the question of freedom of the press and parliamentary control of all government actions, as well as the participation of parliament in government. There are virtually no longer any differences of opinion among Social Democrats, Conservatives, the People's Party, the Center Party, and National Liberals regarding the need for freedom of the press, the need for censorship to be limited to military matters, and the need for the people to have a say in war aims, while Parliament has the right to have a say in the decisions. There may be differences in details, but there is agreement on the basic principles. Will it even occur to the most extreme doctrinaire to deduce from this the claim that the demand for freedom of the press and the strengthening of parliamentary power are reactionary? No one thinks of it, and if someone did, a pitying shrug from everyone would be the least reward. [The phrase "Staatsgesinnung" appears in the original German.] This word plays a role at present. It inevitably crops up wherever the Social Democratic position on the war is discussed. The Social Democratic workers have now acquired a state-minded attitude, some claim; they still don't have enough state-mindedness, others claim. They now recognize the state and no longer want to destroy it. Strangely enough, one can also find arguments for and against in Social Democratic newspapers that uncritically riff on the phrase without actually attacking the concept. Another sign of theoretical shallowness, despite all the party schools. After

all, it is a slogan from the anarchist storeroom. Anarchism wanted to destroy the state because it viewed the state as a diabolical invention for the destruction of freedom. At a certain stage of economic development, state organization is a social necessity. Within not too wide limits, which are also determined by the level of economic development, the form of the state can be changed; the state's internal stratification changes under the influence of economic forms; the balance of power within the state shifts; its borders can be altered; nationality relations can change, but the state as the organizational form of human society will remain. The ruling social elements that gave form to the state will always regard their state as the normal state, and their economic and political happiness as universal human happiness. We Social Democrats are critical of the current form of government because, as the proletarian element of society or its representatives, we stand on the dark side of this state. We want to turn the structure inside out so that light can reach everywhere. Proletarian solidarity reveals, on the other hand, a lack of a sense of solidarity with the other elements of society. This lack becomes ever greater and more obvious the more the usufruct of the advantages of the state organization and its economy increases. This then appears to others as a lack of civic spirit. It is certainly a lack of public spirit. But is the current social organization at all inclined to generate public spirit? Where is the public spirit of the food usurers and other usurers in the face of present-day hardship? But who counts the usurers? Those who steadfastly resist every temptation to usurp would be easy to count. The civic spirit of most people only comes alive when they expect the state to protect their profitable activities. If we Social Democrats, despite our critical stance toward the current state, are prepared to do everything to preserve it against the storm from outside, it is for two main reasons. We want to continue building on the existing foundation of an efficient economic body and not allow it to be reduced to rubble by others who only want to create more space for their individualistic-capitalist state and make a larger piece of land subservient to their need for exploitation. And we have recognized that our German state, despite all its shortcomings, is better than most others who now want to destroy it under the hypocritical mask of culture and freedom. We expect true solidarity only in the socialist state, which will eliminate economic individualism. Then, civic spirit will also be a matter of course. In the meantime, the present state could bind its proletarian elements to itself much more firmly than before, and thus significantly strengthen their civic spirit, if it made them citizens with equal rights in every respect. This would serve to strengthen its position both internally and externally. hw p. 321
( 341) DIE GLOCKE 36th Issue December 2, 1916 2nd Year Reprint of all

articles permitted with detailed source references EDUARD DAVID, M. d. R.: Missing and mutilated documents. BEYOND the question of the economic aspirations and national-political currents that plunged the peoples of Europe into hostile tensions and growing unrest in the years before the war, the question of diplomatic guilt exists as an independent issue in its own right. As strong as the economic and national differences between states and groups of states were, resolving them through peaceful negotiations and treaties was not beyond the realm of possibility. Who is to blame for abandoning this path of balancing interests and resorting to the violent means of war? The source of material for shedding light on this question, which naturally occupies the minds of all camps and truly has more than merely theoretical-historical significance, is the official document books of the governments involved. The material contained therein is, of course, neither complete nor does it guarantee the scholarly objectivity of the authors or compilers. It is the diplomatic stakeholders who speak. But the documents from the various camps complement, illuminate, and correct each other, so that critical conclusions are possible from the overall material. Anyone who reads and uses these official collections of documents must, of course, be assured that the relevant edition presents the documents in their entirety. This is unfortunately not the case with one of the most widely distributed editions in Germany. 36/1 p. 322 ( 342) 322 Missing and mutilated documents. It is the collection "Documents on the World War 1914" (Vorwärts-Verlag), edited by Eduard Bernstein, which has shortened and mutilated the extremely important English Blue Book in a way that has provoked the sharpest criticism. Bernstein notes in the preface to his edition of the English Blue Book that the volume of the correspondence prohibited its unabridged reproduction, but that "only those documents or parts of documents were omitted that repeated information already reported in other documents." Bernstein could not hide the questionable nature of this arbitrary process of elimination from himself. To reassure readers and perhaps also to assuage his own conscience, he adds: "However, especially with this correspondence, it is often important to determine in what form or tone one and the same matter was reported to the various embassies, for example, in Berlin and Petersburg, and where such deletions are relevant, deletions are inadmissible and therefore omitted. The decisive factor in the review was not to omit any document that could be of any significance for characterizing the diplomatic traffic of the British Foreign Office." I am sorry to have to tell Bernstein that his actual procedure belies these assurances. He has not only omitted documents that repeat messages, but also those that are of the utmost importance for assessing the diplomatic events during

the critical days. Furthermore, he has allowed himself to make deletions in and on documents that are in no way compatible with an impartial historiography. Given the trust that Bernstein's compilations have been placed in, particularly in working-class circles, it seems to me urgently necessary to raise a warning sign. Anyone who has studied the events of the last days before the outbreak of war knows that on July 29, a proposal for an understanding was made from London p. 323 ( 343) Missing and mutilated documents. 323 that seemed to enable a peaceful solution to the situation and that formed the center of further negotiations. Grey had received a message from the Russian ambassador stating that direct negotiations between Russia and Austria seemed hopeless. He informed the German ambassador, Prince Lichnowsky, and took the opportunity to make a significant new proposal for an understanding. The essence of the new proposal was: Austria would be allowed to continue its punitive expedition against Serbia until Belgrade was captured; then, a conference of the four major powers not directly involved would determine the conditions for a peaceful settlement. The document in which this proposal is first mentioned is No. 88 of the Blue Book. It is a telegram from Grey to the British ambassador in Berlin, Sir Edward Goschen, about the former's conversation with Lichnowsky. Afterwards, Grey said to Lichnowsky, among other things: - His collection "It is now, of course, too late to cease any military action against Serbia, since I suspect that within a short time the Austro-Hungarian troops will enter Belgrade and occupy part of Serbian territory. But even then it would still be possible to find some mediation if Austria-Hungary, retaining the territory it occupied until it was fully satisfied with Serbia, declared that it would advance no further until the Powers had made an attempt to mediate between it and Russia." This document is missing from Bernstein! Jumps from No. 87 to 89. Didn't Bernstein recognize the significance of this document? Didn't he see that here, for the first time, a new, highly significant proposal by Grey is mentioned? A compromise formula had been found that seemed to correspond to the demands of the two most closely involved Great Powers. Austria was granted the right to continue its punitive expedition against Serbia until Belgrade was captured, that is, to "humiliate" Serbia, a right that Grey also expressly granted it (cf. Blue Book 90). Furthermore, the conflict was accorded the character of a European issue. This was what Russia had demanded. The settlement through a conference of the four powers, proposed by Grey at an earlier stage of the negotiations, now came into play. The politically trained historian Bernstein, however, does not consider it appropriate to bring this telegram to the attention of his readers. Why, perhaps? The fate of Grey's proposal in the subsequent negotiations and its

further mistreatment in Bernstein's collection allow us to guess his motives. Let's see! Lichnowsky had immediately passed the new mediation proposal on to Berlin. There It was approved and immediately sent to Vienna. A telegram from Goschen to Grey dated July 30 (Blue Book 98) reports this. It concerns a conversation between the British ambassador and Secretary of State von Jagow. Goschen's telegram begins: "The Secretary of State informs me that immediately after receiving the telegram in which Prince Lichnowsky reported his last conversation with you, he inquired of the Austro-Hungarian government whether it would accept mediation on the basis that its troops would occupy Belgrade or some other point and publish its demands from there." That this "request" was accompanied by urgent support was recently confirmed by the Chancellor in the main committee of the Reichstag by communicating the relevant document. The Viennese government was told that in the event of a military conflict, Austria and Germany would probably find themselves confronted by three great powers; Italy and Romania could not be counted on; Austria's political prestige and military honor were sufficiently protected by the occupation of Belgrade. "We must therefore urgently and emphatically urge the Viennese cabinet to consider accepting mediation on the terms offered." The result was highly gratifying. The Viennese government accepted Grey's proposal. A telegram from Count Berchtold dated July 31st informed the Austrian ambassadors in Berlin, London, and St. Petersburg of this. (Red Book 51.) - The approval of the Viennese authorities seems to have been secured as early as the night of July 30-31, as can be seen from a p. 325 ( 345) Missing and mutilated documents. 325 This is evident from the message in the telegram from the German Emperor to King George of July 31 (White Book, Section 5, III). The negotiation campaign was thus in full swing. Only one danger threatened it: Russia's ever-increasing military measures. Herr von Jagow also pointed out this danger in the aforementioned conversation with Goschen. This is the further weighty content of this telegram. The first sentence quoted above is followed by the following sentences: "So far, he [the Secretary of State] has received no answer [from Vienna], but he fears that the Russian mobilization against Austria has increased the difficulties, since the latter, which until now had only mobilized against Serbia, will now probably consider it necessary to mobilize against Russia as well. The Secretary of State believes that if you [Grey] could persuade Russia to find a solution on the basis of such a proposal and, in the meantime, prevent it from taking steps that could be interpreted as hostile to Austria-Hungary, he would still have some hope of maintaining European peace." These important sentences are missing from Bernstein. The omission is indicated by a few points. Then follow Jagow's

further remarks on the difficult situation into which Germany, too, was being brought by the Russian mobilization and military preparations in France. What could have prompted Bernstein to withhold these sentences from his readers? Has their significance also escaped him? Jagow draws Goschen's attention to the fact that the fate of Grey's proposal for reconciliation depends on Petersburg. He therefore advises Grey to prevent Russia from taking steps that would endanger the success of his proposal to the utmost. One can see that Grey's complicity in the failure of his own mediation proposal is touched upon here. But Bernstein leaves these Sentences fall under the table to save space! But further! Grey transported the communication received from Berlin and his proposal to Petersburg on the same day. It is the telegram to the English ambassador there, Sir G. Buchanan. (Blue Book 103.) The first paragraph of this document reads: p. 326 ( 346) 326 Missing and mutilated documents. "The German ambassador informs me that the Reich government would endeavour to influence Austria-Hungary to give a promise, after it has taken Belgrade and occupied Serbian border territory, not to advance further, while the Powers seek to induce Serbia to give Austria-Hungary sufficient satisfaction to make it peaceful. The Austro-Hungarian troops would, of course, only vacate Serbian territory when the The Danube Monarchy would have received full satisfaction. I suggested this yesterday as a possible means of easing the situation, and if it can be achieved, then I earnestly hope that further military preparations will be halted on all sides." Bernstein provides a somewhat different translation. The first sentence reads: "The German ambassador informs me that the German government would try to influence Austria, so that after occupying Belgrade and the Serbian border area, it would promise not to go further as long as the Powers tried to arrange it, so that Serbia would give Austria sufficient satisfaction to ensure peace for Austria." Here, the reader of Bernstein's collection learns for the first and only time that the proposal originated by Grey and accepted by Berlin and Vienna envisages a four-power conference. However, Bernstein's poor translation, "as long as the Powers tried to arrange it, etc.", makes it difficult for the reader to understand the matter correctly. Anyone who reads the following two paragraphs of the telegram will clearly see what is meant. But these two paragraphs are missing from Bernstein's message! They read: "The Russian ambassador has informed me of the condition made by Mr. Sazonov and mentioned in your telegram of July 30 (Blue Book 97); but he fears it cannot be changed. However, if the advance of the Austro-Hungarian troops is halted after they have occupied Belgrade, I believe that the proposal of the Russian Foreign Minister should be modified to the effect that the Powers should examine how Serbia could

fully satisfy Austria-Hungary without thereby relinquishing its sovereign rights and independence." p. 327 ( 347) Missing and mutilated documents. 327 Should Austria-Hungary, after occupying Belgrade and the neighboring Serbian territory, declare itself ready, in the interest of European peace, to halt its advance and negotiate the means of achieving a complete agreement, then, in my hope, Russia would also be prepared to negotiate and pause its military measures if the other powers followed the same procedure." Three modest points indicate to the reader of Bernstein's collection that something has been omitted. The final paragraph of the telegram, which states that Grey sees in his proposal only a weak, "but the only" prospect of preserving peace, has once again found favor with the stern historian Bernstein. This omission is again most strange! Consider that a very important fact emerges here, namely that a Russian proposal is pending that stands in the way of Grey's proposal, and that Grey therefore had to reckon with resistance in Petersburg. Grey therefore feels compelled to persuade Mr. Sazonov and express the hope that Russia, too, will agree to negotiate on the basis of Grey's proposal and—if the other powers do the same—to pause its military measures. Only through knowledge of the content of these two omitted paragraphs does the situation become clear to the reader: Austria and Germany agree to Grey's proposal, but Russia's consent is still missing! This was the situation in which Grey could save the peace. By forcing Russia to lower the weapon of violent resolution it had already raised against Austria and Germany and to be prepared for peaceful negotiations in accordance with his proposal. For this purpose, Grey would only have had to send to Petersburg the same declaration that Bethmann had reported to Vienna on July 29: "We must refuse to allow our allies to draw us into a world conflagration by ignoring our advice. 66 p. 328 ( 348) 328 Missing and mutilated documents. Grey failed to do this. He renounced the only means of making Russia yield. Indeed, he was responsible for the opposite. He created the certainty in Petersburg that England would be on board even if Russia did not accept that proposal. On the same day that Grey sent his mediation proposal to St. Petersburg, he also assured the French ambassador in London that if war broke out between Germany and France, England would fight on the side of the latter. This was already known in St. Petersburg that same day. This explains why the Russian government responded to Grey's "hope" of accepting the mediation proposal and pausing his military measures by giving the final extension to his mobilization order. Sazonov had the nerve to claim "that he accepted the English proposal." This was done in his telegram of July 31 (!) to the Russian ambassadors in Berlin, Vienna, London, and Rome (Orange Book 67). However, he immediately

contradicts himself by providing the following wording of his modified formula: 99 "If Austria agrees to halt the advance of its troops on Serbian territory, and if, recognizing that the Austro-Serbian conflict has assumed the character of a matter of European interest, it allows the Great Powers to examine what satisfaction Serbia can grant the Austro-Hungarian government without infringing its rights as a sovereign state and its independence, Russia undertakes to maintain its wait-and-see attitude (à conserver son attitude expectante)." If this proposal were to coincide with Grey's, Sazonov could, of course, have saved himself the trouble of finding a new formulation. Grey's formula was already there. That the new Russian proposal was something completely different from what Grey had proposed and what Bethmann and Berchtold had accepted is obvious. Sazonov simply demands that Austria cease its advance on Serbian territory. There is no longer any mention of Austria's right to continue its military action until the occupation of Belgrade and the neighboring territories. p. 329 ( 349) Missing and mutilated documents. 329 And far from conceding a cessation of its military measures, Russia only wants to commit itself to "maintaining its wait-and-see attitude." To understand what lay behind this diplomatic turn, one must consider that on the same day the official announcement of the general mobilization of the Russian armed forces on land and sea had been made! This was the response of the St. Petersburg war party to the "hope" expressed the day before by Grey that Russia would accept his mediation proposal and accordingly pause its military measures. That it turned out this way was, as already mentioned, Grey's own fault. Sazonov, Nikolai, and Co. were assured of the allegiance of the two Western powers in any case. And since they wanted war, they unleashed it as soon as the prospect of maintaining peace took shape through the acceptance of Grey's proposal by the two Central Powers. The St. Petersburg warmongers also saw the goal of their policy in jeopardy in the second path. The path of direct negotiations between Vienna and Petersburg regarding the content of the ultimatum to Serbia had also been pursued in the meantime. In contrast to the still widely held notion that this path of direct negotiations and the Four-Power Conference proposed by Grey were mutually exclusive, it should be pointed out that Grey himself, in a telegram to Goschen dated July 28 (Blue Book 67), had described the direct exchange of views between Austria and Russia as the best method of reaching an understanding; and a telegram dated July 29 to Goschen (Blue Book 84) begins with the words: "I told the German ambassador that the direct establishment of an agreement between Austria and Russia would be the best solution." The well-known telegram that Bethmann sent to Vienna on July 29 decisively promoted the willingness of

the Austrian government to pursue this path of understanding. Nevertheless, even today p. 330 ( 350) 330 Missing and mutilated documents. Even anti-German authors of the diplomatic guilt question try to conceal the fact of this influence and make the opposite claim, that Germany was the evil spirit that prevented Austria from entering into negotiations. These authors find the best help in the way Bernstein mutilates several other documents. What should one say about the following achievements?: On July 31, a telegram was sent from Grey to the British ambassador in Petersburg (Blue Book 110), the first paragraph of which reads: "I learn from the ambassador that, as a result of suggestions from the German government, a discussion took place between the Austrian Foreign Minister and the Russian ambassador in Vienna. The Austro-Hungarian ambassador in St. Petersburg was also instructed to consult with the Russian Foreign Minister and to make statements about the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia and to jointly consider proposals and questions directly affecting Russian-Austrian relations. In response to a Russian objection regarding the eight mobilized Austro-Hungarian army corps, it should be emphasized that this number was not too large compared to 400,000 Serbs. The German ambassador asked me to influence the Russian government to it shows goodwill in the negotiations and ceases its military preparations." The first three sentences of this paragraph are missing in Bernstein. The telegram begins in its edition with the words: "The German ambassador has asked me to influence the Russian government to show goodwill in the discussions and to cease its military preparations." This is followed by the two remaining paragraphs of the telegram, in which Grey expresses his satisfaction with the discussions that have begun and remarks to the German ambassador that he cannot see how Russia could be asked to cease its military preparations if Austria-Hungary does not limit the advance of its troops into Serbia. (The latter remark no longer had any factual basis due to Vienna's meanwhile announced willingness to stop in Belgrade.) p. 331 ( 351) Missing and mutilated documents. 331 The opening sentences omitted by Bernstein are a confirmation of the suggestion made by Berlin and of their practical success. Something in Bernstein rebels against this statement. So he simply omits the sentences. And what's most amazing: here he even forgoes the ellipsis! Nothing suggests to the reader that anything is missing from the official document! This extremely strange procedure could be a coincidence, a typesetter's error, or something similar. One would like to accept it in Bernstein's favor. But the worst thing is, this procedure is repeated, and in fact, in the very next document (Blue Book No. 111). It is a telegram from Grey to Goschen, which begins with the sentence: "I hope that the talks now

taking place between Austria-Hungary and Russia will lead to a satisfactory result." This sentence, too, has been completely omitted in Bernstein's work, without an ellipsis. The document begins with the second sentence, "So far, the stumbling block has been ... " One wonders, shaking one's head, whether these two lines, with their not insignificant and necessary reference to the direct negotiations for the purpose of what follows, took up too much space? Was the space so limited that not even three points could be granted as an omission? Strange, very strange! Especially since these are always matters that are not insignificant in assessing the question of guilt in favor of Germany. Finally, the crowning glory: On August 1, Grey sent a telegram to the British ambassador in Petersburg, which forms number 135 of the Blue Book. It reads: "I have been informed by the best sources that the government of Austria-Hungary has informed the German government that, despite the situation having been transformed by the mobilization of Russia, it would be prepared, in recognition of the steps taken by England in the interests of peace, to accept my proposal to Austria-Hungary and Serbia. The consequence of this assumption would, of course, be that Austria-Hungary's military action against Serbia would continue at present, and that the British government would urge the Russian government to cease its mobilization against Austria-Hungary, in which case Austria-Hungary would naturally revoke its military countermeasures in Galicia, which were imposed by the Russian mobilization. Report this to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and add that if Russia, mindful of Austria-Hungary's acceptance of the mediation proposal, could agree to cease its mobilization, it would still seem possible to maintain peace. Presumably, the matter must be discussed with both the German and Russian governments. "Here it is stated quite clearly: Austria, despite the situation aggravated by the Russian mobilization, has accepted the mediation proposal, and Grey himself concludes, "that if Russia, mindful of Austria-Hungary's acceptance of the mediation proposal, could agree to suspend its mobilization, it still seems possible to preserve peace." That was on August 1. Meanwhile, Russia had expanded its mobilization, already greatly expanded on July 29 and directed against Germany, to official total mobilization during the night of July 30-31. Germany's response to this was not, as Buchanan had predicted on July 25 (Blue Book 17), an immediate declaration of war, but a final attempt to induce Russia to withdraw the measure that must have meant the beginning of the World War. The German government had issued its ultimatum. The situation was clear, it was extremely serious, but still not irretrievably lost. The path to peaceful settlement had been found, it had been accepted by the Central Powers; the only obstacle was the Russian threat of arms. Peace could still be saved if

only Russia would agree to cease its mobilization. This is expressed most clearly in Grey's telegram. Bernstein withholds it from his readers! This is how this impartial chronicler treats the question of guilt. This is how he fulfills his sublime mission as herald of "international neutralism"! Thus, Bernstein "corrects" history. p. 333 ( 353) The Age of Franz Joseph. 333 Dr. PAUL LENSCH, M. d. R.: The Age of Franz Joseph. In a long life, he had learned to let the affairs of this world take their course. These precious words, with which Ranke characterizes the activities of Emperor Frederick III, the father of Maximilian I, one would also like to inscribe on Franz Joseph's tombstone. Indeed, the similarity between these two Habsburgs was great, however different the times in which they lived and the conditions under which they were formed. A certain, strongly pronounced tenacity, which could not be overcome even by a multitude of adversities and severe blows of fate and which they both probably inherited as a maternal inheritance, distinguished them. From Frederick's mother, Cimburga von The chronicle reports that one of Masovia's sons, Sophie of Bavaria, was able to drive nails through a board with her bare fist. The other's mother, Sophie of Bavaria, was the only man in her circle who resolutely fought against Metternich's "old man regime" and ultimately succeeded in securing the crown of the old Habsburg Empire for her firstborn. It is no coincidence that the death of the Austrian Emperor awakens memories of past centuries, since Franz Joseph himself seemed almost like an anachronism, a memory of long-vanished times and cultural periods. A whiff of the old Roman Empire of the German Nation surrounded him, and only with some difficulty could one imagine that he, too, had once begun to rule and that he, too, had predecessors in government. Austria and Franz Joseph have become synonymous concepts for today's generation, and I still remember well how years ago an Austrian party comrade explained to me that, during this emperor's lifetime, agitation for the republic would be practically impossible for the Social Democrats. Not that Franz Joseph ever set out to become popular. His cool nature was not at all suited to that. But people had been used to him for ages; they didn't know any different, and since he, like his ancestor from the 15th century, had learned over these ages to let the affairs of this world take their course, an excellent relationship had gradually developed between him and his people. Added to this was sympathy for the old man who experienced one tragedy after another in his family. Thus, in Franz Joseph, not just a person but an entire era has sunk into the grave. His life begins in the period of pre-March absolutism in Austria, which received its first shock in the revolution of 1848, and ends in the great world revolution, in the midst of which we stand and which will finally overcome that absolutism. His first political teacher was Metternich,

who gave him lectures on European politics in the winter of 1847-48 and who, at that time, had reached the pinnacle of megalomania and declared his political system to be identical with the divine world order. His last political teacher was the World War, which showed him that the "divine world order" knows no other principle than eternal change. In between lies a series of terrible upheavals in the state of which he was ruler, and which seemed to have weakened it to such an extent that this very weakness was not the final reason for the outbreak of the World War. The opponents believed they would have an easy time with the "decaying" empire. Had the internal conditions of the state and the energy of its leaders been able to create for the Danube Monarchy an armor on land and sea as strong as the one the German Empire had forged in the same period, the World War might not have broken out. But of course, here too, a historically necessary course of development was at work. Externally, the power and world position of the state that Franz Joseph inherited in 1848 were incomparably greater than the power of the state he left to his successor in 1916. At that time, Austria was the dominant power in the German Confederation. In Prussia, at the Berlin court, no one dared to entertain the sacrilegious p. 335 ( 355) The Age of Franz Joseph. 335 thoughts of old imperial power to somehow place themselves on an equal footing. Frederick William IV always felt like a kind of vassal and, in his romantic-medieval way of thinking, perceived his relationship to the emperor as that of the Elector of Brandenburg to the old Roman Emperor of the German Nation. In Italy, the old cultural provinces of Veneto and Lombardy still belonged to Austria. Everything was lost. The German Confederation collapsed, and with it the basis for Austria's position in Germany. The Italian provinces fell to the newly emerging nation-state in the south, Lombardy as early as 1859, Veneto in 1866. At that time, on February 24, 1866, Prince Cusa of Romania had been overthrown. It seemed possible to the Italian cabinet to give its territory to Austria as compensation for the Veneto ceded to Italy. However, the plan failed; no major power wanted to hear of it, and so it was decided to separate Veneto from Italy without exchange, that is, by force, through a major war. Austria. But after Romania came a Hohenzollern, whose state, like Italy, is now at war with Austria. In retrospect, one can say that the loss of the Italian provinces was a gain for Austria, and whether the acquisition of Romania, with its French bourgeoisie and Russian sympathies, would have been a real increase in power is, judging by today's experience, more than questionable. In this respect, Austria suffered much the same fate as its old enemy and new friend, Turkey, which was only able to develop its full military power once it had lost its disastrous possessions in the Balkans and fought as a purely Asian power. Thus, Austria, with half a century of

defeats and territorial losses behind it, only gained the necessary concentration to survive this monstrous war through these losses. Of course, we all know how strong the forces that oppose state concentration still are today. It is the fate of Austrian history in general that p. 336 ( 356) 336 The Age of Franz Joseph. never could a bourgeoisie develop in this country that could have provided a bond for the individual provincial masses, indeed, that could have been mobilized for the state idea and put into its service. Hardly any of the Austrian rulers thought of elevating this class socially or politically. Maria Theresa tried, but under her successors, the attempts soon died down. No Austrian city ordinance corresponded to Stein's city ordinance in Prussia. Franz Joseph did not think of anything like that either. In doing so, however, Austria deprived itself of one of the most important pillars of a great, state-wide policy for the 19th century and also inflicted wounds on the development of its intellectual life that still bleed today. In August of this year, the "Wiener Arbeiterzeitung" carried a letter from a German Bohemian who had looked around the world and had left his homeland had visited again. Bohemia is known to be the most developed industrial region of the monarchy, and if anywhere, it should be here that a vibrant bourgeoisie, conscious of its strength and secure in its future, should be seen. But the social, cultural, and state tasks of capitalism are still one of the seven world riddles for this bourgeoisie. Wavering between black-yellow excessive loyalty and black-white-red high treason, and still proudly boasting of its national kinship with the German Reich people, this bourgeoisie has never made the effort to consider what made this German Reich great and where the strength of its state organization lay. "Truly, our government could authorize the discussion of peace goals; hardly any of our politicians will know what their peace goal is. Bethmann-Hollweg will do it. There are no problems, political, state, or social problems; nothing that stirs, excites, or confuses, for calm is the citizen's first duty." The working class has, with great effort, won universal suffrage; the bourgeoisie could not ride in the saddle we placed it in. We will achieve the district division, but again there is a fear that this bourgeoisie will be incapable of filling this district division with organizational life. Therefore, the working class in Austria is interested in finally confronting a thinking, politically motivated, and goal-conscious bourgeoisie, so that our work does not have to perish again and again due to the intellectual impotence of this petty-bourgeois incompetence. And in angry patriotism, this Austrian socialist concludes: "Our state and our social development are still so deeply stuck in the forms of the feudal state because the bureaucracy is confronted by a people who are largely uneducated and who lack the free, democratic organization of political parties. War must be the teacher who

enforces the education of all classes." This, according to a certainly unobjectionable judgment in the year of Franz Joseph's death, is the intellectual character mask of the German bourgeoisie of Austria in the most developed regions of the country. What the situation is with the non-German bourgeoisies needs no further elaboration. Here we see the inescapable consequences of centuries of state infirmity. From this perspective, the age of Franz Joseph did not mark the end. On the contrary! The illness only came to light and led an apparent cycle in the infamous paragraph 14 back to the same absolutism at the end of Franz Joseph's life that the deceased had started from in the first years of his reign. Despite universal suffrage in Austria and despite the "threat" of universal suffrage in Hungary. But appearances are deceptive. In truth, Austria-Hungary is on the verge of its rebirth. In the newly emerging Central Europe, the old empire will experience its political and economic resurrection and find in it the strength to gradually overcome the thousand obstacles that still cling to it from a long, painful past. Thus, war will indeed be the teacher that enforces the education of all classes. 36/2 p. 338 ( 358) 338 We and the new Poland. Dr. LUDWIG QUESSEL, M. d. R.: LITTLE We and the new Poland. The echo that the manifesto of the two emperors on the restoration of Poland has aroused in Russia sounds very gratifying. If one examines the pronouncements of the press, the government, the Duma, one gets the impression that the announced separation of the Polish territories from the Russian state has rekindled already dying energies, so that we must expect to witness the same spectacle in 1917 as in 1915 and 1916: that is, that new Russian armies numbering millions, well equipped and abundantly supplied with ammunition, will move against our Eastern Front. Despite all this, however, one must maintain that the restoration of Poland by the Central Powers is an event that can no longer be undone. Even if the creation of an independent Polish state by the Central Powers must be accepted by all parties as an irrevocable fact, the Central Powers' manifestos have by no means settled matters to the extent that Poland's resurrection has been determined in every detail. On the contrary. The state of war alone compels us to build only the shell of the new Polish state, with the internal construction reserved for the future. Much still remains to be done. do so, so that it would by no means seem useless for the individual parties to make their opinions known to the government on the question of how they wish to restore Poland, from which one can assume that objective expressions of opinion on this subject will not be unwelcome. It is known that there were different opinions among those who advocated the separation of the Polish territories from Russia. One faction wanted nothing to do with a new Polish state and advocated the

division of the Polish territories between Austria and Prussia. The other faction saw this plan as the greatest misfortune for the Central Powers, because such a fourth partition of Poland would create two eastern Alsace-Lorraines, which would have made any assurance of peace in the East illusory for the two partitioning powers. As far as Social Democracy is concerned, there can be no doubt that restoration is more in keeping with its views than partition. We are particularly guided by the consideration that the path now pursued is preferable because Russia's territorial loss does not imply any territorial gain for the Central Powers and can therefore be more easily overcome by Russia than a partition of the Russo-Polish territories between Austria and Prussia. It seems to me of great importance for the achievement of an early peace that this fact be brought to the forefront, not only through words, which, if they were not in accordance with reality, would naturally have no effect in Russia, but through deeds. Such actions, which would demonstrate that the Central Powers do not wish to enrich themselves territorially at Russia's expense through the restoration of Poland, could significantly mitigate the bitter mood that the Central Powers' manifestos have created in Russia. Undoubtedly, Russia will be able to come to terms with the founding of the Polish state all the more easily the more the Central Powers demonstrate now that they want to create a Poland that will be truly free and independent after the war in shaping its internal and foreign policy. Such a policy of the Central Powers could also correspond to Social Democratic wishes alone, because we fundamentally believe that every state should be guaranteed its right of self-determination, even in questions of foreign policy. It is now necessary to destroy the objection raised by the right-wing parties that such a policy would be incompatible with securing Germany in the East. Let us therefore examine what separates the new Poland from Russia and what unites it with it. Probably the most important of the dividing powers standing between Russia and Poland is the living idea of a 36/2* p. 340 ( 360) 340 We and the New Poland. own Polish statehood. Although it may have been greatly weakened among the peasant population of Poland due to 100 years of membership in the Russian state, it has become a passionate passion among the Polish intelligentsia. I know from my time as a student in Zurich how strictly the Polish students separated themselves from the Russian students, even though most of them had almost perfect command of the Russian language. Since those days, as everyone who has paid attention to Polish affairs knows, the idea of the nation-state has lost none of its magic for the Poles. On the contrary, it has grown stronger and more powerful, so that even Polish socialism has not been able to escape its influence. Where the idea of Polish statehood is too

weak to create a deeper contrast to Russianness, religious antagonism sets in as a dividing force. The rural population of Poland, whether Catholic, Jewish, or Protestant, is in any case deeply imbued with its religious otherness compared to the Russians. In addition, the lower Roman Catholic clergy are the bearers of the idea of Polish statehood, a circumstance that makes it almost impossible for the Polish rural inhabitants, even if they were nationally indifferent, to view the Russians as their equals. A further dividing force is the cultural discord between Poles and Russians. Polish culture belongs to the Central European cultural sphere. However different life in Warsaw may be from that in East Germany, during my stay there in 1910 I encountered Central European cultural influences at every turn. The same impression is had by anyone who visits the Polish National Museum in Romanshorn on Lake Zurich, where Poland's glorious Central European cultural monuments have found refuge. And no greater cultural contrast is conceivable than that between Warsaw and Moscow. Culturally speaking, Warsaw is a synthesis of ancient Rome and modern Vienna; in the streets of Moscow, on the other hand, the cultural influences of Byzantium and p. 341 ( 361) We and the New Poland. 341 Peking. Nowhere is the cultural contrast between Russians and Poles more evident than in these two cities. Although the Poles differ fundamentally from the Russians in their political, religious, and cultural sensibilities, they also display many affinities with Russianness in terms of language and national temperament, which become more apparent the lower the cultural level the Pole occupies. This can be explained simply by the fact that Poles and Russians are members of the same great Slavic family of peoples. However, the sense of community is nowhere near as strongly developed among the Slavs as it is among the Latin peoples. In particular, there can be no question of Moscow being the center of Slavic culture, as Paris is the center of Latin civilization. In contrast to the Latin peoples, the racial and cultural community of the West and East Slavs is diverging. It should not be overlooked, however, that the Vistula region's 100-year affiliation with Russia created close economic ties. But the fate of the war had already torn these apart. In the last year of the war, Poland's economy was forced to orient itself westward under the relentless pressure of circumstances. Even if Poland remained with Russia, it would be highly unlikely that the Russians would allow the full restoration of Polish industry. Moscow has always resented Polish competition, and its selfish interest would certainly be sufficient after the war to prevent the resurrection of Polish export industries. One must also be careful not to overestimate the number of Polish enterprises that absolutely depend on Russia as a sales area. To the extent that Polish industry is based on the processing of raw

materials obtained domestically, such as the spirit distilleries and breweries spread throughout the country, sugar factories, coal mining, the iron industry, and the processing of wood, clay, stone, and animal products, the sales difficulties will by no means be insurmountable. It should not be overlooked, moreover, that the favorable trade position of Polish industry for sales in Russia will not be eliminated by Poland's independence. Thus, the situation is not such that Poland, if it could freely determine its foreign policy, would have to seek ties with Russia. The dangers threatening its state existence from there are too great for economic interests to prevail. Apart from the economic, however, all other factors such as national security, religion, and culture point the Poles toward Central Europe. Incidentally, a western orientation of Polish foreign policy by no means means that Poland would necessarily be an enemy of Russia after the war. This consequence would only arise from Poland's accession to the Central Powers if the latter were absolutely compelled to remain in permanent, irreconcilable hostility to Russia. But this is absolutely out of the question. If we ask whether Russia's rise to world empire over the last 100 years was achieved through conquests at the expense of Central Europe, the answer can only be no. Russia became a world empire through the internal colonization of the southern Russian steppe (Ukraine) and through the expansion of its colonial sphere of influence in Central and East Asia. This is also the reason why Russia and Germany were able to live in peace for over 100 years. Russian and Central European interests do not clash on Russian soil, nor in the Far East, but solely at the Golden Horn. From the Chancellor's speech of November 9, we know that England has assured Russia "territorial dominion over Constantinople and the Bosporus and the west bank of the Dardanelles with its hinterland." England wants to take Syria, Arabia, and Mesopotamia in order to achieve the goal set by Lord Curzon: "Cairo-Calcutta." The annexation of the German colonies in Africa is also intended to achieve the goal of "Cape Cairo" set by Cecil Rhodes. Since England has no intention of relinquishing its sphere of influence in the Far East, which encompasses nine of the 18 provinces of the gigantic Chinese empire, the English war aim of "Cape Cairo-Calcutta-Yangtze Region" includes control over the raw material and food production of the majority of Black people, whose number, according to the lowest estimates, is 600 million, according to the highest, 1,000 million. In order to win the other peoples of Europe over to these gigantic annexation plans, it was naturally necessary to hold out the prospect of Austria-Hungary as an easily conquered and divided booty. Russia could only be won over by England for the war against Germany and Austria-Hungary if it assured it "territorial control over Constantinople and the Bosporus and the west bank of the

Dardanelles with their hinterland." This much is certain: the decision over Constantinople and the Straits can only be brought about by the sword. As long as Russia still has a prospect of being able to divide Turkey with England and France, it will not refrain from war. The same applies to an even greater extent to England, which wants to bring home at least Syria, Arabia, Mesopotamia, and German East Africa as secure possessions from the world conflagration it has ignited. According to the Russian view, the English, Belgians, French, Italians, Serbs, and Romanians are now fighting, in a sense, for the division of Turkey. But what if the military developments in the Balkans make it increasingly unlikely that the Russians will achieve their goal in this war? the psychological moment will arise for our government, through cleverly calculated concessions to Russia, such as the opening of the straits to the war fleets of the riparian states of the Black Sea, to ensure that the impetus for a general peace based on mutual understanding comes from Russia. 1 More detailed information about the Yangtze region as a British sphere of influence can be found in the work of the famous East Asia expert Prof. O. Franke: "Germany and China", p. 12 ff. Prof. Salomon provides information about the British statesman Cecil Rhodes and his program of world conquest, to the realization of which he dedicated his entire fortune, in the recently published book: "British Imperialism" pp. 191-192. p. 344 ( 364) 344 We and the new Poland. That this is now only possible if Russia accepts the restoration of Poland is, of course, certain. Therefore, the achievement of an early peace depends so much on the form in which the restoration of Poland will take place. Keeping this in mind, it must be said that the Polish debate in the Prussian Landtag on November 20th did not serve the cause of peace. It is particularly regrettable, however, that Comrade Ströbel's speech was fundamentally more Polish nationalist than social democratic. For only someone rooted in extreme Polish nationalism can demand that the Prussian-Polish territories, where, as the Polish side itself admits, less than half the population speaks Polish as their mother tongue, be united with the new Kingdom of Poland. To raise such demands, which essentially trample on the right of nationality because they deny the Germans living in the Ostmark the right to their ethnicity, is to pour oil on the flames of the world war. In view of our successful advance in Romania, there is reason to hope that Russia's day of reflection will come perhaps not too far in the future. This process will be accelerated by the now dawning realization that what Russia could gain as a major European power through the conquest of Constantinople and the Straits, it would have to lose again as a major Asian power, because England, in possession of the immense masses of land from Cairo to Calcutta, would have to increase its power in Asia and could no longer maintain an

independent policy towards Russia. Apart from Turkey, however, Russian and German interests no longer intersect anywhere on the globe. Opposing Russia's policy of conquest in Central and East Asia is not ours, but England's, as is p. 345 ( 365) We from the trenches. 345 But we have little reason to look askance at internal colonization in Russia. But it was this, in conjunction with colonial expansion in the Far East, that made Russia a world empire. But Germany is, in a certain sense, even interested in maintaining the Russian world empire; it must serve us as a counterweight to the British world empire, which would inevitably fall into the hands of world domination if it no longer had to reckon with Russia in Asia. All political art and all diplomatic wisdom should therefore serve the purpose of preventing the restoration of Poland from taking place in a way that would bring about a permanent rift between Germany and Russia. FRANZ RENÉ: We from the trenches. For over two years now, we have read in the debates about our party dispute the recurring claim: We from the trenches have a very definite, firm view of the dispute, we know exactly what it is about, and when we return one day, we will settle the dispute in accordance with our program and the international congresses. For just as long, we have been reading in both the majority and minority papers, the Spartacus Group, the Bremen and Dessau factions, that we in the trenches are entirely of their opinion. Field post letters are supposed to prove this on both sides, and for every field post letter that approves of the "policy of August 4th," there are supposedly three others that prove the opposite. At the various conferences of the Party Committee, the local organizations, and most recently at the National Conference, whose reports I read as a wounded man in the hospital, field post letters are produced that supposedly vindicate one or the other faction within the party. And promptly followed each time by the assertion: You see, those in the trenches , those at the front, they agree with us, they completely agree with us. I believe that we are greatly overrated. Very much so! I don't even believe the "countless" field post letters whose authors vent their opinions on the party dispute in one way or another. I believe that, despite the millions in the field, the number of those out at the front expressing their opinion in letters about the controversy surrounding Kautsky, Haase, Bernstein, David, Haenisch, and so on, is damned small. Certainly far smaller than the constant repetition of the argument about the view of "those in the trenches" would suggest. I believe I have some evidence for this. In fact, in about fifteen months, I have come into close contact with many thousands of comrades in the garrison and in the field. Very close contact, indeed, most recently in field hospitals and at home. I have had hundreds of opportunities to see at close quarters what my

comrades write. Indeed, for months I have had to write not only the "reports" but very frequently also their private and other letters for those of my comrades closest to me, namely my corporal rank, because most of them have difficulty handling ink and pen. And especially in some hospitals, I had many opportunities to conduct private correspondence for wounded comrades who, because of their wounds or because they were seriously ill and had to stay in bed, to their parents, fiancées, and friends. They placed their complete trust in me. But I didn't meet a single one who took a position in their letters on the controversy surrounding the question of August 4th, etc. Not that one could say they were perhaps embarrassed to let me in on it! No, they all knew perfectly well that I was a Social Democrat; they read my party papers and often sought my advice, discussed party issues with me, and also saw that their superiors knew me as a "Red." No, if they had let me look into their most intimate private correspondence, they would certainly not have been embarrassed to let me know their political views. I also became acquainted with most of the letters these comrades received from home, just as out in the field one comrade very often lets another take part in what is written to them. Many read out whole passages from their letters to their comrades, and these letters, particularly if they are about or come from comrades on other fronts or in other theaters of war, often pass from hand to hand within the corporalship or group. Even in these letters, very little was said about anything relating to our party dispute. Certainly: Dissatisfied p. 347 ( 367) We from the trenches. 347 were the letter writers on both sides, in the field and behind the front, all of them! Many letters complained about the state of the party and how they were "up to their necks in this shit"—a phrase that was constantly recurring in all incoming and outgoing letters. However, only very rarely did one see or hear of letters in which the sender or recipient went into more detail about what had filled our party papers for the past two years. And even where the "perseverers" were vehemently criticized, where the drastic comments were made that "the whole thing" wouldn't have happened if the party had voted differently on August 4th, even then the conclusion was usually: But what can we do? Since the war was already there, we couldn't abandon the country, or: better still, the faction voted in such a way that we now have enemies in the country. (For the fact that the war is being fought abroad and not on German soil, that the fury of war is destroying enemy and non-German territory, is a tremendous relief for everyone, for supporters of the majority as well as the minority.) - No, no, I can't believe the many field post letters. In general, unfortunately, our comrades abroad aren't very interested in the party dispute. Not even the organized party members in their colorful coats and

field uniforms care much about the dispute! Not to mention the mass of the indifferent. The debates mostly only express dissatisfaction that the party wasn't strong enough to prevent the war and now doesn't have enough influence to shorten it. And above all: people are outraged at the way the French and English comrades are behaving "internationally"! The stupid chauvinism in Paris and London offers recurring material for indignation or contemptuous hilarity in these debates. But debates about the questions of whether any resolution of a previous Party Congress is to be interpreted this way or that, whether Kautsky was right in 1912, 1913, 1914, or 1915/16, whether this or that statement or action of a majority or minority representative is in harmony with this or that sentence of a time-honored Party Congress resolution—I have never heard a word about all of this, neither in the field, nor in the garrison, nor in the hospitals! Yet that would still be bearable. But I have also had to make much more deplorable observations: Just as it is little true what chauvinists have often claimed, that almost every German p. 348 ( 368) 348 We from the trenches. Soldier carries "Faust" or "Zarathustra" around with him in his pocket, it is unfortunately not true that every German Social Democrat in the field or in the garrison or in the hospital or in the convalescent home reads his party newspaper. This is a particularly sad chapter. While I was in the garrison, I often had the opportunity to help with distribution in the post office. For months, I was the only one of the 360 men in our company who held a Social Democratic newspaper! Despite careful observation, I was unable to find a comrade who could lend me a party newspaper from his constituency. Indeed, the custom of having the newspaper sent to them free of charge from the publisher, which was still common at the time, was not even practiced. Even the few wives of our comrades who continued to read party papers did not consider it necessary to send them to their husbands in the barracks. And when one asked those comrades who admitted to being socialists in conversation why they didn't read their party paper or their union newspaper, one usually received only a shrug of the shoulders. In the field, where people read a great deal and very eagerly whenever the opportunity arises, things were somewhat better. Besides me, there were two other comrades in our company who had the "Social Democratic Field Post" delivered to them, which costs nothing. There were also three comrades from the Erzgebirge who had their Chemnitz "Volksstimme" forwarded to them daily and eagerly gave it to the other comrades to read. But that was all! Of those who occasionally admitted in conversations that they were supporters of the sharper and sharpest tone, or expressed their sympathy for the left wing, not a single one dared to have their "radical" party paper sent to them! Indeed,

some of them were perfectly content with their wives sending them the bourgeois local paper! And they continued to do so, even when this inconsistency was pointed out to them. They kept coming back and read my "Vorwärts," my local party newspaper, and the other workers' papers that I regularly received. They at least read what I highlighted in blue and particularly recommended to them, but they couldn't bring themselves to maintain their own "radical" party paper! Incidentally, I also saw in our subsidiary companies that only very, very few party papers were read there, perhaps four to six at most. And strangely enough, only papers of the majority! No matter how much I searched around in the quarters where we were stationed with foreign troops, I was unable to find a single issue of the "Bremer Bürgerzeitung" or the "Vorwärts," the "Braunschweiger Volksfreund," the "Leipziger Volkszeitung," or any other To get a minority newspaper. Where I distributed my papers, a few party comrades soon gathered, read them, and discussed them with me. But the constantly repeated question, "Why don't you read your paper regularly? It costs nothing and is allowed everywhere?" was answered with an ambiguous shrug. Or the answer born of fear or error: "It could cause us problems," or "The sergeant major won't allow it," or "It could cause inconvenience," etc. - How is it always with that? As far as my observations go, and I have always kept my eyes open in this regard and paid particular attention everywhere, I have not come across a single case of objection to Social Democratic reading material in the army. My party papers and those of the few comrades who also had them always arrived under cross-bandage printed with the sender's company name. So, if anyone wanted to know what kind of papers these were, they could have easily and conveniently found out "up top." But who cares about it? Who actually gets their hands on their comrades' mail? Only comrades! I have never seen a superior officer poke their nose into the mailroom, or even into the mailbags in the field. Distribution is done by comrades, by privates, but never by superior officers. In the garrison, in the field, and in the hospitals. The superior officers are very happy that they don't have to worry about these things. And if they actually find out? Even then, nothing happens. In my garrison, and especially in the hospitals where I was sometimes incarcerated for weeks, every noncommissioned officer and every sergeant, even the captain, knew that I not only regularly received Social Democratic papers, but also that I occasionally wrote for them, yes, that I even wrote here and there about events in the barracks, etc. But I found only lively interest from them, no disapproval whatsoever. And not once was my service made more difficult because of it—quite the opposite! It often happened that superiors jokingly said to other superiors, in my presence and that of my

comrades: "Be careful, otherwise that red journalist will make it into the newspapers!" And my superiors also knew that I was passing the party papers on to my other comrades. In many cases, even these superiors asked me for the papers, and for a while, I regularly displayed them in the NCOs' room. So, I didn't notice any "inconveniences" due to my holding Social Democratic papers, and I didn't know of a single case in other companies. Of course, I don't mean to imply that there are only such superiors; certainly, here and there, an overzealous individual may have looked askance at the workers' paper or even banned it. But I believe I can say, and say it based on my experience, that these were certainly only exceptions, exceptions that would surely have been remedied immediately upon complaint. But that's usually where the problem lies: Most people don't even dare to file a complaint, even though the time has long since passed when one could have been "snubbed" at the enlisted man for making a complaint. A particularly blatant example of how even party comrades show little courage occurred to me every time people lined up for church or when a field service was announced. Besides me, there were at least a few comrades among us who, like me, had left the regional church. But not a single one stepped forward and asked for a dispensation. It only cost me a few polite words each time: "I request dispensation from church attendance." "Why?" "I'm a dissident, Sergeant." "Fine, excused," was the reply. But in all those months, I wasn't able to persuade a single comrade to join in. These "radicals" preferred to accept the tedious preparations of cleaning, roll call, the loss of time itself, sometimes even accepted sermons, which they were subsequently quite annoyed about, and were also quite annoyed that I was allowed to go for walks, read, or laze around during those hours—but they never dared to step forward. This resulted in the sergeant in the field, when we sometimes got new superiors, and I would get the answer: "Well, you're getting a special treatment again." But I did get time off for that. Item: One shouldn't think too highly of us from the trenches. In many cases, we are not at all what you optimistically assume. And when we come back one day, just don't think that we have the desire or inclination to take part in certain hair-splitting about certain sentences in previous resolutions. Whether it was right to approve the credits three times and then stop, R p. 351 ( 371) Wassily Kandinsky. 351 - just at the moment when the enemy offensive began on all fronts - the brave home warriors behind the front can rack their bomb-proof little heads over that. In any case, we hope that the time after the war will be too precious to pursue this thread any further. Whether it was right of Kautsky to allow the Japanese comrades to stand up for their war credits and to resent the German faction for it - that will hopefully no longer concern us after the

war. There is already far, far less interest in it than is generally believed! Dr. JOHN SCHIKOWSKI: THE - Wassily Kandinsky. The Russian art writer Alexander Benois claims of the artists of his homeland that they are all "sick with Oblomoffism" and characterized by "terrifying laziness." Whether this accusation is justified, I cannot judge, as I lack the necessary knowledge of the individuals. In any case, the outsider is forced to observe that the Slavic phlegm, if it truly is a characteristic feature of Russian artists, is accompanied and balanced by an at least equally characteristic restless zeal for innovation. Otherwise, there is no explanation for the fact that wherever upheavals take place in the field of European art, we see Russian poets and artists at the forefront of the movement. In literary naturalism, Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky were pioneering and exemplary figures whose names formed the battle cry of the young generation of fighters of that time. And Russia has also contributed a very significant part of the ferment to the latest artistic revolution, which is summarized under the name "Expressionism." Marc Chagall already enjoys a European reputation as one of the strongest painterly geniuses and as the most profound and impressive herald of the Russian national soul. The most remarkable and, in some respects, most significant personality among young Russian artists, however, is Wassily Kandinsky, the most consistent representative of Expressionism, the pathfinder and prophet of "pure painting." p. 352 ( 372) 352 Wassily Kandinsky. Kandinsky, who was born in Moscow in 1866, did not devote himself to painting until he was in his thirties. He received his technical training in Munich, and even with the first works he exhibited in public, he attracted attention and acclaim. The unusual, highly original color scheme of his pictures and the strange technique, which made the painting appear as if composed of individual, larger and smaller mosaic tiles, were so memorable that even the layperson who had once seen a Kandinsky painting would remember the artist's touch. Had he continued his development along this path, he would quickly have become a made man, but art would not have benefited much from him. Fortunately, however, he did not suffer from Oblomoffism; rather, he constantly strove beyond his achieved level toward higher goals. His rise proceeded with conscious consistency, for Kandinsky is one of those artists who do not surrender themselves to the blind course of their development in a genius-like manner, but rather seek to understand each step intellectually and concentrate on their clearly recognized goal. But what was this goal? He theoretically founded and developed it in "The Blue Rider," which he edited with the recently fallen Franz Marc, in his essay "On the Spiritual in Art," and in the "Kandinsky Album" published by Sturm Verlag. The task of art, very generally speaking, is to express and evoke

certain feelings, sensations, and moods. Every art form has specific means at its disposal for this purpose. Poetry uses words, music tone, sculpture form, and painting line and color. The painter who reproduces any external natural model, a landscape, a human body, and the like, thus takes a detour to achieve his goal. He does not allow the lines and colors to speak directly and immediately to the viewer, but rather forces them to first serve an alien purpose, namely the imitation of the natural object, and only then, through this means, to strive toward the true goal. Impressionism had already recognized that all "narration" in the visual arts was evil and to be rejected on principle. It directed its accusations p. 353 ( 373) Wassily Kandinsky. 353 primarily against genre painting, which was popular at the time and whose main appeal lay not in the actual painterly work of art, but in the literary content, in the anecdote that the painting told the viewer. Impressionism, however, had not been consistent. Logically, it should have rejected not only genre painting, but also landscape, portrait, and still-life painting—in fact, any painting that sought to depict any natural object. For if "narration" is frowned upon, then so must "description" be as well; one is no more literary than the other. Every painterly representation of a natural object is essentially nothing more than a description of it, and strictly speaking, it contradicts the very purpose of painting, whose goal is precisely to evoke a specific feeling in the viewer through color and line. Kandinsky's endeavor was and is directed toward purifying painting of all extraneous accessories and limiting it exclusively to its inherent means: color and line. Thus, the much-discussed "Improvisations" and "Compositions" of his most recent period, from about 1910 onward, emerged; they no longer depict anything objective, but rather speak to the viewer only with irregularly outlined colored surfaces, lines, hatching, and dots. This artistic language is entirely new, completely unfamiliar to us, and one we must first learn. For the public of our time, which was educated by Impressionism, observes and appreciates in a painterly work almost exclusively the degree of external fidelity to nature achieved at any given time and possesses hardly a trace of understanding for the pure expressive values of color and line. And even the professional art critics, sworn to naturalism, are mostly helpless in the face of Kandinsky's work and seek, for the time being, to eliminate the uncomfortable innovator by utter silence. But among the youngest generation of painters, he is finding more and more followers, and it is interesting to observe how unprepared, artistically receptive laypeople are deeply moved and shaken by his works. Kandinsky then attempted to extend the theory of the elimination of all representational elements to the other arts, and especially to stage art. Here, too, he rejects any external 36/3 p.

354 ( 374) 354 Wassily Kandinsky. process radically and allows only the three pure means of music, color, and physical-mental sound expressed by people or objects to become effective. A brief description of the first scene of Kandinsky's stage composition, "The Yellow Sound," will give the reader a clearer idea of the nature of this new art than theoretical explanations can. In the background of the very deep stage we see a broad green hill, and behind it a dull, blue curtain. Soon the music begins, first in high registers, then quickly moving to lower ones. At the same time, the background turns dark blue (simultaneously with the fading of the music) and acquires broad black borders. Behind the stage, a wordless choir can be heard, sounding devoid of emotion, wooden and mechanical. After the singing ends, there is a general pause: no movement, no sound. Then darkness. Then the scene is illuminated. From the right and left, five bright yellow giants float in above the floor. They remain standing next to each other at the very back, some with raised shoulders, some with low ones, with strange, yellow, indistinct faces. They slowly turn their heads toward each other and make simple movements with their arms. The music becomes more definite, and soon one hears the deep, wordless singing of the giants. They slowly approach the stage. Quickly from the left and right, red, indistinct beings, reminiscent of birds and with large, somewhat human-like heads, fly. Their flight is reflected in the music. The giants sing ever more quietly and become ever more indistinct. The hill in the background slowly grows and becomes lighter. In the end, it is white. The sky turns completely black. Behind the stage, the wooden choir becomes visible. The giants can no longer be heard. The front stage turns blue and increasingly opaque. The orchestra fights with the choir and defeats it. A thick blue haze makes the entire stage invisible. As one can see, here too, the strange Russian has opened up and trodden entirely new paths—paths that not many are able to follow today, but which, if all is not deceptive, will lead to the great Gesamtkunstwerk that the spirit of our time strives for. p. 355 ( 375) Glosses. 355 To critically examine Kandinsky's creations in detail does not seem appropriate to me at present. For the significance of this artist lies less in what he can do and has actually achieved than in what he wants and strives for. In Kandinsky's will, the will of the entire young generation of artists found its most resolute and clearest expression. Anyone who judges these efforts as extravagant artistic whims and temporary fashion follies should note that the aesthetic upheavals taking place in the name of Expressionism have already begun their work among all civilized nations, that they began almost simultaneously and independently of one another, and that new bands of followers from among the youngest generation are flocking to them daily. Whatever one's attitude

toward them, in any case, they must be taken seriously . For the artistic will expressed in these works and theoretical manifestos is rooted in the entire spirit that dominates the young generation, in a spirit that is paving the way for the fundamental overthrow of the rationalist and scientific era that began with the Renaissance and reached its most perfect artistic expression in naturalistic Impressionism. All signs point to the fact that this is not just an artistic revolution, but something much greater, namely the birth pangs of a new worldview that will dominate civilized humanity. These modern longings, which turn away from all outward appearances and penetrate into the inner essence of things, show manifold similarities with the tendencies that became apparent at the fall of the ancient world in the emergence of early Christian art, and the question arises whether these modern artists, like prophetic petrels, are not perhaps announcing to civilized peoples the approach of a new world change. Glosses. Political Characters. RABE VON PAPPENHEIM. In this great, strong man, none of the scruples of the small, delicate Heydebrand can be seen. He has remained the ruthless Junker of yesteryear. Age has indeed softened his manner, 36/3* p. 356 ( 376) 356 aossen. And his successor does not look as uncomfortable and fanatical in making the closing motion as the late Arnim-Züsedom. But he, who once introduced the beautiful word "Bengel" as a collegial term, is not concerned today with drastically demonstrating his feelings to the opposition, and when he speaks, he likes to turn his broad back on the Left. The Chamberlain sits in Hesse, but he exudes the East Elbian spirit, and he will not be able to find his way into a time when, according to the words of a very important German, the Reich cannot be governed like an East Elbian province. We don't hate the gnarled man at all, we hardly get annoyed with him anymore, we know his era is over, just like that of Jordan von Kröcher, sleeping broadly and comfortably behind him with his head bowed, or of the tall Count von der Gröben. About the masses. There are certain things that everyone knows, about which everyone agrees, and which no one but a socialist is allowed to utter. Among these things is the truth about the nature of the masses. Anyone who wanted to avoid incursions into countless peppery curses had to, as a socialist, praise the masses as the epitome of all political wisdom, all judgment, all intelligence; they had to praise them as infallible, like a god. --- - The willingness to do so diminished with age and experience in the individual. Those who had gained a certain amount of experience and had some scruples about speaking against their own honest convictions respectfully kept silent on this point, listened to the praises of the masses, and thought their own thoughts. Even as a socialist, one was allowed to! - sometimes sing and say of the "lack of understanding of the masses," but

the indispensable condition was that in such a case one meant only the mass of others; those present, that is, the masses of party comrades, were, of course, strictly excluded. Once and for all! That's how it was. And that's why it could have only a very bad ending for our now-resting friend Adof von Elm when, seven years ago now, he dared to speak to Hamburg trade unionists about masses and leaders, instilling some quietly cautious doubts about the godlike nature of the masses. What followed was outrage. An outrage of goodwill. Everything flows. That's why we shouldn't have been too surprised when the "Vorwärts" (and indeed the old "Vorwärts" as it was before the big sweep on Lindenstrasse!) recently declared that it was not possible for the mass of comrades to understand all the paths and features of political To understand life and weaving. I forbid any doubt: that was still in the old "Vorwärts"! p. 357 ( 377) Glosses. 357 We will not brood over why the "Vorwärts" has come to such a sigh. The hard bread of the minority tastes bitter and takes away some of the embarrassing taste of bitter truths. We always want to rejoice in the truth, even when it comes from an unusual source. But seriously, in complete seriousness, speaking about this question: do we not want to finally speak the truth about the characteristics of the masses? Even if this speaking out is something like a confession? Why should our masses be so towering above the general mass? Certainly, they have found their way to us and have thus taken a decisive step. But where are the real masses in our organizations? In about 80 constituencies, we have fewer than 50 members in our associations today. They constitute perhaps one percent of the adult population there. In Berlin, even more so in Hamburg, perhaps also in Leipzig, we really had something approaching "masses." But, good God, let's not fool ourselves; we know what coincidences play a role in whether someone is politically organized or unorganized! Job and residence, meeting place are often far more decisive than conviction or political maturity. And what about the expression of will even among these masses! Of approximately 400 members of an electoral district, 30, at most 40, come, or in peacetime came, to pay evening or district evening! It's no use; one must speak these truths about the masses. Why should we keep them quiet? To keep a bogeyman alive even longer? One appeals to the compact majorities who, here and there, have decided for the minority, indeed for the Spartacist principles. Well, there are religious sects in Hamburg. There are probably them everywhere. I know the beliefs of one of these sects by chance, because my caretaker is a first-time brethren in it and once wanted to convert me. They contain, for example,—but I don't want to describe them, because they are, of course, so naive that there's no need to talk about them. Well, these sects recently held a large "day" in June, at which

more than 2,000 of their followers gathered. It looked quite mass-like, and I believe the first brothers of this sect were very proud and saw in the mass of their believers the unmistakable proof of the truth of their obscurities. Isn't there in this phenomenon a trait related to our own admiration of masses? Let us finally be clear about the nature of the mass. It is not easy—we all know that who have to study the masses and their utterances. Above all, the mass has one thing in common: straightforwardness and simplicity of thought. But these are the result of the wonderful complexity of every large mass. Thousands fill the hall; for the speaker, a sum of heads, which he selects according to his personal experiences. experiences. But the thousands are just as many individuals, all different in the disposition and development of their inner lives. Yet there is no room, no task, for the peculiarities of the individual. He can only act, think, and feel with the thousands. And so, from the fact of the mass, a typified way of thinking arises. It is of no use to the individual to go his own way; he is, after all, a member of the thousand-headed mass and must always give space to the question: What do the others think? Thus, the thinking and judgment of the mass grows from below: dominance falls to the thought that most can grasp. Within the framework of this simplicity, the judgment of the mass is strong, just, great; unerring in the sense of the dominant idea. Outside of this framework, the thinking of the mass resembles that of a child. Where it is a matter of evaluating relativities, where complicated tactical questions must be decided, where new concepts must be formed and appreciated, the mass fails and must fail. It is not guilt, it is fate. We never want to deal with this. accept it, but always strive to overcome it, even if it takes our breath away. But we will no longer deny it. And now that "Vorwärts" has recognized it, the rest of us may do so without danger. Albus. Stories of a Grenade Driver. The art of storytelling has so far profited less from the World War than poetry, although novelists have not been lazy since August 4th. Not at all! The inundation of war stories in the past twenty-eight months has not been inferior to the flood of verse. But while a few weighty volumes of verse could at least be salvaged from the streams of poetry, precious little of lasting value can be found among the collected war narratives. The explanation is obvious: the storytellers who stayed at home lack direct experience (which can perhaps be replaced later by historical understanding), while those who went into the field lack distance from the material. Therefore, the soldier's novellas that have so far seen the light of day in the typesetters' rooms have, at best, depicted good battle scenes, trench episodes, field-gray life with authentic colors. But in ninety-nine out of a hundred descriptions, the lasting thread was missing, the distillation of the particular from the general

occurrences, of the symbols of life from the dance of death, in short: the supposedly necessary distance of time between great external events and inner clarification. The supposedly necessary distance! For that this law need not apply to every poet's temperament, that someone can stand in the midst of the conflagration and yet describe mighty field-gray experiences as if from long-clarified memories, is proven by a volume just published by Kaden & Co.: Trümmer, Geschichten by Edgar Hahnewald. (Gift edition 1.30 marks, well-covered 90 pfennigs) Apart from the remarkably confident technique for a first work, the simple yet vivid language, the broadly gripping presentation, one thing is particularly striking about these ten war stories: the naive, unspoiled perspective with which real, bloodiest reality is constantly seen like an enraptured dream image. -- Although Hahnewald (a socialist editor before August 4th) rode his column horse for two years across so many battlefields and is currently crouching in some dugout in the Russian soil where he begins to describe them, everything great and small of this blood-soaked life merges into a unity whose lasting lines emerge sharply as if from the distant past. If one puts the book down, the rattling of the columns, the concert of cannons, fade away, and the experience remains of the fates of humans and animals that reach far beyond the roar of war. "Backgrounds grow into infinity," says Hermann Wendel in his warm foreword, "everything becomes a deepest symbol." In "Rubble," the war is reflected as it is felt, despite the immediacy of experience, by a poet who, in his profound socialist sensibility, brings with him the distance from the milieu of the battlefield that is desirable for the epic poet. Therefore, the book will one day be among the lasting war poems, namely those felt with the heart and written with passion. Robert Grötzsch. "Jungvolk" 1917. The well-known and popular almanac for working youth (published by the Central Office for Working Youth in Germany, published by the Vorwärts bookstore in Berlin, price for youth committees 25 Pf., otherwise 50 Pf.) has been published again. Externally and internally, the beautifully designed little book presents itself in an appealing guise and compiled with commendable skill. Poems and stories provide stimulating entertainment. Popularly written essays offer instruction in the fields of art, science, and politics. In addition, good, serious yet cheerful illustrations enliven the text. Thus, the Jungvolk Almanac once again combines all the advantages that allow it to claim the designation of a good folk book in the best sense of the word. Jürgen Brand introduces the pretty, handy calendar with a poem entitled "Loyalty": in it, he calls on his readers to continue to work faithfully for the aspirations of young workers. Karl Bröger, Max Barthel, and others have also contributed gripping and sonorous verses to the content of this attractive little book. With glosses. The essays

by Max Peters ("The Working Youth in the War Year 1916") and W. Sollmann ("Wanderkleid und Wanderzeit") deal with 360 events and information that are of particular interest to the youth movement. Edmund Fischer then chats about the "Reichstag now and in the past." Quite contemporary are the articles by Ernst Däumig, "Sepoys and Sovars in the People's War," and Max Sachs, "From the History of World Trade." Franz Diederich (he deals with the humorous illustrator Max Wilke) and Adolf Behm ("The Pyramids") lead us into the realm of the arts with their stimulatingly written contributions . Heinrich Schulz provides a thorough, concise review of the events of the World War during the last reporting year. Fritz Müller, Timm Kröger and Helene Hanna Kühn are represented with stories, whose deeply felt urban story "Peter's Spring", which tells of the joys and sorrows of a young typesetter's apprentice, will certainly appeal to many young readers. Also quite interesting is an old calendar excavation by the almanac compiler, which talks about "The Chinese War and Fasting Schools." We have already spoken of the carefully selected, good-quality images; however, we would like to draw special attention to the illustrations and redrawings by Ilse Schütze-Schur, which are directly adapted to the text and whose lively style is perfectly attuned to the fresh tone of the Jungvolk booklet. LL ARTUR ZICKLER: Once... One day there will be peace, and millions of dear figures will work and manage their daily tasks as before, will grasp the wonders of their homeland with joyful eyes. If the night still has a secret gaze, a terrifying memory of images full of horror, the day will be as beautiful as a fairy tale! In the spring wind of humanity, our experiences will blow away like chaff, from the ruins a better world will arise, where we had, will love those who come, then nothing will remain to mankind of our Horror and our disgust, as a portent of yellowing chronicles... an evil legend in the book of time. p. 361 ( 381) DIE GLOCKE 37th Issue December 9, 1916 2nd Year. Reprint of all articles with detailed source references permitted. HEINRICH CUNOW: THE World Revolution. The question of whether the current World War can be considered a revolutionary factor appears not only pointless, but downright naive in view of the enormous transformations it has brought about in the political and economic life of the peoples involved during its course—upheavals that, under normal peacetime conditions, would undoubtedly have taken decades to mature. Nevertheless, this revolutionary effect of the gigantic struggle between the major European states is repeatedly denied, and the war is viewed merely as a retarding factor that blindly delayed cultural development by several decades. or, as others claim, thrown back half a century. Strangely enough, those proponents of a fantastic prophecy today see in the war a mere "conservative element" who,

with formerly optimistic minds, wanted to see in almost every favorable election result or international congress resolution a "milestone of the movement," a "new epoch of development," or even a "world turning point," and despite the regular non-compliance of their prophecies, announced new social revolutions every few years. 99 Even at the beginning of the war, some of these people, based on their thorough theoretical studies, were firmly convinced that after just a few months the capitalist economy would collapse in a world crash, and that out of the chaotic twilight of capitalism, the 37/1 p. 362 ( 382) 362 world revolution. new socialist society would rise; however, the more this strong belief was contradicted by the facts during the war, the more it shifted into the pessimistic view that the World War was an anti-revolutionary factor that would leave behind only misery, suffering, and exhaustion, and that after its disappearance, development would have to resume where it had been decades ago. Psychologically, this change is entirely understandable, just as understandable as the other fact that precisely those who, before the war, had often spun themselves into the most beautiful illusions of the future, still desperately try to cling to these illusions and, when the merciless course of events finally tears this illusory support from them, collapse spiritually. The fate of Friedrich Adler offers a sad example of this. Anyone who, in his study, has, out of a prophetic spirit, precisely calculated the world situation on the day before and after the revolution, as well as the means of power to be used in this situation, will naturally be only too easily inclined to believe that development will take entirely different, less smooth paths. The extent to which some commonplace socialist theorists have encapsulated themselves in certain ideas of development and regard all processes that deviate from their directional scheme of progress as "retrograde," "reactionary," or "conservative" is clearly demonstrated by an article recently published in the Italian "Vorwärts" (Avanti) by his well-known theoretical collaborator, "All Right." He seriously denies the current war any revolutionary effect because, in the parliamentary-governed warring states, the parliaments have partially lost their power to the governments, because racial hatred is intensified by war, because it also brings individual parts of the states concerned under foreign domination, and because the tendency toward an arms race could be strengthened. A truly comical line of reasoning, which, while it does nothing to deny the revolutionary effect of today's war, certainly p. 363 ( 383) World Revolution. 363, however, proves how limited the sociological and historical knowledge of so many socialist theorists, who are heavily infected by English pacifism, is. If these characteristics are to be considered decisive for whether a war can be viewed as a revolutionary factor, then there have hardly ever

been wars with a revolutionary effect in world history; then the Revolutionary Wars of the French Convention in 1792/95 were also the "most conservative events imaginable," for they too had the consequence of increasing the power of the government at the expense of parliament—individual committees, such as the Committee of Public Safety and Security, attained almost dictatorial power, racial hatred was stoked, and countries were torn apart and annexed. It is strange, however, that the theorizing comrade "All Right" also claims to be a Marxist, an interpreter of the same Marx who saw not only the French Convention Wars, but also the Russo-Turkish War of 1854 as an eminent revolutionary factor, and who expected from it a similar revolutionary influence on Europe as the French Revolutionary events of 1792 had brought about. He further agreed with Engels that even the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 would have a strong revolutionary effect on the fate of Central Europe (cf. the "Correspondence between Friedrich Engels and Karl Marx," Volume III, p. 336 ff.). Yet perhaps—who can know—Mr. "All Right" is of the opinion that the current world war will not intervene nearly as deeply in the economic and political life of Europe as the war of 1866. Certainly, the current war demands immense blood sacrifices, certainly it has brought misery and suffering to millions, certainly it is destroying enormous assets that could have been more usefully applied to the spiritual and material upliftment of the masses, and furthermore, it will undoubtedly leave all belligerent states with a severe exhaustion, which they will probably all have to bear long after the conclusion of peace. - 37/1 p. 364 ( 384) 364 World Revolution. - Nevertheless, it is evidence of more than mere shortsightedness to overlook the revolutionary repercussions of today's war on all living conditions because of such harmful consequences and to disregard the tremendous impulse that it gives to social development. Already today, it has turned the entire economic machinery upside down in the warring countries and beyond, dismantled old branches of industry, promoted new ones, and promoted industrial technology in many ways. At the same time, it has torn down outdated views and dogmas, brought about new insights and institutions, thrown the entire government apparatus into disarray, forced numerous state interventions in the so-called free play of forces, and helped laws such as the German Civil Service Act to break through. And yet we are only at the beginning of this great process of upheaval. The true consequences of the war will only become apparent later, when it comes to cleaning up, reordering, and reorganizing. For the most part, war does not yet create revolutionary development itself, but rather the new foundations for this development. To what extent, hardly imaginable at the beginning of the war, for example, has the so-called shift in the economic

machinery changed the property and class stratification? Germany in particular. The once leisurely commercial middle class has been deeply degraded in some areas. In its place, a new bourgeoisie with different lifestyles and different traditions has emerged, which has grown out of war industrialists, suppliers, and speculators. The enormous increase in the price of agricultural products has considerably shifted the economic power relations of large rural landowners towards large-scale industry, and not only will their situation be different after the end of the war, but that of the large and medium-sized peasants has also become considerably more favorable, which has simultaneously intensified their opposition to the allotment farmers and agricultural workers. On the other hand, a section of the so-called liberal and learned professions, the middle and lower civil service, sees itself degraded in its position in life and, embittered by the prevailing egoistic acquisitiveness and Food price gouging has gained a fundamentally different position vis-à-vis the business bourgeoisie and the socialist working class than before. And the working class itself? Here, too, we find that individual categories of workers employed in war industries have risen to a certain level of prosperity, while others have been pushed far below the employment level they occupied before the war by the war conditions. Everywhere, a shift in the class situation, an intensification of conflicting interests. And this process should remain without influence on political life? Likewise, the war has paralyzed certain branches of industry, but forced others to undergo a school of technical transformation and modern mass production, which has greatly increased their productivity and competitiveness compared to foreign countries. Activity in German laboratories and experimental workshops has by no means come to a standstill; rather, the urgent task of creating substitutes for many raw and auxiliary materials that cannot currently be imported from abroad, of utilizing existing means of production The desire to utilize resources more efficiently and to adapt production methods to the demands of war has already given rise to a long series of the most diverse technical inventions and improvements. The technical development of shipbuilding, brought about by the war and typical of the production of merchant submarines, is only one example of this development process. The war, with its increased demands, forced industrial production to switch modes, and this in turn necessitated changes in production technology. Many companies found themselves compelled to begin manufacturing entirely new items; but even where factories remained active within their old branches, they often found themselves, in order to meet the demands placed on them, driven to place their main emphasis on the production of certain specialized items, which

they had perhaps previously only manufactured incidentally. Even such limited partial switching within the same industry was, however, usually only possible through modification of the manufacturing facilities, reconstruction or new acquisition of machinery, in short, through a change in the technical equipment and its more intensive utilization. With this industrial transformation, the tendency toward industrial concentration, cartelization, and trust formation has also increased, especially since the high profits achieved by some war industry enterprises have provided the necessary capital for the acquisition and integration of smaller enterprises. And in addition to the industrial ones, large coalitions of interests will probably emerge soon after the end of the war in shipping, and perhaps also in export trade, in order to recapture the foreign traffic and sales territory occupied by foreign shipping and trading companies in the meantime, and not to be hindered in these efforts to regain control by counter-moves and undercutting by competing enterprises in the country itself. However, after the war, large financial capital will play the most important role. Today Even though most industrial concentration and merger projects originate from the respective branches of industry themselves, and the former debt relationship of many large industrial enterprises to the banks has changed due to the abundant operating surpluses so that these enterprises now have exceptionally high deposits with the banks, this entire process of reconversion, concentration, and expansion will not be possible at all unless the banks step in with large loans. As is well known, several of the large interest groups currently being implemented, such as the Hamburg-Bremen Shipping Pool currently being developed, are already seeking close ties with bank finance. The current interweaving of industrial capital with finance capital will therefore become even closer and firmer. Moreover, The major banks are tasked with issuing new bonds for the Reich, the individual federal states and municipalities, placing these new bonds as well as a portion of the existing German war bond assets abroad if possible, and furthermore selling off foreign securities still in German hands there in order to create new funds for them, that is, new operating resources, and to make the balance of payments and the exchange rate more favorable. - In addition, there was a complete change in the Reich's financial situation, the gigantic increase in national debt, the restructuring of the tax system, the introduction of state monopolies, the expansion of the economic sphere of the German Reich, and its progressive development into a production state; and furthermore, the complete economic shift in the relationship between the European states, the industrial and financial rise of the United States of America brought about by the war, the increasing importance of the New York capital market

compared to the London money market, the numerous bank foundings and capital investments by North American banking finance in South America, the improvement in Japan's financial situation through its deliveries of war material to Russia, the intensification of the conflicting interests of Japanese and North American countries in the Pacific Ocean, etc. And all these are just a few of the repercussions of the "most conservative war imaginable"; the list of global economic upheavals could be extended for pages, were it not for the consideration of the space of the "Bell" that put a stop to it. Should these enormous shifts and changes in the international economic machinery, the likes of which no war has ever left behind, not even the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, not be regarded as revolutionary effects simply because they do not fit into the beautiful development scheme constructed by so-called "Marxist" theorists? When I wrote in my pamphlet "Party Collapse?" 20 months ago While he stated that capitalist economic development was not yet ripe for the socialist economic order and that the consequence of the war would therefore not be the rule of socialism, but rather a new imperialist economic epoch that would first have to create the economic preconditions for the implementation of socialism, Kautsky sought to prove with casuistic deductions that the economic stage already reached before the war was long ripe for socialism and that a new imperialist economic epoch was therefore not a historical necessity. Today we are already at the beginning of this new economic epoch, and even among those who see Kautsky as the qualified interpreter of true Marxism, the number of those who believe in the immediate arrival of a socialist era after the conclusion of peace has probably dwindled to a few "persistent" illusionists. Yet, in certain circles, it still seems that one has not grasped that in social development, what comes to life is not what seems desirable to one person or another, but rather what the necessary preconditions for are present. Dr. PAUL LENSCH, M. d. R.: THE sect and party. The day of the adoption of the National Auxiliary Service Act could have been something like a second August 4th. The significance of the proposal, the scope of which was not yet foreseeable, would have justified this. The approval of the Social Democrats for the underlying idea was certain from the outset, and when the formal approval of the Reichstag faction was also secured through the material establishment of the text, difficulties no longer stood in the way. p. 369 ( 389) Sect and party. 369 Only the spirit that now prevails in the Reich Office of the Interior prevented such a thing. Mr. Helfferich, whom we were told was such a skillful man, has so far only demonstrated his skill in the remarkable speed with which he has lost the trust of almost all parties in the House. What the Social Democrats, in particular, think of this "Minister for Social

Policy" was made clear to him in the committee and in the plenary session, and Mr. Helfferich responded by saying that if he were portrayed as an evil spirit against whom warnings must be given, it caused him a little pain, although it is still uncertain whether he meant to place emphasis on the first or the second word. In any case, nothing made it more difficult for the Social Democratic parliamentary group in the Reichstag to approve the law than this man's attitude. But that is not the only thing that made a strong and joyful mood during the passage of the law impossible. The discord that has torn the ranks of the Social Democrats since the beginning of the war also erupted anew during the discussion of this bill. It turned out that here, too, all roles had been reversed. That the Auxiliary Service Act represents the most revolutionary imposition that the government has yet imposed on civil society is something that both friend and foe agree on. agreed. Well then! And what picture presented itself to us? The representatives of the Working Community, who so like to use the word revolution and who stand on tiptoe every morning to see whether the dawn of the future state has not yet dawned, voted unanimously against the bill, while the most determined champions of the adoption of the law were those union leaders who want nothing to do with revolution and who, precisely through their cool, anti-revolutionary stance, helped the most revolutionary law of the entire war to victory. While it appeared that the representatives of the Working Community had been completely thrown off the track of historical progress and were only accompanying the historical development as a chorus of grumblers, their typical sectarian character also became clearly apparent on other occasions. We mean the various Elections that have taken place in recent weeks and in which the Working Group participated as an independent group, partly in violation of the truce. First and foremost here is the Reichstag election in the Oschatz-Wurzen district, about which enough has been written in the daily press, so that we can assume the results and the detailed circumstances of the election are known. As is well known, it led to a very sobering defeat for the Working Group candidate, who believed they had victory in the bag and who always assured us that the masses of our people were behind them, and who now had to recognize that the opposite was the case. In other districts, where the Working Group completely dominates the organization, the lesson was even more striking. There, the party is collapsing in a very short time due to general lack of interest. In the municipal elections in the Berlin suburb of Lichtenberg, the Working Group candidates received 1,000 votes, while others were not nominated! — in the various city districts, from a maximum of 25 down to 3. Votes. In some districts, the voters' indifference to the Working Community's victory was so great that, towards the end of the

election period, the election officials telephoned some Social Democrats they knew, saying that no voters had appeared yet and that they should quickly find a few voters so that the election would not have to be repeated. A few people were then hastily gathered to cast their votes, and in the evening the Working Community's proud banner flew in triumph of this "victory." In Wilmersdorf near Berlin, Reichstag representative Herzfeld opposed a candidate from the party majority in the elections, and the result was that Herzfeld suffered a miserable defeat. In short: where the Working Community campaigns under the protection of the truce, voters stay away; but where it proceeds in breach of the truce, voters go over to the opponent. That would be bad for any party, ver- p. 371 ( 391) Sect and Party. 371 But it is negligible for a group that acts as presumptuously as the Working Community and that never tires of insisting that the millions of our working class see in it, and only in it, the representatives of their interests and the embodiment of their views. A new by-election to the Reichstag is approaching in Cologne. It is not yet entirely certain whether the supporters of the Working Community will forgo putting up their own candidate. If they do not do so and actually put Dr. Breitscheid against our already nominated comrade Meerfeld, then an even more severe defeat for the Working Community would certainly be a certain prospect, but at the same time the party would be forced to take a stand on the whole question: what is the relationship of the Social Democratic Party to the Working Community in the election campaign? Where, as in the case of Oschatz-Wurzen, they have only bourgeois candidates as opponents, are the candidates of the working group also considered candidates of the entire party? And where two Social Democratic candidates face each other, as in Wilmersdort and possibly in Cologne, should the Social Democratic voters be allowed to make the decision? One might have hoped that the question would not become relevant until after the war, at the earliest, during the first general Reichstag elections. The length of the war alone, which brings all problems to fruition early and tolerates no postponement, makes a quicker decision necessary here as well. In the election in the 11th Saxon district, people were initially satisfied with the solution quickly improvised by "Vorwärts," and the candidate of the Working Group was also designated as the candidate of the entire party. The discussion in the party press following the election results alone demonstrated how uncomfortable they felt about it and how internally impossible they perceived it to be. Yet the situation in the Oschatz district was still relatively simple. The candidate of the Working Group was the same one who had been a candidate for the Social Democrats for almost two decades; the election costs were covered by the Leipzig agitation district without recourse to the Berlin party coffers. But what if two

Social Democratic candidates face each other in a district and both turn to Berlin? for financial support from the central treasury, to which both parties are formally entitled, unless there is a decision to freeze contributions? Should the party executive then say: you are both equally close to my heart and my safe, I support you both? Or should it say: I do not support the fraternal squabble; neither of you will get anything? Or, thirdly, should it say: only those who represent my point of view will get my money? Or, to make the situation less complicated, if the representative of the working group runs alone, should the party executive support him with the resources of the entire party, even though it knows that the working group sees its life's work in fighting the party and its executive committee most ruthlessly? For understandable reasons, the party executive will try to postpone the decision on these issues as long as possible, but as with most other issues, it will be forced to make a decision by developments themselves, only that in the meantime, much harm will have been done that could have been avoided by timely intervention. The consequences of August 4 emerge ever more sharply with the consistency of a law of nature, and whoever opposes them or even attempts to obscure them is seized by an iron grip. The gap between the sect thrown off course and the party marching with historical development grows greater with each day. Already, the working group has sunk completely to the level of the small anarchist circles of the pre-war period, which saw their real task not in combating capitalism, but, conversely, in combating the opponents of capitalism. Their appearance in the Reichstag proves this. The main target of their attacks is no longer bourgeois society, but Social Democracy. And this contrast between sect and party will only deepen due to the opposing positions of both on the Auxiliary Service Law. The sect will seek to disgust the workers with it by all means; the party will have to justify and defend it, without glossing over its shortcomings, but recognizing the great social progress it offers. But what will the election campaigns of the coming period be about? Nothing other than the decision of August 4, 1914, and December 2, 1916. On both issues, however, the sect and the party stand on opposing points of reference. It is therefore inherently impossible to overlook these decisive differences and to try to avoid a clear and purifying decision even further in elections. WILHELM JANSSON: The Trade Unions and the Civil Service Law. Three main questions about the new Civil Service Law arouse particular interest among trade unions: its content, its creation, and the Helfferich problem. Regarding 1: The law introduces compulsory civil service for every male German between the ages of 17 and 60. unless he fulfills military service obligations. Patriotic Auxiliary Service, the official title, is activity in authorities and official

institutions, in the war industry, in war economic organizations of all kinds (which also includes the trade unions), as well as in other professions and businesses that serve the purposes of warfare and national welfare. The entire area covered by the law is subordinate to the War Office, whose head is the previously meritorious organizer of the German field railway system, Lieutenant General Gröner, a man who can also be praised for his extensive social understanding. p. 374 ( 394) 374 The Trade Unions and the Civil Service Compulsory Law. To decide whether certain businesses and professions are important for warfare and national welfare, and whether the number of personnel employed there truly corresponds to the needs, committees consisting of an officer, two higher State officials and two representatives each of employers and employees, each formed for the district of the Deputy General Command. The committees can order the closure of businesses that do not have that significance. Compulsory military service is therefore not limited to male Reich citizens, but extends to the entire German economy. Its purpose is to place life behind the front in the service of the one great cause of contemporary Germany: victorious perseverance in the struggle for the existence of the Reich. No valid objections can be raised against this principle. The attempt to dismiss the law as a "compulsory law" is misplaced and has nothing in common with the principles of socialism, which are based on the general obligation to work, not to mention trade union principles, which by no means avoid the concept of coercion. The decisive factor for our position is merely the implementation. The German trade unions could not have been persuaded to support a militarization of wartime industry, as in France. For militarization means the transfer of military laws to industry and its workers, thus the elimination of general workers' rights. The German Auxiliary Service Law does not take this path. It merely creates the possibility of the systematic organization of German labor during the war on a civil legal basis. For the workers, it restricts freedom of movement; that is the only shackle imposed on them. The compulsion to work exists for them even without the law; for the workers, it consists in the economic necessity of having to earn a living. But their freedom of movement would also have been partially automatically abolished by the necessity, p. 375 ( 395) The trade unions and the civil service law. 375 to systematically close certain types of businesses in order to keep operating only those that are important for ensuring the war effort and the nation's supply chain. This would economically force workers to seek their livelihood only in these operating businesses. The actual restriction on freedom of movement imposed by the law therefore lies only in the fact that workers cannot change jobs at will. But this restriction already existed in

large parts of the war industry. In Berlin, Saxony, Bavaria, etc., the employer's consent was required to terminate the employment relationship, and only those in possession of a "resignation certificate" could be hired in another war industry company. Our unions had attempted to mitigate the hardships through free agreement, so that workers could appeal to voluntary committees of employers and unions if their employers refused to issue the certificate. The new law implements this principle throughout the Reich. Within each district command, it establishes a committee consisting of a representative of the War Office and three representatives each of the workers and employers. This committee not only decides on the resignation certificate, which must be issued if there is a serious reason for leaving the position, but also acts as an appeals body for disputes regarding wages and working conditions after an agreement within the company itself has proven impossible. At the joint request of the employers and workers, the appeal can also be made to the responsible trade authority. or merchant court, etc. Workers' committees, which constitute the first instance in such disputes, are to be introduced in all companies with at least 50 workers, unless they already exist; all adult workers have the right to vote according to the principles of proportional representation. Regulations on the establishment of workers' committees are also to be issued by the responsible departments for the industrial companies of the army and navy administration. The workers' committees are the company authority that must negotiate with the employer regarding wage and employment conditions within the company. In smaller companies, where they do not exist, as well as for agricultural companies, any disputes that arise are brought directly before the arbitration board for decision. Where there are at least 50 employees in a company, employee committees with the same tasks as the of workers' committees. If we add that an appropriate improvement in wages and working conditions is considered an important reason for leaving work, and that the exercise of the right of association and assembly for persons employed in the patriotic auxiliary service may not be restricted, it follows from all this that legal protection for those liable for auxiliary service is guaranteed by law. The Reich demands sacrifices, not arbitrarily, but on a legally regulated basis that protects the interests of the citizens as far as possible. Further participation of the Reichstag through an advisory council at the War Office completes this protection. 2: The passage of the law was not without certain complications, which had their origin in the Reich Office of the Interior. This office introduced a bill for a blanket bill that merely declared the obligation to perform auxiliary service and transferred its management to the War Office. Implementation was left to the administrative channels, and only certain

guidelines for the implementing provisions were given in the explanatory memorandum to the bill. But these very guidelines lacked everything that was necessary for decisive participation. of the workers and their organizations was necessary in implementing the law. The Reich Office of the Interior was well informed about the unions' wishes. There was also no doubt that the military authorities raised no objections to the unions' wishes. As throughout the entire war, in this case too, the higher military authorities had demonstrated that social understanding without which a satisfactory integration of the working class into the general service of the nation is not possible. One can certainly enact coercive laws that oblige everyone to serve, but one cannot force anyone to give the best of their labor. The joy of work cannot be enforced. It depends on psychological preconditions that can be encouraged and enabled by state law, but cannot be imposed coercively. The Reich Office of the Interior had not given this aspect of the problem the desired attention. Its guidelines provided for war committees for various purposes, but limited the representatives of employers and workers to one assessor each, thus placing greater emphasis on the civil servant committee members. The question of wages and working conditions was completely eliminated, and the right of association and assembly was not guaranteed; rather, it was left open, thus leaving room for any interpretation. In addition, not in connection with the law, but running parallel to it, came the publication of decrees by the Prussian Railway Ministry prohibiting railway workers from belonging to organizations that do not explicitly exclude the right to strike in their statutes. And this statement by the Railway Minister was explicitly and sharply supported by State Secretary Dr. Helfferich. This must have inspired the greatest mistrust among the workers' representatives. For the first time, the trade union leaders met in the Reichstag for joint action to prevent the dangers that they as a result of these events, the workers had to fear. The leaders of the Christian and free trade unions sitting in the Reichstag submitted joint motions intended to transform the umbrella law into a complete law that also contained the guidelines for implementation. And the Reichstag took these motions into account in the essential points. The law was amended with the consent of the representative of the War Office in such a way that the trade unions could give it their consent, and they will now naturally also seek to promote its implementation. --- and not only in But one asks in trade union circles whether it was really necessary, or even expedient, to give the negotiations on this law, which brings out the highest development of the entire people's strength, a basis that would, as a final result, have the appearance of a parliamentary defeat of the State Secretary in the Reich Office of the Interior,

which will undoubtedly be reflected in the anti-German foreign press? And here we come to our third starting point, not unimportant for the trade unions as the bearers of social policy on the workers' side: the social policy position of State Secretary Dr. Helfferich. The head of the Reich Office of the Interior is responsible for the broad area of social welfare for workers in the German Reich. A comparison with the same institutions abroad immediately shows that his predecessors in office paid great attention to these issues, for Germany is at the forefront of the major powers in this regard. The secondary title "State Secretary for Social Policy" has a very realpolitik background. The objections of organized workers to some of the government's social policy proposals have so far been prompted by the desire to achieve more, to do a thorough job, so to speak, and above all by the bureaucratic spirit that lacks understanding of the feelings and thoughts of the broad masses and has dominated some of these proposals. With regard to the quantity of what it offers, the government will always be dependent on the parliamentary majorities with which it is supposed to work. But with regard to quality, it must set the standard, and it does not lack the power to do so. Dr. Helfferich is not a career civil servant. Even though he previously held government positions, he was in leading economic positions long enough to be able to shake off the bureaucratic streak that comes with a life's work in government. p. 379 ( 399) The Trade Unions and the Civil Service Law. 379 offices is otherwise difficult to separate. And the scientific capacity of Dr. Helfferich is so beyond all doubt that no one could think that he lacks the ability to survey these questions or to think about the needs of practical life. For, as an economic researcher, he has given us works that were more than flash in the pan and that testify to great ability and knowledge. Certainly, trade union circles were cautious about the new Secretary of State, and at first, no major socio-political initiative was expected from him. But at least one hope was tied to his name: that he would be less of a bureaucrat and more of an economist in his office, and that he would be alien to the police spirit that had often been bitterly felt under his predecessors in domestic politics. Should we bury these hopes on the basis of the last Reichstag proceedings? Despite all this, we do not want to go that far. However, it must be said with all openness that these paths of Dr. These changes will not lead Dr. Helfferich to Rome; rather, they open up the prospect of a revival of the old struggles in the old spirit, which people in Germany now believed to have been overcome and which the Reich Chancellor has rejected in a gratifyingly decisive manner. This revival would, there can be little doubt, also be beneficial to syndicalist currents among the broad masses. The Reichstag and the President of the War Office have this

time put the matter right in the most fortunate way. The law offers the unions the opportunity to work devotedly towards the great goal in association with all other sections of the population, and they will not fail to do so. Perhaps this will then lead to Dr. Helfferich quickly recognizing his erroneous assessment of the workers and their unions and paving the way for a certain relationship of trust. It is not his job to be a direct representative of the workers, but he is the State Secretary for Social Policy in the German Reich, and that in a 37/2 p. 380 ( 400) 380 War Profits and Compulsory Labor. A new, difficult time that presents new challenges. The unions' activities within the national context would be somewhat easier if Dr. Helfferich would also pay attention to this side of the problem. XYZ: War Profits and Compulsory Labor. The question of war profits taxation has become particularly urgent due to compulsory labor for the war industry. The idea that the introduction of compulsory labor could result in even greater war profits for war suppliers is intolerable. If, in the first six months of the war, the army administration had to practically hand out millions to encourage industry to produce military equipment, one can perhaps find an explanation for this in the emergency situation at the time. Today, things are quite different. Qualified representatives of industry have repeatedly revealed that industry is swimming in money. Alongside the almost fairytale-like war profits, we see new industrial plants springing up like mushrooms after warm, rainy days. Construction and equipment executed in the most perfect manner imaginable – copied down to the last brick. The war suppliers are Sunday's children; their trade flourishes and prospers. The united onslaught of an enemy who spares no sacrifice compels the German people to ever new exertion. New billions pour over the country to provide the army with the necessary war equipment. New life is emerging in the quiet workrooms of the new workshops. Before the moon has completed its orbit around the earth three times, new, technically even better equipped, gigantic industrial buildings will be built, and the new labor army, called up for military service, will move into them. New golden times are dawning for the war suppliers. No worries about labor, raw materials, semi-finished products; no battle for the market; no expenses for distribution and trade, thus no capital risk. The Army Administration ensures the provision of the necessary workforce and transfers the goods to be processed and manufactured, down to the last drop of glue and string. Whether one calls it war socialism or war capitalism! Even the most stubborn thinker and the greatest clairvoyant would not have considered such an organization for satisfying pre-war demand for goods possible. p. 381 ( 401) War Profit and Compulsory Labor. 381 War Profit and Compulsory Labor. 381 Now we are witnessing the "overthrow of all existing

economic systems" (Ernst Heilmann in the "Glocke," issue 34) and the "collapse of the old individualistic social order" (Paul Lensch, Social Democracy, Its End and Its Happiness. "Glocke," page 182). The current organization for war supplies is causing a depersonalization and objectification of our economic life and the creation of an enormous technical-bureaucratic apparatus, which differs from previous state economic enterprises not only in its greater scope, but above all in the serious disadvantage that its profits flow not into the public coffers but into the pockets of the war suppliers. This brings us to the most deplorable aspect of the entire system. Immense sacrifices of property and blood are willingly borne by the people. New, large war profits must not once again provoke and embitter the mood and attitudes. The war tax offers no guarantee of preventing this. The compulsion to labor demands, as compensation, the compulsion to produce. This can be fully implemented in the war industry. The capital employed in this industry must be content with an interest rate equivalent to that of the war bond. Cost price +5 percent; anything above that is bad. The calculation of cost price would initially be the responsibility of the entrepreneur. The Army Administration would have to subject this calculation to a thorough examination. By cost price, we mean the acquisition costs of the ready-to-use goods. The Commercial Code distinguishes between: a) Acquisition costs, the price of raw materials or semi-finished products; b) Manufacturing costs, resulting from 1. Acquisition costs, 2. Wages, 3. Manufacturing overhead; c) Trading overhead, expenses for the distribution of the goods. All raw materials and semi-finished products used in the manufacture of military equipment have been removed from trade due to confiscation. Their price is therefore not determined by market conditions, but by the determination by the Raw Materials Office of the War Ministry. The acquisition costs (see above a or b 1) are therefore known to the Army Administration. Since entrepreneurs only work to order, operating costs are also eliminated. Wages and salaries can be readily determined from the payment lists. Therefore, only factory overheads require calculation and special verification (see above b 3). p. 382 ( 402) 382 War Profits and Compulsory Labor. Let us now assume that, from January 1, 1917, the Army Administration would only pay 5 percent of the cost price for all deliveries of military equipment. First, a precise inventory of all raw materials, intermediate and finished products would have to be taken, and a similar operational accounting procedure, as has been introduced for state weapons workshops, would have to be established for all companies manufacturing military equipment. This procedure is very easy to implement and transparent for companies with mass production. But these are all companies

supplying the army. For a specific period of time (approximately 28 days), work lists are compiled for each factory with the following information: a) Raw materials and semi-finished products processed; b) Number of intermediate or finished products manufactured (including the stages of production); c) Power consumed (steam, light, oil, etc.); d) Materials consumed (tools, implements, etc.); e) Wages and salaries paid; f) Scrap material. In addition to these operating costs, there are so-called general expenses, e.g.: 1. Wages and salaries not included in the factory lists (administrative costs); 2. One-time expenses for buildings and equipment (machinery, etc.); but only the costs equal to the depreciation caused by the work process; 3. General costs (public charges, insurance fees, transport, etc.). The operational inspection of the production process for military equipment is already carried out by the military inspection and acceptance centers. There are no trade secrets for them. If these departments are now expanded to include audit offices, we will have a suitable control apparatus for monitoring the cost price. A follow-up audit can be carried out by the directorates of the Army Administration. The entire organization must not be filled with the spirit of a dusty bureaucracy, but must be built on the highest degree of utilization of personal ability and independence. Only the right to personal development guarantees good work results. The entire armaments industry is almost exclusively about impersonal capital. The prerequisite for success is therefore the closest possible contact between the Army Administration and the main members of economic life, with the employees and workers. Good beginnings have been made here. Unconditional, honest, mutual trust in the face of the difficult situation created by the times will overcome all difficulties. The experiences thus gained will form the precursor to the nationalization of the armaments industry, which has now become absolutely necessary. All resistance to this will be useless. The Reich's financial difficulties will overturn many cherished traditions. The peace bells will proclaim war on unemployed income. ERNST MEHLICH: Beer and schnapps. One of the first enemies against which war was declared after mobilization was alcohol. All commanding generals ordered restrictions on the sale of alcohol, which during the first days of mobilization intensified to the point where all bars and pubs were often closed. Gradually, the regulations were dismantled, and pub life today essentially bears the same character as before. Although a restriction in schnapps and beer production had to be made, consumption was not significantly affected by the corresponding "stretching." A number of breweries have been able to increase their dividends despite high material prices, and schnapps distilling is thriving despite constantly rising spirit prices. It is questionable whether

the government would have enforced the restriction in production without the constant warnings that the shortage of foodstuffs does not permit waste through distilling and brewing. Although approximately 5 percent of the total potato harvest, equivalent to 5-6 million hundredweight, goes to distilleries annually, in August 1914 the "Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung" was still able to claim that the prospect that a restriction in the distilling industry could free up any significant quantity of potatoes for food and fodder purposes is not correct. In the meantime, people have come to terms with this—particularly due to the ever-increasing The increasingly noticeable shortage of concentrated feed has convinced us that this view is untenable, and distillery operations have been limited to the production of the beer and schnapps spirits necessary for commercial purposes. p. 384 ( 404) 384 If, despite this, a lot of schnapps still comes onto the market, this is due in part to the heavy advance supplies, but also to the "dilution" practiced here, and not least to the fact that large quantities of fruit are still being processed into schnapps. In 1912, a total of 194,000 hectoliters of pome fruit and 336,000 hectoliters of stone fruit went to the distilleries, and to date, no order has been issued prohibiting the processing of fruit into schnapps. On the occasion of the confiscation of plums and apples, the need to ensure the jam needs of the army and the population was emphasized. Why, then, didn't they first block the distilleries' access to our orchards? As with schnapps, so it is with beer. The brewing quota has been reduced several times, finally to 48 percent, but (as a result of the extension) it still amounts to more than half of peacetime production. Despite all the restrictions that the population has to put up with in the allocation of bread and flour, 200 wagons of grain still flow to the breweries every day! If the beer cult were not so flourishing in all sections of the population, a storm of indignation over such conditions would sweep through the country. But such a trend rarely arises in the German press. The only more lively support has come from the suggestion of Medical Councilor Dr. Bonne found the idea of only selling beer on bread stamps. At first glance, this proposal is indeed compelling, since it assumes that the grain contained in the beer will be counted toward the general ration. But it remains a half-measure. We need the grain that goes to the breweries with its full nutritional value, so it must not be devalued. It is well known that the most important nutritional values are lost during the brewing process. Such waste represents a sin against our national nutrition, which is already seriously endangered. The wasted grain, however, cannot be replaced by selling beer on bread stamps. At most, there might be a reduction in the consumption of bread and flour, but this would in all likelihood not equal the amount of grain consumed. In any case, the

population threatened by malnutrition will not fully benefit from the available nutritional values. Now, it is certainly a pitiable thing to paralyze the alcohol industry with its entourage of workers and employees. But how many businesses hasn't the war brought to a standstill that are of far greater importance to the national economy? In any case, it must fundamentally be assumed that the interest of the general public towers above the earnings of distillers and brewery shareholders. And this demands that every potato and every bushel of grain be used unadulterated and unabridged. But in response to such demands, one invokes the army's beer needs, to which every brewery must contribute a certain share of its production, and the need for spirits for commercial purposes. As for the troops' consumption, it must be stated from our own knowledge that quite considerable quantities of beer go to the rear, which not only can be quite easily dispensed with there, but are completely superfluous. The consumption of alcohol is in no way beneficial to guard duty, which is the main task there. How many guard offenses have not been committed, which, on the one hand, endanger the safety of the fighting troops and, on the other, can make the citizen in uniform unhappy for life? Is it necessary for a company to have three canteens, as I myself experienced? The soldier on guard duty is much better served with coffee or tea; moreover, any insurmountable craving for alcoholic beverages can be satisfied from products from the occupied territories. The increase in venereal diseases is lamented. But what good are all the speeches and decrees as long as the essential cause—namely, the consumption of alcohol—is not decisively addressed! Now, alcohol at the front! Paragraph 416 of the "War Medical Regulations," which govern the entire German Army, explicitly states: "Alcohol initially has an invigorating effect, but consumption in larger quantities soon leads to a weakening effect. Experience teaches that abstinent soldiers best withstand the rigors of war." And in a speech he gave a few years ago to the cadets at the cadet school in Mürwik, the Kaiser himself pointed out the undermining of nerves by alcohol and declared: "The nation that consumes the smallest amount of alcohol wins." We also know from medical experience how crucial abstinence is not only for the performance of the troops, but also for the recovery of the wounded, their state of health, etc. Given this situation, can the distribution of alcoholic beverages to the troops even be justified? In any case, a reduction in field deliveries would have the most beneficial imaginable influence on the army's condition, even if no significant deficiencies have arisen so far. Initially enforced abstinence could become of outstanding importance for the entire future of our people. Where the general public is suffering hardship, it will not be difficult to convince the troops of the

necessity of stopping all serving of alcoholic beverages. With their acknowledged willingness to make sacrifices, they will gladly forgo alcohol if necessary, so that army deliveries need no longer serve as a pretext for wasting essential bread grain. But can we do without spirits when petroleum and gasoline are in very short supply and spirits must often replace them? Even spirit is not indispensable, at least not when it is made from potatoes, which can serve us better as animal feed to increase our meat and fat quantities. Technology has long since discovered other raw materials that are less precious. Just consider methyl alcohol (wood spirit), which is made from wood, leaves, straw, and the like, and is of the same quality and of the same usability as potato spirit. Therefore, the potatoes, doubly valuable due to this year's poor harvest, need not be sent to the distilleries. Now the potato quantities have been reduced, citing the low yield. This poor harvest makes it impossible for the vast majority of the population to compensate for the lack of other, more important foodstuffs with potatoes; yet, strangely enough, it allows us to waste potatoes in the distillery! These are unpleasant conditions that would be impossible if the far-reaching influence of alcohol capital were eradicated by the democratization of our constitutional and administrative foundations. At present, unfortunately, all that can be stated is that the war against alcohol was initially ended with a rotten peace for the population; like a triumphant victor, the alcohol trade continues to sap our marrow. It takes away our flesh and bread and gives us stones. Stones? No, it gives us poison! p. 387 ( 407) A letter. 387 DEM A letter. EM From letters from a German socialist to an English party friend we take the following statements: Berlin, July 29, 1916. Dear Comrade! I received your letter of July 12th. J. and welcome with satisfaction the opportunity to speak to you about English views and conditions, which have unfortunately been so misjudged in Germany so far. You call England the birthplace of freedom. Freedom is something that has evolved, something that develops. Therefore, it must progress, like everything that is life and belongs to life. It is something organic, like life itself. Like everything in England, freedom there is also conservative. The appeal to the writ of habeas corpus is an expression of this conservatism; it never created freedom among equals. It gave freedom to the nobility, giving them personal inviolability, as a result of the Cromwellian dictatorship. Otherwise, only the "loyal" subject enjoyed it. But neither the Scots nor the Irish were loyal, and unfortunately, they had to learn all too well about freedom as the English understand it. Freedom and equality belong together. Where is equality in England, where the individual castes barely know each other, are socially isolated from one another, and practically speak their own language? English freedom is a body without a

soul; what should be living and developing is sacrificed to the concept. But concepts that are not living become dogma. Only in this way can one understand how it could be an infringement on rights in England to restrict the freedom of capitalist exploitation through child protection laws, hygiene laws, factory laws, compulsory elementary school, etc. It was the freedom of the rich and the great. Nowhere are their freedom and influence on state and law greater than in England. Their excessive strain gave rise to the idea that everyone's freedom should be left to decide whether they wanted to go to the factory or not, whether a child should attend school or not, whether the farmer wanted to be bought out or not, whether the worker wanted to live in unhealthy housing, whether he wanted to earn a lot or a little. That was the practical development, which remained conservative in the face of all economic requirements. p. 388 ( 408) 388 A Letter. Ultimately, however, this senseless and unlimited freedom has been restricted, albeit only in recent times, through factory laws, compulsory schooling (not until 1871), equal rights for sects, social legislation, housing reform, food sales laws, and others, after many difficult struggles, when other countries, and especially Germany, had long since set an example. The social freedom of people in England is no different. Here, too, conservatism prohibits violating tradition, stepping out of line. The Englishman, like no other, is dependent on his neighbor, on conventional coercion. He who has less than his neighbor is looked down upon. It begins with the worker and extends to the highest circles. The model is the nobility, the original sole bearer of freedom. Everything imitates it. Whatever is capable of elevating itself must copy its superiors, if only to appear more. External freedom is in truth internal unfreedom, producing reserve and uniformity. No one wants to deviate from the general public, neither outwardly nor in outlook. The result is a tacit subordination to the public opinion of the moment, politically and scientifically. Hence the so-called aloofness and reserve of the Englishman in England, not abroad, where the Englishman is presumptuous. It is either ignorance or fear of being compromised. In short: "In England, freedom exists only between state and law, not between man and law." And now the excesses of this freedom: Haymarket, Hyde Park, Charing Cross, Victoria Station, they are heralds of freedom in human trafficking and public immorality. No other country possesses anything similar. English freedom, then, is that anyone can be the greatest bully, as can be read in Whitman. Freedom also includes unlimited drunkenness to the point of public scandal; freedom is the cab driver's right to run anyone over, since the free Englishman has to look after himself; freedom is also to marry as early as one wants; hence apprentice marriages with their attendant misery. Freedom

is to set the protection period for girls at 12 years, since people must be free to sell their bodies as early as they want, etc. England is so free that it still has the right of confiscation to this day, but no uniform penal code! But the conclusion p. 389 ( 409) A letter. 389 of Rule Britannia reads: "Never, never shall an Englishman be a slave!" I must confess: I prefer Prussia's "Suum cuique" even more. While we could certainly wish for many things of English institutions, I certainly do not want this English "freedom" as a whole. It would be a step backward for Germany, a real threat to socialism. It is surely no coincidence that socialism in England has only produced sects. . . Theodor Fontane, the best German expert on England, correctly characterized it: "England is aristocratic, Germany democratic." That may seem paradoxical even to pre-war Germans, but it is true. But the Kaiser's right of veto! Admittedly, it is an evil. But is the evil greater than that of England? No! The English Parliament may have eliminated the power of the monarchy, but at the same time it castrated itself. English ministers are slaves to the majority; the majority is the scuttlebutt of autocratic plutocracy. Ministers can only be overthrown by the majority, but the majority thereby overthrows itself. Thus: responsibility only to the majority, autocracy beyond the majority and the king—that is English democratic parliamentarism. Is it merely a coincidence that England, despite having this institution, has not experienced a ministerial impeachment in 200 years? Are such conditions not, as Earl Grey called it, "encouragement to corruption"? I think the history of the World War, once written from authentic sources in the state archives, will confirm this "encouragement to corruption." We Germans, right down to our own ranks, now understand, taught by the facts of the World War, the importance of a strong German fleet. Does a peaceful England, as it claims, have a categorical right to the largest fleet? It is not necessary for the mere preservation of the colonial empire. Where did Cawdor get the right to establish the well-known naval principle for Germany as well? Didn't Germany, of all people, have to see aggressive intentions against it? In any case, the fact is that these and similar proclamations accelerated the increase and expansion of the fleet in Germany. One may, in principle, have whatever stance one may take on naval and land militarism. One may consider it a scourge of humanity, like all socialists. But then, for everyone. And if it is to be eliminated, then it should be done universally, as we wish and demand. But as long as that is the case, everyone should sweep in front of their own door. It is exactly the same with imperialism. It, too, is international; the tendencies are the same, since they arise from the same causes. Only, English imperialism has shown itself to be the most voracious. ... The German workers will have learned through the hard school

of the World War that they were worshipping a phantom when they saw in England the model of freedom, equality, and democracy. They will realize that recovery comes not from without, but from within, that every people must live its own life, that a foreign organism cannot be grafted onto it schematically. We now believe in your "cant"! We believe that you are fighting for your supremacy and your business, and that you are neither discerning nor honest in your choice of means. We also believe and hope that you have miscalculated this time. But we know above all that supremacy is the opposite of democracy. If the world is to become democratic, as we wish, then this must apply to all peoples. . . . This letter fragment is taken from an extremely captivating and instructive book, which has just been published by the Verlag für Sozialwissenschaft in Berlin. It is called "The New International" and contains a series of letters in which German, English, French, and Russian socialists discuss nationalism and internationalism, the old and the new International, and numerous other questions raised by the war or at least closely related to it. The letters themselves are fictitious, but the author, A. Rundé, has amazingly understood how to empathize with the souls of the socialists in the various warring countries and to give appropriate expression to what moves each individual with great accuracy—equally remarkable in content and style. One can learn more from this small book, especially psychologically, than from many a thick tome. Not only socialist workers, but all those interested in politics in general will read the book, which seems like a thrilling narrative, with great benefit and pleasure. The low price of 1 mark makes it easier to acquire. KH p. 391 ( 411) The German Field Press. 391 JOSEF KLICHE: AL The German Field Press. One of the many surprises of the war at its beginning was the almost fairytale -like news of the existence of field newspapers. They were astonished; for the fact that, amidst the terribly serious, bloody work, people still showed a sense for such improvisations aroused not only the astonishment of experts, but even more the surprise of all laypeople. The local press soon seized on the material, and in numerous more or less accurate notes, reports were made of newly created field newspapers and their peculiarities. Admittedly, such reports did not always make it clear enough that some of these then-sparse press publications were less a newspaper in the true sense of the word than a random rag, mostly operating at a very primitive level. While, technically, the old, natural conditions were returning, editorially, the practices of harmless beer newspapers were becoming apparent. This was certainly quite right, since a front-line newspaper is primarily intended to provide humor and entertainment to the hard-hit minds of soldiers, with the home press

providing everything else. Despite all the economic blows and censorship, the home press has become more necessary than ever in these times. Indeed, the fact that even in the field, at the front and in the rear quarters, a rich press system has developed, both officially and unofficially, speaks to how closely our entire way of life is related and intertwined with "reading the journals." The term "field press" represents an interesting chapter in this war, both for the present and the future. The arbitrary, completely unforeseen emergence of the field newspaper has its appeal. For such reasons, it seems time today, after two years of the first field newspapers' existence, to provide an overview of the German field press. As is usually the case with research into the origins of a phenomenon, the words of Gutzkow's sage find confirmation in this case too: field or war newspapers already existed. Apart from the various medieval mass reports, which, despite their reporting on murders, are even less to be regarded as predecessors of today's field newspapers than those that appeared somewhat later in Lower Saxony, Hamburg, Venice, and elsewhere. p. 392 ( 412) 392 The German Field Press. Of the war and trade news published in the 19th century, about a dozen publications come into consideration, and I think it appropriate to outline them here. One hundred and twenty years earlier than the "Landsturm," published in Vouziers in the autumn of 1914, the "Geprüfte Tagschrift der gesamten Kombinationen Armeen" (Examined Journal of the Entire Combined Armies) appeared in 1794 on behalf of the General Command of the Imperial and Royal Army in the Netherlands, in both German and French editions. This "literary phenomenon," as J. v. Schwarzkopf calls it in his "Contribution to Political Science on Newspapers," published a year later in Frankfurt am Main, also had to endure all the dangers that plague many of our contemporary field newspapers in abundance. After just four months, the phenomenon slumbered peacefully, as little tainted with glory as the Coalition Wars themselves. Among the subsequent publications worth mentioning were the "Courier de l'Egypte," published by the Napoleonic command in Egypt in 1798; the "Oesterreichische Zeitung," edited by Friedrich Schlegel from July to September 1809, which was also intended for army purposes; and the "Deutsche Blätter," published by FA Brockhaus in Leipzig in 1810, which compiled regular news for the field. A war newspaper also sprouted during the Russian campaign of 1812. This was the "Russe," published in German and Russian, but for reasons unknown today, it never got beyond the first issue. The following year brought the Austrian "Army News" and, along with one or two other obscure papers (including one from the Prussian headquarters), the "Newspaper from the Camp," launched by the Russian General Tettenborn in Lüneburg in September. It was intended to

arouse enthusiasm and announce news of the Allies' victories. The paper counted among its contributors the officers Jahn and Varnhagen von Ense, who were in Tettenborn's entourage. Sixteen issues of this publication were published. The last of these, since it followed the headquarters, were in France. During the campaign of 1815, another German publisher was involved in producing a field newspaper. In the spring, Bartholomäus Herder in Freiburg received an order from Metternich to immediately assemble an easily transportable field printing press, which he did, leading to the founding of the Herder Field Newspaper in June of that year. The existence of a "German Field Newspaper from Paris" is also reported for the same year, whose editors were Friedrich Lange and Varnhagen. p. 393 ( 413) The German Field Press. 393 In contrast to those campaigns, nothing is known about field newspapers in the wars of 1864 and 1866. Even the printing of the ordinance sheets, which, as we shall see later , were extraordinarily diverse in this war, was at that time largely done by order from the field at home. Reports from the war of 1870/71 were published by a newspaper, the "Moniteur Official," founded by the German administration in Versailles. The next stage is the "Peking German Newspaper," which, despite its significance in newspaper history, has actually received little attention. It was published as the official organ of the Imperial German authorities in Peking during the 1901 China campaign. Although the paper appeared in large format and carried detailed articles, it was printed on only one side for technical reasons. However much one might consider these publications to be precursors to today's war newspapers, there is nevertheless a fundamental difference between the two. All of these earlier publications mentioned here owed their existence to the will of a military ruler, but the first field newspapers of this war were born from the womb of the troops. * Let us now turn to the current field press. First of all, the question of priority arises. When and where was the first field newspaper created in this war, by soldiers for soldiers? According to my research, this question can be answered as follows: On September 2, 1914, the first issue of the "Garde-Feldpost" (Garde Field Post), published by the Deputy General Command of the Guard Corps, appeared. The paper was printed in Berlin and regularly sent to members of the Guard serving in the field. Five days later, on September 7, the "Kriegszeitung der Festung Boyen und der Stadt Lötzen" (War Newspaper of the Fortress Boyen and the City of Lötzen) appeared, and on September 14, the " Hahnacker Neuesten Nachrichten" (Hahnacker Latest News), later renamed the "Bayerischer Landwehrmann" (Bavarian Landwehr Man), appeared for the first time. It should be noted, however, that the "Garde-Feldpost" cannot be considered a field newspaper in our sense, not least because the troops it

serves had little to do with its production. The next two publications could certainly be described as war newspapers, but lack the appeal of being born in enemy territory. This privilege is claimed by the "Armee-Zeitung" for the 2nd Army, whose first issue appeared in Charleville on the last day of September 1914. Later, the paper was moved to St. Quentin. The "Armee-Zeitung" first appeared tentatively in an informal sequence. The first field papers to appear regularly with a fixed program in enemy territory were the "Landsturm" in Vouziers and the "Landsturmbote von Brieg." Both began their careers on October 11, 1914. The first paper was the offspring of a Leipzig Landsturm battalion, the second of a Metz battalion. A field newspaper was also produced in Kalisz in January 1915 by a Saxon Landsturm unit, the Zittau Battalion, while from the end of July, the Hersfeld Battalion in Alest, Belgium, published its "Landsturm" three times a month. The most recent Landsturm creation, "Unser Landsturm im Hainaut" (Belgium), was added in May of that year. For bibliophiles, it should also be mentioned that a Hanoverian battalion also published a war newspaper at home, namely in the Celle camp; this is the "Scheuener Kriegszeitung," which proudly calls itself the first Hanoverian Landsturm newspaper. It is produced using a hectographic method. It is not the only one of its kind. Typewriters and hectograph ink produced, and still produce, many a field newspaper that delights its subscribers. For example, the first 25 issues of the "Champagne-Kriegszeitung" were produced by typewriter, as was "Die Feldgraue," the organ of a regiment stationed in the western theater of war, now published in a distinguished booklet format. Yet another publication, the already defunct one of the 84th Landwehr Regiment, entitled "Der Feldgraue," was published by lithography. "Der Drahtverhau" (The Wire Crawl), a publication that names the 3rd Company of the 1st Bavarian Landwehr Regiment as its publisher, appears by autograph. Most of these field newspapers are (or, where they no longer exist, were) produced either in a dugout in the trenches or in reserve or rest positions, as is usually the case with field newspapers for smaller formations. The difficulties to be overcome in producing these smaller newspapers are also quite considerable. Firstly, the material used is usually quite primitive, which requires a similar production process, and secondly, the personnel are constantly threatened by imminent danger. A very eloquent example in this area was provided by an incident involving the field newspaper "Hurrah" of the Bremen Infantry Regiment, which was produced in a blockhouse on the Oise. There, in August of last year, enemy grenades suddenly swept through the praiseworthy work of the Gutenberg disciples, taking the life of the machine operator. Incidentally, the Landsturmblatt in Vouziers, as it itself

reported in its last issue, was blown apart by the assignments of the editors involved. The last issue of this first field newspaper in enemy territory appeared on October 31, 1915. A good six weeks later, the " Champagne Comrade" was launched, if not in the same place, then certainly in the same readership. It is considered the army newspaper of the 3rd Army, has a circulation of 50,000, and can probably be considered the best German field newspaper today. Editorial organization, textual content, illustrations, and variety are of a respectable standard, and—what seems essential to emphasize compared to many other field newspapers employing the same resources—the originality of the presentation is also evident in the factual content. For, understandably, many field newspapers conscientiously maintain reprints from the home press. This is understandable for the smaller papers, which neither find staff within their battalion nor receive official financial support, but not for the major army newspapers. Although the editorial staff of the "Champagne-Kamerad" is composed of fashion experts with a reputation for poetry, it has succeeded in becoming an interesting and respected newspaper. Among the field newspapers published by companies, battalions, and, in the best case, regiments, are the "Seille-Bote," published by the 68th Landwehr Regiment, "Schützengraben in den Vosges," the graphically very original newspaper of the 1st Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment, which, although edited in the trenches, is printed in Leipzig. Incidentally, the newspaper of the 32nd Reserve Infantry Regiment is also printed in Leipzig, while "Nachrichten aus Sachsenruh," the divisional newspaper "Zwischen Maas und Mosel," is printed in Metz. The "Kleine Minenwerfer" (Little Mine Thrower), which has already gone the way of all things earthly, should also be counted among the smaller field newspapers. From what has been said so far, the contrast between the earlier war news sheets mentioned above and today's field newspapers is quite enormous. The familiarity of Germans with newspapers is already evident from the fact that the first field newspapers sprang from the womb of the smallest military units, and that it was interested officers or men in some company who, after obtaining permission from higher authorities—for even in the field one cannot publish newspapers without being punished—made use of the available intellectual and technical material for the amusement and entertainment of their comrades. The prerequisite was a long stay in one place, i.e., trench warfare. As soon as this began, the 37/3 p. 396 ( 416) 396 The German Field Press. The first leaflets that can be found today on all fronts. The discovery of a printing shop, abandoned by its owner during the general flight, with still piles of paper stock, provided the initial incentive; the general goodwill with which the product was received led to a search for its

continued existence. These leaflets, mostly produced close to the front, are particularly susceptible to the effects of adversity, which often come and sometimes disappear again. The fortunes of war and troop movements play a significant role here. Since no funds are available for them, they must not incur excessive costs. These costs must be covered by distributing the paper to comrades and interested parties at home for a fee. The romantic circumstances under which the newspapers are produced, however, give them precisely that original touch, in conjunction with the sometimes lavish imagination of the The editor and his staff assess the collector's value. There is a difference between present value and later collector's value. The soldier in the field is pleased if his newspaper, produced by comrades and possibly delivered free of charge, brings him as much as possible, but the collector or the future researcher will often look elsewhere. How harmless it sounds, for example, when a sports festival is announced in the vanishingly small "Düna-Zeitung," or when, as was the case in its first June issue, one reads, among other things, three two-line advertisements on the last page in which a pioneer offers Reclam magazines at original prices, another has lettuce plants for sale at fifty pfennigs for one hundred, and a third, from an artillery measuring crew, is looking to exchange a clucking chicken for a laying hen in his advertisement. How harmless, and yet what a piece of field poetry shines through these lines! For these offers are not jokes, but serious business deals. Don't these three small advertisements about field life in trench warfare tell us infinitely more than many extensive treatises? And quite unintentionally. In addition to the smaller leaflets mentioned so far, there are a number of similar ones, the individual listing of which we can omit, just as we can omit the occasional newspapers published at Christmas or the Kaiser's birthday celebrations. However, many a regular trench leaflet has been born from the success achieved by an occasional newspaper. p. 397 ( 417) Glosses. 397 Things are not so closely intertwined in the organs of divisions, corps, and armies. Here, the ideas that easily coexist, at least as far as the business-technical aspect is concerned, can hope for tangible realization earlier. Army newspapers are particularly well-off in this regard. The decree of a high-ranking military commander can overcome all technical difficulties, and the newspaper can often be produced far behind the front in well-equipped factories. Larger troop units also have considerable latitude in the selection of editorial and technical personnel; illustrators and lithographers can be found within the ranks. Within a battalion, however, the selection is limited; indeed, chance may dictate that no suitable staff can be found at all. The individual newspapers and their fates will be reported on in a separate article. Notes. Political Characters. OKTAVIO VON ZEDLITZ. In the

second bench of the Free Conservatives, who are still a strong faction here in the Prussian Parliament, but practically a nobody in the Reichstag, one sees a bald head with a long white beard leaning close to the desk: Baron von Zedlitz und Neukirch, retired President of the Royal Naval Office. D., writes one of his daily articles. The old man's eyes are miserable, but otherwise— respect! In his speeches, he doesn't seem to want them to appear too accurately in the newspaper; saving his voice, he takes advantage of the miserable acoustics of the niche-rich hall. But he is always convinced that he alone is right. The incessantly repeated gesture of his right hand says: "Here you have what you need!" Praeceptor Prussiae. Didactic in all his utterances, even when, as now, he well-intentionedly admonishes and advises the Poles, whom he previously chastised with rods and scorpions. In him is embodied the system of preventing discontent as far as possible through tax justice, as far as taxes are concerned (in the progression of direct taxes, less so in indirect and land rent taxes), through social and housing welfare, school education, and the promotion of transport, but at the same time, exterminating every inconvenient spirit with fire and sword. "You have to be content with what I, the Illustrious One, give you, and if you are, I will not forget you either; but if not, then misfortune and brimstone be with you!" p. 398 ( 418) 398 Glosses. Also a system, without a doubt, even a well-thought-out one. Only its presuppositions no longer hold when the others no longer want grace and gifts, but rather rights and self-government. If it comes to that, perhaps, who knows, Octavio will also swing along with a smile, like the cunning lodge on the procession of the gods to Valhalla. Bernstein as a text revisionist ALMOST simultaneously with No. 36 of the "Glocken" (The Bell), in which Comrade David demonstrated to Eduard Bernstein, who, alongside Kautsky, served as a scientific authority in the Social Democratic Working Group, all sorts of interesting corrections to the English War Blue Book, is a kind of correction by Bernstein of his doctored excerpts from the British dispatch exchange. Foreign Office. Although this self-denial, published under the euphemistic title "Supplements and Additions," can make no claim to completeness, it nevertheless fills the entire fifteenth volume of his "Documents on the World War." Bernstein has this much to correct. Approximately two years have passed since the publication of Volume 3 of the "Documents," which contains this exchange of dispatches and, according to the announcement by the Vorwärts bookstore, is "strictly limited to the reproduction of the documents." During this time, Bernstein, in his love of justice, found no reason to correct his talentedly mutilated "documents," even though he repeatedly saw his translation of the English Blue Book being exploited in the press dispute over war guilt. All the false conclusions drawn

from them did not stir his delicate aesthetic sense. Finally, after two years, he found the time to add this addendum. Yet even now, it is not honest scruples that arise in his Anglophile heart; as Bernstein himself recounts in the deliciously naive preface to his book of corrections, rather, "a large portion of the buyers" of the books in question have expressed their desire to have the complete British dispatch exchange. A somewhat improbable story! For the large portion of buyers in question to have such a wish and thus turn to Bernstein with confidence, they must have noticed beforehand that important documents in both volumes, crucial for the entire assessment of the political situation at the time, had been castrated and corrected. We find it somewhat difficult to assume that politically educated readers, when they find such sensible "corrections" by the editor in a supposedly strict reproduction of official documents, would only turn to the editor with the respectful request that they kindly make a correction. Discerning readers lose all respect in such a case. p. 399 ( 419) Glosses. 399 Eduard Bernstein probably corrected the facts here again. Shouldn't the large portion of buyers be good, specialized friends of Bernstein who had heard of David's intention to expose Bernstein's scheme? But the new corrective preface is so characteristic of Bernstein's peculiarly naive, honest disposition that we cannot resist printing at least the first part of this preface: "The sheer volume of the exchange of dispatches concerning the outbreak of the war, which the British Foreign Office presented to Parliament on August 6, 1914, prevented us from reproducing it in one issue of our edition. Therefore, in Issue 3 of our edition, which is dedicated to it, we have taken only the most important of the 159 numbers it comprises, as explained in the preface, and have also omitted parts from various of these dispatches that appear less important or merely repeat what has been said elsewhere. However, it is the wish of a large number of the purchasers of our edition to have this correspondence complete, and it is all the more advisable to comply with this wish, as in the discussions about the origins of the war, reference is repeatedly made to dispatches that were not included in Issue 3. Diplomacy often retrospectively attaches importance to things that initially appear unimportant, and many things that could rightly be considered so actually acquire significance through later publications." In view of the simplicity of heart expressed in these lines, one might almost conclude that perhaps the naive belief that the suppressed passages had no political significance might have prompted Bernstein to revise his text; but the fact that he specifically revised the English dispatch exchange and eliminated precisely those passages that could expose English policy removes any doubt about the "honest" purpose he pursued with his mutilations. Incidentally, the so-called "supplements" in

the form Bernstein presents them are completely worthless, for he does not reproduce the "supplemented" documents in the original text, but simply requests that certain words or sentences be inserted in such-and-such a booklet, page such-and-such. The reader is thus forced to seek out the relevant passages and make his comments there. It may be painful for the publishing house that the revelation of Bernstein's text revision has completely devalued the relevant issues of "Documents on the World War." The blame for this devaluation, however, lies solely with the publisher himself. It would certainly have been desirable if the publisher had encouraged this unique editor to at least issue a complete reprint with the exact, rectified original text. Perhaps the mutilated passages could have been reproduced in italics in this reprint. At the same time, this would have thoroughly instructed every reader about what Bernstein means by a strict reproduction of official documents. Habakkuk. It was border demands a hundred years ago. It is not without interest today to recall the demands made by the liberals a hundred years ago, when France lay defeated at the feet of Prussia and England. One of the leading liberal newspapers of the time, the "Rheinischer Merkur," published an article on October 23, 1815, vigorously advocating the establishment of natural borders against France. The liberal newspaper compares France to a cauldron, the edges of which Germany must have at all costs if the "boiling porridge" is not to continually overflow. Historical borders are rejected because what matters is the principle according to which they are drawn, not whether they have already existed. The liberal newspaper of that time describes natural borders that run concurrently with the language border as the only ones advantageous for Germany. But only that border divide can be considered a natural border that nowhere touches or intersects a natural body of water, thus: "the watersheds on mountains and ridges, certainly accompanied by language, constitute natural national borders." The national wealth and strength of a people lie not in its outermost border divides, but rather in the lowlands of the rivers. The mountain dwellers of a watershed will follow the watercourse on this side for purely natural reasons. This also explains the sense of community in purely economic, not linguistic, terms. The mountain ridges provide better security against attacks. Therefore, the watershed is a national divide! From this standpoint, a hundred years ago, the border along the ridge of the Vosges was demanded, which was only achieved after the Franco-Prussian War in 1871. But then the Liberals demanded the entire source area of the Meuse and Rhine from south of Metz. Pointing out that the bishoprics of Metz, Toul, Verdun, and the counties of Hainaut, Kammrik, Flanders, and Artois were formerly German, and these territories were demanded. The

"Rheinischer Merkur" generously wants to allocate the then-German territories of Mömpelgard and Hochburg to the French in return. They belong to the source region of the Rhone, and it is considered a misfortune for a people to strive for two seas. This is a sure harbinger of disintegration. p. 401